Rapid Development of Counter-IED Capabilities

stagetofuAI and Robotics

Oct 29, 2013 (3 years and 9 months ago)

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JIEDDO BAA 12
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Introduction

The Joint Improvised Explosives Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Broad Agency
Announcement (BAA), which is issued under the provisions of paragraph 6.102(d)(2) of the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), provides the vehicle for the competitive selecti
on of
basic and applied research, and that part of development not related to the development of a
specific system or hardware procurement. Contracts based on responses to this BAA are
considered to be the result of full and open competition and in full co
mpliance with the
provisions of Public Law (PL) 98
-
369,

The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984.


As the
issuing agency, JIEDDO will not issue paper copies of this announcement. Any proposal
documents or other materials submitted in response to this B
AA will not be returned. It is the
policy of JIEDDO and its contracting agencies to treat all proposals as sensitive competitive
information and to disclose their contents only for the purposes of evaluation

in accordance with
federal law
.

No contract awar
ds will be made until appropriated funds are available from which payment for
contract purposes can be made. JIEDDO reserves the right to select for award all, some or none
of the proposals in response to this BAA. JIEDDO will not provide funding for direc
t
reimbursement of proposal development costs.

Approach

JIEDDO will use a two
-
phased proposal selection process for this solicitation to minimize cost
and effort of prospective offerors. Phase

1 will solicit and evaluate proposal quad charts and
white pape
rs. Section

III

provides general proposal preparation considerations. Section

IV

provides detailed guidance on Phase

1 proposal preparation. Section

V

provides information on
the Pha
se

1 evaluation process. Proposals found to have technical and operational merit during
Phase

1 will be selected for Phase

2. Submitters will be contacted with specific instructions for
Phase

2, which will consist of technical meetings as well as more deta
iled presentations and
submissions to the JIEDDO acquisition management process. Subsequent to funding approval,
full technical proposals may be requested.

HBCU/MI and Small Business Set Aside

The Government encourages non
-
profit organizations, educational

institutions, historically black
colleges and universities (HBCU), minority institutions (MI),
small businesses, small
disadvantaged businesses (SDB),
women
-
owned businesses, and historically underutilized
business

(HUB) zone enterprises, as well as large businesses and Government agencies, to
submit proposals for consideration or to join others in submitting proposals. However, no portion
of the BAA will be set
-
aside for these special entities because of the impract
icality of reserving
discrete or severable areas of research and development in any specific requirement area. The
final determination will be made based on the relevance of the proposal to JIEDDO
requirements, individual technical merits of the proposal,
and budget constraints within the
mission priorities. To ensure full consideration in these programs, registration in the BAA
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Information Delivery System (BIDS), described later in this document, requires the appropriate
business type selection as well as
accurate up
-
to
-
date information.

Limitation of Funds

The Government may incrementally fund contracts awarded from this BAA as provided by FAR
52.232
-
22,

Limitation of Funds.


Contracts awarded to proposals submitted under this BAA
are anticipated to be 6

to 24 months in duration. To facilitate incremental funding, submissions
shall include the cost and schedule by a task
-
phased structure organized by fiscal year (October
through September) with clear exit criteria, and shall be inclusive of all work to co
mplete the
effort including any options. It is anticipated that the entire effort will be negotiated with the
initial contract award.

Technical Evaluation Support

JIEDDO will use contractor support personnel in the review, evaluation, and administration of

all submissions to this BAA. All individuals that have access to any proprietary data shall certify
that they will not disclose any information pertaining to this solicitation including any
submission, the identity of any submitters, or any other informat
ion relative to this BAA. They
shall also certify that they have no financial interest in any submissions evaluated. Submissions
and information received in response to this BAA constitute permission to disclose that
information to certified evaluators und
er these conditions.

JIEDDO may share responses to this BAA with foreign nationals tasked by us as subject matter
experts to assist in the evaluation of proposals. No export authorization is required for U.S.
companies responding to this BAA. Submitters
may decline the use of foreign nationals in the
evaluation of their proposal.


I.

GENERAL INFORMATION

1.

BAA Issuing Agency Name:
JIEDDO

2.

Contracting Agency Name:
Any United States Government contracting organization
may serve as the contracting agency for this

BAA.

3.

Sponsoring Agency Name:
JIEDDO

4.

Program Name:
Rapid Development of Counter
-
IED Capabilities

5.

Research Opportunity Number:
BAA JIEDDO
-
1
2
-
02

6.

Submission Deadline
:
Offerors responding to this BAA may begin submitting
responses on
June
7
,

201
2
. Final submissions for all proposals to this BAA are due by
1600 hours
(local time in Arlington, VA)
on
October
5
,
201
2
.

Proposals may be
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submitted at any time during this period. JIEDDO reserves the option to extend the
submission deadline, if it so cho
oses.

7.

Description of Opportunity:
JIEDDO is soliciting

proposals for the development of
innovative capabilities to defeat IEDs employed against U.
S. forces anywhere in the
world
. JIEDDO is seeking counter
-
IED capabilities that can be rapidly developed,
de
monstrated, and deployed within
6

to
24

months

from award.

However, JIEDDO is
willing to entertain less mature systems with a potentially high payoff.

Proposals must
address
at least one of
the following requirements
:

A.

Pre
-
detonation
:


the ability to
cause IEDs to trigger at the time and place of the
warfighter

s choosing

in order to reduce effective attacks and enable greater
freedom of maneuver
. (See
Appendix A, page
12
)

B.

Counter
-
T
hreat Network
:


the ability to find and fix IE
D builders, suppliers,
financiers, and distributors in order to finish threat networks through lethal and non
-
lethal actions.

(See

Appendix B, page

1
4
)

C.

Detection
:


the ability to determine the location of emplaced IEDs and IED
components

through the purpo
sed collection of observables in order to enable
greater freedom of maneuver
. (
See Appendix C, page

1
8
)


D.

Counter
-
D
evice
:


the ability to neutralize IEDs before detonation or mitigate the
effects following detonation

in order to reduce effective attacks
.
(
See Appendix D,
page
28
)

E.

Home
m
ade Explosives (HME)
:


the ability to locate, avoid and neutralize IEDs
containing non
-
standard explosives compounds

in order to reduce effective attacks
.
(
See Appendix E,

page 30
)

F.

Information Integra
tion & Fusion
:

the ability to integrate, visualize, and analyze
information and intelligence in order to increase situational awareness for counter
-
IED/counter
-
threat network planning and operations. (
For Information Integration
& Fusion detail requiremen
ts,
See Appendix
B
, page

14
)

(Appendix F intentionally
omitted.)

G.

Weapons Technical Intelligence

(WTI)
:


the ability to collect and exploit
information from individuals, IEDs and components in order to understand threat
networks, IEDs and components

for pla
nning and operations
. (
See Appendix
G
,
page

3
3
)

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II.

DEFINITIONS

1.

An
Improvised Explosive Device

(IED) is defined as a device placed or fabricated in an
improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary
chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate
military supplies, bu
t is normally devised from non
-
military components.

2.

Counter
-
IED

(C
-
IED) is defined as the collective efforts at all levels to defeat the IED
system in order to reduce or eliminate the effects of all forms of IEDs used against
friendly forces and non
-
combat
ants according to the mission. It includes offensive and
defensive measures taken to predict, prevent, detect, neutralize, and mitigate the IED
threat, as well as train our forces to counter it. It also includes operations to predict and
prevent the IED ne
twork.

3.

Safe Stand
-
Off Distance

means that both the personnel and equipment performing IED
detection

or
neutralization capabilities must operate at a distance that substantially
mitigates personal and operational risk should the IED detonate. The stand
-
off

distance
will vary depending on the operational scenario.

4.

Airborne Platforms
maybe manned or unmanned.

5.

Mounted Forces
move by ground vehicle
.

6.

Dismounted Forces
move by foot
. However, they

may be accompanied by small robotic
or unmanned ground vehicle (U
GV) that can traverse the same terrain as a dismounted
solider

at the same endurance
.

III.

PROPOSAL PREPARATION CONSIDERATIONS

There are two key considerations for a successful proposal: it must be operationally relevant
and technically feasible.

Even high
performing technologies w
ill be rejected if they do not satisfy
a valid C
-
IED
requirement. C
areful thought must be given to the concept of operations (CONOPS) for the
system once it is deployed. Factors to consider are: interoperability and compatibilit
y with
other systems;
size, weight and endurance
; human factors; logistics burden; and safety (both
of the operators and civilian bystanders).

Proposals that are operationally relevant to the warfighter and satisfy a valid C
-
IED
requirement must also be te
chnically feasible. JIEDDO is looking for innovative solutions to
our problems, and is willing to accept higher risk for the opportunity of higher payoffs in a
short time. However, proposals should balance these risks with a solid scientific foundation.


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The application of modeling and simulation (M&S) is necessary for the mitigation of risk and
the evaluation of performance, compatibility, and interoperability of the proposed system.
Models will only be acquired, or developed as applicable, in parallel
with system
development; results will be considered in the continuous evaluation process. Simulations,
where applicable, will be acquired or developed in order to facilitate training.

All proposals are initially evaluated by a panel of scientists and engin
eers with expertise
relevant to the proposed technology.
Proposals must
provide sufficient technical detail for
the evaluation panel to understand the theory, and have confidence that the proposer can
successfully develop it.

Performance claims substanti
ated by test, experimental or modeling
& simulation data provide a higher level of confidence. At a minimum, proposals should
provide theoretical calculations or scientific basis for their performance claims.


JIEDDO will occasionally fund multiple devel
opment efforts for the same C
-
IED capability
to reduce the risk of any one failure. However, proposals that duplicate already fielded
capabilities, or more mature development efforts, should provide sufficient technical detail to
demonstrate how they will

significantly enhance those current operational capabilities.


Information Resources

T
he JIEDDO Reading Room

is intended to provide customers, stakeholders, and industry
partners with easy access to information on JIEDDO

s capability gaps, emerging criti
cal
initiatives, new developments, studies, documents, and items of interests for the effort in
defeating IEDs. You can learn how to access the reading room at the following website:
https://www.jieddo.do
d.mil/rr.aspx
.

IV.

PROPOSAL PREPARATION GUIDELINES

This
s
ection

provides information and instructions for the preparation and submission of all
proposals under this BAA. All submissions must meet these requirements including format,
content, and structure, and

must include all specified information to avoid disqualification,
submission rejection, or delays in evaluation.

1.

Submission Process:

All proposals must be submitted electronically to the BAA
Information Delivery System (BIDS) website at:
https://bids.acqcenter.com/JIEDDO
.
This website is used to collect all
files for
unclassified propos
als, and to collect
placeholder records
for classified submissions.
DO NOT UPLOAD CLASSIFIED
DOCUMENTS TO THE BIDS WEBSI
TE
; see paragraph
9

below for instructions on
classified submissions.



1.1.

The Government will not accept proposals submitted by any other means.

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1.2.

As
part of the submittal process on the BIDS website, offerors are asked if their
submission is classified. If the submitter selects

NO


(i.e.
an
unclassified
proposal), they are agreeing to the following statement:


I further certify and expressly agree th
at, if my proposal contains
classified material, I will reimburse the United States for any and all
damages caused by this act. Such costs may include, but may not be
limited to, the costs to wipe or replace unclassified computer equipment
tainted by the
introduction of classified material in any way.



1.3.

As part of the submittal process on the BIDS website, offerors are asked
if
JIEDDO may use foreign nationals in the evaluation of their proposal
. If the
offeror

selects


YES,


they are agreeing to the following statement:


I certify that I am authorize
d to act on behalf of my company/
organization,
and do hereby consent to the release of the information contained in this
proposal to the U.S. Government and to
any
foreign nationa
ls selected by
JIEDDO to act as evaluators for this BAA. Release of this information will
be limited to the use
of it
in the BAA evaluation process and any
subsequent discussions or meetings between my company
/
organization and
JIEDDO regarding the proposa
l.



If the offeror selects

NO,


they may still submit
a

proposal, and JIEDDO will not
use foreign nationals in the evaluation of their proposal.

2.

Submission Deadline
:

Pro
posals must be completely uploaded to the BIDS website
prior to the
submission deadline specified in Section
I
, paragraph
6
; the

web
site will not
allow
files

to be uploaded or modified after the
deadline
.

The Government will not
accept late proposals
.

3.

Submitter Registration
: Submitters must register on the BIDS website to respond to
this BAA.

Existing BIDS accounts are acceptable for a new BAA; offerors should make
sure that the company contact information is current.

A unique username is created by
the offeror and is used for BIDS login and submission tracking.

Registration acceptance
for su
bmitters is automatic, but takes several seconds to be recognized by BIDS.

A
success email will be sent to indicate that the username and account were accepted.

BIDS is email dependent and uses the registration email as the single point of contact for
al
l notifications associated with the BAA.

It is very important to keep BIDS registration
contact information updated, especially contact e
-
mail address, since all BIDS
notifications will be sent via e
-
mail to that address.

Registration account information

such as the point of contact (POC), e
-
mail, and password can be updated after login. The

Forgot
Your

Password
?


link on the BIDS homepage allows registered users with a
valid e
-
mail address to automatically reset a password. The system will verify the
account name and e
-
mail to send a new password to that e
-
mail.

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4.

Registration and Account Help
: BIDS help requests c
an be emailed to the BIDS
administrator at the

Help Request


link located on the BIDS homepage.

5.

BIDS Security and Access Control
: All data uploaded to BIDS is secure from public
viewing.

All submissions will be considered proprietary and source selectio
n sensitive,
and protected accordingly.

The documents can only be reviewed by the registrant and
authorized
personnel that are part of the evaluation process
.

See paragraph
9

below for
instructions on classified submissions.

6.

Proposal Format
: It is mandatory that offers provide both a quad chart and white paper
that meet the format requirements provided below.

Acceptable file formats are
Microsoft
Word, Microsoft PowerPoint and Adobe Acrobat.

The maximum size for
each file uploaded to the BIDS website is 0.5 MB
. The submitter is solely responsible
for ensuring that their files meet
the
size constraints, and allow
ing

sufficient time to
upload them
to the BIDS website prior to the submission deadline
.
The Government
will not accept late proposals
.

6.1.

Quad Chart Content
: A quad chart conveys the essence of the proposed solution
on a single page. When preparing a submission, the offeror shall ensure that

the
specific criteria of the requirement are addressed, the solution is clear, and can be
accomplished with the proposed technology, cost, and schedule.
The quad chart
shall be no more than one 8 ½ by 11 inch page, in landscape format. The text shall
be n
o smaller than 10 point. The quad chart format and sample are provided at the
BIDS website under

Reference Materials.


The quad chart includes
the following
header information and
four quadrants:


6.1.1.

Header information

shall include the proposal title
, company name,
date
and

appropriate document markings.

6.1.2.

The
top left quadrant

is a graphical depiction, photograph, or artist

s
concept of the proposed solution or prototype. Include labels or brief
descriptive text as needed for clarification. Ideally, th
is will convey the
system concept, use, capability, and any relevant size or weight.

6.1.3.

The
top right quadrant

contains a summary of operational and
performance capabilities.

6.1.4.

The
bottom left quadrant
contains a summary of the technical approach.
Specifically,

describe the technology involved, how it will be used to solve
the problem, actions done to date, and any related on
-
going efforts. Briefly
describe the tasks to be performed for each phase if applicable. Bullet lists
are acceptable.

6.1.5.

The
bottom right quad
rant

contains the rough order of magnitude (ROM)
cost, schedule, products and deliverables, and corporate contact
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information. The ROM and schedule shall be proposed in phases, and
include the cost, period of performance (POP), and exit criteria for each
p
hase. A total cost and POP that combines all phases shall also be included.
Products and deliverables shall include, by phase, a list of all prototype
hardware and software. Corporate contact information shall include the
submitter

s company name, point of

contact, phone number, and e
-
mail
address. Include any significant teaming partner (contact information)
relevant to the evaluation. Note that the contact information in the BIDS
registration is used for all notices and contact purposes.

6.2.

White Paper Conte
nt:
Offerors shall prepare and upload a white paper detailing
their proposed technical approach, schedule in phases, and ROM costs. Proposals
are evaluated by a technical panel of subject matter experts (i.e. scientists and
engineers with advanced degrees

in the subject area), as well as experienced
operational personnel. The technical approach and concept of operations should be
written with sufficient detail for the panel to make an informed decision. If
available, a summary of modeling and simulation or

test data should be provided
to
justify

performance claims. The white paper shall be no more than 12 pages plus
a cover page; each page shall be 8 ½ by 11 inches with one inch margins. The text
shall be double
-
spaced with fonts no smaller than 10 point. E
ach page of the
submission shall contain the BAA announcement number and the proposal title in
the header. If the white paper contains more than 12 pages including tables, charts,
and figures only the first 12 pages will be evaluated.

The white paper form
at and
sample are provided at the BIDS website under

Reference Materials.


7.

Status and Inquiries
: Submitters can check the status of their submissions at the BIDS
website under

My Submissions.


All submission
s

will complete
all five levels of the

Phase

1

evaluation process
, which are
:

7.1.

Level 1
:

Initial Technical Reviews.

7.2.

Level 2
:

Technical Evaluation Panel.

7.3.

Level 3
:

Internal coordination and staffing of panel recommendation.

7.4.

Level 4
:

Management review of panel recommendation.

7.5.

Level 5
:

Deputy

Directo
r
,
Resources & Requirements
,

review and decision
.

8.

Notification to Offeror
: The Government will notify the offeror by email when their
submission has completed
the
Phase

1

evaluation.

9.

Classified Proposal Submission Instructions
:
DO NOT UPLOAD CLASSIFIED
DOCUMENTS TO THE BIDS WEBSITE
.

For any proposal related to current or
previously funded Government work, the offeror should submit the proposal to the
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sponsor for classification review prior to submission to BIDS.

If any submission
contains classified in
formation, the offeror shall upload an unclassified placeholder
document in BIDS, and identify in the comments
s
ection

of the submission record that
the submittal cannot be uploaded due to classification.

Classified proposals shall then be
mailed or deliv
ered to the following address:

Joint IED Defeat Organization

2521 South Clarke Street
, 12
th

Floor

Attn
: DDRR
/
CID

(BIDS)

Arlington, VA 22202


Classified proposals must be postmarked or hand
-
delivered
prior to

the submission
deadline specified in Section
I
, paragraph
6
.

The BIDS document identifier m
ust be
clearly identified on the
classified

submittal.
All submitted documents

must be
appropriately and clearly marked (including all paragraphs and pages containing the
subject data), packaged, and shipped in accordance with classified material handling
procedures and security regulations pertaining to the level of classification.

10.

Intellectual Property, Technical Data and Software
: All anticipated intellectual
property, technical data or software rights shall be disclosed.

11.

Patents and Patent Applications
: Identify any existing, applied for, or pending patents
that will be used in the conduct of this effort. Provide patent number or application
number and title. If no patents or patent applications are relevant; so state.

12.

Data Rights:
Identify any technical data
and

computer software that will be delivered
with less than unlimited rights as prescribed in DFARS 252.227
-
7017 and DFARS
252.227
-
7028. If unlimited rights in technical data are proposed, state this.

13.

Central Contract Registrati
on (CCR)
: Prospective contractors must be registered in
the DoD CCR database prior to award of an agreement. By submitting an offer to this
BAA, the offeror acknowledges the requirement that they must be registered in the CCR
database prior to award, duri
ng performance, and through final payment of any
agreement resulting from this BAA. The CCR may be accessed at
http://www.ccr.gov/
.
Assistance with registration is available by phone at 1
-
8
66
-
606
-
8220
.

V.

PHASE

1

EVALUATION

PROCESS

1.

Proposals are evaluated as they are received, not at the conclusion of the BAA
submission deadline. Upon receipt, proposals receive an administrative review for
compliance with BAA
Section

IV
, above, followed by an initial technical review.
Proposals are then evaluated by
a

technical evaluation panel, which normally meets on a
routine

basis. Proposals are not evaluated against eac
h other
, but on their own technical
merits
. After any necessary staff coordination, a recommendation to either accept or
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reject the proposal for
Phase

2

is staffed to the JIEDDO
Deputy

Director
, R
esources and
Requirements
,

for approval.

2.

Technical review pa
nels will use the following selection criteria, in descending order of
importance, when conducting proposal evaluations:

2.1.

Addresses one of the JIEDDO C
-
IED requirements published in this BAA

as
identified per each Appendix
.

2.2.

Overall scientific and technical
merits; to include potential for successful
performance of intended functions in an actual operational environment. Proposals
exhibiting technical or scientific innovation to solve a requirement are desired and,
in such instances, a higher than average ris
k of initial failure may be allowable.

2.3.

The proposed solution provides a significant enhancement in operational capability
compared to existing fielded systems.

2.4.

Offeror

s capabilities, experience, facilities

or
techniques or unique combinations
of these whi
ch are integral factors for achieving the proposal objectives.

2.5.

Proposed schedule to deliver a prototype
to

be tested at a Government facility.

2.6.

Proposed cost.

3.

Each proposal will be evaluated on its own merit and relevance to the requirements
listed in
Secti
on

I
, paragraph
7
, rather

than against other proposals.

4.

Proposal submissions may be rejected for the following reasons:

4.1.

The submission does not comply with the guidelines listed in
Section

IV
.

4.2.

The proposed solution does not address a C
-
IED requirement
.

4.3.

The proposed
solution

is not based on sound scientific principles (effects must be
measurable, quantifiable and reproducible; cannot be user
-
dependent).

4.4.

The proposed solution includes development or acquisition of an aerial vehicle
platform which is not within JIEDDO

s fieldin
g authority.

4.5.

The proposed solution does not provide a significant enhancement in operational
capability compared to existing fielded systems.

5.

Proposals submitted electronically to the BIDS website which are determined to contain
classified information will

be rejected and the potential breach of information security
reported to the appropriate authority.

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6.

Proposal submissions that are determined to be offers of commercial items, as defined
by FAR, 2.01 may be rejected from BIDS. The FAR prescribes policies a
nd procedures
unique to the acquisition of commercial items.

7.

The socio
-
economic merits of each proposal seeking a procurement contract will be
evaluated in the context of the requirements described in this announcement. The
evaluation process will consider

the extent of commitment in providing meaningful
subcontracting opportunities for small businesses, HUB Zone small businesses, small
disadvantaged businesses, woman
-
owned small business concerns, veteran
-
owned small
businesses, historically black colleges

and universities, and minority institutions. The
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code for this solicitation,
334511 (which corresponds with the standard industrial classification code of 8731),
specifies a small business size standar
d of 750 employees or less. Historically black
colleges and universities (HBCU) and minority institutions (MI) are encouraged to
submit proposals and/or join others in submitting proposals. However, no portion of this
BAA will be set
-
aside for HBCU and MI
participation due to the impracticality of
reserving discrete or functionally separable areas of this technology for exclusive
competition among these entities.

VI.

OTHER BAA INFORMATION
.

This notice constitutes a BAA as contemplated by FAR 6.102(d) (2).
Unless otherwise stated
herein, no additional written information is available, nor will a formal RFP or other
solicitation regarding this announcement be issued. Requests for the same will be
disregarded. The Government reserves the right to select all, s
ome, or none of the proposals
received in response to this announcement. Interested parties are invited to respond to this
synopsis. No hard copy version of this announcement will be made available. The
Government intends to issue awards based on the optim
um combination of proposals that
offers the best overall value to the Government. One or more technology areas may receive
no funding. Also, the Government reserves the right to select for award some portions of the
proposals received in response to this B
AA. In that event, the Government may select for
negotiation all, or portions, of a given proposal. The Government may incrementally fund
any award issued under this BAA. The Government will not pay for proposal preparation
costs. The cost of preparing pro
posals in response to this BAA is not allowable as a direct
charge to any contract resulting from this BAA or to any other Government contract.
Offerors are advised that only Contracting Officers are legally authorized to contractually
bind or otherwise co
mmit the Governmen
t


JIEDDO BAA 12
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Appendix A: Pre
-
detonation Requirements

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35


APPENDIX A: PRE
-
DETONATION REQUIREMENTS

JIEDDO defines pre
-
detonation as the ability to cause IEDs to trigger at the time and
place of the
warfighter’s choosing in order to reduce effective attacks and enable greater freedom o
f

movement.
JIEDDO and the military services have evaluated and developed a broad range of
pre
-
detonation
(pre
-
det)
capabilities, such as high
-
power RF sys
tems, mechanical rollers and
electrostatic discharge systems. JIEDDO has recently begun exploring a number of alternative
technologies that could potentially cause IEDs to detonate. The objective of this solicitation is to
identify or enable development
of new pre
-
detonation capabilities, or to improve upon and
advance the state
-
of
-
the
-

art of existing pre
-
detonation capabilities
, which are related to the
following: pre
-
detonating IEDs while dismounted; pre
-
detonating IEDs while mounted; pre
-
detonating I
EDs from airborne platforms; pre
-
detonating surface
-
emplaced, deeply buried, and
underwater IEDs; integrating pre
-
detonation capabilities with other systems; and reliable pre
-
detonation with minimal collateral damage.

Proposed solutions must detonate any
IED in its path at a standoff distance, without prior
knowledge of the existence or location of the IED. Standoff means that both the operator and the
system function at a safe distance from the IED. This BAA will not accept proposals for systems
that

on
ly

remotely detonate a
previously
found or suspected IED.

For mounted operations, systems will likely be required to operate

so as to pre
-
det at all points
along a path although not necessarily
operate
continuously
, since it is unknown whether there is
an
IED in the path of the convoy. Proposed solutions should consider this in their size, weight
and power requirements.
O
perating mounted systems must also consider the effects on
armed

personnel/vehicles and the indigenous population.

For dismounted operat
ions, it is unlikely that systems will have to operate continuously. Human
safety must be a major consideration in system design; unlike mounted systems, there is no
vehicle to shield the operators. In addition, dismounted system must be small enough to
be
operationally relevant; therefore they must be either man
-
portable or mounted on a small robotic
platform
;

either ground
,

or aerial controlled by a dismounted
operator
.


JIEDDO has already invested in many pre
-
detonation capabilities that use: high
-
pow
er
microwave and other RF techniques; direct electrostatic discharge; and mechanical pre
-
detonation (e.g. rollers). At present we have a full portfolio of devices based on those
technologies. Any proposed solution using those techniques must

provide clea
r and significant
improvement over existing systems.

JIEDDO is
also interested
in proposals in
new and alternative technologies for IED pre
-
detonation

such as
using acoustic
-
like waves

or
low
-
frequency magnetic fields
.


JIEDDO will also consider proposed solutions that are hybrids or combinations of the
technologies mentioned above, or ones that include detection with targeted pre
-
detonation. Any
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-
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such proposed solution is subject to the same conditions outlined above, an
d must provide a clear
and significant improvement over existing capabilities.

Proposed efforts
are expected to
meet the following

requirements
:

1.

Must b
e based on sound scientific principles (effects must be measurable, quantifiable and
reproducible; cannot

be user
-
dependent).

2.

Have the ability to pre
-
det or neutralize IEDs over wide angle or warfighter designated small
angle and direction with the potential for reducing adverse health effects and collateral
damage.

3.

Operate mounted on relatively light
tactical platforms not requiring trailers, or

4.

Able to operate as man portable or small robotic portable systems
;

either ground
,

or aerial
controlled by a dismounted
operator
.

5.

Able to operate at a safe standoff distance while not significantly interfering w
ith other
tactical vehicles and systems whether kinetic, acoustic, electromagnetic, or otherwise based
while achieving high pre
-
detonation probability and neutralization of IEDs.

6.

Able to pre
-
det or neutralize IEDs at various soil depths and types of soil o
f high, medium
and low water content.

7.

Able to operate cooperatively with and mutually support other platforms of various sizes and
capabilities. Able to be integrated with other user systems and components.

8.

Minimally limit the freedom of movement on the ba
ttlefield.

9.

Must p
rovide an effective mechanism which targets an
IED

or its components

in a way

to
cause the system to malfunction in manner which
causes the IED to
detonate prematurely
,
deflagrate, or become a permanent dud.

10.

Must describe c
ollateral
effects (e.g. human exposure limits), and any other issue relevant to
the integration of the proposed system into a military operating environment.


JIEDDO BAA 12
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Appendix B:

Counter
-
Threat Network Requirements

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APPENDIX B: COUNTER
-
THREAT NETWORK
/
INFORMATION
INTEGRATION

&
FUSION REQUIREMENTS

Current policies and lack of standardization rules on information sharing do not address the
needs of the community (both DoD and Inter
-
agency) in providing an adequate counter
-
threat
-
network situational unde
rstanding for planning and operations. Furthermore, the current set of
methodologies and tools do not address the future technical requirements given the focus on
ever
-
increasing sets of classified and unclassified data.

Critical to the success of future e
ngagements amongst these government partners will reside in:
(1) creating an analysis crowd sourcing framework and capability; (2) leveraging others’ ‘just in
time’ capabilities and authorities; (3) creating supporting data
-
correlation, pattern
-
recognition

and trending capabilities to improve processing time; (4) leveraging technology to improve the
net
-
centric sharing of data; (5) creating decision
-
support systems that easily transition from
tactical to operational to strategic levels; (6) creating cross
-
d
omain solutions


unclassified to
classified; US, inter
-
agency, intelligence community, coalition and alliance partners; (7) leading
DoD and NATO standards for information sharing. The
integration and fusion of information to
support the counter
-
threat ne
twork problem domain will explore developmental solutions that
build upon a comprehensive solution to streamline and aggressively reduce the operational
deficiencies associated with (1
-
6).

While a holistic integrated architecture for the “whole of government” is beyond the scope of
this BAA, JIEDDO intends to build upon and leverage lessons learned from existing CLOUD
-
based projects (e.g. Enhanced
-
Hadoop, Ozone Widgets, Defense Intelligence
Information
Enterprise [DI2E], Distributed Common Ground System


Army [DCGS
-
A] CLOUD, etc.) in
the DoD and intelligence community (IC).
The operational needs of the Counter
-
threat network
gaps provide scoping capabilities for the algorithms that support
the assembly, fusion, correlation
and transformation of various types of data (e.g. full
-
motion video, imagery, biometrics, IC
reporting , open source, raw sensor, TTL etc.) that should be held in both a raw and structured
schemas or mappings.
The operati
onal needs demand an adaptive infrastructure that can be
adjusted to exploit the changing
data

environments where Counter
-
threat networks reside.



The following assumptions can be made about the data entering the architecture:

-

Data flow is from disparat
e databases, static files, real
-
time feeds, structured feeds, etc.

-

The data will be a combination of structured and unstructured text, descriptive imagery,
TTL sensor output, etc.

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-
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In order to be integrated into the analytical capabilities of the Counter
-
IED Operations
Integration Center (COIC), any developmental software solution must:

-

Be provided, including source code, under Unlimited Rights or Government Purpose
Rights as defined in DFARS Clause reference 252.227
-
7013(a)(15), 252.227
-
7014(a)(15),
252.2
27
-
7013(a)(12), and 252.227
-
7014(a)(11).

Be
able
to integrate with the COIC’s persistence layer
, not bundle a proprietary datastore.

-

Be browser
-
based and modular so that those components can be utilized within the
COIC’s UI framework.

-

Be service oriented a
nd be OSGi compliant.

-

Be Operating System independent and able to run on the COIC’s application servers
without significant modification to either the application or the application server.

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-
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The key enabler for achieving seamless sharing of information begi
ns with applying new
te
chniques to enhance the data ingestion process.


The objective is to provide better sorting or
mining of data to permit for faster discovery and analytical manipulation of the data in this initial
ingestion phase. JIEDDO seeks new d
evelopmental techniques for improving data pre
-
processing, which can include new methodologies for data normalization, feature standardization,
transformation, and cleaning. Key to this development is further standardization of the
unstructured and struct
ured data into representation schemes (e.g. data stacks) that support
processing of the data across both local and external CLOUD structures. This initial data
ingestion is part of a continuous complex ingestion process, which will support data
manipulati
on resulting in identification of threat network activities, financiers, and exposure of
critical supply chain nodes. These new capabilities will be combined to explore new data
indexing, sorting, sense
-
making, semantic discovery, and data tracking concep
ts. The
anticipated results are faster analytical assessments of the emerging operational environments
used to support the quick exploration of counter
-
threat network activities.

While the ingestion process has typically exhibited a vacuum mechanism, the
CLOUD
-
based
concept centers on sharing of data without formal ingestion of all information. JIEDDO seeks
new concepts that leverage and build upon existing research in fusion of data across the
distributed C
-
IED enterprise that might result in the: (a) sh
aring of data indexing and tagging
techniques between disparate CLOUD structures; (b) running of stationary algorithms between
CLOUD structures; or (c) transportation of algorithms between CLOUD structures. The
anticipated results should demonstrate enhan
ced seamless sharing of information, rapid
dissemination of data and fusion of databases across the C
-
IED enterprise.

After the data has been ingested, correlated and made locatable in the C
-
IED enterprise,
performing advanced analytics on the accessible d
ata is key to providing the end
-
user with the
next level of analytical reasoning. In the past the C
-
IED domain and similar problem spaces
were capable of providing lots of data individually, geo
-
spatially rectified on a globe. The
analyst was required to

turn layers of data on and off to determine relevant reporting associated
with the desired location on the globe. The analytics seeks to answer questions associated with
global views of C
-
IED problem and track global threat networks trends similar to the

following
questions: correlation of all reporting, assessment of threat per region, identify new threat
networks, identify level of social unrest, report on extreme weather changes, changes in threat
networks, and assessment of agricultural trends.

JIE
DDO seeks new analytics that combine robust data connectivity and high
-
speed computing to
deliver automatically generated analytical reasoning across clusters or patterns of data that might
be displayed on a graphical
-
user interface, globe, maps or multi
-
d
imensional grids. The two
main goals are to: (1) reduce the 80% of time spent by end
-
user searching for desired data; and
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-
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(2) build analytics that are beyond traditional search oriented algorithms as illustrated in the prior
paragraph. The solutions are
envisioned as individual algorithmic development that would
integrate into the larger architecture and demonstrate new applications that might combine
concepts from machine learning, statistics, analytical trending, behavioral modeling,
organizational unde
rstanding, computational linguistic, and network dynamics to name a few.
The advanced analytic development must adhere to the COIC architectural criteria, which
parallels the CLOUD
-
based concepts supported by the larger DOD and IC communities. These
solu
tions should result in improvements in identifying all aspects of threat networks activities,
supporting rapid analysis, understanding of social /cultural aspects of threat network, and ability
to push relevant data quickly to expeditionary forces.

The f
inal topic supports the rapidly delivery of data to the end
-
user at the edge and the methods
for capturing information back into the architecture. JIEDDO seeks technology to deliver
relevant data via mobile and small form factor devices and to receive cri
tical data from the field
for integration into the enterprise. While this problem has several other important factors like
security, the DOD and IC already has related projects in these areas. JIEDDO is specifically
interested in dealing with methodologi
es for determining relevancy of data and how to rapidly
disseminate this information. The solution must deal both text and imagery data deliver. A
second component to this solution seeks innovation in how data should be displayed in small
form factors de
vices without significant redesign of code for these domains. The desired
solutions will result in improvements in rapid dissemination of data, seamless data sharing, and
rapid analysis for emerging operational environments.


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Appendix
C
:
Detection Requirements

18

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35


APPENDIX C: DETECTION REQUIREMENTS

JIEDDO defines Detection as the ability to determine the location of emplaced IEDs and IED
components through the purposed collection of observables in order to enable greater
freedom of maneuver.
JIEDDO detection requirements are primarily focused on thr
ee areas;
detection of: buried IEDs (see section
1
), person
-
/vehicle
-
borne IEDs (see section
2
), and
sensitive radio frequency (RF) emissions (see section
3
).

1.

DETECTION OF BURIED IEDS

Buri
ed IEDs are emplaced on or under the ground with the intent to detonate them beneath
vehicles and personnel. They are used on roadways, thoroughfares and choke points where
intended victims are likely to pass. Emplacements vary widely, but burial depth oft
en
corresponds with the net explosive weight of the device (i.e. larger devices will be emplaced
more deeply or in culverts). The explosive charge is typically a low metal device, consisting
of homemade explosives in a plastic or fabric container. Devices
are often emplaced in or
near features that screen their signatures and channel traffic over them such as washouts,
culverts, curves and choke points.

The most common initiators for buried IEDs are pressure switches and command wires.
Pressure switches clo
se a contact when compressed under a wheel or foot. They are
emplaced under light overburden within ten feet of the main charge. Frequent association
and proximity of pressure switches to buried charges enable detection strategies that address
either IED

component or the wire that connects them. Command wires lead from a remote
firing point to the main charge in the path of the intended victim. The wire is often
concealed, and may be partially or entirely buried.

Common pressure switches are fabricate
d from lightweight conductive components that are
held apart by non
-
conductive flexible or collapsible spacers. Common components are nails,
foil, dual conductor wires and commercial pressure switches. Metal content is deliberately
minimized. Other comp
onents associated with pressure switches are batteries and
occasionally radio controlled arming devices. These components may be co
-
located with the
switch or concealed elsewhere

and connected with wire leads.

Similarly, IEDs are frequently carried by
humans or in motor vehicles, to support suicide
-
bombing goals. Suicide bombs typically involve an explosive charge, fragments, and a
human
-
operated initiator. Not surprisingly, these devices are very difficult to detect because
the devices are very easy
to conceal, and because person
-

and vehicle
-
anomalies are very
difficult to unambiguously correlate with the presence of an IED.

Detected IEDs via mounted, dismounted, or check point operations is a significant challenge.
To support these missions, JIEDDO

seeks solutions in the following areas:

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-

Capabilities for detecting IEDs during mounted and dismounted
operations with integrated devices that are reduced in size and weight, so
that they can be worn or hand
-
held. These devices will enable units to
displa
y/control a myriad of sensor inputs in a fused network via a common
controller. This may include enhanced optics for surveillance, and
potentially bio
-
inspired micro
-
sensors.
For mounted operations, devices
should provide for detection at convoy speeds w
ith devices that can be
supported on multiple vehicles.

-

Tools and methodologies for determining the location of emplaced IEDs
and IED components from safe stand
-
off distances. This may include
detection of water
-
borne IEDs, as well as human
-
safe methods
for
detecting IEDs concealed on humans or in motor vehicles. Devices should
be able to demonstrate high reliability, low false alarm rates, and should
allow for detection of low metallic devices.

-

Algorithms, fusion methodologies, and other tools and metho
ds to allow
for the sharing of IED detection data at the tactical edge. Tools and
technologies of this kind will operate within the fusion/sensor
management framework that JIEDDO is currently developing to support
counter PBIED and VBIED efforts, but will

not necessarily be limited to
use at checkpoints. These technologies will provide a common operating
picture, for improved situational awareness, that can be shared with DoD
partners or other federal agencies. These technologies should have a small
form
-
factor, so that they are versatile across a range of missions.

-

Technologies and methods for collecting IED and IED component
observables, from captured enemy materials. This will include capturing
and cataloging enemy materials, and then exploiting the m
aterials, through
several methods, to understand the IED manufacturing, emplacement, and
initiation processes.

-

Technologies and methods for detecting IEDs from ISR air platforms.
Provide for integration of airborne ISR systems with semi
-
autonomous
airborn
e systems.

Detecting buried IEDs is a significant technical challenge. JIEDDO

s is seeking proposals
for technologies to: directly detect the device in situ; detect emplacers and emplacement
activities; and detect signs of emplacement, by change detec
tion or by identifying the
characteristic signatures of an emplacement. Capabilities are required for dismounted
personnel, vehicles, unmanned vehicles and aircraft. Partially or fully automated threat
identification will be required in most operational
scenarios; white papers should provide a
clear discussion of the automated threat identification approach proposed. Proposals to
develop automated threat recognition software or operator interfaces independent of a sensor
will be considered.

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Principal
performance metrics for buried IED detection are probability of detection (P
d
), false
alarm rate (FAR), rate of advance, stand
-
off distance from the target, ease of use and
compatibility to available platforms (e.g. size, weight, power, durability, etc.).

Ground
detection requires that the sensor payload be operated by coalition forces, either on foot or in
military vehicles (e.g. Husky, MRAP). The minimum safe detection range, performance and
search rate vary with the operation. There are several signif
icant types of detection
operations addressed in this BAA:



Route Clearance operations are intended to find and remove threats on frequently
travelled routes. While advancing along the route, the clearance team directs its
attention to discovering threats
; near likely threat locations, it may proceed at a slow
pace as required by current sensors. Detection systems intended for route clearance
require that threats be automatically nominated with high P
d

in time for the operator to
stop, and that the false
alarm rate (FAR) be low enough to permit reasonable forward
progress as determined by the mission and operators. Route clearance rates are lower
than desired, so additional consideration will be given to sensors and systems that
operate with low false ala
rm rates or at stand
-
off distances that permit higher search
rates.



Tactical and convoy operations require higher speeds and demand more of the
operator’s attention, so detection systems need to automatically find and identify threats
independent of the op
erator at a distance that accommodates the vehicle speed. Tactical
and convoy scenarios may require a forward
-
looking, or closely linked, airborne system.
A lower P
d

may be tolerated.



Detection of buried IEDs from the air benefits all ground forces regardl
ess of mission,

but success of an airborne system depends on: meeting the size, weight and power
requirements of the proposed platform; availability of the platform; search rate; rapid
communication of IED nominations to ground forces; and viability of the

required
search CONOPS. Special consideration will be given to disturbance, wire, emplacer
and IED detection capabilities that can be fielded on small, high density UAV
platforms.

All viable solutions must exploit signatures that are robust, distinct and
persistent. The
technical challenges include: penetration through air, pavement, and soil; identification of
target signatures in clutter; identification of a wide variety of target materials, depths and
shapes; automated threat detection; variations in s
ensor perspective and environment;
compatibility with other systems; and mitigation of collateral effects on friendly forces,
civilians, and electronic infrastructure
.

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2.

DETECTION OF PERSON
-
BORNE AND VEHICLE
-
BORNE IEDs

2.1.

Background

T
he challenge in person
-
born
e IED (PBIED) detection and verification is that it
requires fast, multimodal, surreptitious interrogation of each individual at a checkpoint
or in a moving, unstructured crowd (e.g. in a market square), from a standoff distance.
Vendors should assume the

operational environment is permissive, but the crowds are
uncooperative.

Stand
-
off


means that both the operator and the sensor performing the
PBIED detection and verification operate at a distance that substantially mitigates
personal and operational risk should the PBIED detonate. The stand
-
off distance will
vary depending on the scen
ario.

The challenge in vehicle
-
borne IED (VBIED) detection and verification is fast,
multimodal, surreptitious interrogation of a moving vehicle in traffic or at a checkpoint,
from a stand
-
off distance. Vendors should assume the operational environment is

permissive, but the traffic is uncooperative.
Stand
-
off means that both the operator and
the sensor performing the VBIED detection and verification operate at a distance that
substantially mitigates personal and operational risk should the VBIED detonate
. The
stand
-
off distance will vary depending on the scenario.

JIEDDO seeks components and system
-
of
-
systems technologies that will measurably
improve DoD capabilities to detect PBIEDs or VBIEDs. Proposals can include, for
example, human
-
safe anomaly and
explosive detection capabilities, detection and target
recognition algorithms, fusion concepts and algorithms, and user
-
friendly displays.

Due to interference, clutter, occlusion, system capabilities and limitations, potentially
large numbers of individual
s, traffic speed and active countermeasures, no single
system provides the desired sensor coverage and detection confidence to address every
operational situation in either the counter
-
PBIED or the counter
-
VBIED fight.
Accordingly, JIEDDO is structuring i
ts counter
-
PBIED and counter
-
VBIED
investments to build a modular, expandable system capability, enabling JIEDDO and
Service managers to integrate components and systems as necessary to achieve desired
probabilities of detection (P
d
) and false alarm (P
fa
).

Thus, all developed software
components will be non
-
proprietary and compliant with a JIEDDO
-
specified
architecture, and will be built taking into account standards established by the Security
Equipment Interoperability Working Group (SEIWG).

2.2.

Counter
-
PBIE
D/
-
VBIED proposals should address one of the following areas:

2.2.1.

Single
-

and multi
-
sensor aided or automated threat detection
. Single
-

and
multi
-
sensor systems (hardware and software) are desired. To support detection
of PBIEDs in an operational environment
, threat assessment algorithms must be
able to exploit very short sensor dwell times (i.e., no longer than one second)
JIEDDO BAA 12
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and provide real time threat assessment. Simultaneous screening of multiple
targets is desired. Proposed solutions should measurably en
hance state
-
of
-
art
capabilities (i.e., increased P
d

and decreased P
fa
). Confidence values should be
included for weighting sensor inputs to fusion algorithms.

Proposals for detection algorithm development should describe methods for
exploiting sensor data to extract threat features in an automated fashion to
reduce operator decision cycle; for example, automatically isolating anomalous
regions in 2D or 3D multis
pectral imagery.

JIEDDO is seeking intelligent decision fusion engines for combining multiple
sensor threat assessments and confidence values to improve overall P
d

and
minimize P
fa
. Additionally, JIEDDO is also seeking other types of fusion
engines that
operate directly on fused data (e.g., images), rather than solely on
detection probabilities.

Proposed solutions should address data transformation. For example, data
captured by sensors at different ranges and look angles need to be transformed
to correc
t for perspective and parallax.

2.2.2.

PBIED threat detection and verification sensor technologies
. Screening and
interrogation of all individuals in a moving, unstructured crowd, requires
human
-
safe sensors with a wide field of regard to quickly detect and id
entify
persons of interest, as well as sensors with small fields of regard and fast slew
rates (on the order of milliseconds), or with the ability to screen multiple targets
simultaneously, to quickly interrogate specific individuals. Typically PBIED
sens
ors of this kind fall into two distinct categories: (1) sensors that detect

anomalies

, such as concealed objects, etc., and (2) sensors that identify
energetic materials, or the other components of an IED.

2.2.3.

VBIED threat detection and verification sensor

technologies.
In order to
screen and interrogate all vehicles moving past a fixed point in traffic, human
-
safe sensors are needed to quickly identify contaminated vehicles (i.e., vehicle
triage), and to then quickly interrogate specific volumes in vehicl
es of interest
with both detection and confirmation technologies. Given the ranges at which
some of these technologies are effective, collocation with the operator may not
be an option. In these cases, proposals must discuss feasible camouflage and
conce
alment concepts for cities and villages in theater. As with PBIED sensors,
VBIED sensors of this kind include anomaly detectors, and detectors that
identify energetic materials, or the other components of an IED.

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2.2.4.

Tracking technologies.
Algorithms to trac
k all individuals in the area of
coverage are of interest. Capabilities to hand off individual tracks from one
sensor to another are required, particularly when overlapping fields of coverage
are not available.

a.

PBIED
-
specific video analytics capabilities
. Capabilities to detect and track
specific objects, e.g. person
-
carried and leave
-
behind bags, backpacks,
unusual clothing, etc., in highly cluttered backgrounds are needed.

b.

VBIED
-
specific video analytics capabilities. Capabilities to detect and track
specific vehicle attributes, e.g. color, shape, damage, rust, decals, etc., in
highly cluttered backgrounds are needed.

2.3.

All Counter
-
PBIED/
-
VBIED proposals should include:

2.3.1.

Description of key detection signatures or observables, as well as data and
statist
ical treatment to support why the signatures are unique and reliable.
Proposals that include modeling, observations and analysis, or preliminary test
data supporting the existence of a strong observable will be given preference.

2.3.2.

Information or empirical d
ata on system vulnerabilities will greatly assist
JIEDDO in assessing how and where the proposed solution best supports
warfighter needs.

2.3.3.

Description of sources of false alarm, and how false alarm sources will be
mitigated.

2.3.4.

Description of expected Pd and P
fa, and their dependence on operational
conditions, (e.g., range, environmental conditions, crowd density, variations in
body type, etc.) are required. For existing technologies, proposers are
encouraged to provide test data in support of the expected perf
ormance of the
proposed detection system.

2.3.5.

A clear statement of the current and end
-
state technical maturity of the primary
detection methods.

2.3.6.

Interoperability in a radio
-
frequency jamming environment

2.3.7.

Collateral effects (e.g. human exposure limits), and any other issue relevant to
the integration of the proposed system into a military operating environment.

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3.

DETECTION OF SENSITIVE RF (SeRF) EMISSIONS

3.1.

Background

JIEDDO is seeking detection and neutralization capabilities for
Radio Controlled IED
(RCIED)
s
.
RCIEDs are IEDs initiated electronically in a wireless method consisting of
a transmitter and receiver (e.g. personal mobile radios, cell phone, cordless phone,

pager, etc.)

There are several technologies which can improve the performance of both
neutralize and detection
Counter
-
RCIED capabilities including:



Dynamic reconfigurable antennas



Innovative waveforms



Automatic target recognition systems and algorithms



Specific and general sensor fusion algorithms



User
-
friendly graphical user interfaces (GUI) with crisper image resolution



Operator cueing to detected
RCIEDs



Increased effective stand
-
off range



Methods to improve functional capability for dismounted forces



Multiple, orthogonal sensors to improve the probability of detection and reduce
the false alarm rate



Modeling & simulation (M&S) analyses to conduct mission planning, to train
users to operate the system, and to predict performance and limitations of
exis
ting and proposed capabilities to pre
-
empt evolving threats.

Proposed solutions should address RCIED detection and neutralization capabilities for
either mounted or dismounted operations that operate at safe stand
-
off distances.

3.2.

Nature of the RCIED Threat

3.2.1.

Location. RCIEDs are located along routes/paths where military forces are
likely to transit (e.g. roadways and pathways, choke points, washouts, culverts,
craters from previous IED blasts, and curves in roadways).

3.2.2.

Components Placement. Most RCIED compone
nts (i.e. the main charge, the
initiator/blasting cap, the container, the electric power source, and
enhancements) are buried under or along the route of traffic where: the main
charge is likely to cause the greatest number of casualties and damage/destro
y
the most military equipment; and near terrain features that camouflage their
presence. However, RCIED receivers are normally not buried. Insurgents place
the receivers on or above ground where they have line
-
of
-
sight visibility to
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ensure good connectiv
ity. They normally carry or pre
-
position the RCIED
transmitter in an area that he has good observation of the intended attack zone.

3.2.3.

Fabrication Materials. RCIED components are fabricated from easily procured,
commercially available power sources, electro
nic components, and associated
materials. Offerors with appropriate security clearances are invited to make use
of the JIEDDO Reading Room to gather information on the nature of the actual
RCIED threat components encountered in the current theater of oper
ations.

3.2.4.

Combinations of RCIED Switches. Insurgents frequently use combinations of
arming and switching devices to complicate the efforts of U.S. forces to detect
and neutralize the RCIEDs.

3.3.

Typical SeRF Detection Operations

Mounted and dismounted forces ar
e continuously vulnerable to RCIEDs during
patrolling, convoy and route clearance operations. Consequently, they require both
counter
-
RCIED capabilities to maximize their mobility and their mission effectiveness.
Airborne platforms can support ground for
ces on patrolling, convoy and route clearance
missions. Both mounted and dismounted forces conduct deliberate route clearance
operations to detect the location of RCIEDs.

3.3.1.

Patrolling Operations. Patrolling operations gather situational awareness,
intellig
ence and demonstrate warfighter presence within the area of
responsibility. During patrolling missions, dismounted forces move at walking
speeds (e.g. 2

4 mph).

3.3.2.

Convoy Operations. Tactical convoy operations require higher speeds of
advance and demand more

of the operator’s attention. During convoy missions,
mounted forces move quickly (e.g. 25

35 mph) to minimize exposure to enemy
fire. Consequently, RCIED detection systems need to automatically identify
and geolocate RCIED threats independent of operato
r actions at a safe distance
that accommodates the vehicle speed.

3.3.3.

Deliberate Route Clearance Operations. Route Clearance operations find and
remove IED threats on frequently travelled routes. Route Clearance teams
concentrate on discovering threats at sa
fe standoff distances and proceed at a
slower pace to enable current sensors to geolocate the IED threats more
accurately. During deliberate route clearance missions, both types of forces
move more slowly as the mission requires (e.g. 5

10 mph for mounted

operations, and 0.5

2 mph for dismounted operations).

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3.4.

Platforms.

JIEDDO is seeking counter
-
RCIED solutions that may be integrated onto airborne and
ground vehicles, or carried by individual soldiers. The following general
considerations effect platform s
election: size, weight, power required, detection rate,
and type of operation. Specific considerations for the various platforms include:

3.4.1.

Dismounted force mobility generally confines counter
-
RCIED capabilities to a
handheld or pocket
-
size device. Individ
ual soldiers are normally required to
wear helmet with night vision goggles, protective vest, uniform, and weapon.

3.4.2.

Mounted force mobility is normally more accommodating in terms of size and
weight. For this type of platform the counter
-
RCIED capability is

normally
constrained by electrical power available and compatibility with other electronic
equipment on the platform.

3.4.3.

Integration on airborne platforms depends heavily on the payload capacity (size
and weight) and endurance of the vehicle. Available powe
r and compatibility
with other on
-
board systems are also key concerns. Finally, operational altitude
of the air platform must be considered (e.g. manned platforms will not operate
at extremely low altitudes).

3.5.

Performance Parameters
. Proposed counter
-
RCIED

technologies should achieve the
following performance parameters:

3.5.1.

Probability of detection/neutralization (as appropriate)

=

0.90, with a probability
of false alarm = 0.10.

3.5.2.

Location accuracy of 1 meter at maximum detection distance.

3.5.3.

Provide detection/ne
utralization capability at a safe stand
-
off distance, while
travelling at the appropriate speed for the intended vehicle and operation (e.g.
patrolling, convoy or route clearance operations).

3.5.4.

Easily and inconspicuously integrate onto their intended vehicle
, and be
compatible with existing electronic systems (e.g. communications, jammers,
etc.). Systems must be ruggedized to withstand operation on the intended
vehicle and environment.

3.5.5.

Provide automated threat detection/neutralization capability to the
maximum
extent possible, to minimize operator workload. Alerts and information
provided to the user should be clear and easily understood by a non
-
expert.

3.5.6.

Technologies must be safe not only for the operator, but also any blue force or
indigenous personnel

that may be in the operational range of the system.

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3.5.7.

Systems should

be
operable and maintainable by a typical soldier with no more
than two weeks of training.


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-
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APPENDIX D: COUNTER
-
DEVICE
REQUIREMENTS

JIEDDO defines
Counter
-
device

as

the ability to neutralize IEDs before detonation or mitigate
t
he effects following detonation

in order to reduce effective attacks
, and
includ
es the means to:
d
isabl
e

IED delivery systems in multiple environme
nts
; m
itigat
e the

effects of IED attacks on
dismount
ed

and mounted

forces; and n
eutraliz
e

water
-
borne IEDs (
WBIED
).
This requirement
also includes any new or improved means to deny or detect the tampering with road culverts for
the purpose of emplacing I
EDs.

JIEDDO is seeking solutions that provide the following:

1.

Counter
-
Device

capabilities.

1.1.

Integrated systems of various and different neutralization capabilities (System of
Systems approach) with the ability to neutralize or disable a broad spectrum of th
reat
devices and systems at various distances.

1.2.

Systems capable of targeting and neutralizing IEDs specifically and precisely, prior to
them functioning as intended, for both mounted and dismounted applications. This may
include fused detection and neutr
alization capabilities. This may also include enhanced
neutralization options using remotely operated vehicles (ROV) capable of precise tool
placement and direct manipulation of the IED and/or its components. Applications to
the water
-
borne IED (WBIED) p
roblem (surface and underwater) are strongly desired.

1.3.

Systems to disable IED delivery systems (including humans), in various environments,
using lethal or non
-
lethal weapon technology. Methods of countering WBIEDs, vehicle
-
borne IEDs (VBIEDs) and suicide
personnel/vehicle
-
borne IEDs (SVBIEDs), including
surgically
-
implanted IEDs, are of particular interest. The ability to neutralize or disable
such IEDs without loss of the delivery system and without collateral damage to
surrounding infrastructure or popu
lace is strongly desired. In particular, a non
-
lethal
capability of detecting and neutralizing surgically implanted IEDs is required. For
SVBIEDs (including surgically
-
implanted IEDS) methods to
physically and

electromagnetically isolate a

suspect
and

prevent the suspect from tak
ing any further
action are
required.

A hazardous
-
dud designation capability (i.e. to detect and indicate
that device is “duded” but remains hazardous) is also strongly desired.

1.4.

Systems to disable or otherwise stop a VBIED (i
ncluding a water
-
borne vehicle) at long
-
range, and without lethal effect on the occupant(s). In particular, n
on
-
lethal interdiction
technologies to isolate, neutralize, and secure VBIEDs at stand
-
off distances are desired.
In situations where the false a
larm rate is not sufficiently low, commanders require
alternatives to kinetic enga
gement. Methods to
physically and electro
magnetically
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isolate a suspect vehicle and prevent any occupant from
taking any further action are
required.

Potential applications

include (but are not limited to) protection for: entry
control points (ECP), FOBs, critical infrastructure, observation posts and dismounted
units.

1.5.

Focused methods to detect and neutralize WBIEDs or hull
-
emplaced IEDs and the
swimmers that may emplace

them. Counter
-
swimmer technology is of great interest.
Solutions are sought for all
water operational environments

(i.e. open water, ports, etc.),
for vessel protection (at
-
sea and in port) and for both surface and underwater
applications. Underwater t
hreat detection and cueing systems that include mobile,
highly
-
autonomous threat investigation, identification and targeting capability are
strongly desired.

1.6.

Systems to mitigate the effects of IED attacks on mounted and dismounted units. This
may include
improved (lighter and more effective against a blast) armor for personnel
and platforms relative to existing systems; fire and abrasion protection; and technology
to reduce and otherwise mitigate the results of traumatic brain injury.

1.7.

Human signature explo
itation methods. Highly accurate and precise methods that assess
a human

s recent exposure

(i.e.
days to weeks) to specific explosive materials. JIEDDO
desires human
-
safe point and standoff detection methods that will enable operators to
distinguish betw
een civilians who are contaminated as a result of living in a
contaminated environment and suspects who have significant contamination caused by
repeated close contact with explosives. Proposals should lay out a short
-
term roadmap
toward an inexpensive, h
ighly effective field test. Previous experience in executing
science and engineering for disposable assays should be highlighted.

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Appendix E: Homemade Explosives Requirements

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APPENDIX E: HOMEMADE EXPLOSIVES (HME) REQUIREMENTS

J
IEDDO defines
the
HME

requirement
as “The ability to locate, avoid, and neutralize IEDs
containing non
-
standard explosive compounds in order to reduce effective attacks
.
” In the
context of this Capability Gap, a homemade explosive is defined to be an expl
osive that isn’t a
traditional commercial or military explosive. Due to
its

nature, HME
varies

in
its

explosive
characteristics, chemical/physical properties, and persistence/provenance under different
environmental conditions and threat scenarios. Comme
rcial and military explosives that have
been adulterated, adapted or modified for use in alternative, or improvised, manners are not
considered HME. That being said, standard commercial and military grade explosives are often
used in IEDs

as

explosive com
ponents other than the main charge. This section, though focused
on HME is looking for novel approaches regardless of explosive type. In this BAA, JIEDDO is
seeking capabilities to:
improve sensor capabilities to detect HME

(see section
1
);
detect and
disrupt
HME
supply chains

(see section
2
); and
render HME precursors unsuitable/less detonable

(see section
3
).

1.

IMPROVE SENSOR CAPABILITIES TO DETECT HME

Explosives

detection poses a difficult challenge for a variety of reasons. Chemical and
physical factors such as low volatility, variable composition and sensitivity to environmental
factors (
e.g
. relative humidity) are a few examples that compound the issue of det
ection.
Operational factors such as detector/sensor portability, time
required
to detect/identif
y
,
battery life, etc. add to the detection problem.

Device development that results in the detection of HME and HME precursors at greater
distances is of inter
est to JIEDDO. Improvements to detection include higher sensor
sensitivity with dismounted (handheld) systems and the increased ability of the systems to
detect emplaced (deployed) HME charges at greater distances.

JIEDDO is interested in novel or improve
d methods of HME detection, identification and
confirmation. Exploitation methods and signature elucidation need not be confined to
electromagnetic radiation
-
based techniques (e.g. Raman spectroscopy, infrared absorption,
laser
-
induced fluorescence). Ion

techniques (
e.g.
mass spectroscopy
[
MS
] or
ion mobility
spectroscopy

[
IMS
]
), fast chromatographic techniques, au
tomated colorimetric
techniques
and

etc.
,

will also be considered. Real
-
time detection
is preferred
, but near
-
real
-
time
capabilities may be
acceptable provided a particular CONOPS is being addressed. Stand
-
off
detectors are desired, but sensitive, lightweight, ultra
-
portable point detectors will also be
considered. Regardless of detection technique,
a statement regarding perceived operationa
l
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uses or operational scenarios of a proposed detector or instrument is required
. Combined
filtering/detection modalities with proven, rapid detection/identification capabilities and
interferent rejection will also be considered. Man
-
portable systems and

fixed systems with
checkpoint applications will be considered. Detector compatibility with military sensor
networks is desired, but not required.

2.

DETECT OR
DISRUPT
HME
SUPPLY CHAINS

JIEDDO is interested in developing methods that lead to an increased frequency of HME
supply chain interdiction and disruption events. HME and HME precursors can be
interdicted through the appropriate use of tagging, tracking and locating (TTL) materials.

TTL is defined as any method by which an HME or precursor material’s history or location
can be traced

or determined
. Precursor materials are any chemicals or reactants used to
synthesize explosives or enhance the blast effects of explosives. Studies t
hat determine the
chemical, electrical, magnetic and physical signatures of HME or
precursor

materials during
their smuggling and transport, which will aid detection and future capability development,
are of interest. For example, more information is need
ed to determine what chemicals or
other markers would be appropriate to determine a material or mixture’s history.

(Methods
to find and fix
HME network nodes
,

financiers, illicit
wholesalers

or retailers of precursor
materials
, manufacturers, suppliers,

t
ransporters, distributors, trainers,
bomb makers
,
intelligence, operations
, leaders
, etc. may be submitted in response to
Requir
ement B:
Counter
-
Threat Network
.
)

Proposed TTL improvements may be novel or can enhance the probability of detection
through the

use of existing s
ensor mechanisms and modalities.

General additives and
methods that enhance the probability of illicit use detection and HME identification are also
desired. Potential additives may alter the physical or chemical properties of the HME i
n such
a way as to increase a signature that can be exploited. Additives and methods intended for
inclusion during manufacturing or
special use

will be considered. A safety assessment with
respect to manufacturing inclusions or
special use
of the additiv
e should be clearly stated.

Other TTL considerations may include, but are not be limited to: increasing stand
-
off
distances,
special use

applications, instrument footprint reduction, sensor/detector battery life,
instrument automation and real time data tr
ansfer.

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3.

RENDER HME PRECURSORS UNSUITABLE/LESS DETONABLE

Nitrate fert
ilizer
s

may be processed into
HME
.

T
he desire is to
disrupt such processing to
increase the logistical and time burdens associated with the illicit processing of chemicals
into HMEs.


Additives and methods intended for inclusion during manufacturing are desired. Additives
intended for use may resemble HME precursors and possess similar bulk chemical and
physical properties (e.g. similar bulk density or viscosity).
A
dditives may be tar
geted toward
explosive output reduction, increasing HME processing burdens, altering the chemistry
expected during processing into HME or rapidly decreasing
HME

shelf life of bulk materials
(without leading to unintended detonation). A safety assessment w
ith respect to

manufacturing inclusion,
storage (on person, in vehicle, etc.), toxicity and reactivity of the
additive should be clearly stated.

In the event that manufacturing dilutants are proposed, a statement addressing the impact on
the legitimate end

user of the product should be included. For example, if the proposal
involves increasing the relative amount of
a dil
u
tant

during
manufacturing, a statement
summarizing the perceived impact to the agricultural user should be included (i.e. a 10%
increase

in
dilutant

mass fraction would require an additional 10% increase in mass fertilizer
per area coverage to maintain an equivalent agronomic value)
.

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Appendix
G
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APPENDIX
G
: WEAPONS TECHNICAL

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS


JIEDDO defines
Weapons Technical Intelligence

(WTI)

category of intelligence and process
derived from the technical and forensic exploitation of IEDs, associated components, and other
weapon systems.

In

this BAA, JIEDDO is seeking solutions
for the following WTI capabilities
:




Capture, transmit, and receive biometric data and watch list information
;

o

capture biometric data

rapidly
;

o

capture biometric data

at stand
-
off distances
;

o

capture biometric data

from
non
-
cooperative subjects
;

o

capturing biometric data

in various conditions and environments
;

o

automatically proce
ss and match captured biometric data

in near real
-
time
.

o

Ruggedize and reduce in size lab equipment to enable labs to be more mobile.



Certifi
ed Modular Hazardous Materials Shipment C
ontainer
;

o

Department of Transportation (DoT) and Department of Defense (DoD) air
transport certified.

o

e
nable air shipment of explosive samples, detonators and residue aboard civil
ian
and military cargo aircraft;


o

mo
dular design
s

based on shipment requ
irements and load configuration;

o

i
nclude a plan for obtaining the appropriate DoT/DoD testing and approval.



Provide enhanced communications to enhance management, reliably fuse and transfer
WTI data
;

o

i
nclude integration
of all technologies that collect, submit, and analyze items of
interest
;

o

o
perate in band
-
width limited situations
;

o

p
rovide networks and platforms (handheld/mobile devices) capable of both
capturing and supplying information to as well as receiving informat
ion from the
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larger community that can be deployed with individual mounted and dismounted
soldiers
;

o

p
ersist WTI data in an intelligible, searchable form
;

o

t
rack captured enemy materials to support host
-
nation operations and proceedings
.



















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