Port Security Neg

wispsyndicateSécurité

23 févr. 2014 (il y a 3 années et 1 mois)

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Port Security Neg


AT: INHERENCY

2

AT: ECON

9

A2 TERRORISM

25

ALT CAUSE LABOR SHOR
TAGE

51

AT: INVASIVE SPECIES

55

AT: ORGANIZED CRIME

58

AT: SOLVENCY

64

A2 ECON IMPACT

87

CAPITALISM LINK

88


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AT: Inherency


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Squo Solves (Generic)


Squo
solves

port security and grant distribution improving now

Terreri 09

World Trade

[April, “The Current State of Port Security,” Web, 10/09, World Trade, Proquest, 6/20/12]

Security improved significantly

since 9/11
through relationship building and resource

sharing
among federal, state, and local law enforcement and emergency response agencies,

notes Beth
Rooney, manager of port security at the Port Authority of NY & NJ. "
These improvements are due in large part to
physical security improvements, personnel
enhancements through training and drills, and
through a tremendous amount of work done in collaboration and partnership with other
agencies
," she says.
The Port of NY & NJ is the third largest in the country and it is the highest at
-
risk port as well
. "Whi
le folks view us to be the end
-
all of the port, the reality is we touch only 13 of over 190 commercial
maritime facilities in the port," continues Rooney.
But the port continues to take an active role in security and
has,

for the last six years, chaired th
e Area Maritime Security Committee,
a bottom
-
up approach to security that is
working well
. Historically,
port and terminal operators and law enforcement entities competed for
grant dollars. So the port decided to work collaboratively to assure the money we
nt where these
various entities felt the greatest risks were
, explains Rooney. "We wrote our own document called 'Port
-
wide
Strategic Risk Management Plan' in which we identified initiatives for the next five years that would benefit everyone.
This is a
hu
ge success story for us because the only reason we could accomplish this was by collaborating
with our two states
, five boroughs, the City of New York, 17 New York counties, and seven New Jersey counties." This type of
plan is now a national requirement fo
r the nation's top 45 ports. The Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach account for about 45
percent of containerized cargo entering the U.S.
Port security is approaching the optimal state in terms of
capabilities and initiatives performed to achieve its secu
rity mission
, adds Cosmo Perrone, director of
security for the Port of Long Beach. "We are approaching the point of execution on critical large
-
capital projects as we continue to
look for continuous improvements." He adds that
because larger ports are reac
hing maturity, they will focus
on resiliency and the trade community's ability to operate under adverse situations
. Like the Port of
NY & NJ, the Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles are landlord ports
-
as opposed to operator ports
-
and are not regulated unde
r the
Maritime Transportation Security Act. Operator ports adhere to the U.S. Coast Guard's rules for port facilities. "But
we have a
duty to our customer base as well as to the public at large and to the national economy to assure
goods move through our p
ort in an effective and secure manner
," says George Cummings, director of port
security, Port of Los Angeles.
The port developed a layered security model allowing terminal operators,
transportation companies, and other stakeholders to operate under a unifi
ed security system
within one command
-
and
-
control center. "We can deploy information in real time to our
customers or response agencies, including military organizations
." He adds that California's 11 ports are
discussing the feasibility of developing a Pa
cific Coast model of regional integration to facilitate security monitoring and response.


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AT: Inherency Funding High Now


Port security funding high now

Customs and Border Protection, 2006

[ No author given, "An Overall Picture of Port Security", CBP.gov
,
07/12/2006, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/port_security/securing_us_ports.xml, 18/06/2012]

Port security has been dramatically strengthened

since 9/11.

Funding has increased by more than
700 percent

since September 11, 2001. Funding fo
r port security was approximately $259 million in FY 2001. DHS spent
approximately $1.6 billion on port security in FY 2005. Following 9/11,
the federal government has implemented a
multi
-
layered defense strategy to keep our ports safe and secure. New tech
nologies have been
deployed with additional technologies being developed

and $630 million has been provided in grants to our
largest ports including $16.2 million to Baltimore; $32.7 million to Miami; $27.4 million to New Orleans, $43.7 million to Ne
w
York
/New Jersey; and $15.8 million to Philadelphia.



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Squo Solves


Tech exists and is being implemented now


Tech Exists and has already been implemented in other areas

Grant 10
-

US port security council

(Jay Grant is the Director US Port Security Council and

the Chief of InterPort
Police; Written June 19, 2012; Accessed June 20, 2012; “A leap in technology: fusion authentication”
http://www.porttechnology.org/
-
images/uploads/technical_papers/PTI
-
26.pdf)

The system has been successfully installed by the govern
ment in several housing projects
throughout the US
, along with some other commercial buildings and a police station. We have just begun pilot testing in the
port authority environment. Yet as stated,
the greatest challenge for any system is adoption and co
st
. Those
factors will be crucial for this or any other system. As new as all this sounds,
we are seeing similar programs being
tested. The UK has in place facial recognition entries at Gatwick Airport and an employee
program

at Heathrow. They plan to impl
ement full facial screening for EU passport holders later this year. Again,
this moves
the bar from verification to identification.


Tracking tech exists and is being utilized on a small scale now

Walker 12

(Shaun Walker is a writer for PRWeb; Written May
24, 2012; Accessed June 20, 2012;
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/5/prweb9540171.html; National Security Boosted As A Critical Louisiana Port Installs Next
-
Generation Technology)

The

Greater
Lafourche Port Commission
, in partnership with national securi
ty firm Crescent Guardian, Inc.,
has
completed implementation of an advanced video analytics application to accompany its next
-
generation video surveillance system. This milestone ensures that first responders

in Port Fourchon
are receiving “as they happen
” alerts identified automatically by the surveillance system and can
coordinate their response in real time
.
This level of data sharing and interoperability is
unprecedented and will aid in lowering response times and overall situational awareness

during
r
eal
-
time events, placing the port’s security among the most advanced in the nation. The Greater Lafourche Port Commission's is
committed to continually improving the security and emergency response preparedness of Port Fourchon by building a Maritime
Domai
n Awareness System that allows local, state and federal agencies such as Harbor Police, Lafourche Parish Sheriff's Office,
LOOP, Lafourche Parish EOC, Fire Central Dispatchers, GOHSEP, Department of Defense, Customs, and Coast Guard to collaborate
effectiv
ely and become more proactive. To do this, the port's director of information technology, April Danos, wanted to find a way
to take all technologies and disparate data and bring them into one common operating picture that would allow these several
agencies

to work collaboratively within the same situational awareness platform over multiple networks. Crescent Guardian, Inc., a
partner security firm of the port, developed an effective solution by providing advanced software that could run the new surv
eillance

system for Fourchon’s Maritime Domain Awareness System, or GLPC
-
C4. The cutting
-
edge software allows the system to send alerts
and alarms if anomalous behavior is detected, meaning there are "No Rules" to be written prior to their use

Making it one of the

easiest and most effective systems in the industry to install and use. “The Port Commission was pleased to work with CGI to
integrate BRS Labs’ video analytics into Port Fourchon’s Video Management System and the GLPC
-
C4 System,” said Director Danos.
The
US Department of Defense supported Port Fourchon's efforts by sharing
the DoD
-
developed capabilities of the
Knowledge Display and Aggregation System (KDAS) to serve as the basis for the Port's incident
command and control system.
The use of KDAS provides P
ort Fourchon with the unique ability to network its system
with the DoD in the event of an incident requiring information sharing.


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Current technology more than adequate

we already have the newest technology

Harrald 05

[John R, “Sea Trade and Security: an Assessment of the Post
-
9/11 Reaction,” Web, Fall 05,
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqrl/docview/220702986/1376BF5C74E6A8F9B1B/5?accountid=14667, 6/19/12]

Innovative technology has been applied to the p
roblem of maritime security in two
general areas: (1) container security and (2) vessel identification and surveillance
. The
advancements in container security include the CBP automated commercial
environment, which provides the information necessary to ta
rget inspections; improved
non
-
intrusive scanning technology; and the creation of sensorequipped containers
. Prior to
9/11, and despite two decades of advances in electronic data interchange, the flow of information within the supply chain's
transaction la
yer and between the transaction layer and the oversight layer was slow and paper
-
driven.
The most
revolutionary technological change caused by U.S. government security initiatives, and
the least visible, is the automation of this information flow, which al
lows the effective
screening of containers prior to shipment. The second area of improvement is the
development of technologies to track containers and to ensure their physical integrity.

These include the smart
-
container initiatives, such as radio frequen
cy identification that
can track sensors; sensors that can detect chemicals and radiation; sensors that detect
and record intrusions and other anomalies; and antitamper seals
. An industry consortium, the
Strategic Council on security Technology, has initia
ted a series of pilot tests of sensor technology called Smart and secure Tradelines
(SST).47 For example, the Department of Defense (DOD) and SAVI Technology have developed an SST pilot that uses these
technologies to ensure the security of the DOD supply
chain.
48 Nonintrusive inspections of containers have
been improved with radiation monitors, portal sensors and remote monitoring
technologies
. The SAIC
-
developed VACIS
system uses a gamma
-
ray imaging system to produce
radiographie images that may be transm
itted or stored
. A mobile VACIS unit may be set up in 10 minutes
and can scan a 40
-
foot container in six seconds.49 VACIS
technology is also being applied to the problem of
maritime domain awareness
-
identifying vessels and monitoring those with suspicious
cargoes, behavior or ownership. International requirements

for AIS and SSAS
are coming into
force. The U.S. Coast Guard and the Navy are utilizing satellite technology and airborne
sensors to locate and track vessels in the maritime domain
, and both organi
zations plan to add
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to the mix.
The Coast Guard is purchasing Bell Eagle Eye UAVs as
part of its fleet modernization program.
50 Enhancing communication and information technologies will be
required to make the National Mariti
me Intelligence Integration Center an effective reality.



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Squo Solves


Piracy and Oil


Current security measures solve maritime oil threats

Houreld 11

Associated Press Writer

[Katharine, “Oil Tanker Terror Hijacks Easy, Attacks Complex,” Web,
5/21/11, Le
xisNexis, 6/19/12]

To counter attacks, tanker owners have begun putting barbed wire around ship guardrails and
installing firehoses that can launch high pressure jets of water at attackers. They are also
installing bulletproof glass around ship bridges and

accommodation quarters, a vessel's two
most vulnerable areas
, said Chris Austen, the head of Maritime and Underwater Security Consultants.
Some shipping
companies also insist their tankers travel through pirate
-
infested waters only in convoys
, added
Crisp
ian Cuss, program director at Olive Group, one of the biggest security companies working in the Middle East.
If hijackers
decide they can't get onboard and steer a ship toward a target without detection, they might try
to seize a vessel in port but that wo
uld be much risker given the global port security measures

in
effect in the last decade. The
al
-
Qaida
plot found in bin Laden's hideout also
mentioned attacking oil facilities, but
most oil terminals are considered strategic installations meaning they are
protected by roving
coast guard boats, radar, divers who conduct inspections and heavy security
. Brazil, for example, is
justifying the cost of developing a nuclear submarine to protect its vast offshore oil fields. Security levels vary, but the
ports that

terrorists value the most generally have the heaviest protection
, Cuss said.


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Squo Solves


Biometric Screening



Current programs are sufficient

employee screening, inspections, increased
intelligence, partnerships, container inspection, X
-
ray/gamma ray
machines, and
radiation detection devices

PR Newswire 2011

(American Association of Port Authorities, “10 Years After 9/11, Security Still a Top Priority of U.S.
Ports” 6/19/12 Lexis 6/19/12)

The industry
also
maintains ongoing liaison with the federal gov
ernment's
lead

port
and maritime

security agencies.
These
dialogues address
timely

security issues such as the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential
(TWIC
), which the TSA and Coast Guard implemented 2007 to ensure
those seeking access to secure p
ort areas
can be positively identified, have authorization to enter the facility and

do
not pose a terrorist risk.
In concert with public port authorities and terminal operators
, the Coast Guard
is charged
with

routinely inspecting and assessing the security of U.S. port facilities
and the vessels that call those
facilities, in accordance with the MTSA and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code
. Since 9/11, the Coast
Guard has instituted innovati
ve programs such as Maritime Safety and Security Teams, enforced
security zones, increased its intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities, expanded its
partnerships with the maritime industry, international organizations, federal, state and local
age
ncies, and has joined with other agencies within DHS to

strengthen

U.S. borders and

protect
America's ports

and waterways. The
Coast Guard also cross
-
checks crew lists against terror watch lists

in advance of arriving ships. Additionally since 9/11
, CBP ha
s initiated: the Container Security Initiative to
examine high
-
risk
, U.S.
-
bound containerized

cargoes at foreign ports; the 24
-
Hour Rule, which
requires cargo manifests be submitted a least a day ahead of ship arrivals; C
-
TPAT which
provides expedited insp
ections for U.S. importers
that voluntarily work with CPB to improve baseline security
standards for supply chain and container security
; and large
-
scale X
-
ray, gamma ray and radiation detection
devices
at U.S. ports

to scan the contents of
inbound cargo
c
ontainers.


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AT: Econ


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1NC Econ

Turn :An attack would increase demand for higher security measures both by
workers and the government

Learner and Thronburg 2006

-

Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief Economist
of the Ceridian
-
UCLA Pulsel of
Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a founding principal of
Beacon Economics

[ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner,
Jon D. Haveman and Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S.
Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson,
\

James
E. Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W.
Richardson, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing

Security and Cost, 2006,
http:
//www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698
, 6/20/12

One result might be that

work crews
understandabl
y would refuse to work until the government could
assure
some degree of

safety
. In another scenario,
the ports could be closed
not by labor but

by the
government.
If the attack on the World Trade Center was an indication of what might happen

in the wake of a serious
attack,

then

the government
itself

might shut down U.S. ports while deciding how to handle the
new

crisis
. This would imply that

the

government would have to put some
sort of

screening process into place
rapidly

by which safe containers could be separated from
potentially

dangerous ones, with a second
physical screening to detect
potential

explosives
in this latter category.


Economist
s’ predictions of the effect of a supply chain disruption on the economy
are highly exaggerated

Learner and Thronburg 2006

-

Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief Economist
of the Ceridian
-
UCLA Pulsel of Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a foundin
g principal of
Beacon Economics

[ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner,
Jon D. Haveman and Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S.
Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson,
\

James E. Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W.
Richards
on, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing
Security and Cost, 2006,
http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698
, 6
/20/12]

Previous Port Closures Hold Lessons for the Present
When economists
trying to

make predictions
are

faced with a
long list of unknowns, they can
either

develop complex models to

help

answer
the
questions
before
them

or look to historical events that

migh
t provide lessons for the future.

The complex questions stemming
from a terrorist attack on the port complex cannot be answered easily
within a typical static input
-
output
(IO) model, because

the economy is flexible and will work to mitigate the
poten
tial

damage caused by a
supply chain disruption
. Input
-
output models assume a mechanical structure in which a resource unused in one place
remains unused. For example,
there is an assumption that a laid
-
off worker will not
try to

find new
employment, or th
at a factory,
denied a critical component,

will simply shut down instead of finding an
alternative supplier.
Of course,

these assumptions are not true. Input
-
output models tend to highly
exaggerate the true cost (and also the true benefits under other circumstances) of economic
events.


Improving the scanning program would impede trade and hurt the economy

Terreri 09

Worl
d Trade

[April, “The Current State of Port Security,” Web, 10/09, World Trade, Proquest, 6/20/12]

Donnelly at NAM believes
the 100 percent scanning directive is heading in the wrong direction. "It
treats all cargo the same, spreading our limited enforcemen
t resources across all shipments,
rather than targeting shipments from riskier shippers
from dubious places. Major transnational
companies
with overseas plants shipping to their own companies here in the U.S. every two weeks should
not be subjected to the
same intensive security review as an unknown shipper
. Established shippers
and importers have invested in government programs like C
-
TPAT and are sharing information to assure their supply chains are
secure.
Security checks need to focus where the risks ar
e the greatest
."


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Turn: Increased trade introduces invasive species, which can`t be fixed

international problem

Keller 2011
-
worked at the Program on the Global Environment at the University of Chicago, Illinois (Reuben P., Charles
Perrings
-

worked at the
ecoSERVICES Group in the School of Life Sciences, Arizona State University, Tempe “International Policy
Options for Reducing the Environmental Impacts of Invasive Species” Bioscience 12/11 ProQuest 6/20/12)

Preventing the spread of nonnative invasive speci
es is an international public good. Some categories of invasive species
-
such as
diseases of humans and livestock
-
are addressed by international agreements that coordinate efforts to reduce their spread. In
contrast
, invasive species that
primarily
cause en
vironmental impacts are managed
almost exclusively

at
the national level
.
Control of environmental invaders is internationally undersupplied because
the efforts of nations that do invest to prevent their spread are undercut by nations that do not
.
Addressi
ng
this problem will require international cooperation
. We identify the international approach to
controlling human diseases as a model that could provide institutions and mechanisms to map the spread of environmental invad
ers
and assess the risks they imp
ose. This would allow individual nations to manage potential vectors of invasion. Because such a system
is unlikely to be implemented in the near future, we make recommendations for intermediate steps, including the widespread
adoption of existing risk ass
essments and importation standards. Keywords: Convention on Biological Diversity, sanitary and
phytosanitary agreement, World Health Organization, World Trade Organization, invasive species
International trade

increases human welfare but also
leads to the
introduction and establishment of nonnative invasive
species
, such as human and livestock diseases, pests and diseases of crops, and species that cause environmental harm.
The
increasingly global nature of trade means that efforts to prevent the spread of
invasive species
should be internationally coordinated
. To this end, there are already relatively advanced international programs in
place for identifying and managing the spread of human diseases, and the 178 member nations of the World Organisation for A
nimal
Health (OIE) have agreed to report outbreaks of animal diseases, mostly diseases of livestock, to a central database. These p
rograms
allow nations to track invasive species threats and to use the shared information to impose import restrictions. Spec
ies known to be
diseases and pests of crops are often the focus of quarantine inspections at national borders, but this varies by country and

there is
little international coordination. In contrast, nonnative invasive species that do not directly affect hu
man health or agriculture are
generally perceived to primarily pose risks of environmental harm
. Few international agreements exist to control
the spread of these species, and at an international scale, they are traded with much less
inspection and fewer e
fforts to prevent their spread
. This essay addresses the potential for wiser management of
these species, which we refer to as environmental invaders. Despite the lack of international efforts to prevent their spread
,
environmental invaders have enormous e
nvironmental, economic, cultural, and human
-
health
impacts (
Pejchar and Mooney 2008, Sala et al. 2000). These
include reductions in the populations of desirable
native species as a result of predation, competition, parasitism, and disease.
An example of th
is is the
invasion of European waterways by North American crayfish, which both compete directly with native crayfish for resources and

carry the crayfish plague disease (Aphanomyces astaci) that has devastated European crayfish populations (Gherardi and H
oldich
1999).
Economic impacts can arise in a variety of ways, including the costs of herbicides and
pesticides to control nonnative invaders in national parks and the costs of cleaning industrial
facilities that become infested with invaders (e.g., zebra
mussel

[Dreissena polymorpha]
infestations of
power plants in the Laurentian Great Lakes require the facilities to close down while workers
clean pipes
; Leung et al. 2002).
Cultural and human
-
health impacts can also arise in many ways
, but
a
good example c
omes from cases in which invasive species become so prolific that farmers
abandon agricultural land, leading to the loss of traditional farmland and agricultural practices
and potentially to human
-
health impacts from reduced food supplies. This has occurre
d in
Mexico
, where it is no longer feasible in some areas to control the invasive bracken fern (Pteridium aquilinum; Schneider and
Geoghegan 2006).
The introduction of environmental invaders is an externality of trade

(Perrings et al.
2002, 2005). That is,

the impacts of these species are not incorporated into the costs of
doing

trade,

and

those who trade the species have no
economic

incentive to reduce the invasion risks
inherent in their
business. For example, the global horticultural trade is responsible

for many thousands of invasions of harmful plants and plant
diseases around the world

(Reichard and White 2001, Dehnen
-
Schmutz et al. 2007). However,
the environmental costs
imposed by this trade

are not borne by either exporters or importers.
Instead,

th
ese costs are spread
widely among society as government agencies spend taxpayer dollars on inspection,
interception, eradication, containment, and compensation.
Two factors have hampered efforts to slow the
international spread of environmental invaders. F
irst,
although nations generally act defensively to control
invasive species, the benefits arising from that control are almost always shared broadly among
those at risk of being invaded, not just among those who pay for the control

(Perrings et al. 2002). For
example,
if a country spends resources
to ensure a disease
-
free horticultural industry
, all nations to which it
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exports benefit
from a reduced likelihood that they will be invaded.

In the absence of cooperation,
however
,
indivi
dual countries

will protect their own borders but
are less likely to commit resources to preventing
the export of invaders
. Because

the invasion risk to which a country is exposed depends on the
actions of its neighbors and trading partners,
this means tha
t

countries face higher risks than they
would if there were greater cooperation.
Second,

controlling the spread of an invasive species is a
"weakest
-
link" public good

(Perrings et al. 2002). Although the risks posed by any nation will depend on a complex s
et of
climatic, biogeophysical, and social factors, including the type of trade they engage in and its volume,

the overall global risk
will be strongly determined by the nations
or trades

that operate the least effective programs
to
control species transpo
rt
.

Because

removal of an invasive pest from trade requires all those involved to
contribute, and because little is gained by providing more than the country making the smallest
contribution, there is an incentive
to adopt a matching strategy
-
to converge o
n the weakest link.
This is
because

unilateral action cannot prevent the pest from continuously spreading through trade

(Touza
and Perrings 2011). Nevertheless, even though enhancing cooperative efforts should be the ultimate goal of a collective strat
egy
to
manage the problem of environmental invasions, there is much that can be done independently. In this article, we identify
alternative strategies at the national and international levels for reducing the spread of environmental invaders with or wit
hout
c
ooperation. We begin by reviewing existing unilateral defensive efforts to reduce exposure and by identifying programs that h
ave
been successful and could be implemented more widely without the need for additional international policy. We then consider t
he

options for effective coordinated international management, building on existing commitments by countries under the Conventio
n
on Biological Diversity (CBD) and on the international success achieved in managing human diseases. Finally, we discuss the o
pti
ons
for achieving at least some of the gains that could be had from coordinated action without the need for renegotiation of any
multilateral agreement. Figure 1 summarizes our recommendations. National efforts to manage the spread of environmental
invader
s Under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its constituent agreements, particularly the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), individual countries have

the right

to take actions in restraint of trade if those actions are needed in order to protect food safety and animal or plant health.

In
contrast to those that deal with human diseases, these agreements authorize only national defensive measures. That is, indivi
d
ual
nations have direct responsibility for managing risks to themselves posed by the many vectors of nonnative species introducti
on
(table 1) but are not permitted under the GATT and the SPS agreement to cooperate in the collective control of pest or patho
gen
transmission through trade restrictions. The standard
-
setting bodies for the SPS agreement
-
the International Plant Protection
Convention (IPPC), the OIE, and Codex Alimentarius
-
do cooperate in setting sanitary and phytosanitary standards and reporting
requirements for member countries. This has led to the harmonization of rules on classes of traded commodities involving know
n
risks. The OIE has also coordinated veterinary campaigns against particular pathogens within member countries and has achieve
d
su
ccess in the eradication of rinderpest, one of the most damaging of all animal pathogens (Normile 2008). But only in the case

of
novel human diseases does there exist an agreement to take collective action in restraint of trade as a precautionary measure
.
Environmental invaders can be transported to a country through intentional or unintentional vectors. Regardless of the vector
, it is
widely accepted that the most cost
-
effective way to reduce total impacts from nonnative invasive species is to prevent thei
r arrival
and establishment (see figure 1a, 1b; IUCN 2000, Leung et al. 2002, Lodge et al. 2006, Keller et al. 2007, 2009). That is, pr
eventing
the arrival of an invasive species will generally lead to less harm than addressing the species after it enters
a country. Nations can
choose from a range of options to prevent a species' arrival, including restrictions on trade in species of concern, requirem
ents on
exporters to ensure that invaders do not leave their shores or do not survive transit, and the opera
tions of quarantine and inspection
facilities at the point of entry (Lodge et al. 2006). Importantly, policies focused on prevention have more opportunities to
shift the
burden of responsibility to the industries that profit from risky trade in live organi
sms (Perrings et al. 2005). As an example of a
prevention program, most plant shipments to the United States must be accompanied by a phytosanitary certificate to show that

they were produced at a facility following high standards for the control of plant
diseases and parasites. This system puts the costs of
obtaining certificates and those of producing relatively safe plants onto exporters. In contrast, established plant pest spec
ies can
generally be controlled only through expensive techniques such as man
ually pulling plants or the use of herbicides and pesticides.
Because it is almost never possible to determine the party responsible for an invasion, these costs have never (to the best o
f our
knowledge) been passed on to importers or consumers who benefit
ed from imports. Intentionally introduced species, including pets,
crops, and garden plants (table 1), provide many economic and social benefits. They also often become environmental invaders
or
act as vectors for environmental invaders (Jeschke and Straye
r 2005). Efforts to reduce imports of environmental invaders generally
consist of individual
-
species risk assessments so that resources can be focused on those species posing the highest risk. Because the
proportion of traded species that become invasive i
s generally low (Smith et al. 1999), this approach leaves most species
-
those with
low risk of invasion
-
unaffected. The approach has been shown to yield financial benefits for importing countries (Keller et al. 2007),
whereas fewer invasions confers environ
mental, social, and agricultural benefits. The most prominent riskassessment procedure
currently available is the Australian Weed Risk Assessment (WRA; Pheloung 1995). Australian government scientists developed t
his
tool in the early 1990s, and in 1997, it

was introduced as a mandatory screening tool for all new plant species proposed for
introduction to Australia. Species assessed as posing a high risk are not allowed to be imported. The WRA has been demonstrat
ed to
have good accuracy in Australia, New Zea
land, Florida, Hawaii, and the Czech Republic (Gordon et al. 2008). It has been adopted in
a modified form by New Zealand. In contrast to intentional introductions, species transported unintentionally have some proba
bility
of becoming invasive but are not
expected to provide benefits. This means that efforts to prevent their arrival can aim to simply
remove all organisms from transport. Although this is conceptually simple,
the number and magnitude of
unintentional vectors makes preventing introductions a
n
enormous

challenge.
For example,

the global
maritime fleet includes more than 99,000 large vessels and moves most international trade (IMO 2009).
Each arriving ship
presents risks of introducing new nonnative species entrained in its ballast water, attache
d to its
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hull, and in the cargo it offloads

(table 1; Keller et al. 2011).
It is unlikely that any nation could commit
sufficient resources to ensure that all arriving ships are free of invasive species.
Each vector of
unintentional species transport requi
res a different management approach. This approach needs to be based on the trade moving
the species, the mode of transport, and the available technology. For example, the approaches necessary to limit the movement

of
fouling organisms of recreational boat
s are very different from those required to prevent the spread of invasive mollusks on water
-
garden plants or of forest pests in wooden packaging material. One relatively successful approach to limiting the spread of
unintentional invaders is the US phytos
anitary certificate system mentioned previously. This program aims to prevent the arrival of
diseases, parasites, and plants that unintentionally accompany a traded species. It does this by requiring certain standards
of plant
and soil hygiene at facilitie
s that grow plants for export to the United States. It is consistent with the United States' obligations as a
signatory to the WTO's SPS agreement (Hedley 2004).
Although the number of risk
-
assessment tools and
vector management strategies continues to inc
rease, they still provide protection against only a
small proportion of the vectors
that introduce invasive species. We offer two suggestions for improving this situation
within the current international policy framework. First, some existing risk
-
assessme
nt tools have been shown to perform well in a
range of countries (e.g., Gordon et al. 2008), and other nations could adopt those tools. This was done by New Zealand when i
t
adopted a modified version of the Australian WRA. In many cases, it may be possible

for nations to relatively cheaply adopt tools
developed elsewhere. Second, established national standards for treating vectors of unintentional introduction could be adopt
ed by
other countries. For example, the US Phytosanitary Certificate program could p
robably be adopted by other importing countries
because many export facilities are already set up to achieve its standards. Further developing and applying these tools and s
tandards
would serve a double purpose by directly protecting those countries that a
dopt the procedures and by providing indirect protection
to other nations that would subsequently be less likely to receive invaders from their trading partners. Although
there are
potential advances to be made in national
defensive

policies, these can nev
er provide the level of
protection that would arise from
increased
international cooperation

(see figure 1c). Most
vectors could
be more efficiently rendered free of invasive species in their country of origin. This would
, for
example
, reduce the demand on

quarantine facilities at ports
of entry
. Such coordination is currently
unlikely
for at least three reasons
.
First and foremost,

there are no international agreements
or bodies

that are
mandated to implement such a coordinated approach.
Second,

the "free
-
rider" issue means that
the financially rational approach for many countries is to take the benefits from trading with
countries that implement higher standards but not to pay the costs to implement those
standards in their own operations.
Finally,

many co
untries lack the resources,
institutions, or political will
to implement such policies. Without programs to transfer resources
and expertise

to these
countries, they will remain weak links and will
continue to

pose a risk to all other nations.




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Evidence

shows that significant closure of ports would only have a mild effect on
the economy

Learner and Thronburg 2006

-

Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief Economist
of the Ceridian
-
UCLA Pulsel of Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a founding
principal of
Beacon Economics

[ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner,
Jon D. Haveman and Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S.
Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson,
\

James E. Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W.
Richardson
, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing
Security and Cost, 2006,
http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698
, 6/2
0/12]

“Surely you must be joking!” might be the immediate response to the conclusion that

a significant closure of the ports
would have
at most

a mild effect on the economy.

It would seem more likely that a substantial disruption to the
supply chain because of a port shutdown would have a very dramatic effect on the production process. Yet all the evidence poi
nts to
the opposite conclusion. The major labor actions of the sixt
ies had measurable effects on the timing of imports but hardly any on
total imports, and
there is little or no evidence to support the idea that they had any substantial effect
on the overall economy as measured by rising prices, falling employment, or a r
eduction in
production activity.


Port shut downs do not adversely affect the broader economy

Learner and Thronburg 2006

-

Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief Economist
of the Ceridian
-
UCLA Pulsel of Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a founding

principal of
Beacon Economics

[ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner,
Jon D. Haveman and Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S.
Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson,
\

James E. Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W.
Richardso
n, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing
Security and Cost, 2006,
http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698
, 6/
20/12]

Indeed, with these results in mind
, it is hardly surprising

then

that we could find little evidence of
the

port
shutdowns within the context of the broader economy
. The statistical results reconfirm our eyeball results for
the other four variables s
tudied

manufacturing production; consumer spending on durable and non
-
durable goods; and
employment in manufacturing, wholesale trade, and transportation
. Very few of the strike indicator variables have
any statistical significance, implying that there is
little reason to believe that the strikes had any
significant effect on the wider economy.



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2NC Ext. Econ



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AT: Econ


port security impossible hurts the economy




Extensive increases in port security undercut the economy

it’s impossible to
eliminate
every threat

Wolf 06

Political Editor and Director for ABC
[Z Byron, Political Editor and Deputy Political Director
for ABC News, “How Much Is Too Much for Port Security,” Web, 9/13/06, http://abcnews.go.com/US/Politics/
story?id=2425748&page=1, 6/19/12]

Despite billions of dollars already spent, he argued,
the government can't ensure 100 percent safety
. Chertoff
probably didn't expect to find himself drawing

the analogy between car accidents and port security
, but that's
what he did in one awkward exchang
e. He said to the panel that
no matter how careful drivers were, people were
going to die in car crashes
. Then he
implied the same was true of port security, suggesting there
was no way to entirely safeguard America's ports
. The federal government has spen
t $10 billion on port security
since 2004, according to Chertoff. The new bill would allocate nearly $9 billion more over the next five years to beef up sec
urity at
the nation's ports. While Chertoff encouraged its passage, he tried to convince Sen. Frank
Lautenberg, D
-
N.J., that
scanning
100 percent of the cargo coming into the country was logistically impossible
. "You know,
it's like I
get in my car or I put my daughter in my car. I understand it's not 100 percent safe. If I wanted
my daughter to be 100 p
ercent safe, I'd put a 5
-
mile
-
an
-
hour speed limit cap on the car, and it
wouldn't go more than 5 miles an hour
." Noting that the costs would be immense
, he also argued against an
amendment
offered by Sen. Charles Schumer, D
-
N.Y.,
that would require screeni
ng of all shipping
containers coming into the United States
. "
No matter how hard we may try, we cannot eliminate
every possible threat to every individual in every place at every moment. And if we could, it
would be at an untenable cost to our liberty and
our prosperity
," Chertoff said to the committee. "
We
don't want to undercut our economy while trying to protect it. We also don't want to undercut
our civil liberties while trying to protect them
."




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AT: Econ


hurts small businesses



Small businesses an
d suppliers are currently suffering due to increased security
regulations

Laite 10

Georgetown University

[Parker Stone, “Maritime Trade Security: Promoter of Terrorism?,” Thesis,
5/10, http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553351/
laiteParker.pdf?sequence=1, 6/20/12]

Regulations often serve as a ‘‘fear factor’’ for small companies with limited resources and the
Internet
-
based paperwork can mean problems
for those in rural or remote communities.
Add to this the
uncertainty of continu
ously revised regulations
under an implement and amend approach
,

and it is not hard to
reach the conclusion that
security can drive away the faint
-
hearted supplier. Micro
-
businesses
and
artisans, the path to economic development in many developing countrie
s,
will see security as a barrier to growth.
32

Non
-
compliance by developing
-
world companies can mean more than just increased scrutiny
by
customs officials

and can seriously disadvantage these countries’ trade programs.

The American Association
of Exporter
s and Importers (AAEI), for example, has expressed concerns that though
importers often lack the
“expertise
or wherewithal

to guarantee container security…[U.S. companies] could be held
responsible for security in places where they may have no control, suc
h as the premises of small
suppliers

in Third World Countries.”
34

Since non
-
compliance with C
-
TPAT results in disenrollment from the program and a loss
of competitive advantage,

importers drop small suppliers in the developing world in favor of more
established suppliers having better security, often in more developed countries
. In fact, a 2007 survey
conducted by the University of Virginia, found that 12.2 percent of the C
-
TPAT
member
-
companies surveyed had rejected foreign
suppliers, manufacturers, or vendors due to security concerns in the previous year.
35


Small businesses and suppliers are key to the economy

The Seattle Times 09

[“Obama Says Small Businesses Key to Economy,”
Web, 5/19/09,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/politics/2009238084_apusobamasmallbusiness.html, 6/20/12]

WASHINGTON

President Barack Obama says
the nation's small businesses are responsible for half of the
nation's private sector jobs and deserve sup
port

from Washington. Obama on Tuesday welcomed winners of a
Small Business Administration award to the White House's East Room. He said
some of the nation's best businesses
began as small ventures
, such as Google and McDonald's.
Such businesses' impact go
es beyond the
economy
, Obama said, adding that
small business owners help strengthen local neighborhoods.

Given
everything a small business does for its community, the government should do its part to help leaders, he said. That's why Ob
ama
says his econom
ic policies would help pay off private loans and increase government backing for SBA loans.


The key to an improved economy is small business and suppliers

government and
private sector needs to back down

Redmond 12

member of Job Creators Alliance
[Billie,

“Small Businesses Are Key to the Economy, Not
Big Government,” Web, 6/18/12, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic
-
intelligence/2012/06/18/small
-
businesses
-
are
-
key
-
to
-
the
-
economy
-
not
-
big
-
government, 6/20/12]

The solution to the jobs problem is smal
l business, not more government.
Job Creators Alliance has laid
out a roadmap to sustainable economic recovery

and that path is paved with commonsense regulatory reform, certainty about
future taxes, and the return of spending sanity to our federal governm
ent. In recent years,

the federal government has
unleashed a regulatory onslaught on small businesses in the private sector and has made it
much harder for the engine of our economy to function as it should
.
Until policymakers and
elected officials start t
o listen to the voice of the entrepreneur and small business owner, it's
hard to see how job creation will come back
. A March Small Business Outlook Survey conducted by the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce shows that
concerns about over
-
regulation are the highest

we've seen in the past year.
Small business owners are hesitant to hire because of uncertainty created by the plethora of
threatening regulations

coming from and pending in Washington. There is something to be said about
the correlation
between the unemplo
yment rate and the increasing concern about regulations
coming out of
Washington. America needs

the government to step down and let true job creators lead the way to
recovery
.


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Hurts Consumers


Increase in Security will lead to an increase in pr
ices for the consumer

Thibault et al, 2006

Marc Thibault is a researcher, Homeland Security Institute
[Mary R Brooks is William A. Black Chair of Commerce, Dalhousie University, Mary Brooks was on a Fulbright Fellowship at Geor
ge
Mason University, Kenneth
J Button is professor of public policy and director, Center for Transportation Policy and Logistics,
George Mason University; George Mason Center for Infrastructure Protections and Homeland Security, The Response of the U.S.
Maritime Industry to the New Co
ntainer Security Initiatives, Transportation Journal, pgs. 5
-
15, Winter 2006, Proquest 6/19/12]

The competitive nature of the shipping industry poses an additional challenge to increase the
security of the maritime container supply chain
. Vessel operators,

ports, and marine terminals compete on the
basis of price as well as security, safety, and on
-
time delivery
. Each of these actors provides its customer with a
desired level of service by utilizing different combinations of production factors. Each has a
s
trong incentive to minimize its costs because a failure to do so may undermine its profits,

excluding it from a shipping network and making it less competitive.
Firms that provide higher levels of security
than their competitors may have to raise their pri
ces or cut back other types of service they
provide their customers
, facing the distinct possibility of losing customers to their competitors.



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Developing Countries


Current programs impede exports from developing countries, which also harms
US e
conomy

Laite 10

Georgetown University

[Parker Stone, “Maritime Trade Security: Promoter of Terrorism?,” Thesis,
5/10, http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553351/laiteParker.pdf?sequence=1, 6/20/12]

Though C
-
TPAT is likely to imp
rove overall security to the global supply chain,
components of the program act as
non
-
tariff barriers to companies in the developing world
. According to the program’s security criteria,
importers must conduct a comprehensive assessment of their internatio
nal supply chains
including outsourced and contracted element
s (e.g. foreign facilities, conveyance, and domestic warehousing)
to
receive a certification
.
They are required to work with these business partners to ensure that
necessary security measures are

in place and adhered to, and are responsible for establishing
processes by which business partners are chosen.
29

An Importer must also provide information
indicating which of their business partners
, eligible for C
-
TPAT,
have and have not received a
certi
fication. Similarly, those business partners not eligible for the program

(e.g. many companies in the
developing world)
must demonstrate that they have met

C
-
TPAT
security criteria
.
30
To cope with these
regulations,
many C
-
TPAT companies contractually requ
ire businesses to improve security
, extending
C
-
TPAT’s reach well beyond the borders of the United States.
31

Lloyd’s Practical Shipping Guide, entitled Risk Management in Port
Operations, Logistics and Supply
-
Chain Security, highlights some of the problems

that arise from increased trade security
regulations on developing countries: Regulations often serve as a ‘‘fear factor’’ for small companies with limited resources
and the
Internet
-
based paperwork can mean problems for those in rural or remote communiti
es. Add to this the uncertainty of continuously
revised regulations under an implement and amend approach, and it is not hard to reach the conclusion that security can drive

away
the faint
-
hearted supplier. Micro
-
businesses and artisans, the path to econom
ic development in many developing countries, will see
security as a barrier to growth.
32

Similar concerns have been voiced at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
Members at a recent meeting on the Development of Multimodal Transport and

Logistics Services. which “felt that
the
developing countries had difficulty in meeting the requirements of the C
-
TPAT, which would
significantly affect their exports
.”
33

Since all C
-
TPAT importers must prove that the companies they work with at every
poi
nt in the supply chain meet C
-
TPAT requirements,
companies that cannot afford to meet these
requirements


or are ineligible to participate in the program


are flagged for increased
security checks by customs officials, resulting in a major non
-
tariff bar
rier into the U.S. market
.


Developing countries have motives for flooding the market

US creates non
-
tariff
barriers that increase the cost of trade

Laite 10

Georgetown University

[Parker Stone, “Maritime Trade Security: Promoter of Terrorism?,” Thesis,
5/10, http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553351/laiteParker.pdf?sequence=1, 6/20/12]

Many laud the benefits of these security initiatives
, however, some

are concerned that
they create non
-
tariff barriers for trading partners and will “penalize developing countries who may not be able
to afford the installation of the required facilities at their ports, and thus be unable to join the
[initiatives].”
7
In 20
03, the OECD estimated the initial burden of implementing supply chain security measures on ship
operators to be at least $1.3 billion, and $730 million per year thereafter, with most costs coming from management staff and

security
-
related equipment expend
itures. Similarly, the OECD analyzed the cost of system
-
wide procedural changes, like the United
States’ 24
-
hour advance notice rule, which is estimated to cost approximately $281.7 million
8
.
U.S. programs have also
been perceived as non
-
tariff barriers by

some of America’s closest allies.

According to the European
Commission,
the reluctance of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to allow foreign participation
in C
-
TPAT is discriminatory and increases costs

for European exporters. Similarly,
CSI causes addi
tional
costs and delays

in E.U.
-
U.S. shipments
9
.
When combined with the fact that exporters in developing
countries often pay two to three times as much in import customs and duties in destination
countries as do exporters in developed countries, it is cle
ar that significant trade barriers to
developing countries pervade the new maritime trade security environment
10
.


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Developing countries could flood the market

developed countries dependent on
international maritime trade

Laite 10

Georgetown University

[Pa
rker Stone, “Maritime Trade Security: Promoter of Terrorism?,” Thesis,
5/10, http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553351/laiteParker.pdf?sequence=1, 6/20/12]

In today’s globalized world, almost
no nation can rely solely on what i
t produces domestically. Most
countries are involved in international trade

at some level. Everything from raw materials like oil, copper, and
lumber, to consumer goods like food and clothing are transported overseas. Without shipping, intercontinental tra
de would not
exist, nor would the bulk transport of raw materials and the import and export of affordable food and manufactured goods
1
. As the
most cost
-
efficient method of bulk transport,
over 90% of world trade is carried on the water
.
Worldwide
maritime

commerce supports 8.4 million jobs, and over $300 billion in personal income
2
. There
are around 50,000 merchant ships trading internationally
, which represent over 150 countries
3
. In the United
States,

maritime trade makes up 78% of all international trad
e
4
. Annually,
U.S. maritime trade
amounts to

nearly 1.6 billion
tons of cargo, valued at over $2 trillion and generating over $21 billion
in
U.S. customs

revenue
.
This reliance on international maritime trade, however, has not benefited
all countries equal
ly
. A recent study analyzed the role of maritime freight costs in determination of ocean
-
shipped imports.
By disaggregating imports (including detailed freight charges) from trading partners of 43 countries, the study found that in

2007
maritime transport
costs made up about 6 percent of a product’s total cost. On average, this totaled a cost
-
per
-
weight shipping rate
of about $59 per ton of merchandise. The study concluded that
the cost of exporting from developing countries
was significantly higher than th
e cost of exporting from countries within the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD), and that
it was cheaper to import into developing
countries than into OECD countries
5
. This disparity in shipping costs has significant
implications

for those in the developing word. The higher cost of shipping for developing
countries makes it more difficult for these countries to export their goods to the global market.
Conversely,

the lower import costs into developing countries makes it easier
for

OECD
-
origin products

to
“flood” the developing world with their products.

The Graph 4.1 reveals a significant uptick in shipping costs
starting in the 2001
-
2002 timeframe. This is likely due in part to the trade barriers that resulted because of trade sec
urity measures
implemented around the world after 9/11.


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Programs are non
-
tariff barriers to developing countries

small suppliers no
longer exporting

Laite 10

Georgetown University

[Parker Stone, “Maritime Trade Security: Promoter of Terrorism?,” Thesis,
5/10, http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553351/laiteParker.pdf?sequence=1, 6/20/12]

Although

CSI
arguably improves U.S. maritime supply
-
chain security, it also

serves as a non
-
tariff barrier to
developing countries whose
small
er

ports are
often
unable to afford
CSI
participation costs.
43

The
program incentivizes the use of CSI ports.

Because

goods are scanned prior to their arrival
at U.S.
ports
, resulting in shorter wait times and fewer security checks,
a significant number of

shipping
companies have moved away
from smaller non
-
CSI ports

to keep their competitive advantage. The
expense of meeting CSI requirements (especially to small port facilities that need to upgrade
their systems
to handle electronic shipping manifest data,

hire new security personnel, and purchase Gamma and X
-
ray
machines, bio sensors, and advanced container locks)
limits membership to only the larger and more modern
port facilities
. According to Luciano Pugliatti of Crown Agents, an NGO working to help dev
eloping nations modernize their
customs infrastructure, “
customs in less
-
developed countries face problems
of corruption, under
-
capacity,
outmoded inspection methods,

and
loss of national revenue to fraud and smuggling. Such nations

don't have the money
to

buy high
-
tech inspection equipment, nor do they have the trained personnel to run them
."
44

India fears that
CSI has “imposed additional costs on exports to the United States...[and] may
penalize developing countries who may not be able to afford the insta
llation of the required
facilities at their ports, and thus are unable to join the US initiative
."
45

Similarly, Malaysia, is concerned
about “who would bear the cost if unloading was delayed or if consignments were detained for further inspection.”
46

Based

on
documentation fees levied by carriers, the OECD estimates the overall implementation costs of the 24
-

hour rule to be approximately
$281.7 million. This number, however, does not cover the costs associated with delays, liabilities, or fines.
47

Accordin
g to the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD), "
non
-
CSI ports may find it difficult to stay
competitive,
and as far as U.S. trade is concerned may sooner or later
be used only for pre
-
carriage purposes
-

goods being loaded at one of t
hese ports on feeder vessels to join the nearest CSI port."
48

This would disproportionately
increase shipping distances and costs for developing countries.

Shipping experts like Pugliatti fear that, as a
result,
increased supply
-
chain security measures cou
ld negate the trade facilitation and
modernization
that has taken place in the developing world over the past decade
by the widening gulf between
developed and underdeveloped nations
.”
49

CSI disadvantages Exporters in the EU as well. According to the EU’s
2009
annual report on US trade and investment barriers,
CSI is causing


significant additional costs and delays to
shipment of
European

machinery and electrical equipment to the United States
.”
50

As a result,

a
number of small
European
engineering companie
s have stopped exporting to the United States
.
51

The majority of CSI ports are in developed countries; only 12 of 58 (21 percent) CSI ports are located in the developing worl
d.
52


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Can’t solve Internationally


Any shipments across water to reach the US often go through many countries
and people

Lukas, 2004

Analyst with Cato's Center for Trade Policy Studies and
U.S. Trade
Representative

[Title: Protection without protectionism: Reconciling Trade and Homeland
Security, April 8 2004, Lukas is
also

an analyst at the Cato Institute’s Center for Trade Policy Studies.
CATO foundation site, http://www.cato.org/pubs/tpa/tpa
-
027.pdf, accessed Jun 19 2012]

The manufacturer, the freight forwarder, the railroad, the port

authority in Hong Kong, the shipping company, the Port of Manila,
the Port of Los Angeles, and an American trucking company all have some control over it at different stages. This scenario is

not
unusual; indeed, many shipments follow paths far more convo
luted than the one described above.
According to the
Organization for Economic Co
-
operation and Development, the typical door
-
todoor journey
using a shipping container will involve the interaction of about 25 different actors, generate 30

40 documents, use

2

3 different transportation modes, and be handled at 12 to 15 physical
locations.

There are many points during this

imaginary

journey where the shipment could be
susceptible to terrorist infiltration or tampering: at the manufacturer; during or before pa
cking
;
during movement by rail, especially when the train is stationary at a switching station or side track; at the port in Hong Ko
ng; during
the voyage by sea; and finally, at the port in Los Angeles before clearing customs. In addition, if the container

had landed in Canada
or Mexico and then traveled to the United States by ground

as many cargos do

that would create more points of vulnerability. The
fact that thieves regularly violate the integrity of the cargo chain

with worldwide thefts estimated at $
30

50 billion per year by the
OECD

illustrates the leakiness of today’s international trade environment.
19
The ideal security system would offer what experts call
“Total Asset Visibility and Authentication”


integrated procedures and technologies that safe
guard cargos at all stages of transport.
Total Asset Visibility and Authentication would require (1) loading of shipments in a secure facility, by authenticated perso
nnel; (2)
verification of the contents of a shipment; (3) security in transit; (4) transmi
tting the content and manifest information to Customs
and stakeholders upon loading; (5) the ability to identify container tampering; and (6) a way for Customs to provide verifica
tion of a
container’s contents and integrity in a nonintrusive manner at the
point of entry.




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No impact 9/11 proves


Previous terrorist attacks were not the fault for a slow US economy

Learner and Thronburg 2006

-

Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief
Economist of the Ceridian
-
UCLA Pulsel of Commerce,
Christopher Thornberg is a
founding principal of Beacon Economics

[ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner,
Jon D. Haveman and
Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S. Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson,
\

James E.
Moore,
II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W. Richardson, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting the
Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost, 2006,
http://www.ppic
.org/main/publication.asp?i=698
, 6/20/12]

Similarly, the

U.S. economy did not slow down after
the

September 11
attacks; indeed,

the economy was
in the midst of

accelerating its way out of the 2001 business
-
led downturn
that had begun in the middle of

2000.

And

although consumer confidence fell sharply after the attacks, consumer spending in the
fourth quarter grew at an unprecedented 7 percent
seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR),

one of the
sharpest increases seen in the past decade (
Figure 2.2).
Unemplo
yment did rise sharply after
the
event,

but this seemed to be
primaril
y an acceleration of the employment loss
that would have been expected

given the weak economic climate.

This was especially true because labor markets were still overheated from the tech
-
fueled economic boom of the late nineties.

Retail sales did drop sharply in September 2001 but also rebounded sharply in October
and returned to trend in November

business delayed, not business cancelled. Indeed,
it is hard to find any evidence of
an effe
ct of the September 11 attacks on the aggregate economy,
with the exception of that on the air travel
industry. Even in that case, the industry was in deep trouble beforehand, with profit margins dipping into the red in the beg
inning of
2000

long before th
e attacks. Even then, it must be remembered that total consumer spending went up, so the dollars that were not
spent on air travel went to some other part of the economy.


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No impact natural disasters prove



Natural Disasters Do Not Cause Recess
ions

Learner and Thronburg 2006

-

Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief
Economist of the Ceridian
-
UCLA Pulsel of Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a
founding principal of Beacon Economics

[ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner,
Jon D. Haveman
and
Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S. Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson,
\

James E.
Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W. Richardson, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting

the
N
ation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost, 2006,
http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698
, 6/20/12]

More local effects of disasters are easier to see in the data. The three state charts in Figure 2.3 show indexes of the quart
erly path of
real personal income (adjusted for changes in the consumer price index) for substantial catastrophes in Florida, Calif
ornia, and New
York.
Hurricane Andrew, the Northridge earthquake, and the September 11 attacks each caused
approximately $25 billion to $30 billion worth of destruction
in each state’s economy, in constant (2004)
dollars. The charts give a rough approximat
ion of the disturbance to the local flow of the economy

business disturbances should
result in loss of economic output, and thus income. (Government transfers have been removed to exclude federal disaster relie
f
payments.)
In all three cases we also show p
ersonal income for the balance of the United States as a
frame of comparison. The quarter in which the disaster event occurred is highlighted.


Recessions are not caused by natural disasters

Learner and Thronburg 2006

-

Director of the UCLA Anderson Fore
cast, Chief
Economist of the Ceridian
-
UCLA Pulsel of Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a
founding principal of Beacon Economics

[ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner,
Jon D. Haveman and
Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S. Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D.

Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson,
\

James E.
Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W. Richardson, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting

the
Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost, 2006,
http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698
, 6/20/12]

All this indicates that

disasters, although tragic, are not recession
-

causing events. Recessions are
caused by a sharp, substantial, and sustained red
uction in spending by
one or more

segments of the
economy.

Typically, this segment is consumer spending on homes and durables, but not always. In the case of the 1953 recession,
and in the case of the 2001 recession, Department of Defense spending on the K
orean War, and business spending on equipment
and software, were the respective segments that experienced reductions.
Natural disasters might cause a sharp and
substantial decline in consumer spending, but that decline is
very

short
-
lived.

Within a month o
r two,
there is more consumer spending, not less, because of repair and rebuilding activities. The hype of the effect of a disaster
is typically
much greater than the reality.
Business is only delayed, not cancelled, and the economy can
quickly

get
back on

track.2


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1NC


Current methods are effective for employee screening

tamper proof and
biometric

Rockwell 2012
-

Washington Correspondent for Security News for Government Security News. (Mark, “TSA and U.S. Coast
Guard Extend TWIC Renewal” Gover
nment Security News, 6/18/2012
<
http://www.gsnmagazine.com/node/26569c=maritime_port_security
> 6/19/12)

The Transportation Security Administration and the U.S. Coast Guard have implemented a new
option for ship crews and port workers to renew their security documentation.
The two agencies
announced a new policy for Transportation Worker Identification Creden
tial (TWIC) cards on June 15 that allows a temporary
extension.
TWIC cards are the tamper
-
resistant biometric credential given to maritime workers for
unescorted access to secure areas of port facilities,

outer continental shelf facilities and ships.
Those

that
need unescorted access to secure areas aboard ships and all Coast Guard credentialed merchant
mariners have to possess a TWIC.
To get the card
, workers have to provide biographic and biometric
information
, such as fingerprints, sit for a digital phot
ograph

and successfully pass a security threat
assessment conducted by TSA
.


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The aff makes the terrorist smarter than they are
-

this helps them recruit and
leads us to over defend ports they aren’t capable of attacking

Bynum 10


Ph.D in political science

(Daniel Bynum; Staff Member of the 9/11 Commission , Policy Analyst
and Director for Research, Center for Middle East Public Policy, The RAND Corporation, Director of the Center for Peace and
Security Studies and the Security Studies Program at the Edmund

A. Walsh School of Foreign Service Georgetown University, and
holds a Ph.D in Political Science; Written June 14, 2010; Accessed June 19, 2012; Brookings; http://www.brookings.edu
-
/research/opinions/2010/06/14
-
terrorism
-
byman, “Most Terrorists Lack Traini
ng, Expertise”)

In the years after 9/11, the images we were shown of terrorists

were largely the same: shadowy jihadists who,
even when they were foiled, seemed always to have come
terrifyingly close to pulling off a horrific attack
. We’ve all
become famil
iar by now with the stock footage of Talibs in black shalwar kameezes zipping across monkey bars or, more recently,
perfecting kung fu kicks in some secret training camp. Even in the aftermath of the botched Times Square bombing earlier this

spring,
the pe
rception persists that our enemies are savvy and sophisticated killers. They’re
fanatical and highly organized

twin ideas that at once keep us fearful and help them attract
new members.
But
this view of the jihadist community is wildly off the mark
. To be
sure, some terrorists
are steely and skilled

people like Mohamed Atta, the careful and well
-
trained head of the 9/11 hijackers. Their leaders and
recruiters can be lethally subtle and manipulative, but the quiet truth is that
many of the deluded foot soldi
ers are
foolish and untrained, perhaps even untrainable. Acknowledging this fact could help us tailor
our counterterrorism priorities

and publicizing it could help us erode the powerful images of
strength and piety that terrorists rely on for recruiting an
d funding
. Nowhere is the gap between sinister
stereotype and ridiculous reality more apparent than in Afghanistan, where
it’s fair to say that the Taliban employ
the world’s worst suicide bombers: one in two manages to kill only himself. And this success
rate
hasn’t improved at all

in the five years they’ve been using suicide bombers, despite the experience of hundreds of attacks

or
attempted attacks. In Afghanistan, as in many cultures, a manly embrace is a time
-
honored tradition for warriors before they
go off
to face death. Thus,
many suicide bombers never even make it out of their training camp or safe
house
, as the pressure from these group hugs triggers the explosives in suicide vests. According to several sources at the United
Nations, as many as six

would
-
be suicide bombers died last July after one such embrace in Paktika. Many Taliban operatives are just
as clumsy when suicide is not part of the plan. In November 2009, several Talibs transporting an improvised explosive device
were
killed when it we
nt off unexpectedly. The blast also took out the insurgents’ shadow governor in the province of Balkh. When
terrorists do execute an attack, or come close, they often have security failures to thank, rather than their own expertise.
Consider
Umar Farouk Ab
dulmutallab

the Nigerian “Jockstrap Jihadist” who boarded a Detroit
-
bound jet in Amsterdam with a suicidal plan
in his head and some explosives in his underwear. Although the media colored the incident as a sophisticated al
-
Qaeda plot,
Abdulmutallab showed

no great skill or cunning, and simple safeguards should have kept him off the plane in the first place. He was,
after all, traveling without luggage, on a one
-
way ticket that he purchased with cash. All of this while being on a U.S. government
watch list.

Fortunately, Abdulmutallab, a college
-
educated engineer, failed to detonate his underpants. A few months later another
college grad, Faisal Shahzad, is alleged to have crudely rigged an SUV to blow up in Times Square. That plan fizzled and he w
as
quickly
captured, despite the fact that he was reportedly trained in a terrorist boot camp in Pakistan. Indeed, though many of the
terrorists who strike in the West are well educated,
their plots fail because they lack operational know
-
how.

On
June 30, 2007, two m
en

one a medical doctor, the other studying for his Ph.D.

attempted a brazen attack on Glasgow Airport.
Their education did them little good. Planning to crash their propane
-
and
-
petrol
-
laden Jeep Cherokee into an airport terminal, the
men instead steered t
he SUV, with flames spurting out its windows, into a security barrier. The fiery crash destroyed only the Jeep,
and both men were easily apprehended; the driver later died from his injuries. (The day before, the same men had rigged two c
ars to
blow up near

a London nightclub. That plan was thwarted when one car was spotted by paramedics and the other, parked illegally,
was removed by a tow truck. As a bonus for investigators, the would
-
be bombers’ cell phones, loaded with the phone numbers of
possible accom
plices, were salvaged from the cars.)
A
similar
streak of ineptitude has been on display in the
United States, where many of those arrested on terrorism
-
related charges possess long criminal
records and little sense of how to put a nefarious idea into acti
on.

A group of Miami men schemed (often
while smoking marijuana) to attack targets in South Florida as well as the Sears Tower in Chicago, but they couldn’t get thei
r hands
on explosives and were uncovered when the FBI easily penetrated their ranks. If
our

terrorist enemies have been