Smart Grid - PointView, Inc.

Smart Grid:

Overview of

Relevant
EMC/Electromagnetic Environment, Spectrum, and
Security Issues and Standards Development Activities

Andrew L. Drozd, iNCE & IEEE Fellow

EMC Society Standards Development Committee Chair

ANDRO Computational Solutions, LLC President/CEO


Smart Grid EMC Workshop

Santa Clara, CA


27 May 2010

ANDRO

Outline

•
This presentation will

cover the key aspects of the Smart Grid
"systems of systems" concept design, specifically:

–
Relevant EMC/electromagnetic (EM) environments for Smart Grid
operation

–
Efforts by the IEEE EMC Society and

its Standards Development
Committee (SDCom) in cooperation with the IEEE P2030 Working
Group

and in collaboration with industry

to define the scope and
application of standards

to address

integrated EM effects

–
Illustrations

of spectrum sensing and network (cyber) security
strategies and potential risks that must be addressed early on in the
design cycle.

•
Goal: raise awareness of the key EM environment issues and
potential impacts

in support of an international rollout of the
Smart Grid system.


Unique Challenges

•
Smart Grid:

–
A confluence of power and energy, communications, IT, EMC, reliability and
cyber security technologies.

•
Two things make electricity unique and a challenge for
Smart Grid
:

–
Lack of flow control (Grid Management and control transformation is
needed
–

i.e., communications!)

–
Electricity storage requirements (static or dynamic storage and load
optimization/power electronics
–

efficiency!)

–
Change either of these and the grid delivery system will be transformed!

•
NIST specifications

–
Prioritization and application

•
IEEE P2030 Working Group

–
Development of guidelines for future
Smart Grid

technologies and
interoperability
.



Systems of Systems


Interoperability

Smart Grid

System Interoperability

Power

Comm

IT

Power

Comm

IT

Power

Comm

IT

Power

Comm

IT

Smart Grid

Device Interoperability

Source : Xcel and
GridPoint


Grid


Modernization

•
A smart grid has the following characteristics:


–
Self
-
healing (fault tolerant)

–
Active participation by consumers in demand response

–
Operates resiliently against physical / cyber attack

–
High power quality

–
Accommodates all generation and storage options

–
Enables new applications

–
Operates efficiently.

•
The most important aspect of the modern grid:

–
Seamlessly integrate many types of generation and storage
systems with a simplified interconnection process.


Grid


Modernization

Today’s

Electricity …

Power park

Hydrogen
Storage

Industrial DG

Tomorrow’s
Choices …

Combined Heat
and Power

Fuel Cell

e
-

e
-

Wind
Farms

Rooftop
Photovoltaics

Remote
Loads

Load as a
resource

SMES

Smart
Substation

Fuel Cell


Multi
-
Phase


Program

•
NIST developed a three
-
phase plan to accelerate the
identification of standards and the establishment of testing
& certification procedures.

•
In Phase 1 establish a high
-
level reference model for the
Smart Grid:

–
Nearly 80 existing standards identified to support
Smart Grid

development

–
14 high
-
priority gaps identified, including cyber security

–
Documented action plans with aggressive timelines by which
designated Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) are
tasked to fill these gaps.

–
More than 20 EMC
-
related standards identified (TF
-
3
External Standards Committee)


Smart Grid


Principle

•
Smart Grid

technologies better identify and respond to man
-
made or natural
disruptions:

–
Real
-
time information enables grid operators to isolate affected areas and redirect
power flows around damaged facilities.

–
One of the most important issues is
resistance to attack

•
Achieved through “smart monitoring” of power grids

•
The basis of control and management of smart grids is to avoid or mitigate the system
-
wide disruptions like blackouts.

•
The project is bringing together and attempting to harmonize a number of disparate
engineering disciplines, namely:

–
The markets of power and energy distribution

–
Radio frequency (RF) communications

–
Information technology (IT)

–
Cyber security

–
Reliability

–
Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)

–
Spectrum management.


Integrated


Disciplines

Photovoltaic systems

Central Generating

Station

Step
-
Up

Transformer

Distribution

Substation

Receiving

Station

Distribution

Substation

Distribution

Substation

Commercial

Industrial

Commercial

Gas

Turbine

Diesel

Engine

Cogeneration

Cogeneration

Turbine

Fuel

cell

Micro
-

turbine

Wind Power

Residential


Storage

1.Power System Infrastructure

Control Center

Operators,

Planners & Engineers

2. Communications and Information Infrastructure


NIST Framework

*Baseline standards identified
–

along with consideration of extensions and gaps (e.g., IEEE
1547
Standard for Interconnecting Distributed Resources

with Electric Power Systems)

and IEEE P2030 Smart Grid interoperability standards development
identified in NIST report.




Cognitive Sensors/



Networks

•
Spectrum Sensing: Detection of white
-
spaces

–
Multi
-
dimensional (beyond frequency)

•
Spectrum Management:

–
Capturing the best available spectrum to meet user requirements

–
Providing fair scheduling among coexisting CRs.

•
Spectrum Mobility: Maintaining smooth handoffs while
transitioning from one TH cell to another.

Space
Frequency
Others
…



Distributed




Spectrum Sensing

•
Spectrum Sensing, i.e., detect the spectrum holes:

–
Hidden Terminal Problem: What if the primary user’s signal deteriorates at the
secondary receiver’s end?

–
Solution: Collaborative (or) Distributed Spectrum Sensing

•
Incorporating spatial diversity to mitigate hidden
-
terminal effects.

•
Distributed Detection/Estimation/Classification of primary users’
transmissions and their parameters.


Security Issues in


Distributed Networks

Security Threats

Intrinsic

Byzantine Attacks

Insecure Channels

Eavesdroppers

Jammers

Extrinsic

Primary User

Emulation Attacks (PUEA)

PHY Layer

Software Control
Implementation
provides flexibility in
the security design (
spectrum
-
mutability
) based on intrusion
detection schemes.

Spectrum Sensing

(Data
-
Collectors)

Spectrum
Management

(Decision
-
Maker,
Scheduler)

Spectrum Mobility


(Handoff
-
Control)


Cognitive Sensor

FCC: Design in such a
way so that the primary
user’s network does not
have to make major
changes in their designs.

1. Byzantine Attacks
–

Spectrum
Sensing Data Falsifiers

•
False local data from some
malicious sensors (Byzantines)
causing the fusion center (FC) to
make a wrong decision

•
An imposter who sends signals that
have same features as that of a
primary user.

–
Causes the sensor to make wrong
spectrum sensing decision




Security Threats


Focus on Spectrum Sensing…

2. Primary User Emulation
Attacks (
PUEA
s)

3. Eavesdropping

•
Eavesdropper present in the channel

4. Jamming

•
A jammer trying to degrade one or more
communication links.

•
More interesting problem is when
jammer also eavesdrops to enhance its
attack.

S
1

S
2

S
n

FC


u
1

u
2

u
n

X
1

X
2

X
n

S
1

S
2

S
n

FC


u
1

u
2

u
n

X
1

X
2

X
n




Security Threats


Focus on Spectrum Sensing…


Need for


Standards

•
Priorities for Standardization


–
NIST is focusing on standards needed to address the priorities identified in
the FERC Policy Statement plus four additional utility stakeholder items:

•
Demand Response and Consumer Energy Efficiency

•
Wide Area Situational Awareness

•
Electric Storage

•
Electric Transportation

•
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI)

•
Distribution Grid Management

•
Cyber Security

•
Network Communications

•
IEEE P2030
Smart Grid

Development Guidelines meant to address
these stakeholder requirements (
keyword:
interoperability
).


Interoperability


Standards (EMC)

NIST Framework & Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability
Standards, Release 1.0 (D)


Additional


Requirements

•
Resist attack to man
-
made or natural disruptions

–
Real
-
time information enables grid operators to isolate affected areas
and redirect power flows around damaged facilities.

–
Smart monitoring of power grids to avoid or mitigate the system
-
wide
disruptions like blackouts.

–
Traditional monitoring is based on weighted least square (WLS) which is
very weak and prone to fail when gross errors (including topology errors,
measurement errors or parameter errors) are present.

–
New technology of state monitor is needed to achieve the goals of the
smart grids.

•
Cyber attack

–
Protect industrial supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
systems and secure their interfaces to the power grid.

•
High
-
quality power

–
Assuring more stable power provided by smart grid technologies will
reduce downtime and prevent such high losses.


EMC for


Smart Grid


EMC is an important factor for consideration in standards
relating to the
Smart Grid
, including the work on IEEE P2030.
For the
Smart Grid

to function properly and coexist with
other electrical and electronic systems, it must be designed
with due consideration for electromagnetic emissions from
the grid and for immunity to various electromagnetic
phenomena near or from the grid.
EMC must be addressed

effectively if the
Smart Grid

is to achieve its potential and
provide its benefits when deployed.

Haddam Neck, CT 1997

Halon gas release caused by a camera flash.


Interoperability


Means EMC

•
The situation:

–
IEEE
–

EMC Society believes that for the
Smart Grid

to achieve its
potential it must be reliable, secure and fault
-
tolerant.

–
If the
Smart Grid

is less reliable, less secure or less resistant to
faults than the existing grid, is it ready for deployment?

–
EMC is the ability of equipment to withstand its EM environment
while not causing disturbances.

–
These EM disturbances from or to the power grid have caused
degradation, outages, shutdowns and system failures.

–
EMC is required for grid components / controls to operate or
interoperate reliably.

Southern Illinois 9/25/01

Relaying shutdown caused by a radio.


Broad Categories


of EMC Events

Indian Point, New York 3/23/08

Cooling shutdown caused by a camera.

•
Common events (ESD, fast transients, power line disturbances)

•
RF Interference from various emitters/transmitters

•
Coexistence of various wireless devices

•
High
-
level EM disturbances

–
Naturally
-
occurring lightning surges or geomagnetic storms

–
Intentional EMI (terrorist acts) or High
-
altitude Electromagnetic Pulse
(HEMP)

Smart Grid should be
immune to these events
, or if that immunity
fails,
fault
-
tolerant

so failures don’t lead to system disruption.
Signals should not interfere with others. (control of
emissions
).


Commonly Occurring


EMC Events

•
Unintended emissions can cause harmful interference.

•
Limits on emissions are critical for interoperability.

•
Emissions limits & methods exist and should be used.

•
Immunity to EM phenomena must be demonstrated.

•
Variety of environments:

–
Information Technology Equipment to IEC/CISPR 24

–
Substation equipment to IEC 60255
-
26, 61000
-
6
-
5, IEEE 1613

–
Wireless devices to various IEEE / IEC Standards.

•
Inadequate immunity

to interference
causes failures
.

•
EM phenomena that can cause upset:

–
Electrostatic discharge (from humans or furniture)

–
Electrical Fast Transients (from switching operations)

–
Lightning strike (surge, both unipolar and oscillatory)

–
Radiated RF energy

–
Conducted RF energy

–
Power
-
frequency magnetic fields

–
Dips & Interruptions.


•
Robustness must be demonstrated like never before.

•
Field failures indicate need for
immunity test criteria
.


Commonly Occurring


EMC Events


Wireless


Transmitter EMI

•
Wireless transmitters induce RF currents.

•
May be fixed in frequency, power & location.

•
May be mobile in all three relative to the grid.

•
Power levels range from 5W to 1500W.

•
Various modulation schemes used.

•
Environment simulated by testing variables:

–
Frequency range

–
Power levels

–
Modulation

–
Criteria for Acceptance.


Coexistence with


Wireless Devices

•
Co
-
related issue arising from use of wireless devices.

•
Wireless devices can cause and receive interference.

•
Coexistence with other devices & incumbents needed.

•
Interoperability won’t happen unless this is addressed.

•
EMC planning, analysis & research prevents failures.


High
-
Level EM


Disturbances

HEMP

Geomagnetic
Storms

IEMI


EMC Concerns

•
The EM phenomena identified here causes problems:

–
Momentary, self
-
correcting malfunctions

–
Localized network failure

–
Large
-
scale interruptions.

•
Naturally generated, grid
-
caused & man
-
made.

•
Unintentionally or intentionally generated interference.

•
Results are the same:

–
Grid doesn’t function as intended

–
Grid
can’t interoperate if it can’t stay operating
.

•
EMC Standards

need to be referenced in P2030.


Referenced


Standards

EMC Standards
:


ANSI C63.4 (Emission Measurements)

IEEE C37.90.1 (Relay and electric power apparatus surge withstand capability)

IEEE C37.90.2 (Relay system withstand capability to radiated EM interference from transceivers)

IEEE C37.90.3 (ESD measurements of protective relays)

IEEE 1613 (Requirements for Communications Networking Devices Installed in Electric Power Substations)

IEEE 473 (EM site survey)

IEEE 139 (In
-
situ measurement of Industrial, Scientific and Medical equipment)

IEEE 1560 (RFI filter capability measurement)

IEEE 1597.2 (EM computer modeling applications)

IEC/CISPR 22 (ITE emissions) and CISPR 24 (ITE immunity)

IEC 61326
-
x series (Electrical Equipment for Measurement, Control and Laboratory use
—
EMC)

IEC 60255
-
25 (Relay and protection equipment measurements
—
EMC Emissions)

IEC 60255
-
26 (Relays and protection equipment measurements
—
EMC Immunity)

IEC 61000
-
6
-
5 (Immunity for power station and substation environments
—
EMC)

IEC 61000
-
4
-
2 (ESD measurements)

IEC 61000
-
4
-
3 (Radiated immunity measurements)

IEC 61000
-
4
-
4 (Fast transient/bursts measurements)

IEC 61000
-
4
-
5 (Surge measurements)

IEC 61000
-
4
-
6 (Conducted immunity measurements)

IEC 61000
-
4
-
8 (Magnetic field immunity measurements)

IEC 61000
-
4
-
11 (Voltage dips/variation immunity measurements)

IEC 60439
-
1 (Cable distribution cabinets for power distribution networks)

IEC 60870
-
2
-
1(Telecontrol equipment power supply and EMC)


Referenced


Standards

HEMP Standards
:



IEC 61000
-
1
-
3 (Effects of High
-
Altitude EMP (HEMP) on Civil Equipment and Systems
-
EMC)

IEC

61000
-
2
-
9 (Description of HEMP Environment
-

Radiated Disturbance, Basic EMC Publication)

IEC

61000
-
2
-
10 (Description of HEMP Environment
-

Conducted Disturbance
–

Basic EMC Publication)

IEC

61000
-
2
-
11 (Classification of HEMP Environments
-

EMC)

IEC

61000
-
4
-
25 (HEMP Immunity Test Methods for Equipment and Systems
-

EMC)

IEC

61000
-
4
-
32 (HEMP Simulator Compendium
-

EMC)

IEC

61000
-
4
-
35 (HPEM Simulator Compendium
-

EMC)

IEC

61000
-
5
-
6 (Mitigation of External EM Influences
-

EMC)

IEC

61000
-
5
-
8 (HEMP Protection Methods for the Distributed Infrastructure
-

EMC)

IEC

61000
-
6
-
6 (HEMP Immunity for Indoor Equipment
–

EMC Generic Standards)


IEMI Standards
:


IEC

61000
-
1
-
5 (High Power Electromagnetic (HPEM) Effects on Civil Systems
-

EMC)

IEC

61000
-
2
-
13 (High
-
Power Electromagnetic (HPEM) Environments
-

Radiated and Conducted EMC)

IEC

61000
-
4
-
33 (Measurement Methods for High
-
Power Transient Parameters
–

T&M Techniques)

IEC

61000
-
4
-
35 (HPEM Simulator Compendium
-

EMC)

IEEE P2030 Draft Guide for Smart Grid Interoperability of
Energy Technology and Information Technology
Operation With the Electric Power System (EPS), and
End
-
Use Applications and Loads


(PAR Approved March 19, 2009

Under IEEE SCC 21)


Project P2030

Smart Grid

Interoperability Standards Project
―
Unifies Power, Communications, IT & “ilities”


Communication

Technologies

{exchange processes

for information}







Information

Technologies

{data, facts, and

knowledge}









Power and Energy Technologies


[electric power system, end use applications and loads]



EMC

Safety

Cyber

.

.

.


P2030 Goals

•
Provides guidelines in understanding and defining
Smart Grid

interoperability of the EPS with end
-
use applications and loads.

•

Focus on integration of energy technology and information and
communications technology.

•

Achieve seamless operation for electric generation, delivery,
and end
-
use benefits to permit two way power flow with
communication and control.

•

Address interconnection and intra
-
facing frameworks and
strategies with design definitions.

•
Perform study of EMC and other “ilities”.

•

Expand knowledge in grid architectural designs and operation to
promote a more reliable and flexible electric power system.


P2030 Standard


Development

•
P2030 Working Group (WG):

–
Task Force 1
–

Power & Energy

–
Task Force 2
-

IT

–
Task Force 3
-

Communications

•
External Standards Committee (where EMC enters the picture)

•
Divide interfaces according to protocol stack:

–
TF3 addresses OSI layers 1
-
4

–
TF2 addresses OSI layers 4
-
7

•
TF1, TF2, and TF3 should standardize on a single architecture framework or
combination of architecture frameworks

•
It may not be possible to have a single P2030 TF3
Smart Grid

Reference
Architecture (may end up being a family of architectures).

•
Recommended to leverage DoD Architectural Framework (DODAF) for
development of reference architecture artifacts


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Department_of_Defense_Architecture_Framework


Summary

•
We have modeling, simulation and testing technologies.

•
Costs increase and reliability suffers without EMC.

•
Power, IT and Comm for
Smart Grid

is multidisciplinary

–
Synergy of expertise must be applied

–
EMC designed in early to reduce costs, increase effectiveness

–
EMC discipline includes dynamic & adaptive spectrum mgmt.

•
IEEE EMC Society is the leading source of expertise.

•
Design & validation testing minimize EMC problems.

•
Smart Grid

devices need “hardening” to interference.

•
Please contact Andy Drozd:
adrozd@androcs.com


Acknowledgements


We wish to thank the members of the IEEE EMC
Society SDCom along with Jerry Ramie and Brian
Cramer for their insights, technical contributions
and support of the P2030 activities as they pertain
to assuring EMC, power quality and
interoperability of the Smart Grid concept design.