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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM THEORY IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES;
for
presentation at the 18
th

NISPAcee Annual Conference, Working Group on PA Reform,
submitted by Donald E. Fuller, Senior Lecturer, Anglo
-
American University, Pr
ague
, Czech
Republic, April, 2010.

To reform requires a theory. But what would be a reform theory for public administration? We
may consider the past: New Public Management, Max Weber, Herbert Simon, Washington
Consensus,
homo economicus,
World Bank Indicat
ors, rule of law. These have all surfaced
along with many others.


What are the issues? What are we trying to reform? Favorite examples include corruption,
coordination, predictability, uncertainty, fairness, justice, conflicting values, cultural bias.

What
research plausibly affects public administration? Social Psychology,
1

cognitive dissonance,
incentives, moral hazard, repeated trials,
status,
altruism, greed, norms, rules, governance/good
governance,
2

all come to mind.


We cannot propose solut
ions without discussing inputs. What brings about reform? History,
revolution, change in circumstances, intolerable conditions, desire for change, precipitating
events, crises, failed states, market failure, and others occur. History reports significant

events
such as the French Revolution, 1789; multiple European revolutions, 1848; Bolshevik
Revolution, 1917; end of World War II, 1945; disturbances in Poland and East Germany, 1953;
Hungarian Revolution, 1956; disturbances in France, 1968; Velvet Revolut
ion, 1989. Any
pattern? Change occurred in response to state violence.
3

Reform in public administration
typically occurs without violence. The nexus links frequently, but not always to politics.
Weber’s bureaucracy grew from statism. Herbert Simon’s
views grew from mathematical
economics.
4

Public Choice emerged from Mancur Olson and economic epistemology; New
Public Management grew from neo
-
liberalism, particularly market values to the right on the
political spectrum including Reagan and Thatcher;

Patronage yielded to meritocracy with a
revulsion to corruption. Yet problems continue.





1

See Sobis, I. and de Vries, M. (2009), “Restoring Professionalism: What Can Public Administration Learn from
Social Psychology?” paper presented for the 17
th

NISPAcee Conference, Budva, Montenegro, May 14
-
16.

2

The United
Nations defines governance as “…the process of decision
-
making and the process by which decisions
are implemented (or not implemented), UNESCAP (2009), “What Is Good Governance?” accessed on June 2, 2009,
at
http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp
; also see Drechsler, W. (2004),
“Governance, Good Governance, and Government: The Case for Estonian Administrative Capacity,”
TRAMES, 4,
388
-
396.

3

Whether psychological, political, authoritarian or physical.

4

Among a number of influences. See Simon, H. (1997),
Administrative Behavior,
4
th

ed.. The Free Press.

2


Theoretical bases encountered ill fits. Marxism, as interpreted by Lenin, could not work;
5

Schumpeter’s creative destruction depended on market equilibrium rather

than serious recession;
Weber’s model had contradictions as pointed out by Simon; New Public Management cannot
manage a non
-
market entity; public choice gets entwined in
homo economicus;
neo
-
liberalism
assumes trickle down economics is inviolate; post
-
mod
ernism lacks coordination and control.
New conceptualization is needed. This chapter works in that direction. Yet conceptualization
labors unless problems are identified. These include corruption, personalized power, non
-
transparency, arrogance, ethic
al and moral fragility, conflicts of interest, principal/agent
inversion, pseudo
-
administration (bean counters), malfeasance and illegality, abuse of power.
What
themes
do these problems suggest? Moral hazard, poor incentives, unintended
consequences, los
s of confidence, greed, cognitive dissonance, nefarious rewards, contagion, loss
of trust, instability come to mind. Using the latter as independent variables, we could build
models relating to solution of problems such as the above.


POTENTIAL MODELS

So
me would argue for an
equilibrium

model in which a steady state would be pursued.
Feedback would realign variables to reduce uncertainty and disruption. This might be the
Nordic

model. Yet, if equilibrium is the objective, Ford would have produced faste
r horses
rather than produce an automobile. Others would argue that most public administration reform
has paralleled exogenous political, economic and social conditions. Nevertheless, despite
poverty, unemployment and unemployability, different states ha
ve produced different welfare
models for the same problem. Bismarck hoped to deter the likelihood of communism by
initiating a welfare program. It didn’t work. Was it the market that deterred communism? Not
really. Yet Marx had complained to Engels

that the proletariat had become bourgeois. Engels
replied that the capitalists were paying more money in wages. Is that still true? The Asians like
managed democracies. They now challenge western democracies with their own brand of
capitalism. Pub
lic administration there is top down. Was Weber right? The tradeoff is between
liberty, rights and material well being. The west, in 2008
-
2009, scores very low on these
outcomes.


The
Rhinish
6

model concentrates on material well being at the social s
afety net level while
espousing less interest in liberty and rights. The
Anglo
-
Saxon
7

model prefers rule of law and
trickle down economics. Public administration tends to follow these models plus the Nordic



5

Przeworski, A. (1991),
Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Refo
rms in Eastern Europe and Latin
America,
New York: Cambridge University Press,

ISBN 0
-
521
-
42335 X.

6
Social democracies that are essentially welfare states, located on the European continent.

7

UK, Ireland, U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

3


model with some exceptions; the Germans prefer

the
rechsstaat
8
,
the French like their national
champions, but the focus is still on redistribution of income. Central Europe has adopted the
post
-
communist model: path dependent on the social safety net, yet resembling populist models
with neglect of c
ivil service systems. Eastern Europe departs very little from prior statist models
during communist days with the current failings of a dominant party or coalition. Civil service
systems resemble patronage systems without tenure
9
. When specialists are
hired, they leapfrog
the “technical core” and follow their ministers to new ministries unless the party or coalition
loses, pushing technical cores out on the street.
10


CORRELATION MODELS


While not necessarily causal, the above themes suggest that pub
lic administration is linked to
political change, particularly ideological. As political changes occur, concepts flow into public
administration. Accordingly, we examine political, economic and social change in the 21
st

century to extricate potential de
terminative factors. There are three: one each for politics,
economics and society.


POLITICS


While the world is not flat, with respects to Tom Friedman, the challenge now, since the
beginning of the millennium, is how to deal with
countervailing forc
es

exacerbated by
globalization. These include insurgency, multipolar world, the west’s dependency on oil and gas
and Russia’s need to sell it; post
-
colonial Africa, sustainable environment, radically changing
demography, immigration, realignments in the
United Nations, the rise of the BRICs;
11

weapons
of mass destruction, decline of print communications; internet.


ECONOMICS





8

A law b
ased state.

9

They tend to be
pro forma,
legislated, but not implemented.

10

Post
-
communist bureaucrats have discovered the need to form think tanks or NGOs as employment insurance.
Their funding can be opaque.

11

Brazil, Russia, India and China.

4


Globalization continues to increase the gap between rich and poor; emergence of the knowledge
society challenges a demography of nin
e billion people peaking in 2050; the world recession
plunges middle classes into despair; labor markets are divided between those with globalized
skills and those with few, if any skills; women in much of the world have become an underclass;
hunger, dise
ase and sickness numbs children and adults in substantial parts of the world; human
capital is restrained by markets and under investing states; rich states subsidize their
commodities at the expense of the poor states; global networks reduce capacities
of nation states;
criminal activity siphons productive resources from economic capacity; market failures cause
state interventions with decreasing returns.


SOCIETY


Several nations
12

are seeking self government lacking state boundaries; health care varies

from
none to high quality without comprehensive distribution to populations; developed country
populations are ageing while developing countries are young; adults are living longer changing
the population pyramid; labor markets are unable to sustain reti
rees while depriving useful
employment to ageing workers
13
; migrants seek work in semi
-
hostile environments while
occasionally abandoning the care of children to others; single parents increase steadily; education
varies from useless to high quality even
w
ithin

countries; knowledge society has not been
internalized in most states.


PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION “PATHOLOGIES” CENTRAL TO REFORM BARRIERS


Marx assumed that in democratic, capitalist countries, the government constituted the central
committee of capitalist governance. He had argued that materialism had provided the foundation
for government’s superstructure. Therefore, liberal democracy und
ergirded capitalism to ensure
that capitalism survived. Prior to that time feudalism produced kings and queens; the industrial
revolution produced elite governments espousing
laissez faire
liberalism; factories and firms
produced a proletariat, kept in pl
ace by entrepreneurs and their representatives in parliament;
democracy completed the cycle by introducing representative government dedicated to
capitalism. Socialism and communism would constitute the next state of material wellbeing.
Yet, a bureaucr
acy would remain in place, before withering away, to make sure it all happened.



12

Defined
as a group of people with an identifiable ethnicity, culture, history and, usually, the same language. The
Kurdish nation is an example.

13

Retirement ages may be inflexible; normative barriers exist past age 65; personnel systems may formalize an age
barr
ier.

5


It didn’t happen. Stalin spoiled it for most communists such as Althusser, Gramsci, and, of
course, Trotsky. Only Cuba and Vietnam seem to keep the flame alive
14
. China is a

state
oriented form of capitalism, not unknown elsewhere in the world, particularly Russia
15
. But
Marx’s diagnosis was much better than his prognosis. He argued that capitalists were greedy and
were exploiting the worker. The surplus value provided by t
he worker went to the capitalist.
Therefore, we needed a revolution and property would inhere to the state. Though his proposed
construction of a state seems faulty, it was further exacerbated by Lenin, and ruined by Stalin.
Lenin feared Stalin and said

we have to go back to the beginning and reform our strategy.
16

Marx’s analysis of the problem, at the time, now seems accurate. His psychological analysis of
capitalists stressed greed and exploitation. The answer for him: get rid of them and construct
a
new class. The world has been antagonistic to Robin Hood economics but has labored in
attempting to “socialize”
17

Marx’s greed and exploitation argument.


Just as Marx struggled with greed and exploitation, pathologies exist in the 21
st

century.
Mor
al
hazard
comes to mind. Guaranteeing an individual success without fear of failure seems to have
infected a large number of individuals participating in derivatives, hedge funds, credit default
swaps, and sub
-
prime mortgages particularly during 2008
-
09.

The effects of this, linked to a
world
-
wide recession, may worsen before extending well into 2010. Without political reform,
the effect could endure for ten years, as in Japan.

Moral hazard not only affects the private and public sector but
public adm
inistration
as well.
Serious questions have been raised regarding the rating agencies
18

but also the American
Securities and Exchange Commission, government regulators, semi
-
owned organizations such as
Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as the Federal Res
erve Bank and U.S. Treasury.
Caveat
emptor
19

is likely to garner a great deal of attention. The essential failing of moral hazard is that
once decision making is guaranteed, one not need worry about the consequences. Further, ethics
and morality suffer.

The activities of many participants in the sub
-
prime debacle may not have
acted illegally, in the absence of definitive law. The answer could reside in new laws. That



14

North Korea is an enigma.

15

Often described as a corporate state.

16

See Zizek, S. (2009), “How to Begin from the Beginning,”
New Left Review,
57, May
-
June, quoting Lenin, V.I.
‘Notes of a Publicist,’ published posthumously in
Pravda,
16 April 1924;
Collected Works, vol. 33,
Moscow: 1966,
pp. 204
-
07, accessed on June 14, 2009, at
http://www.newleftreview.org/?page=article&view=2779
. “Those
Communists are doomed who imagine that it i
s possible to finish such an epoch
-
making undertaking as completing
the foundations of socialist economy (particularly in a small
-
peasant country) without making mistakes, without
retreats, without numerous alterations to what is unfinished or wrongly done
. Communists who have no illusions,
who do not give way to despondency, and who preserve their strength and flexibility to ‘to begin from the
beginning’ over and over again in approaching an extremely difficult task, are not doomed (and in all probability

will not perish).”

17

In a sociological and political sense rather than economic.

18

Such as Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s.

19

“Buyer beware.”

6


means more public administration, including watchful prosecution, auditors, inspector
s general,
and a host of finance specialists sprinkled around the civil service as well as among the
President’s immediate advisors.


The
principal/agent problem

tends to surface when public administration provides tacit
support, as in Guantanamo Bay, or u
nclear guidelines as to what constitutes torture. Secondly, it
can emerge when agents exceed their own authority in carrying out what they perceive to be
orders of their supervisors. This is the “tail wagging the dog” phenomenon. This became
infamous at

Nuremberg when German bureaucrats argued they were simply carrying out orders.
Thirdly, bureaucrats with particular expertise may assume that their advice to supervisors fills a
void not defined by elected or appointed officials. Intelligence and polic
e bureaucrats may
subscribe to the “thin blue line” precept that it is they who stand between liberty and chaos vs. a
safe, orderly society. The reverse condition may exist in
cognitive dissonance,

in which public
administrators may be displeased with e
xerting authority or dictates of the principal when
cognitively,
they do not question a failing policy in international aid,
20
such as the Washington
Consensus, even realizing that the fit is bad.



The
politics/administrative dichotomy

continues to obfuscate public administration despite
Weber’s prognostication that the legal/rational approach produces meritocratic excellence. If
power corrupts and absolute power absolutely corrupts, civil services are left to fend for their
profession
al reputations. Whistle blowers have seldom survived employment or promotion.
Despite their allegations of unlawful or unethical behavior within a government agency, their
future is often proscribed even in the presence of an ombudsman. Without them, in
vestigators
search for needles in haystacks. While ombudsmen around the world seem inclined to favor the
wrongdoers, prosecutors must occasionally impersonate Arab sheiks
21

in order to trap a
government official in wrongful behavior.
22

When the Czech Chief

Prosecutor proposed such a
system for her government, the politicians reacted in horror should the country implement an
ideology of secret police well known to everyone during the Communist period.



To some extent, the phenomenon of cheating the state c
an create a
contagion.
Most former
communist bureaucrats are aware of the slogan: “He, who does not cheat the state, cheats his
family.” Bribes are justified to recompense poorly paid bureaucrats and their supervisors.
Whether or not the state ever sees

that money is left to moral hazard. Rationalization of
acquiring state property is not difficult given many state budgets, particularly in Eastern Europe.



20

See Sobis and de Vries (2009), op cit.

21

Used in the prosecution of a Southern California mayor.

22

Known as a “sting” operation.

7


If bribes become a normal practice, the civil service becomes co
-
opted by malfeasance with or
wi
thout cognitive dissonance. Ostrom has advocated in favor of public choice and polycentric
circles of governing, rationalizing that such a structure will reduce the amount of abominations
implemented by unitary governments.

His preference is for “fragm
ented and overlapping
jurisdictions.”
23

In fact, he and others suggest administration (public administration) offers
resolution of continuing barriers confronting minority groups, and others, by invoking
administrative remedies that might include the incl
usion of ethnic and racial groups on
administrative boards, either by appointment or election. The concept resonates with
subsidiarity.
If the problem is local, and even local to a neighborhood, delegate responsibility to
citizens residing in the locale.



The Lindblom Legacy


Charles Lindblom, in his seminal article, “Muddling Through,:
24

postulated two designs for most
public administration theorizing: root and branch. Root was a metaphor for the deductive
method; branch was a metaphor for the inductive

method. In working toward a theory of public
administration reform, it is reasonable to postulate a theory of reform that is embedded either in
root or branch. That is, does reform evolve from Lenin’s return to the beginning and deduct the
solution, or
does reform evolve incrementally, creating new branches from the old tree? The
ontology of this question might be construed as contained within realism, empiricism, positivism
and/or post
-
modernism. We have considered history, a bit of empiricism and po
sitivism, and
very little post
-
modernism. Encapsulating these four to deductive and inductive reasoning offers
an advantage to prospective public administration reform. So far, our analysis has
eschewed a deductive approach. We assume that what
ever advantage a
manifesto
approach
might contribute, that
realism

suggests we will muddle through. Even the Green Party, that
explicates a rather similar set of postulates encountered in our discussion such as sustainable
environment, changing demograph
y, immigration, world energy, weapons of mass destruction,
globalization, would force the Greens to negotiate and compromise in seeking its goals. While
public administration is not likely to announce a manifesto to the world, it can propose a set of
inte
rconnected postulates grounded in certain empiricism rather than prescription or normative
theory. These postulates would constitute a theory of reform for public administration having
introduced its best review of human behavior findings in psychology, s
ocial psychology,
sociology, political science, economics and social science in general. We would consider that
philosophy produces germinating alternative views rather than outcomes. We would



23

See Wagner, R.E. (2005), “Self
-
Governance, Polycentrism, and Federalism: Recurring Themes in Vincent Ostrom’s
Scholarly Oeuvre,”
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
57, 173
-
188, accessed on June 14, 2009.

24

Lindblo
m, C.E. (1959), “The Science of ‘Muddling Through,’”
Public Administration Review,
Vol. 19, No. 2 (Spring),
pp. 79
-
88.

8


concentrate on the Marxian approach of diagnosis without con
taminating the analysis with
prognosis. There would not be a New Public Administration as much as a surfacing of key
concepts that must be addressed. The specific remedies to public administration would flow
from the concepts. The chapter now turns to s
uch concepts.


Theory Conceptualization


Without a theory of public administration, any reform is elusive. The problem must first be
identified; a theory of public administration should be postulated; then reform becomes possible.
Before that time, the u
sual indicators ring a bit hollow: voice and accountability; political
stability and lack of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and,
control of corruption.
25

These indicators attach themselves to conditions that are somewh
at
circular. They prescribe ingredients for good governance. Yet no one really knows what good
governance is. Secondly, the indexes constructed for such indicators presume that the
computations reflect a meaningful distance among countries. Yet what va
riables might
intervene? The Scandanavian countries invariably score quite high on all indicators yet
contrived by the IFIs (international financial institutions). Is it the Scandanavian mentality? Per
capita income? Gini coefficient?
26

The U.S. has th
e most expensive health care system in the
world ; the best health care is costly; some 47 million citizens have no health insurance. Yet the
per capita income is high. What do we then know about the U.S.? On the basis of the six
indicators shown above,

the U.S. may score well. However, Its HDI (Human Development
Index) score is not particularly impressive. This includes health care. What does this say about
the level of good governance in the U.S.? Is it only an illusion?


Secondly, we are troubled
by output indicators that may assume they are ends in themselves.
27

Suppose the indicators had a western bias. We now know that the Washington Consensus was
conceived for South America that already had “functioning” market economies. When applied
to Centr
al and Eastern Europe, it fell flat. Probably because they did not have functioning
market economies. Nor did the transition prove that the Consensus was correct. It failed to
consider the impact of institutions. Thus, our search will be to identify in
put variables that
hopefully describe the
current

state of public administration. Those input variables will be based
on prior empirical research. We emphasize behaviors. Reform must address

behaviors
. That
was the crux of Marx’s diagnosis. It informs

ours.




25

World Bank (2008), “Worldwide Governance Indicators: 1996
-
2007,” June. Accessed on June 15, 2009, at
http//go.worldbank.org/ATJXPHZMHO.

26

Dispersion of income in society by quintiles.

27

Of course, margins of error are also troublesome.

9



Behaviors Informing Public Administration


We now know that
moral hazard

influences decisions both in the public and private sectors.
We have the 2008
-
09 recession to remind us. It also affects public administration. Harrison, for
example, repor
ted “ghost workers”
28

as an element in Sub Saharan Africa countries working with
funds from the World Bank. Accordingly, he identified
a more rigourous audit program

as an
ingredient of administrative reform

in Bank

supported programs. We don’t have to go

to Africa
to find “ghost” expenditures. We can follow the antics of British Members of Parliament and
their woebegone explanations for billing the government for mysterious personal expenditures
in 2009.


We know from the Milgram experiments that i
ndividuals will
obey authority
despite their
cognitive assumption that a simulated electrical shock was electrifying unseen participants
despite protestations by the experimenters that they should continue with the experiment.
29

Eventually, some 28% of par
ticipants in the experiments, replicated, in Germany as well as
elsewhere, refused to continue their participation. This is the Nuremberg example
supra
of “just
carrying out orders.” Guantanamo may or may not have illustrated the same obedience to
author
ity. Yet, if torture was
not
ordered

by American officials,

it represents the

principal/agent problem,
in which the agents enthusiastically tortured their victims assuming
that supervisors would applaud the information obtained.
Cognitive dissonance

has been
verified by Sobis and de Vries
30

among aid
-
giving bureaucrats that continued with their
protocols despite cognition that the design was flawed. They were not appreciative of collecting
reimbursement for work they considered to be inappropriate.

Tannenbaum has shown the
presence of a
hierarchical gradient
dividing management from workers regardless of
ideological influences. His sample included capitalist and socialist countries.
31

The gradient
applied not only to professional workers but was rep
licated with blue collar workers as well. His
findings illustrated the difference in satisfaction as well as desire for increased decision making
among sub
-
management employees. Organizations seem to generate levels of personal esteem
and self
-
actualizat
ion at management levels as opposed to the contrary experience of those
working below the dividing gradient. Where does this fit in Weber’s hierarchy?




28

Funds allocated to unidentified workers. See Harrison, G. (2001), “Administering Market Friendly Market
Growth? Liberal Populism and the World Bank’s I
nvolvement in Administrative Reform in Sub
-
Saharan Africa,”
Review of International Political Economy,
8:3, Autumn, pp. 528
-
547.

29

Milgram, S. (1963), “Behavioral Study of Obedience,”
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,
67: 371
-
78.

30

Op. cit.

31

Tannenbaum, A.S. and Rozgonyi, T. (1986), Authority and
Reward in Organizations
,
Michigan Institute for Social
Research.

10



Harrison used such an analysis of “key words” of the World Bank’s
discourse

emerging after
reforming its “language” of intervention leading to
reformed

normative practices and
actual
actions. Language such as the following informed the reformed discourse. It became the
genesis of a reformed theory:
participation, ownership, st
akeholders, sustainable, citizenship,
customer, civil society, community.
From this discourse, it became possible to construct a
theory of World Bank interventions.
32

To fashion a state which facilitates market
-
based economic growth which derives from

the liberalization of markets and an integration into the world economy…The state’s
administrative apparatus…must become appropriately skilled (capacity building) and
motivated (ownership). This is effected through dialogue and partnership betwee
n the
Bank and the government…
33


CHANGING CONDITIONS





A primary consideration is whether or not conditions have changed affecting public
administration. This would suggest the potential for change and perspicacity of reform.
Conditions
have

changed.
Networks

describe key patterns of communication.
34

Globalization
increases its influence, challenging the viability of nation/states, particularly in response to
strategies having globalizing effects.
Knowledge societies

are developing in ways

affecting
work practices, organizational rigidities and managing strategies.
Confidence

in political
performance declines.
Trust

in institutions is precarious.
Right to work

approaches universal
urgency.
Market failures

challenge state interventions.

Failed states

prompt societal reform
agendas. All “isms” are burdened by limits: institutionalism, individualism, collectivism,
communitarianism, humanism, regionalism, anarchism, voluntarism, libertarianism, jihadism,
fundamentalism, moralism, ethnoce
ntrism, centrism, globalism, and others.


Public administration has been an
illusion
. In some countries, it is “we pretend to work and they
pretend to pay us.” The conventional wisdom is that elected officials construct the grand



32

Harrison (2001), op. cit. (I have shortened the quote).

33

Harrison questions whether one can conceive of a sub
-
Saharan country exis
ting in a real “partnership” with an
aid giving institution considering the power distance between them.

34

Castells, M. (2000),
The Rise of the Network Society, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Vol I.,
2
nd

ed.,
Cambridge, MA; Oxford, UK:
Blackwell, ISBN 978
-
0631221401. Also see Erlanger, S. (2009), “A Green
Coalition Gathers Strength in Europe,”
The New York Times,
June

20,
accessed on June 21, 2009, at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/20/world/europe/20greens.html?_r=1.

11


narratives and public se
rvants carry out the details. Details have a way of becoming
crucial
.
Few are attracted to public service. Government is seen as the enemy. The public considers
bureaucracy to be a pejorative term. Experiments with private sector adaptation to the pub
lic
service have failed. Credentialism has increased to the point of strangulation. Only the “license
raj” in India has surrendered some power. Talented youth seek work in the private sector.
Worse, as the
Financial Times

has argued, “…the entire finan
cial system went wrong as a result
of
flawed incentives

within banks and investment funds, as well as the rating agencies;
warped
regulatory structures
; and a
lack of oversight
.”
35

Julian Jett observes, “…young hotshots
there (J.P. Morgan) placed a premiu
m on ‘innovation’ and ‘creativity,’ “causing revulsion at how
“…their Frankensteinian brainchild had become a ‘rapacious scourge…’”
36

Will youth respond
to restoring Humpty Dumpty as civil servants? Not without reform and new incentives.


I
NCENTIVES


Too often incentives have been perverse. Motivation fuels incentives. Maslow’s hierarchy of
needs reaches self actualization at its apex. Self actualization involves intrinsic and extrinsic
rewards. Today’s society involves risk.
37

Many seek stability.

They wish to reduce uncertainty.
Yet security can involve economics, safety, quality of life, retirement, peace, the maintenance of
a job or profession. Along the way, a feeling of making a contribution may emerge. A
knowledge society requires a differ
ent worker and different projects. Networks bombard
populations with the latest findings, or presumed findings. Money illusion can befuddle many.
38

People seek to reduce risk and uncertainty by making decisions about their own lives whether it
be occupat
ional, financial, or personal. Yet the interconnected world creates impacts beyond
control of each income class. The rich may lose their riches; the middle classes may lose their
dignity and occupations/professions; and the lower classes may observe that

the gap is widening
between rich and poor. Recessions can obviate an individual’s best planning. Whole age groups
may become insulated from the job market.
39

Cotton farmers in Africa may be forced to
abandon farming and seek work in the crowded, pollute
d cities. To some extent, they are victims
of developed world subsidies permitted by governments and their public administrators.




35

Kakutani, M. (200
9), “Books of the Times; Greed Layered on Greed, Frosted with Recklessness,”
New York Times,
June 16, accessed on June16, at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/16/books/16kaku.html?hpw=&pagewanted=print.

36

Ibid. See Jett, J. (2009),
Fool’s Gold: How the Bold
Dream of a Small Tribe at J.P. Morgan Was Corrupted by Wall
Street Greed and Unleashed a Catastrophe,
New York: Free Press.

37

Giddens, A. (1999), “Risk and Responsibility,”
The Modern Law Review,
Vol. 62, No. 1, January, pp. 1
-
10.

38

Akerlof, G.A. and Shill
er, R.J. (2009),
Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, And Why It
Matters for Global Capitalism,
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

39

Many of those who were skilled professionals in Soviet countries found themselves, afte
r 1989, sitting in front
of television sets unable to participate in the post
-
communist economies.

12



Incentives need to change. Self actualization is important. We now know that the Prisoner’s
Dilemma results in different f
indings after repeated trials. Initially we protect ourselves despite
knowing that working
together
would raise the reward to more than ourselves. Yet we do not
trust others nor institutions to facilitate systems for pursuing individual goals coincidenta
lly with
organizational goals. Public administration witnesses the same phenomenon.


In many countries public administration is an illusion that plays upon the concept that
government is the enemy. Often it is. Yet, altruism is not entirely dead. Unfo
rtunately it often
is forced aside by moral hazard. Incentives that seek to
exclude

are debilitating as opposed to
those that seek to
i
nclude
. Great political leaders such as Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and
Nelson Mandela, understood this. Though politi
cal leadership seeks to address public problems,
great success can result if the call to action inspires others. The tone set for public administration
can be set by leadership. Yet today’s potential participants in reforming public administration
will b
e led by leaders having
emotional intelligence.
40



President John Kennedy inspired Peace Corps workers to assist developing countries build
capacity. They did this for altruistic reasons. Their pay was miniscule. Yet some of the
brightest and most comm
itted individuals self actualized not having known what this could
mean. Most had not done so before. Discounting the technical skills of many volunteers, the
primary accomplishment may have been to unleash a corps of people in the 1960s dedicated to
mak
ing a change. They did. The most important change was to show promise and opportunity
and potential to populations that had been inured with poverty and colonialization. Many of
those countries have raised
themselves up.
They found dignity and hope. M
any of the Peace
Corps volunteers chose public service when they returned. Times have changed, but not entirely.
It is not the accumulation of assets and high salaries that will stimulate talented people to enter
public service. It is the opportunity to

do something with their skills, latent or tacit, and to
contribute while at the same time self
-
actualizing. This, however, may be culture bound.
Recruiting youth into many bureaucracies, particularly in post
-
communist countries has been a
challenge.
41




40

See
Annual Review of Psychology
2008, “Human Abilities: Emotional Intelligence,” Vol. 59:507
-
536, January,
accessed on June 23, 2009, at
http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093646?journalCode=psych
;
defining emotional intelligence as “…the ability to

carry out accurate reasoning about emotions and the ability to
use emotions and emotional knowledge to enhance thought.”

41

Personalized public administration systems are often politically oriented. Further, their management systems
are typically patria
rchal and hierarchical. Today’s youth often eschew such systems. These systems extend well
beyond the post
-
communist countries. Fred Riggs labeled these as
ascriptive systems.


13



C
ONTROL


Public administration frequently encounters the need to control. Pathologies such as
corruption,
illegality, malfeasance, non
-
feasance, unethical behavior
, and
arrogance,

often invite state
intervention. Such functions are performed by police, pr
osecutors, judges, ombudsmen,
regulators, agency heads and supervisors. In some countries, such activity is vigorously opposed
by criminal elements. Death and violence can often occur as a reaction to government
interventions. Courage and protection is
critical to minimize criminal responses to public
employees. Italy, and now Serbia have achieved success against organized crime by seizing
assets of those involved in criminal actions.
42

Italy has done the same. In 2009, asset seizures
from Italian cri
minal groups amounted to four billion euros.
43

After Serbia passed a law modeled
after the Italian law, prosecutors began extricating assets from defendants who must prove asset
ownership as well as “…all other assets out of proportion to a defendant’s lega
l income.”
44

Only
the public sector can provide legalized extortion of criminal assets.



COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SYSTEMS


Reform of public administration systems requires contextual considerations.
45

Reform is
contingent upon public administration theory and practice as embedded in various political
systems. Variations exist across each continent including but not limited to Europe, North
America, Indian sub
-
continent, Africa, Mid East, Asia as well

as Anglo Saxon derivatives in
Australia and New Zealand.


It is possible to sketch key ingredients of public administration design. First, one evaluates the
interaction of state and civil society. This continuum may extend from a police state to
substantial
laissez faire

design such as India in its present deve
lopment. Second, state
intervention and management in society may reach deeply as in China, or less so, as in Costa



42

See Carnic, D. and Djorelijevski, M. (2009), “Serbia: Hitting Criminals W
here It Hurts,”
Transitions Online, June

17,
accessed on June18, 2009
@http://www.tol.cz/look/TOL/print.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=4&NrIssue=326&NrSection=1&NrArticle=20
645&ST1=2d&ST_T1=job&ST_AS1=18&ST_T2=letter&ST_AS2=1&ST3=text&ST_T3=aatol&ST_AS3=1&
ST_max=3.

43

Ibid.

44

Ibid.

45

See Peters, G.B. and Pierre, J. (1998), “Governance without Government? Rethinking Public Administration,”
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J
-
PART,
Vol. 8, No. 2, April, pp. 223
-
243.

14


Rica. Third, the
rechsstaat

in Germany and much of Europe reflects the nature of governing: in
this case, the model is legal/rational base
d significantly on a Weberian model. Fourth, the
relationship of the private sector and private interest groups may resemble the neo
-
liberal model
of the U.S. and UK. Fifth, the civil service may be organized as a meritocracy, familiar to the
American st
ates and Anglo
-
Saxon governments or, as in much of the world, ascriptively
stressing personal and political loyalty as in Africa and numerous Asian states.


A second demarcation of public administration is its
philosophy

or
ideology
of administering:
publi
c or private sector oriented. The latter is located in states practicing New Public
Management (NPM). The former is just about everyone else. The dichotomy focuses on a
presumed normative advantage of private sector methods of management versus preferen
ce for
state methods, typically oriented toward command and control. The latter eschews the
supposition that market efficiency is central to improving bureaucratic performance. The former
assumes that governance of government differs insignificantly from

the private sector. Those
espousing state intervention argue that because of market failures, the state must either intervene
or provide the service. Secondly, only the state can ultimately protect human rights particularly
in appeals by private citizen
s for remedy against civil transgressions.


CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEMS


We consider four civil service typologies: political/patronage; meritocracy; ascriptive;
pro
forma
. We seek a benchmark for each type.
Russia

acts as the benchmark for
patronage/personal


systems in Central/Eastern Europe. Brym and Gimpelson gathered
statistics on the Russian Bureaucracy during 1994
-
2001.
46

Recognizing extreme difficulty in
aggregating and segmenting Russian data, they conclude as follows:




Nearly 90% of all employees
are attached to the executive branch;



Of five ranks, about 91% of category C employees are in the bottom three ranks
47



Public servants constitute 1.2% of the labor force; ranking 36
th

out of thirty
-
seven
countries considered;



Most civil servants are women

but they are concentrated at the lowest ranks;




46

Brym, R.J. and Gimpels
on, V. (2004), “The Size, Composition, and Dynamics of the Russian State Bureaucracy in
the 1990s,”
Slavic Review,
Vol. 63, No. 1, Spring: 90
-
112.

47

Ibid., p. 93. Category C posts are “…established by state bodies for the execution and maintenance of their
powers.” This is the nucleus of the civil service.

15




A bi
-
polar distribution exists: there are young at the bottom and older, even pensionable
employees, at the top levels (and some even at the bottom);



Turnover of young employees at the bottom is high; turnove
r at the top is virtually non
-
existent;



Young at higher levels only appear in ministries created to regulate the market;



The young have considerable education but little work experience; the old have
substantial experience and low educational background;



C
ompensation depends on tenure: it is highest among the older employees causing
constant private job sector searches by young public employees;



Few young wait for promotions assuming that vacancies were even available;



Educational degrees concentrate in soc
ial sciences; yet half of Category C consists of
engineers and agronomists;



A comparison with changing elites among
Russia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria

and the

Czech Republic

show that continuity of elites in Russia (upper levels of bureaucracy)
was far high
er in Russia: more than two thirds was composed of elites from 1988;



As of January 1, 2001, every second federal employee at the central level was a holdover
from the Brezhnev era, having been hired 15 years or more years earlier; combining with
those from

the Gorbachev era, 60% of employees at the central level was hired by the
Communist Party;



Even at the lowest ranks, 40
-
50% started working in Soviet times;



The authors conclude: “It is a highly politicized process.”
48


OECD completed a useful study of E
U civil service systems comparing them with “European
Principles of Administration Reform Programs.
49

Accordingly the study categorized various
member countries as follows: Table 1 indicates to what extent each country matches EU
“Principles” and whether

or not the country has retrogressed backward since accession. The
Czech Republic has a decrease in “fit” and is categorized as “Destructive reform reversal.”
Lithuania has the best fit with EU principles and is categorized as “Constructive continuation
of
reform.” Latvia and Estonia are labeled as a “medium fit’ for constructive reform; Hungary,
Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic have lower levels of fit. Linking this typology to the
earlier format, though different, we might say that Lithuania

represents the meritocracy model,
Latvia and Estonia might be a modified meritocracy, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia might be
the politicized model and Czech Republic would resemble the pro forma type. That is because,



48

Ibid., p. 112.

49

Meyer
-
Sahling, J
-
H.(2009), “Sustainability of Civil Service Reforms in Cent
ral and Eastern Europe Five Years After
EU Accession,” OECD, Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate, Sigma Paper No. 44,
GOV/SIGMA (2009), May 7. The EU principles include rule of law (legality, reliability and predictability); openness

and transparency; legal accountability; efficiency and effectiveness; these are further subdivided into eleven
domains and three levels of institutionalization; see pp. 11
-
13.

16


Czech Republic is the only EU membe
r not to have passed its draft civil service law in the
parliament. A new law is contemplated but hardly certain of introduction and implementation.



Table 1. Fit with European Principles of Administration


Current Fit &
Post
-
accession
pathways

High fit

Medium to
high fit

Medium
fit

Medium to
low fit

Low fit

Constructive
continuation of
reform

Lithuania

Latvia
Estonia




Constructive
reform reversal



Hungary
Slovenia



Destructive
reform reversal




Slovakia
Poland

Czech
Republic

Source: Meyer
-
Sahling, J
-
H. (2009).
50







Figure 1, below, shows Sigma’s survey of civil service attitudes compared with the
qualitative categorization for each country done by Sigma. Czech Republic is excluded
since it was not included in the attitude

survey. Source: Meyer
-
Sahling, J
-
H. (2009)
51


Figure 1.




50

Ibid., p. 71.

51

Ibid.

17




Collapsing all countries for which data have been included, we show a summary
according to the earlier typology.



Table. 2. CIVIL SERVI
CE TYPOLOGY


COUNTRY MODEL
COMMENTS

Russia

Politicized

Slow transition from
nomenklatura

Hungary

Politicized

Despite early academic
interest in
meritocracy,
system has slid backwards

Serbia

Politicized

Employees typically
replaced following
elections; senior positions
politicized : aversion to a
senior civil service; low
recruitment of qualified
younger employees

Kazakhstan

Modified meritocracy

Not meeting private sector
18


wage competition; high
turnover; wage system
lacks equity, accountability
and transparency

Macedonia

Politicized

Ministerial decentralized
wage setting; few
prospects for career
advancement; compressed
wage levels

Czech
Republic

Pro Forma

Had draft civil service law:
not submitted nor
implemented

Poland

Politicized

Despite early promise,
trend toward
repoliticization; Civil
Service Office abolished

Lithuania

Meritocracy

Consolidated its reforms;
best record in region

L
atvia

Modified meritocracy

Reforms in salary system,
performance appraisal;
some problems in
examinations, retention of
mgt. contracts, wide salary
ranges

Estonia

Modified meritocracy

Professionalism, political
neutrality; some technical
problems in
examinations
and coordination structures

Kyrgystan

Ascriptive with roving
bandits
52

Kinship and clan based



Sources: Brym and Gimpelson (2004),
53

Meyer
-
Sahling, J.H. (2001),
54

Meyer
-
Sahling,
J.H. (2009),
55

Drechsler, W. (2004),
56

Meyer
-
Sahling, J.H. (2004)
,
57

Eyal and Townsley



52

See Olson, M. (2000),
Power and Prosperity: Outgrow
ing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships,
New York:
Basic Books.

53

Brym, R.J. and Gimpelson, V. (2004), “The Size, Composition, and Dynamics of the Russian State Bureaucracy in
the 1990s,”
Slavic Review,
Vol. 63, No. 1, Spring, pp. 90
-
112, accessed on Ju
ly 4, 2009, at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1520271.pdf.


54

Meyer
-
Sahling, J.H. (2001, “Getting on Track: Civil Service Reform in Post
-
Communist Hungary,”
Journal of
E
uropean Public Policy,
8:6, December, 960
-
979, ISSN 1466
-
4429, accessed on July 4, 2009, at
http://web.ebscohost.co
m/ehost/results?vid=3&hid=9&sid=129bed8e
-
1352
-
4225
-
b8d1
-
ff096bad25a%40sessionmgr1028&&bquery=(Getting

+on+Track%3a+Civil +Service+Reform+in+Post
-
Communist+Hungary)&bdata=JmRiPWEzaCZOeXBIPTAMc210ZT1aG92dC1saXZI.

55

Meyer
-
Sahling, J.H. (2009), OECD, Public Go
vernance and Territorial Development Directorate, Sigma, A Joint
Initiative of the OECD and the European Union, Principally Financed by the EU, “Sustainability of Civil Service
19


(1995),
58

World Bank (2002),
59

World Bank(2005),
60

Zarkovic
-
Rakic (2007),
61

Engvall
(2007),
62
Collins, K. (2003),
63

Kubicek, P. (1998),
64

Transitions Online,
(2009),
65

Edmunds (2009),
66



PROTOTYPE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AGENDAS



The chapter
now postulates a public administration agenda that illustrates a domain of
substantive responsibility. If reform is to be hypothesized, we wish to juxtapose a reform model
against potential agendas deriving from changed conditions postulated earlier.







Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe Five Years After EU Accession,” accessed
on July 3 , 2009, at
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2009doc.nsf/LinkTo/NT00002C4A/$FILE/JF03264288.PDF.

56

Drechsler, W. (2004), “Governance, Good Governance, and Government: The Case for Estonian Administrative
Capacity,”
Trames: A Journal of the Humanities

& Social Sciences,
8(58/53), 4, 388
-
396, accessed on July 4, 2009, at
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf$vid=4&hid=101&sid=d1ac7c9d
-
0967
-
4df1
-
a548
-
7845e20c5e22%40sessionmgr4.

57

Meyer
-
Sahling, J.H. (2004), “Civil Service Reform in Post
-
Communist Europe: Th
e Bumpy Road to
Depoliticisation,”
West European Politics,
Vol. 27, No. 1, January, pp. 71
-
103, accessed on July 4, 2009, at
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=5&hid=108&sid=2136abd0
-
9100
-
4ecd
-
98c4
-
517e90344fdd%40SRCSM2.

58

Eyal, G. and Townsley, E. (19
95), “The Social Composition of the Communist Nomenklatura: A Comparison of
Russia, Poland, and Hungary,”
Theory and Society,
24: 723
-
750, accessed on July 4, 2009, at
http://jstor.org/stable/pdfplus

657849.
pdf.

59

World Bank (2002), “Civil Service Reform: Strengthening World Bank and IMF Collaboration: Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia,” June, accessed on July 1, 2009, at http:www
-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/VIDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2002/0823/0000
94946_02082304053329/Ren
dered/PDF/multil0page.pdf.

60

World Bank (2005), “Kazakhstan’s Reforming The Public Sector Wage System; Policy Paper,” April 1, (Report No.
31707


KZ), accessed on July 1, 2009, at http://www
--
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSC
ontentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/06/20/000012009_20050620094639Ren
dered/PDF/31707rev.pdf.

61

Zarkovic
-
Rakic, J. (2007), “Bureaucratic Behavior: A Review of the Theory and Its Application to Serbian Public
Administration,”
Panoeconomicus,
2: 235
-
242, accessed on J
uly 4, 2009, at
http://www.panoeconomicus.rs/casopis/sestibroj/jelena%20zarkovic%20rakic%20bureaucratic%20behavior%202
%20review%20of
%20the%20theory%20and%20its%20application%20to%20serbian%20public%20administration.pdf.

62

Engvall, J. (2007), “Kyrgyzstan:
Anatomy of a State,”
Problems of Post
-
Communism,
Vol. 4, No. 4, July/August, pp.
33
-
45

63

Collins, K. (2003), “The Political Role of Clans in Central Asia,”
Comparative Politics,
Vol. 35, No. 2, January, pp.
171
-
190.

64

Kubicek, P. (1998), “Authoritarianism
in Central Asia: Curse or Cure?”
Third World Quarterly,
Vol. 19, No. 1, pp.
29
-
43.

65

Transitions Online
(2009), “Kyrgyzstan: West Must Keep Despots at Arms’ Length,” July 3, accessed on July 7,
2009, at
http://www.tolcz/look/TOL/printf.tpl?IdLanguage=1&Id
Publication=4&NrIssue=328&NrSection=2&NrArticle=2067
7.

66

Edmunds, T. (2009), “Illiberal Resilience in Serbia,”
Journal of Democracy,
Vol. 20, No. 1, January. pp., 128
-
142.

20



ONG
OING GOVERNING PROCESSES requiring public policies and employment of public
workers:




Intervening in market failures and negative externalities



Protecting citizens’ rights



Maintaining security: financial/military/economic/employment



Responding to natural
disasters (such as Katrina)



Pushing beyond the status quo: FDR created government competition for private sector
activity such as utilities (TVA)
67

Leading to potential public sector activity affecting public administration:



Sustainable development



Monitor
ing health and safety



Addressing environmental pollution



Addressing population
-
wide health care services



Stimulating research and development



Addressing sustainable energy



Addressing sustainable food supply



Maintaining social safety net


VARIABLES OR FACTO
RS AFFECTING RESOLUTION OF PROTOTYPE AGENDAS:




Potential organizing models: Equilibrium, Nordic; Rhinish; Anglo
-
Saxon; post
-
communist; China and Asia; post
-
colonial




Input or independent variables: moral hazard; principal/agent;
politics/administration/di
chotomy; cognitive dissonance; contagion; hierarchical gradient;
may be moderating variables


Leading to an incremental or inductive method of analysis:






67

Tennessee Valley Authority.

21



And


Considering changing conditions:




Globalization



Networks



Knowledge societies



Perverse incentives vs. rewarding incentives



Intrinsic/extrinsic values



Public/private philosophy



And


Considering public administration civil service
models (to reflect global diversity):



Patronage/personal



Meritocracy



Ascriptive



Pro Forma


We may now turn to the
process

of bringing about reform.


NATURE OF CHANGE


We have said that reform evolves, or bursts in revolution, from such factors as history,
revolution, changing circumstances, intolerable conditions, desire for change, precipitating
events, crises, failed states, and market failure.
68

Obviously,
timing is
important. For our
purposes we concentrate on changing conditions. The pursuit of reform in public administration,
if plausible, will require a clientele, timing, and changing conditions. The clientele may include
those in
praxis

(practice) as well as i
n academic conceptualizing. Yet the cause is critical.
Research must continue or more “Washington Consensuses” will occur. Emerging countries
need the best we can do, including their suggestions. The alternative is to struggle with
normative indicator
s such as rule of law, neo
-
liberal marketizing of public administration,
decentralization, public/private partnerships and principal/agent discourses that mask reality.





68

Page 1.

22


In addition to clienteles the potential obstacles to reform present barriers. Those f
avoring New
Public Management will stress revivification of market solutions.
69

Those preferring the
rechsstaat

will prefer direct services. A host of states will have centralized most public
administration. For that purpose, we include four civil servic
e models: patronage/personal;
meritocracy; ascriptive;
pro forma.
This permits us to create a generalized model that accounts
for indigenous differences.
70



We have seen how EU candidate and accession countries have prepared their accession chapters
regarding public administration. Promises are made and some are kept. Where compliance has
been intolerable, such as in Bulgaria and lesser so in Romania, the EU

simply withheld funds.
Perhaps the aid giving donors will do the same in other countries. Thus, we seek a generalized
model that can be constructed or de
-
constructed to suit state needs. The actual reform process
will then emerge, if at all, within a

political/economic/social milieu, according to disparate
national

interests. Despite national interests, external sources will participate in the discourses.
The recent elections for the Members of the European Parliament produced a French Green
71

repres
entation of 16.28% of the vote, behind only the Socialists, 16.48%, and Sarkozy’s center
right party at 27.87%. Said the Green’s leader, Daniel Cohn
-
Bendit, “We have a project for
Europe, an idea; the ecological transformation of our way of production and

way of life, with a
social shield to protect the people who are negatively affected by the process of
transformation.”
72


We are saying then that
changing conditions
permit us to construct a general model. Those
changing conditions include globalization,
networks, knowledge societies, perverse vs.
rewarding incentives, changing intrinsic/extrinsic values, changing public/private philosophy.
The model would be based on the following assumptions:




Crises exist in the world and in individual states: pollutio
n of the environment;
continuing un
-
sustainable use of hydro
-
carbons; substantial under provision of health
care services; collapsed financial institutions; an ageing planet and continued



69

While the UK and the American states hav
e such interests, many of the applications have been at local levels.
This interest in subsidiarity, also of interest to the EU, may have its logic when local services including police, fire,
education, welfare and employment are locally based. Many sta
tes centralize these functions. Their interest in
NPM is lesser.

70

See Figure 2.

71

Europe Ecologie coalition of European Green parties.

72

New York Times
(2009), June 20, op cit.

23


demographic imbalance reaching nine billion persons by 2050; under
-
e
xpenditures in
research and development;



Individual public administration systems will differ: ascriptive, patronage, meritocracy
and pro forma;



Systems will be affected by the general intervening variable of corruption that includes
mistrust, malfeasance
and non
-
feasance;



Existing instrumental variables would include market failures, protection of citizens’
rights, security, disasters and limitations of system capacity;



The input variables will be mediated through agendas, containing their own technical
un
ique qualities;



The system will then produce outcomes pertaining to system satisfaction, productivity,
morale, efficiency and effectiveness.
73












Figure 2.



Barriers

Incentives





Civil Service Systems




73

See Figure 2.

moral hazard; cognitive
dissonance; principal/agent;
politics/PA dichotomy




Intrinsic/extrinsic;
satisfiers/dissatisfiers; self
actualization


24













Instrumental AGENDAS








OUTCOMES





CONCEPTUAL
: BARRIERS + INCENTIVES + (ascriptive/patronage/meritocracy/ pro forma)
+

INSTRUMENTAL + AGENDAS = OUTCOMES

NOTE to Figure 2: The simplified model displays the theoretical, aggregate result of multiple
independent variabl
es: barriers, incentives, civil service systems, and instrumental variables
mediated through prototype agendas to the dependent variable combining the outcomes of
satisfaction, productivity, morale, efficiency and effectiveness.


THE PROCESS OF CHANGE AND
REFORM


Sustainable Development; Health and
Safety; Environment; Health Care; Research
and Development; Sustainable Energy;
Sustainable Food Supply; Social Safety Net

Market failures; citizens’rights;

Security; disasters; limits

Satisfaction; productivity;
morale;

Efficiency; effectiveness

ascriptive

Patronage

meritcracy

pro
forma

corruption; mistrust; malfeasance;

non
-
feasance (intervening)

25


The chapter focuses on the
process
of change and reform: first, whether or not present day
literature accurately
describes what is extant in public administration; secondly, what conditions
may have causal
valences related to change. We concentr
ate on trying to describe changes that
have occurred and that
therefore, could serve as the basis for change.

Rather than predict
change, we stress the normative case of focusing on the gap between what has been the
conventional wisdom
versus what now nee
ds to be recognized.


Peters and Pierre observe that “Reforms that aim at altering the normative framework and modus
operandi of public administration, and thus
profoundly
74

challenge established norms and
practices, may at best accomplish minor changes and

at worst bring to the public service
confusion, conflict, and discrepancies between organizational culture and external role
expectations, thus causing stalemate. …incremental but consistent changes


are more likely to
bring about less dramatic change b
ut without major dysfunctional consequences.”
75

Rattso and
Sorensen pursue a reform explanation in the “political decision making system.”
76

Haque
observes that in Singapore, “…due to the current economic slowdown and job losses since this
crisis in 1997, t
he logic of rapid economic growth cannot be used to reject the liberal welfare
-
state model, especially when low
-
income households…need economic support and when state
policies need to be widely discussed.”
77

Reform seems to oscillate and coalesce around wh
at
might be called the latest conventional wisdom. More recently status quo arguments have
centered upon New Public Management versus European statist models, corporatist in nature,
that have tended to emphasize law, such as the
Rechsstaat.


Essentially
, the current debate is about modifying the public administration discourse to reflect
private sector values embedded in New Public Management vs. a focus on state intervention
particularly in cases of market failure. The current financial recession in 20
08
-
2009 has caused
increased public intervention in capital markets, particularly banking. These events have, at least
temporarily, lengthened the arm of governments and central banks to invoke counter
-
cyclical
78

activity while at the same time considering

new regulatory measures. The pendulum may then
shift weight toward public antidotes rather than private sector management concepts. Neo
-
liberal and
laissez faire
capitalism have momentarily lost their appeal. This latest change in
ideology could eventu
ally recede. Yet, the dampening economic effects that remind most
observers of the 1930s depression suggest significant interest in legislative and administrative
changes to the prior status quo.




74

My emphasis.

75

Peters and Pierre (1998), op. cit., p. 240.

76

Rattso, J. and Sorensen, R.J. (2004), Public Employees As Swing Voters: Empirical Evidence on Opposition to
Public Reform,”
Public Choice,
119: 281
-
310.

77

Haque, M.S. (2004), “Governance and Bureaucracy in Sin
gapore: Contemporary Reforms and Implications,”
International Political Science Review / Revue international de science politique,
Vol. 25, No. 2, April, p. 227
-
240.

78

Countercyclical refers to action that would counter a current economic spiking such as r
ecession or high
inflation. The converse would be a
procyclical
action that exacerbates the current malady.

26



Melchor has identified
receptivity
as a potential antece
dent to change.
79

He isolates four
components of receptivity: ideological vision, leading change, institutional politics, and
implementation capacity. He derives these from Pettigrew (1997) and Butler (2003).
80

He tests
these against six countries, though

his primary interest is testing for
managing
change. He
hypothesizes that change will not occur in a vacuum. It must be managed to be successful. Our
focus is on pursuing the theoretical potential of change/reform ingredients,
ex ante.
This would
then

permit further empirical work particularly in Central/Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
Melchor’s countries were all in western Europe. His conclusion was that among the six
countries, “…there was no evidence of a coherent strategy to manage change that
accompanies
the reform efforts.” Further, he concludes that while
receptivity appears to be a useful

theoretical construct,

it cannot “…provide a full account of the actual
occurrence
of change.”
He further concludes that additional empirical testing
would be useful.



Table 3, below, encapsulates selected public administration activity since the 1930s depression.


ACTORS/STATES CONDITIONS EFFECT ON BUREAUCRACY
ACTIONS TAKEN

F.D. Roosevelt, U.S.

Depression; hig
h
unemployment;
collapse of financial
markets; decline in
production

Many lawyers joined
the government;
critical education
created new public
agencies

Regulation of banks;
government
challenged private
sector, e.g. in utilities
such as TVA

J.F.
Kennedy/L.B.
Johnson, U.S.

Civil rights activism

More lawyers joined
the government as
civil rights law
implemented

Affirmative action;
hiring quotas; school
bussing; legal
activism

Reagan/Thatcher,
U.S./UK

Government seen as
“the problem”

䕭灨b獩s渠灲i
癡瑥t
獥c瑯爠浡湡来物r氠
灲pc瑩ce猻⁎sj

c楲i搠獴物歩rg⁡楲i
controllers; “trickle
down economics”




79

Melchor, O.H. (2008), “Managing Change in OECD Governments: An Introductory Framework,
OECD Working

Paper
s

on Public Governance
,

No. 12,” OECD Pu
blishing, © OECD,
doi:10.1787/227141782188.


80

Pettigrew, A. (1997), “What is a Processual Analysis,”
Scandinavian Journal of Management,
13(4), Elsevier
Science Ltd., pp. 337
-
348; Butler, M. (2003), “Managing form the Inside Out: Drawing on ‘Receptivity’
to Explain
Variation in Strategy Implementation,”
British Journal of Management,
Vol. 14, special issue, Blackwell

Publishing
Ltd., pp. S47
-
S60
.

27


Post
-
Communism,

CEE

Collapse of
Communism;
privatization;
structuring market
systems

New CEE
bureaucracies were
formed despite
probable path
dependencies

A vett
ing
81

process
was established to
attempt to screen out
former police and
security personnel

NATO/EU

Common market;
integrative
procedures; accession
requirements

Politicized
bureaucracies
required merit
oriented, technical
skills

Negotiations between
EU
and members
created organizational
challenges in Brussels
and in member states

EU ACCESSION OF

EU 12

Partial division of EU
15 and EU 12; old vs.
young members;
western vs. eastern
Europe; some
antagonism to
“Democratic Deficit”

Certain members of
EU 12
had continuing
difficulty in
eliminating
corruption; NPM
created horizontal
and vertical
coordination problems

EU withheld funds
from Bulgaria and
struggled with
Romania’s perceived
corruption; EU
members moved
away from NPM &
toward JUG and
Whole of Gov
t.



Note: CEE = Central and Eastern Europe; NPM= New Public Management; JUG = Joined Up
Government, later known as Whole of Government.
82


DISCUSSION


Change and reform are dependent on timing, internal and external pressures, civil service
blockages, path dependencies, and visions of stakeholders. More specifically, public
administration reform is linked to political urgencies, economic pressures and s
ocial adaptability.
Psychology, particularly social psychology, can be a factor. We argue that input variables must
be identified. Relying only on output variables such as rule of law, privatization, liberalizing the



81

The Czechs have, perhaps, been the most active with their lustration law in pursuing former Communist
“inform
ers” now active in government or seeking public positions. Those accused have often retorted that their
names had been listed by the Party without their knowledge or approval.

82

Middle range strategy to compensate for fragmentation occurring after NPM.

Coordination capacity
strengthened through renewed hierarchy, market and network type mechanisms. See Verhoest, K., Bouckaert, G.
and Peters, B.G. (2007), “Janus
-
Faced Reorganization: Specialization and Coordination in Four OECD Countries in
the Period 1
980
-
2005,”
International Review of Administrative Sciences,
73(3): 325
-
48; Verhoest, K., Verschuere,
B., and Bouckaert, G. (2007), “Pressure, Legitimacy, and Innovative Behavior by Public Organizations,”
Governance:
An International Journal of Policy, Admi
nistration, and Institutions,
20(3), July, pp. 469
-
97; Christensen, T. and
Laegreid, P. (2008), “The Challenge of Coordination in Central Government Organizations: The Norwegian Case,”
Public Organization Review
,
8: 97
-
116, accessed on July 10, 2009, at
ht
tp://www.springerlink.com/content/c476443026621362/fulltext.pdf.



28


economy, and enforcing anti
-
corrupti
on programs, may lead to procyclical outcomes. An
American model, such as the Washington Consensus, may be grounded in prior market
economies rather than linking to pseudo economies in Central/Eastern Europe.


While prior public administration ideologie
s have tended to emerge from changing political
preferences, that is not the only paradigm contributing to understanding. Most observers
consider corruption as a negative public outcome. A solution may involve regulation,
a priori,

or prosecution,
ex pos
t.
Yet moral hazard is a temptation that may cause an imbalance between
reward vs. punishment. Incentives that dissipate the tradeoff may be fortuitous.
Nash/equilibrium postulates that when one knows the expected behavior of others, and that they
will
not change, an actor can calculate a decision. If it is known that an act will
definitely cause

a significant punishment, the decision maker may not pursue the hazard. This requires an
effective organizational response that is well known to decision make
rs. If a politician or
bureaucrat contemplates an unethical or illegal act and he/she must resign from political office if
caught, there is an incentive to deny pursuing the hazard. The incentive is affected by prior cases
that increase the certainty of
punishment. Accordingly, the
ex post

outcomes tend to immunize
future
a priori
decisions.


Incentives
to do good rather than bad are few (altruism is one). Regulations and rules are often
put in place to reduce the moral hazard. Yet they must be enforc
ed. It is easier to measure
outputs as opposed to inputs. We do not know the susceptibility to moral hazard of person A vs.
person B. We can only deal in aggregates. We promulgate rules and laws to all actors
irrespective of their inclinations. The I
talian/Serbian law seizing assets not proven to be crime
-
free, reminds potential offenders that violation will result in punishment. The free rider on a
European tram has calculated the fine vs. the probability of being caught without a ticket.
Enforceme
nt is not ubiquitous, but does occur.


Public agendas in the 21
st

century appear to be turning toward several sets of externalities:
sustainable development, health and safety, environment, sustainable energy, sustainable food
supply, as well as knowledge
society ingredients such as research and development, social safety
nets, demographic imbalances, education and training. All of these agendas are likely to include
significant public involvement. A second set of activity will focus on public leadership
in
casting new frameworks for market failures such as the 2008
-
2009 economic recession. Each of
these agendas seems likely to enhance the likelihood of attracting public servants inclined toward
intrinsic as well as extrinsic motivations.


29


CONCLUSION


R
eform is a process occurring when key stakeholders, public/private sectors and reform minded
societies find the means to reach agreement. The process tends toward negotiation since many
will favor the status quo. Those that are consistently disempowered,

and their supporters, will
argue for change. Bureaucratic pathologies act to derail reform. Public administration will
research and consider behaviors not previously incorporated in organizational structures. Such
reform is likely to examine question
s of public finance, quality control, comprehensive economic
distribution and redistribution as well as the centrality of human beings in public equations. As
public administration focuses on public goods, entrepreneurs can benefit from government
outsour
cing and spinoffs. Societies will follow public leadership when it is in their own best
interests.


We argue then, that neither the Weberian Model nor New Public Management, seen as
contrasting etatist vs. market oriented models, sufficiently describes t
he status quo nor does it
reflect organizational research elucidating behavioral findings of relevance to public
administration. Altruistic behavior is possible depending on incentives. Obedience to authority,
whether bureaucrats or rules, can be moderat
ed by repeated behaviors and/or education and
training in values expectations. Moreover, security of individuals and populations has been
neglected. Such security includes protection against Hobbes’ brutish state of nature that seems
to have deteriorated

toward questions of race, ethnicity, tribe, nationality, religion, gender, class,
elitism, and the ‘other’ stereotype. Further, security must include protection of health, safety,
food, employment, pensions, welfare, education, and human dignity.



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