United States National Security Council

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Nov 21, 2013 (3 years and 4 months ago)

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SWC
HS
MUN 2012


Sir Winston Churchill HSMUN Conference

SWCHSMUN 2012

United States National Security Council


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Table of Contents

National Security
Council ……………………………………………………………… Pages 2
-
3

What are Crisis Committees? ………………………………………………………..
Pages 3
-
6

Global Intelligence Report ……………………………………………………………. Pages 7
-
16

U.S. Security Infrastructure Assessment ………………………………………. Pages 17
-
21

Procedure
……………………………………………………………………………………. Page 22

USNSC Membership ……………………………………………………………………..
Page 22

USNSC Member Profiles ………………………………………………………………. Pages 23
-
38

Works Cited …………………………………………………………………………………. Pages 39
-
42















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The National Security Council

The National Security Council (NSC) is the President's principal forum for considering national
security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet
officials. Since its inception under President Truman, the Council's
function has been to advise
and assist the President on national security and foreign policies. The Council also serves as the
President's principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies.

The NSC is chaired by the President.

Its regular attendees (both statutory and non
-
statutory)
are the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of
Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Chairman of the
Joint C
hiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the Council, and the Director of National
Intelligence is the intelligence advisor. The Chief of Staff to the President, Counsel to the
President, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy ar
e invited to attend any NSC
meeting. The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget are
invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. The heads of other executive
departments and agencies, as well as other s
enior officials, are invited to attend meetings of
the NSC when appropriate.

Brief History of the United States Post World War II

The National Security Council was created in 1947 by the National Security Act. It was created
because policymakers felt that
the diplomacy of the State Department was no longer adequate
to contain the USSR in light of the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States. The
intent was to ensure coordination and concurrence among the Navy, Marine Corps, Army, Air
Force and

other instrumen
ts of national security policy,
such as the Cen
tral Intelligence Agency
(CIA) which was
also created

with the National Security Act
.


A few things to keep in mind with regard to the United States National Security Council at
SWC
HS
MU
N

2012:




While in reality this
is not

the case, during S
WC
HS
MUN 2012
, the United

States National
Security Council will be run under standard
Model
UN

Parliamentary Procedure during
the course of debate

including the use of caucuses, timed speeches, and voting

regu
lations. It is expected that you are at least operationally

familiar with these
protocols before debate, especially in a high

profile, crisis oriented committee as this.



This committee will not be using resolutions
, as the actual
United States
National

Sec
urity Council does not. Instead, we will be using “action orders”.

These orders will be
to your respective departments to either bring

forward some information or to commit
some action. Know what

your departments are capable of in order to maximize the

eff
ectiveness of these orders. These would be written out on paper

and submitted to
the chair for vote very similarly to resolutions.



We will be using an accelerated time frame
. Actions that would take

weeks will yield
results within hours. This is done in
order for the

council to see the consequence, both
good and bad, of its actions

and react appropriately. Note that this also the same for


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crises.

Crises that would take weeks to degenerate into a very threatening

situation will
also be accelerated in order

to ensure a sense of

urgency within the committee.



Being a crisis oriented committee, a crisis director will be assigned

to our committee to
give real time response and coordinate visiting

speakers.



Participants in the USNSC committee at SWC
HS
MUN are stro
ngly encouraged to bring
a laptop to the committee
.
If you do not have access to a laptop for this event
,
please
have your Model UN faculty advisor to send an e
-
mail to the Secretary General

of
SWC
HS
MUN
, Mr. Kevin Gilchrist (
krgilchrist@cbe.ab.ca
)
.


What are Crisis Committees?

Crisis Committees are specialized groups at SWC
HS
MUN that spend most of their time dealing
with real
-
time events that require immediate attention and action. These crises range from
terrorist attacks to natural disasters to corruption within a certain organization. Common
considerations of crisis committ
ees include:
understanding the crisis and its implications
,
informing (or not informing) the press and public
,
undertaking immediate damage control
,
reacting to the actions of other groups
, and
preventing future crises
.


Simulation Overview

Parliamentary
Procedure Specific to Crisis Committees

The same pa
rliamentary procedures used for
General Assemblies and Special Committees

apply to Cris
is Committees as well. However,
Crisis Committees

(such as the US National
Security Council) tend to be more informal
than other comm
ittees, that is, they require a
limited use o
f parliamentary procedure. They
are often t
imes more unstructured, and the
flow
of the co
mmittee is heavily dependent on
the discretion of

the chair. The chair will make
his/her procedural

prefere
nces clear at the start
of the first committee ses
sion.
There ma
y be a
speaker’s list, yet most
committees do

without one. There is often no
official setting of

the
agenda, as debate tends to
flow between
topics and is determined by the
pertinent crisis at

hand.
In general, discussion occurs through

moderated ca
ucuses in which the chair calls
upon
delegates to speak. Delegates motion for

moderated cau
cuses of a specified length and
speaking time and on a specified topic. Many

issues may be di
scussed concurr
ently and crises
introduced by the crisis staff may interrupt

discus
sion. Occasionally, unmoderated
caucuses
(motio
ned for by a delegate) are held
in which

formal debate is suspended and
delegates s
peak
at will in groups of their
choos
ing. In voting, a mot
ion for an
unmoderated

caucus takes
precedence over a
motion

for a moderated caucus. Often,
motions are
simply passed without
voting if there are no competing motions.
Action is taken thr
ough
directives
, and
there are
generally no working papers or resolut
ions
,
unless the chai
r so desires.
Notes

are used to
communicate between delegates while the
committee proceeds.

They are often

used to work
with delegates of
similar vi
ewpoints to coordinate actions.
Questions can also be sent to the
chair (or crisis
staff) in a note
.






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Directives and Notes

Directives

In order

to carry out any action during
committee, a directive must b
e sent by an
individual,

a
group of individuals, or the
committee as a w
hole. If it is not on behalf of
the entire comm
ittee,
then th
e delegate(s) can
choose to make th
e directive private and it will
not be revealed

to the
whole committee. If the
chair deems ne
cessary, the directive may need
to be intr
oduced by a
requisite number of
writers. To pa
ss a directive on behalf of the
whole co
mmi
ttee, a simple
majority vote is
required. The

chair will hold a vote as each
directive is introduced.

There are
three types of directives



Action Orders
,
Communiqués
, and
Press Releases
.

Action or
ders are used to direct troops,
agencies, individuals, e
tc. to take an action that

is within the authority of the committee. An

individual may only send an action order if it is

within his powers. A communiqué
is u
sed to communicate with foreign
governments, or

individuals outside the comm
ittee. A press
releas
e is us
ed to reveal information to the
public.


Examples of Directives


Action Order


Direct Al
lied forces to invade Normandy,
France on June 6th. Paratroopers shall be

dropped behind enemy lines on J
une 4th.
Landings shall take place at Utah, Omaha,

Gold, Juno, and Sword beaches.


-
The Allies



Communiqué


To the Emperor of Japan:

We dem
and an immediate, unconditional
surrender by all Japanese
forces within 48

hours, o
r we shall be forced to unleash
heretofore unimaginable devastation upon your

cities.



-

The Allies



P
ress Release


Yesterday, Dec. 7
, 1941
-

a date which will live
in infamy
-

t
he United States of America was
suddenly and del
iberately attacked by naval and
air forces of the Empire of Japan.


-

Franklin D. Roosevelt








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Examples of Notes
-

To a member of the same committee


[Address Section on outside of Note]

To: Franklin
D. Roosevelt

From: Winston Churchill

[Message on inside of Note]

We ask th
at you work with us to increase
intelligence efforts directed against our so
-
called

allies, the
Soviets, so that we will not be
surprised by any actions they take after the war.

-

Wi
nston Churchill



To a member of another committee


[Address Section on outside of Note]

To: Leaders of Romania, Axis

From: Josef Stalin, Allies

[Message on inside of Note]

Seeing as the
defeat of Nazi Germany is near,
we would advise you to make a deal
with the

Soviet Uni
on now or we will show no mercy
when the time for your defeat arrives.

-

Josef Stalin


To chair or crisis staff


[Address Section on outside of Note]

To: Chair/Crisis

From: Winston Churchill

[Message on inside of Note]

What is the

current disposition of British
forces in the Middle East?

-

Winston Churchill


















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An Outline of Typical Crisis Committee Flow



A moderated caucus takes place with delegates outlining their position.



A delegate motions for a moderated caucus on
a specified topic of a specified length with a


specified speaking time.



Delegates discuss actions to take regarding that topic through the moderated caucus and


through notes.



Delegates submit directives to the chair to take an action and motio
n to introduce the


directive.



Discussion on the directives will proceed through the current moderated caucus and


amendments may be proposed and voted on.



A delegate will motion to vote on a directive
and the directive is either passed or reje
cted.



A crisis will occur, oftentimes in the middle

of debate. The crisis staff will introduce new


information or developments through news articles, videos, intelligence reports, etc.



Discussion will shift informally or through a new moderated
caucus to discuss this

development.






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Global Intelligence Report

As a member of the United States National Security

Council, your duty is to be prepared to deal
with any

potentially damaging situation that may arise. This

section summarizes the most
pr
ominent threats at

this time.


The Levant

Israel

The Levant, for the purposes of defining the

operational areas of this Council, is the region of
the

Middle East that includes Israel, Lebanon, Syria,

Jordan and the Palestinian territories of the
West

Bank
and the Gaza Strip. Some also consider Egypt

to be a Levant nation,

but as this is in
some dispute,

analysis of the Egyptian situation will be left to the

North African segment.

The
Levant is an area of grave concern for the

national security strategy of t
he United States. The

current U.S. administration has made the Israeli
-

Palestinian conflict a foreign policy priority, as

administrations have for the last forty
-
five years, and

as a result, has a clearly defined set of
friends and

enemies in the Levant.
The United States has been

very clear in stating that it
considers Hamas, which

won the June 2007 Palestinian parliamentary

elections and has
relatively unencumbered

jurisdiction over the Gaza Strip, to be a terrorist

organization. Hamas
has launched on
-
ag
ain
-
off
-
again

rocket attacks from Gaza against southern

Israel, and has now
signed an agreement with the

Fatah
-
led Palestinian Authority to form a unity

government after
the 2012 election. Whether this

will lead Hamas to a process of self
-
moderation as it

seeks to
gain legitimate control over the whole of the

Palestinian territories remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, on September 26th,
2011
the Palestinian

Authority applied to the United Nations
for

recognition as an independent state. As of this

writing, the U
nited States has made its
opposition to

recognition clear, and has expressed an intention to

veto recognition should it
come to a vote in the

Security Council. The United States and Israel stand

virtually alone in this
position, and should the

United
States move ahead with the veto, it could

bring about
significant anti
-
American

demonstrations and extremist actions against

American overseas
positions.

Moreover, American relations with Israel are also at

historic ebb. Though the tactical military
bond

b
etween the IDF and U.S. Armed Forces remains

strong, tension exists at the highest
levels of both

governments over the Israeli refusal to comply with

America’s demands for a
total freeze on new

settlements in the West Bank. Public opinion in

Israel toward
the United
State is at a historic low as

well, creating the potential for ultra
-
conservative

Israeli factions to
be provoked into action. Moreover,

President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu

share a
difficult personal relationship, making

upper
-
level rel
ations even tenser.

In sum, the United
States is in the unusual position

of having the frostiest relations with both Israel and

the
Palestinian Authority that it has had in years at

the same tim
e. It must be wary of potential
threats to

its interests on bo
th fronts.


Syria, Lebanon and Jordan

The current regime
in Syria
of Bashar al
-
Assad continues to

face massive protests as part of the
ongoing 2011

Arab Spring, and al
-
Assad has responded by

cracking down heavily on his people.


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The United States faces pote
ntial threats from two

main Syrian sources. Radical segments of
the

dissenters who feel the United States has not done

enough to further the reformist cause
could channel

their rage into potentially dangerous actions.

Elements of Syrian military,
paramilit
ary or

intelligence forces, whom are threatened by

American
-
led sanctions against the
current regime,

are equally alarming. The National Security Council

should be prepared for
potential reprisals against

American assets throughout the Levant. Much of
southern Lebanon
remains controlled by

Hezbollah, which the United States classifies as a

terrorist organization.
However, in June of 2011,

Hezbollah joined a national unity government in

Beirut, and
diplomatic progress in that area remains

underway. Jorda
n is relatively stable, and has not

been subject to the protests that have rocked

neighboring countries; it is not an area of
concern to

American national security at this time.


Arabian Peninsula

The Arabian Peninsula includes Saudi Arabia,

Kuwait, Bahrai
n, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar,

Oman, and Yemen. Many consider al
-
Qaeda in the

Arabia
n Peninsula (AQAP), a terrorist
organization

located in the incredibly unstable state of Yemen to

be the greatest terrorist
threat to the United States

today. AQAP’s p
resent incarnation was formed in

2009 when the
Saudi branch of AQAP and al
-
Qaeda

in Yemen merged under the leadership of Nassir al
-

Wahayshi. AQAP shares the strategic goals of the

wider al
-
Qaeda organization, including ending
what

they view as the foreign

occupation of all Muslim

lands, but also seeks to overthrow the
governments

of Yemen and Saudi Arabia, establish an Islamic

caliphate throughout the Arabian
Peninsula, and

expel all foreign presence from Saudi Arabia and

Yemen. In 2009, the
organization a
ttempted to

execute its first attack outside the Arabian Peninsula

when an AQAP
-
trained operative tried to detonate

explosives on an American
-
bound airplane.

Although the
attempt failed, it demonstrated the

organization’s resolve to attack targets outside
of the

Arabian Peninsula. AQAP has threatened the Bab al
-
Mandab, the strait between the Horn of
Africa and

Yemen through which 3 million barrels of oil per day

and 30 percent of global annual
trade pass, so the

possibility of a coordinated attack with the
al
-
Shabaab militia in the Horn of
Africa is a distinct

threat to U.S. economic and energy interests. AQAP

works to recruit Muslims
in the West through its

strong internet and social media presence. The

Yemeni government has
coordinated with U.S.

intelligen
ce services in its stepped
-
up

counterterrorism efforts against
the organization,

with 28 U.S. drone attacks on prominent AQAP targets in Yemen as of August
2012
.
The most prominent target that has been killed in U.S. drone attacks in Yemen was Anwar
Awkaki
, an Al Qaeda commander who was born in New Mexico. The upsurge in drone strikes
comes as the government of President Abdu Rabu Mansoor Hadi, a U.S. ally, appears to have
gained ground in the country’s civil war. With U.S. backing, Yemeni forces have dislo
dged Al
Qaeda militants from several southern cities and towns that AQAP had previously captured.
White House terrorism advisor John Brennan has gone on record as stating that “so long as
AQAP seeks to implement its murderous agenda, we will be a close par
tner with Yemen in
meeting this common threat.”
The Arab Spring affected the stability of Bahrain

when protesters
challenging the legitimacy of

Bahrain’s government clashed with troops that were

deployed to
keep protests under control. The

Bahraini governm
ent worked with Saudi Arabia and

the
United Arab Emirates, who sent troops to the

country ostensibly to protect financial institutions

and energy installations. In reality, Saudi and

Emirati troops ended up playing a role in


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suppressing protesters. The Bah
raini government is

an important strategic ally of the United
States, but

is nonetheless accused of imposing a repressive rule

that has led its citizens to
protest. While the conflict

in Bahrain remains unresolved, the other “oil

monarchies” in the Gulf we
re largely untouched by

the popular discontent that was pervasive
in Arab

countries in the spring of 2011.



Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran

Afghanistan

Afghanistan, like many nations in Central Asia, is

fraught with internal and external difficulties.
Chief

among these is its political instability. Since the

overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 at the
hands of

American forces, the nascent government has

struggled to rebuild a ravaged country.
Its efforts

have been hindered by tribal and ethnic differences

w
ithin both the electorate and
the legislature.

Despite the construction of a strong central

government under President Hamid
Karzai, the

government’s mandate remains weak. Furthermore,

tribal conflicts, both among
disparate groups and

within the central go
vernment, continue to work

against reconstruction
efforts by the government

and the United States. The latter’s continued

military and
humanitarian presence is another target

of violence, particularly by groups backed by the

resurgent Taliban. The governme
nt continues to have border issues

with Pakistan, as the
mountain tribes in the area are

spread across both sides of the political boundary.

The
government has had to deal with repeated

incursions by the Pakistani military to secure the

treaty
-
based Durand

Line. Similar border issues

exist with Iran; in particular, there is tension
over

Afghanistan’s creation of a dam on the Helmand

River, which flows into southeast Iran.
The Afghan

government has also struggled with Iran’s

deportation of masses of Afghans.

Finally, the

government has attempted to ease tense relations

with Russia over
both the opium
trade
and the Taliban’s support of Chechnyan terrorists

operating within Russia.

The United States’ main security concerns regarding

Afghanistan are its on
-
going

nation
-
building and

anti
-
terrorism efforts. Taliban and Al
-
Qaeda

militants remain entrenched in the
Afghan
-
Pakistan

border mountains, and while U.S. drone and special

forces strikes have had
some limited success, attacks

on U.S., Afghan, and Pakistan forc
es have not

ceased. Another
concern is the opium trade.

Afghanistan is the world’s largest producer of opium.

While this
and the diplomatic fallout with

neighboring countries is a concern, a more pressing

issue the
continuing use of opiate revenues by anti
government

groups, particularly the Taliban.


Pakistan

For Pakistan, like its neighbor Afghanistan, the

primary internal concern is the political
instability

resulting from a history of military rule and regional

conflict. The assassination of
potential
democratic

reformer Benazir Bhutto in 2007 lent to the

uncertainty of the country’s
political situation. While

Al
-
Qaeda claimed responsibility, many suspected the

military
government of Pervez Musharraf as being

responsible. There remains tension between

a
dvocates of Western
-
style democracy and Islamist

groups supporting a theocratic nation and
the

government’s policies have repeatedly shifted

between these two extremes. On top of this,
the

country faces the threat of terrorism from groups on

the Afghan bor
der, a region where the
military

consistently avoids any attempt to impose order, due

to its resistance to central

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authority. Many of these

attacks are supported by transnational terrorist

groups like Al
-
Qaeda
who condemn the

government’s partial cooperati
on with the United

States’ War on Terror,
particularly after the death of

Osama bin Laden during a U.S. Navy Seal raid on his

compound in
Pakistan.

Another pressing concern for the Pakistani

government is its ongoing tension with
India. Since

the
partition

of the two countries in 1947, the

border regions between them have
been continually

disputed, particularly the northern region of

Kashmir. Relations between the
two governments

took a downward turn after the 2008 terrorist

attacks in Mumbai, India, but
so
me degree of

rapprochement has since shown moderate success.

Despite this, continuing
Pakistani terrorist attacks

against Indian army units in Kashmir hinders

attempts at cooperation,
and the standoff between

the two nuclear powers is a great source of
concern

for the
international community.

The U.S.’s primary security interest in Pakistan is the

need for the
government’s cooperation in hunting

Taliban and Al
-
Qaeda militants along the Afghan

border.
This has grown more difficult due to

Pakistani displea
sure with the collateral damage

caused by
U.S. and NATO drone attacks, and the

Islamist reaction to the death of
Osama
bin Laden has

caused the Pakistani government to be more wary of

extremely close involvement in the War
on Terror.

Furthermore, Pakistan’
s possession of nuclear

weapons is a continuing source of
unease, especially

given the nation’s inherent political instability.


Iran

Despite Iran’s desire to place itself against Saudi

Arabia and the United States as a hegemon of
the

Islamic world, its ef
forts are hindered by internal

and external opposition. The so
-
called
“Green

Revolution” protests in early 2011, while primarily

aimed at the constraints on freedom
and civil liberties and the alleged human rights violations by

the government of President
Mahmoud

Ahmadinejad, contained elements of discontent with

the Islamic republic itself and
its embodiment in the

Ayatollah as its supreme leader. Though the protests

were halted by a
strong security response, unrest

remains, and the persistent spread of th
e Arab

Spring
revolutions intensifies the threat of popular

revolt despite Iran’s relative cultural dissimilarity

with the Arab states.

Iran’s closest external concern is the presence of U.S.

forces
-

and, at least
in theory, U.S. friendly

governments
-

on

both its eastern and western

borders in the form of
Afghanistan and Iraq. Both of

these countries’ previous disputes with Iran make

them a
pressing issue for the Iranian foreign

ministry. Furthermore, the transnational Baluch

population has caused interna
l dissent in Iran’s

southern provinces as well as increased border

tension with Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The United States’ top concern for Iran is its

attempts at
a nuclear program. While Iran has

continually asserted that its efforts are solely for

civi
lian
energy purposes, the IAEA has released

reports that Iran has failed to follow guidelines set

down by the Nuclear Non
-
Proliferation Treaty. A

nuclear Iran would be a dangerous
development for

several reasons. Although Iran does not have the

missile cap
acity to strike
North American target, its

Islamist government may not hesitate to use its

capabilities against
nearby Israel. It could also serve

as a deterrent against U.S. counterterrorism efforts

in the
Middle East. Furthermore, there are fears that

Ir
an’s acquisition of nuclear technology could
spread

to non
-
state groups like al
-
Qaeda or the Taliban and

be used for an attack against
Western populations.




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Northern Africa

There are two security challenges present in

northern Africa: Islamist terrorist g
roups and

political instability.

The terrorist threat comes from an Al
-
Qaeda cell in

the region, known as Al
-
Qaeda in the Islamic

Maghreb (AQIM), which is believed to have several

large training camps in
the Sahel, the area wedged

between the Sahara Desert

and the Sudanian

Savannah. Al
-
Qaeda is
believed to receive large

weapons shipments into those countries to supply

the training camps.
Al
-
Qaeda operatives frequently

train in the Sahel and then return to urban areas,

particularly in
Morocco, to plan
attacks in Africa and

elsewhere. In this regard, the proximity of the

Maghreb
region to Western Europe is worrisome, as

terrorists can travel to countries such as Spain and

Italy with relative ease.

In late August

2011
, al
-
Qaeda claimed responsibility for
a

suicide
bombing at a top Algerian military academy

in the city of Cherchell which killed eighteen
people,

including two civilians. A statement by al
-
Qaeda in

the Islamic Maghreb actually
claimed that the attack

took the lives of thirty
-
six individuals. T
his most

recent attack reflects
the type of guerilla terrorism

that is typical of AQIM.

In addition to terrorist attacks, Tunisia and
Algeria

have also been rocked by political unrest in the past

year. In Tunisia, the Jasmine
Revolution in

December 2010 an
d January 2011, considered by

some to be the beginning of the
2011 Arab Spring,

resulted in the downfall of President Zine El Abidine

Ben Ali after mass
popular demonstrations. These

demonstrations were prompted by economic

problems,
government corruption,

and a lack of

freedom of expression in Tunisia. While the protests

inspired protesters in Egypt and elsewhere, those

issues are far from resolved, and protests
continue as

an interim government paves the way for eventual

free elections and the
installatio
n of a new

permanent and democratic government.

Furthermore, the protests grew
violent at times as

police and military forces aggressively sought to

subdue protesters.

In
Algeria, protesters, many of them young men

frustrated by high unemployment and infla
tion in

housing and food costs, as well as a government that

has restricted freedom of speech and
other liberties,

continue mass demonstrations that began in late

2010. As in Tunisia, the
government struggles to

maintain order and this kind of
dissatisfaction with

the government
may leave disaffected young men

vulnerable to recruitment by fundamentalist terror

organizations, such as al
-
Qaeda.

In this Horn of Africa, this kind of governmental

instability has
been seen in Somalia for years now. A

civil war that began in 1991 has consumed the

country,
and for most of that time Somalia has

lacked a central government, allowing for militia

groups
to take power over the country, in particular

the anti
-
Western, radical Islamist group Al
-
Shabaab

in the s
outh of Somalia.

Most recently, instability has become the norm in

Egypt,
where protests began in January 2011 and

resulted in the fall of President Hosni Mubarak’s

government in February

2011
, which had been standing

for thirty years. Though their country

was

considered stable at the time that the revolution

began, Egyptian citizens took to the
streets en masse

to protest long
-
standing injustices such as

corruption and un
-
free elections,
abuse of emergency

law, and police brutality. As in Tunisia and

elsew
here, economic woes also
weighed on the

protesters’ minds.
Following the Egyptian Revolution of 2011, and the
resignation of Hosni Mubarak, executive power was assumed by the Supreme Council of the
Armed Forces, which dissolved parliament and suspended the

constitution. In 2012,
parliamentary and presidential elections were held, with the presidential elections resulting in
the election of Mohammed Morsi as Egypt’s fifth president.



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Latin America and South America

Whether under the guise of securing its
commercial

in
terests, checking the spread of
communism, or

carrying out the War on Drugs, the United States has

a long history of
engagement and intervention in

Latin America. Presently, a number of institutions
-

the
Organization of American States

(OAS)

and the Inter
-
American Development Bank, for example
-

and a

web of trade agreements ensure continued

interaction between the United States and
its Latin

American neighbors. In recent years, three Latin

American states have emerged as
most relevant to

U.S.

security concerns: Mexico, Colombia, and

Venezuela.


Mexico

Narcotics trafficking and the corresponding violence

remain the most pressing issues on the
bilateral

agenda. The current phase of Mexico’s drug war

began on December 11th, 2006, when
newly elect
ed

President Felipe Calderón deployed 6,500 soldiers,

marines, and federal
policemen to his home state of

Michoacán, a hotspot in a recent surge of drug

violence. The
conflict has since escalated in scope

and violence. 50,000 military personnel and federal

police
now patrol Mexican streets, and they have

scored major successes: of the country’s 37 top

traffickers, authorities have killed or captured 17.

Nevertheless, the death toll inexorably
continues to

climb. Over four years, 34,612 Mexicans have died in

drug
-
related killings; almost
half of all fatalities

15,273

occurred in 2010 alone, by far the bloodiest

year in Mexico’s drug
conflict. 90 percent of the

deaths are instances of cartel members killing one

another.

Rather
than spreading throughout the
country, the

bloodshed remains concentrated in three key
states:

Chihuahua, Sinaloa, and Tamaulipas. Violence,

however, has begun to seep into the
state of Nuevo

Leon, which houses the thriving Mexican business

hub of

Monterrey. The

border town of

Ciudad J
uárez,

located in

Chihuahua,

claimed one

quarter

of all

2010 drug

slayings as the

Sinaloa Cartel and the Juárez Cartel (also known as the Vicente

Carrillo Fuentes
Organization) battle for control of

the smuggling routes to the lucrative U.S. market.

Other

major cartels include the Zetas, a group of

Mexican ex
-
special forces who used to serve as the

enforcement arm of the Gulf Cartel, and the New

Federation, a makeshift alliance that the Gulf
Cartel,

La Familia Michoacána, and the Sinaloa Cartel

formed to c
ontain the Zetas’ growing
clout.

The cartels depend on the United States for their

livelihood. In 2006, the White House
Office of

National Drug Control Policy estimated that

Mexican cartels took in $13.8 billion, of
which $8.6

billion
-

roughly sixty perce
nt
-

came from selling

marijuana to U.S. consumers.
Similarly, Mexico now

serves as the transshipment point for 90 percent of

the cocaine destined
for the U.S. market.

Unfortunately, many of the U.S. victories in

combating the Colombian drug
cartels in the

1980s

and 1990s ultimately shifted the cocaine nexus

closer to home, from
Colombia to Mexico. President

Obama has thus acknowledged that the United

States has “to
take responsibility” for the public

safety crisis south of the border, and his

administratio
n plans
to disburse $900 million of the

$1.4 billion Merida Initiative, a U.S. security

assistance plan, by
the end of
2011
. However,

corruption among law enforcement officials, weak

judicial
institutions, and poor intelligence
-
gathering

capabilities all
suggest that more money alone will

not carry the day against the kingpins.


Colombia

For many decades, Colombia has been mired in

warfare between leftist guerillas, right
-
wing


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paramilitaries, and drug cartels. Today, Colombia

faces threats from two major
armed groups:
the

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

and the National Liberation Army (ELN).
The

United States has designed both as Foreign Terrorist

Organizations.

The stronger of these
two groups is FARC, which

formed in 1964 as an amalgamatio
n of “communist

militants and
peasant self
-
defense groups.” FARC

rakes in between $500 million and $600 million

from the
drug trade, the group’s primary source of

funding, but kidnappings, extortion, and protection

rackets also pad the rebels’ coffers. Tho
ugh FARC

still
remains powerful, the Colombian
government

has scored major successes in cracking down on the

organization. The group’s
current strength,

estimated at roughly 8,000
-
9,000 combatants, has

fallen by half since 2002,
when it

commanded17,500
-
18,
000 fighters. Likewise, in

2002 FARC boasted a presence in 514
of Colombia’s

1,098 municipalities; by 2009, that number had

fallen to 206 municipalities. FARC
employs

traditional guerilla warfare tactics, including sniper

attacks, mine laying, car bombs,
a
ssassination of

political opponents, and light, relatively brief

engagements (
hostigamientos
)
with security forces.

In 2009, FARC conducted roughly 177 sniper attacks

and 100
hostigamientos
. Mines caused a further 674

casualties, of which 232 victims were
civilians. The

average age of a FARC recruit, tragically, is a mere

11.8 years.

Hoping to emulate the success of
Fidel Castro’s

Cuban Revolution, a number of “students, Catholic

radicals, and left
-
wing
intellectuals” banded together

to create the ELN in 19
64. Today, ELN operates

primarily in the
“rural and mountainous areas of

northern, northeastern, and southwestern Colombia,

as well
as the border regions with Venezuela,”

according to the U.S. State Department. Similar to

FARC, the ELN primarily finances i
ts activities

through narcotics trafficking. ELN fighters total

roughly 2,000, and the terrorist group carried out at

least 23 attacks in 2010. FARC and ELN
announced

an alliance in December of 2009. Although FARC

and ELN perpetrated some joint
-
attacks in
2010,

hostility runs deep between the two organizations;

FARC alone killed roughly
150 ELN guerillas from

2002 to 2009. The effectiveness of an alliance or

non
-
aggression pact
between the two terrorist

organizations seems to depend on regional

commanders;
whereas a
truce appears to be in effect

in the Nariño and Cauca Departments, FARC’s front commander in
Arauca Department has declared his

intention to fight the ELN until it is eliminated.

The 2002
election of Álvaro Uribe as Colombia’s

president ushered i
n a tougher internal security

policy.
Uribe vowed to negotiate only with

paramilitary and
guerrilla

groups that would give up

terrorism and consent to a ceasefire. Between 2002

and 2008, homicides declined by 40
percent,

kidnapping fell by 76 percent, and
terrorist attacks

dropped by 61 percent. An
incredibly popular

president, Uribe left office in 2010 with an approval

rating of 75 percent. His
successor and former

Minister of Defense, Juan Manual Santos, has

largely continued Uribe’s
policies, although he

has

displayed a more conciliatory attitude towards

Venezuela.

Since Fiscal
Year 2000, Washington has provided

Colombia approximately $7 billion, largely in

military
assistance, through Plan Colombia. Though

Plan Colombia initially began as a
counter
-
narcotics

assistance program, in 2002 Congress authorized

the use of Plan Colombia funds against both
drug

trafficking and terrorist groups. The United States

has provided extensive advisors to
Colombia, but

U.S. personnel cannot directly partake i
n combat

operations. Furthermore,
Congress has mandated

that no more than 800 U.S. military personnel and

600 civilian
personnel can be stationed in Colombia,

although U.S. manpower in Colombia usually does

not exceed one
-
half of that maximum amount. On

Oc
tober 30th, 2009, the two countries
announced the

U.S.
-
Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement

(DCA), which provided U.S.

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forces access for ten

years to seven military bases in Colombia to execute

joint counter
-
narcotics and counterterrorism

actions. Howeve
r, on August 17th, 2010, the

Colombian
Constitutional Court found the treaty

unconstitutional because President Uribe had not

submitted it to the Colombian Congress for

approval. President Santos shows no inclination to

submit the accord to Congress, ensur
ing that the

DCA will not enter into force.


Venezuela

Under Hugo Chávez, Venezuela has turned into a

vocal op
ponent of U.S. policies. Chávez
himself has

frequently railed against the United States and its

leaders: in a 2006 speech before
the U.N. General

Assembly, he called then
-
president
George W.
Bush “the devil”

and “the
spokesman of imperialism.” Even after the

election of Barack Obama, Chavez’s stance has not

noticeably softened. When the United States sent

soldiers to Haiti to deliver post
-
earthquake

humanitarian assistance, Chavez accused the United

States of “occupying Haiti undercover.”

In
addition to developing closer ties with Latin

America’s leftist governments, including the

administrations of Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Daniel

Ortega in Nicaragu
a, Evo Morales in Bolivia,
and

Fidel and Raúl Castro in Cuba, Venezuela has also

courted Russia and Iran. Russia has
agreed to build

Venezuela’s first nuclear power plant, for example,

and the two countries also
conducted joint naval

exercises in 2008. Fur
thermore, Iranian president

Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad and Chavez have declared

that their two states possess a “strategic alliance”

that will overturn Western imperialism and create a

“new world order.” Caracas and Tehran
have signed

energy cooperation agreement
s worth billions of

dollars, leading to accusations
that Venezuela may

have violated U.S. or U.N. sanctions against Iran. In

2011, the German
newspaper
Die Welt
reported that

Iran was constructing missile bases in Venezuela,

although both the U.S. State De
partment and the

Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs have
stated

that the allegations are untruthful.

Venezuela has provided some support to terrorist

organizations, although it is unclear whether that

support is actual government policy or the
actions
of

“entrepreneurial” government officials. In 2008, two

arrested members of Basque
Fatherland and Liberty

(ETA), a terrorist group active in Spain, confessed

that they had received
training from a Venezuelan

official. According to the Colombian government,

Bogotá has
repeatedly provided Venezuela with

information that FARC and ELN terrorists are hiding out in
Venezuela, but Venezuela has taken no

action to expel them. The United States has also

designated Venezuela’s current Director of the

Military Intelli
gence Directorate, General Hugo

Armando Carvajal Barrios, as someone who has

materially assisted the FARC’s drug trafficking

effort
s. Chavez has continued to deny
charges that

his government supports terrorism or that
“a foreign

paramilitary or military
guerilla force has taken over

even the smallest millimeter
squared of our

sovereign territory.”


Other Areas of Note

It is also worth considering independent state actors

who
are not necessarily involved in
regional areas of

concern that could involve the
United States, but

who do represent potential
threats to national

security.





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China

Widely considered to be the United States’ rival on

the rise, the People’s Republic of China has
become

more and more assertive in its foreign policy over

the years, espec
ially concerning the
U.S. On August

10th, 2011, the Chinese announced that sea trials had

begun on its new aircraft
carrier, which had been

recently acquired from Russia. Though China asserts

that the aircraft
carrier is solely for defensive

purposes, its
presence will give the PLA
-
Navy the

ability to project
force around the world and must be

taken as a serious shift both in the global power

scheme and the U.S. defense paradigm.

China has also become increasingly assertive in

cyberwarfare. Both the U.S.
government many of its

major corporations have come under
attack with

increasing frequency from hackers in the last several

years, and many government
sources have

acknowledged that those attacks have frequently

originated from within China.
Google has bla
med

the mid
-
2011 attack on Gmail


which resulted in

the exposure of hundreds
of passwords belonging to

U.S. government officials, Chinese democracy

activists, and others
around the world


on China.

There are also ongoing security and foreign policy

chall
enges
related to the tumultuous relationship

between China and the Republic of China

government in
Taiwan. Historically, the United

States military has maintained a strong working

relationship
with Taiwanese armed forces, including

the sales of jets and ot
her materials. China has

expressed concern about this and in late September

criticized an Obama administration plan to
sponsor

a $5 billion upgrade for Taiwan’s fighter jet fleet.


North Korea

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,

occupying
the northe
rn half of the Korean
Peninsula,

is governed by a secretive and belligerent sultanistic

regime

which until very recently
was

led by Kim Jong
-
Il, who became head of state

after the d
eath of his father, Kim Il
-
Sung.
Upon the death of Kim Jong
-
Il, power was p
assed on to his son,
Kim

Jong
-
Un. From its
beginning, the North Korean

state has been anti
-
American and has repeatedly

flaunted its
disrespect for international demands on

its behavior. Furthermore, animosity between the

two
Koreas is extremely high, and
North Korea is

often the belligerent party in flare
-
ups.

On March
26th, 2010, a South Korean naval vessel

the
Cheonan,
sank in the Yellow Sea, killing 46

sailors.
Upon investigation, an international panel,

led by South Korea, declared the sinking to have

resulted from a torpedo attack by a North Korean

submarine. The United Nations Security
Council

made a statement strongly condemning the attack

without directly implicating North
Korea. The North

Korean government has denied that it attacked the

ship.

Asid
e from this kind of unprovoked violence against

South Korea, North Korea also has a
nuclear

program that may pose a threat to the United States.

North Korea’s nuclear ambitions
can be traced to the

Cuban Missile Crisis. After that incident, North

Korean of
ficials began to
fear that the Soviet Union

would not live up to mutual defense agreements with

North Korea
and would consider ignoring the

agreement in order to curry favor in the West, as they had
when they withdrew weapons from Cuba.

Consequently, the N
orth Korean government sought

to build a large standing army. They did not succeed

in obtaining nuclear weapons during the
Soviet era;

however, as Soviet bloc countries would not give

nuclear missiles to the Koreans for
fear that they

would share them with

the Chinese.

Finally, in 2006, North Korea announced that
it had

conducted a nuclear test for the first time ever.

American and independent assessments
confirmed

the presence of earthquake
-
like tremors in North

Korea at the purported time of the

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United States National Security Council

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test,

cor
roborating the North Korean regime’s account.

Another test was conducted in 2009,
supposedly

with weapons with the same capabilities as those

that were dropped in Hiroshima
and Nagasaki in

Japan at the end of World War II.

Given its apparent willingness to

perpetrate violent

attacks against South Korea, an American
ally in

East Asia, and rumored attempts to develop missiles

that could reach the United States,
North Korea

remains a security challenge that the United States

national security apparatus is
continually

monitoring. The challenge is compounded by the

secretive nature of the North
Korean regime, which

has been untruthful in the past about many

important topics, including
the country’s nuclear

program.


Other Challenges

Natural disasters may also

create security

challenges. The Atlantic hurricane season does not

end until November 30th, and strong hurricanes,

such as Irene, which caused damage up and
down

the East Coast in late August, can be challenging

elements for governments to manage. In
extr
eme

cases, such as the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in

New Orleans in 2005 when looting
and violence

were out of control, affected areas can be paralyzed

by disorder and a failure of
the rule of law.

Furthermore, of strong earthquakes across the globe

re
cently, most notably in Japan in March,
has

heightened awareness of the political, economic, and

humanitarian challenges that can
result from a

large
-
scale earthquake. Though the East Coast

earthquake in August
2011
did not
cause significant

structural or
humanitarian losses in any city, it did

raise awareness of the
potential structural flaws in

buildings in urban areas in the northeast, including

national
landmarks such as the Washington

Monument.

Aside from natural disasters and the countries listed

abov
e that pose direct security challenges
to the

United States, the National Security Council should

remain vigilant of goings
-
on in all
regions of the

world. Those that are suffering particularly acute

economic problems or political
instability, which

may
trigger the kind of discontent among citizens

that can lead to unrest are
always important to

watch, as the chaos risks creating a power vacuum

that may be filled by
terrorist groups; dictatorial,

anti
-
American regimes; or violent non
-
state actors.

The lis
tings of
this guide are intended to provide an

overview of the greatest threats to U.S. national

security; this is not, by any means, an exhaustive list.


STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM

The following is a list of states that are state

sponsors of terrorism, h
ave ties to terrorist groups,

or are terrorist safe havens, taken from the

Department of State’s 2010 Country Reports on

Terrorism document.


• Afghanistan

• Cuba

• Iran

• Iraq

• Lebanon

• North Korea

• Pakistan


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• Philippines

• Somalia

• Sudan

• Syria


Venezuela

• Yemen


U.S. SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE

ASSESSMENT

Cyberterrorism

Often dismissed as pure science fiction,

cybertechnology poses a tangible danger to United

States homeland security, particularly given the high

state of American reliance on advanc
ed
information

systems. Cyberwarfare is not a new concept in

international politics, and states
with advanced

information technology are believed to have

employed cyberattacks in the
contemporary method

as early as 1982. In that year, the C.I.A. was

report
ed, by an unnamed
member of the Reagan

administration, to have placed a packed of malicious

software known as
a ‘logic bomb’ in a Soviet pipeline

control system, causing it to detonate in what was

described
as having been one of the most spectacular

explos
ions not caused by a nuclear discharge. More

recently, in 2003, unknown cyber attackers are

believed to have penetrated U.S. government

databases.

In general, a ‘cyber
-
attack’ is most easily

conceptualized as the selective use of invasive

computer
-
based me
chanisms, such as viruses,

worms, or simple information overload, to cause

digital damage
-

loss of critical data, information

theft, interference in web
-
based activities
-

or

physical damage
-

power loss, failure of hazard

containment systems, destruction
of digitally

controlled

infrastructure. Cyberattacks can come in

many forms. The most basic is that often
used by

private hackers and cyberterrorists: denial of service.

Denial of service involves flooding
a target computer

system with irrelevant or
malicious data in order to

overload it and cause
shut down or procedural

blockage. An example occurred in Estonia in 2007,

when an unknown
attacker nearly shut down the

Estonian civil infrastructure, much of which was

completely
internet
-
based. The system
survived the

attack only because of their capable government IT

division, and damage was costly and significant.

More difficult to detect and counteract are the
more

complex viruses, which must attach themselves to a

host program to reproduce, and the
dang
erous

worm, which reproduces itself but does not need a

host program, and also will cause
damage regardless

of its function. The Israeli military is believed to

make extensive use of
worms; two incidents in

particular lend evidence to this. In 2007, Syrian

air

defenses were
mysteriously crippled by

computerized systems failure shortly before an

Israeli air raid. Three
years later, Iranian nuclear

facilities at Natanz suffered critical malfunctions due

to the release
of the Stuxnet worm in their

containment
systems, causing serious setbacks and

some severe
accidents. Both of these incidents were

widely believed to have been the work of the Israeli

Mossad intelligence service.

Cybertechnology poses several challenges to national

and
international security. The

first is

accountability: cyberattacks make it difficult to trace

or
positively identify an attacker. Even if the

individual(s) who carried out the attack are traced,


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they may not even be directly connected to the state

or non
-
state actor who masterminded
the
plan.

Agents of a foreign government choosing to engage

in or engineer a cyberattack may
reasonably assume

that they will not be identified. In the event of a

nuclear strike, everyone
knows who sent the bomb.

After a cyberattack, however, it could be w
eeks,

months, even years
before the culprit is identified, if

at all. States may not be able to attribute the attack

to a
particular aggressor state or non
-
state actor, or

determine against whom they need to balance.

Another challenge of cybersecurity is
that states with

advanced cyber capabilities and actual or
potential

rivalries with other states possess first
-
strike

capability. Cyber tactics can be used for
both

counterforce and countervalue purposes. As in the

case of the supposedly Israeli attack on
Syrian air

defenses, a cyberattacker can target military

installations to make a conventional
attack more

feasible. However, a cyberattack can also disrupt or

seriously damage critical
infrastructure, even to the

point of creating physical damage outside o
f its

direct target, as in
the C.I.A.’s destruction of a Russian pipeline and the Stuxnet virus in Iran. Such

a strategy could
be used in a populated area to cause

malfunctions in

municipal waste,
water, or power

systems; to sabotage metro rail, airport, a
nd other

transportation services; or even to bring
about

catastrophic failures in nuclear safety systems.

Through combined counterforce and
countervalue

tactics, a cyberattacker could seriously damage, if

not cripple, their intended
target.

The “management
” of the Internet itself


or lack

thereof
-

poses a serious challenge to any
state’s

cyber
security initiatives. The Internet Engineering

Task Force, a key player in the upkeep
of the

Internet, is distinctly anarchic, indifferent to state

authorities, and
prone to questionable
methods of

decision
-
making (it uses whistling competitions as a

means of voting). The Internet,
the key battleground

of cybersecurity, is not conducive to regulation. In

fact, the only entities
with any meaningful degree of

control ar
e the Internet Service Provider (ISP)

companies.
Because of this, the private sector must

be a key player in cyberdefense. Already, attempts

have been made to integrate public/private

initiatives towards cyberdefense, culminating in the

MITRE Advanced Cybe
r Security Center in Boston,

which brings together government and
private sector

cyber experts to develop defense and mitigation

strategies.

The most urgent
danger posed by cybersecurity,

however, is undoubtedly its availability. Any

individual in any
country with access to workable

computer equipment and the skills of hacking can

create a
cyber
-
assault mechanism; armed with the

resources of an organized terrorist organization or a

rogue state, the damage that could be caused by a

dedicated team of cybe
rattackers is
immeasurable.

Even a profitable businessman with the services of a

skilled group of actors
could develop the capability

to challenge a state in the cyber arena. On the

reverse side, with
the widespread use of information

systems in advanced W
estern economies, this

vulnerability will only increases as the process of

globalization goes forward.

With our economy
and daily lives inundated with

digital and other types of information technology,

the U.S. is
particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks.

T
he first potential avenue of attack comes in the

form
of automated systems used by private citizens;

computers, phones, and cars. The threat to

computers is obvious: a well
-
placed virus could play

havoc with financial data, initiate identity
theft,

bring d
own security systems, and cause critical

overloads resulting in physical damage.
Cellular

phones, especially the ever
-
popular ‘smart phone,’

are similarly an easy target. Most of
can be linked to

a physical computer, and many can connect to the

Internet. I
t is easy for a
cyber
-
attack to spread

through these connections to disrupt cellular

communication, send false

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messages, access

restricted call data, and even remote
-
tap phones to

intercept and copy
conversations. IPods, e
-
readers,

and other Internet
-

or c
omputer
-
linked devices are

also at risk.
Less obvious is the danger posed to

automobiles. Cyber researchers have determined

that “car
hacking” is a distinct possibility. Cars built

in recent years contain an amount of digital circuitry

unprecedented in,
say, the 1960s. Examples of

systems affected by computerized systems are
the

fuel supply, brakes, transmission, hydraulic

pressure, and environmental control. Access to
cars

from external computer systems is even more

available through mandated onboard
dia
gnostics

ports, not to mention Bluetooth and cellular

connections for phones and OnStar
services.

Another source of concern is the U.S. SmartGrid

initiative. The SmartGrid project was
designed with

several goals in mind: increasing the efficiency and

econo
my of energy
distribution; facilitate the

creation of interfaces for “smart” technology,

especially as a fuel
alternative for hybrid and

electric
-
powered cars; and providing better

information and
necessity
-
based control of

consumer energy. The idea behind

a SmartGrid is

not the creation of
a monolithic network, but rather

an overlapping system of power companies,

networks,
operators, and receptors. The SmartGrid

is generally conceived as a two
-
fold system: a

‘transmission grid’ moves large amounts of elect
rical energy across large distances, supposedly
even

across the continent when fully developed, and a

‘home area network’ or ‘municipal grid’
distributes

this energy to buildings based on each building’s

specific consumption needs. One of
the aims of this

system is to allow more accurate time
-
of
-
use

information to refine energy
pricing for consumers.

But there are significant concerns related to the

security of the Smart
Grid. Any computer is

vulnerable to infiltration via its connections to other

computers
, and the
Smart Grid depends on

computers. An attack on systems connected by a

Smart Grid could
cause mass blackouts, loss of

critical systems in power plants and emergency

response centers,
and cripple communications

systems. Furthermore, manuals for the
SCADA

control systems
commonly used in power systems

have been found with hackers in over 2,000 separate

incidents.

So far, SmartGrids have only entered early test

phases in a small handful of cities, but
the

technology is quickly gaining attention.

Despit
e the dangers of the SmartGrid and private

computer systems, the most pressing concern for

cyber security in the United States is the
viability of

nuclear containment mechanisms and command

and control systems. The United
States currently has

over 10,000 n
uclear weapons stored in various

secure facilities. Many of
the critical components,

including many of the warheads themselves, are

stored via
computerized monitoring and

maintenance systems. Though the U.S. is considered

to have one
of the strongest cyber
defense

mainframes in the world, it has still been vulnerable

in the past,
and other nuclear powers such as Russia

or Pakistan do not have nearly the same resiliency in

their defenses. Nuclear power plants are at even

greater risk due to their reliance on
computerized

regulatory systems and their connections to

standard power networks. The
catastrophic damage

that could be caused by the critical failure of

containment and control
systems in a nuclear

storage or power facility is a nightmare scenario for

the

security forces of
any nuclear power.


Aviation Security

The weaknesses of the United States’ aviation

security were clearly shown in the attacks of

September 11th, 2001, in which lax security enabled a

group of terrorists to hijack an airplane
and wreak

devastation in New York City, Washington, and

Pennsylvania. Since that event, the

20

United States National Security Council

|
SWCHSMUN 2012


U.S. has acted to

improve its aviation security, but weaknesses persist.

One innovative new
program is the use of full
-
body

scanners at airports, which has led to controversy

over privacy
rights and possible health effects. The

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has

started a program of “chat
-
downs” in which “officers

engage in brief, casual conversations with

passengers and listen for any hints of suspicious

behavio
r,” although such techniques have not
been

fully assessed by the Department of Homeland

Security. Passengers are no longer allowed
to carry

liquids on board their flights. Even with these and

other safety precautions, however,
travelers rarely

feel fully s
afe.

One major issue in aviation security is lax airport

access controls, with investigators using
counterfeit

credentials easily accessing secure areas in airports.

Airport perimeter security is
often taken care of by

the police or local authorities untra
ined by the TSA,

which has too little
authority to properly enforce the

necessary safety standards. Screeners at airports

have been
found to be insufficiently trained, likely

because the rapid turnover rate in the position

disallows extensive and expensive

training. Although

most reforms have taken effect in large
-
traffic

airports, smaller airports may be weaker as a result

of their lower priority status.

Aviation
security jumps to the forefront of the

American news cycle with the advent of each new

bombing

attempt, including that of Umar Farouk

Abdulmutallab, the attempted Underwear
Bomber,

and the intercepted Yemeni bomb packages which

targeted Chicago synagogues.
Although aviation

security has improved vastly since the tragic events of 9/11, the United
States
is still very vulnerable to

attacks which exploit the weaknesses of the aviation

system.


Port Security

Ports and the containerized shipping that passes

through them are immensely important for
the U.S.

economy, but pose a large security risk to the

nation

as well. About 90 percent of the
world’s trade is

transported through containerized shipping, and the

U.S. receives around half
of its incoming trade


by

value
-

through such shipping. Any disruption to the

transport
networks would be catastrophic

for the

U.S. economy. In fact, past port closures along the

West Coast cost more than $1 billion a day.

Because of the cost of inspecting the more than 6

million cargo containers passing through U.S. ports

every year and the large cost of shipping
delays
due

to these inspections, only 2
-
10 percent of shipping

containers are physically
inspected by Customs.

Such insufficiencies in the security network of ports

can be exploited by
terrorists, who could smuggle

conventional bombs, radiological “dirty” bombs,
or

weapons of
mass destruction in cargo into U.S.

ports. In 2005, the Government Accountability

Office
concluded that “while the likelihood of such

use of containers is considered low, the movement
of

oceangoing containerized cargo is vulnerable to

some fo
rm of terrorist action…including
attempts to

smuggle either fully assembled weapons of mass

destruction or their individual
components.”

The Department of Homeland Security leads the

Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs
and Border

Protection, and the Transportati
on Security

Administration in securing U.S. ports.
The Coast

Guard works to protect U.S. ports by inspecting

approaching commercial ships,
protecting U.S. Navy

ships in American ports, and countering terrorist

threats in these ports,
while the U.S. Customs

and

Border Protections inspects cargo and the crew of

the ships.
However, it has been suggested that

customs and Coast Guard have been less than

present in
day
-
to
-
day port security in the past, with

private terminal operators and security personnel


21

United States National Security Council

|
SWCHSMUN 2012


primar
ily responsible for guarding their facilities and

inspecting containers according to Coast
Guard

approved

plans.

The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is a program

created by the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection

to “extend our zone of security outward”

from our

shores by identifying containers
most likely to be at

risk for terrorist actions by using intelligence

sources, screening containers
at their port of

departure instead of upon arrival on American soil,

quickly pre
-
screening such
containers with d
etection

technology, and using containers that evidently show

possible
terrorist tampering. Shippers have also

promised to improve the security of their cargo

shipments in return for benefits from the

government under the Customs
-
Trade Partnership

Against
Terrorism (C
-
TPAT), but the government

has in large part failed to verify the shipper’s
security

information and processes.


U.S.
-
Mexico Border Security

The 2000
-
mile border between the United States

and Mexico has been shown to be porous,
allowing

many to

cross illegally into the United States. Until

today, this weakness has been
exploited mainly by

illegal immigrants and smugglers bringing

contraband into the United
States. However, it

would not be difficult for members of a terrorist

organization to ente
r the
United States or bring

explosive devices into the United States in many

unprotected regions
along the U.S.
-
Mexico border.

This has not gone unnoticed by government officials

operating near this border; as early as 2004, Senator

Kyl from Arizona
questioned, “Why
wouldn’t those

seeking to attack America be tempted to join the

hundreds of thousands
already illegally entering

from Mexico?”

Although money poured into border security and

efforts to counter illegal immigration has
been

relatively effect
ive in many urban areas, illegal cross
-
border

activity has been displaced to
other sectors of

the border which are less secure and far less monitored. Recent investigations
by the GAO have

shown a “significant disparity between the large law

enforcement pr
esence
on state lands in one state and

what seems to be a lack of law enforcement presence

on
federally managed lands.” Even in monitored

areas, GAO undercover investigators were
frequently

able to cross into the United States with counterfeit

identificati
on, leading the
organization to conclude

that “terrorists could use counterfeit identification to

pass through
most of the tested ports of entry with

little chance of being detected.”


Biohazards

Of additional concern to the U.S. national security

apparatus is the threat of bioterrorism,
which,

though it could be a threat in any of the areas listed

above, would demand a different
response than

traditional terror attacks due to its sophisticated,

insidious nature. A March 2011
report by the Center

fo
r Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh

Medical Center, a research
institute dedicated to

conducting research that will enhance the United

States’ ability to
respond to biosecurity threats,

concluded that, “the effective dissemination of a

lethal
bio
logical agent within a population center

would endanger the lives of hundreds of thousands

of people and have unprecedented economic,

societal, and political consequences.”

In a
bioterrorism attack, harmful, disease
-
causing

agents that affect people,
animals, plants, or
some

combination thereof, are released in a target area.

These agents can be spread through
air, water, or in

food. Bioterrorism can be especially potent because

of the built
-
in incubation

22

United States National Security Council

|
SWCHSMUN 2012


period that occurs as

targets are infected with

the agents but do not show

symptoms.

The
United States is, to date, not as aggressively

preparing itself against bioterrorism as it is against

other potential security threats. For example, access

to water plants is essentially unguarded,
prompting

fears
that terrorists could strike against water

supplies in urban areas.






PROCEDURE

The U.S. National Security Council will apply basic

parliamentary procedure loosely to its
proceedings.

The majority of debate will take place in moderated

caucuses, with u
nmoderated
caucuses used sparingly

when prudent. More complicated motions will be left

to the Chair’s
discretion.

The Council will work to pass Directives responding

to the fast
-
paced crises that they
face. Simple

majority will be sufficient to pass Direct
ives, unless

otherwise specified by the
Chair. Each member has

their own portfolio, which can be utilized to obtain

information and
take action; however, individual

decisions are no substitute for group initiatives,

particularly
when facing a large
-
scale
crisis.


USNSC Members at SWC
HS
MUN 2012:


























Vice President Joe Biden



Secretary of State Hillary Clinton



Secretary of Defense

Leon Panetta



Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of
the Joint

Chiefs of Staff






William Daley, White House Chief of
Staff



Tom Donilon, National Security Adviser



Denis McDonough, Deputy National
Security

Adviser



Secretary of the Treasury
Timothy
Geithner



Secretary of the
Department of
Homeland Security J
anet Napolitano




General David Petraeus, Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency



Lieutenant General (Ret.) James Clapper, Jr.,
Director of National Intelligence



Eric Holder, Attorney General




Gil Kerlikowske, Director of
White House
Office of National Drug Control Policy



Susan E. Rice,
U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations



Daniel B. Shapiro, NSC Senior Director for
the Near East and North Africa



John Brennan, Assistant to the President and

Deputy National Security Advisor
for
Homeland

Security and Counterterrorism



23

United States National Security Council

|
SWCHSMUN 2012


USNSC MEMBER PROFILES



Joe Biden,

Vice President



president in decision
-
mak
ing on a variety of policy
issues.

For the purposes of this simulation,
the V.P.

will serve as the liaison between the NSC and

Congress.

The current Vice President of
the United States is

Joseph Biden, Jr. Before
beginning his current role

as V.P., Mr. Biden served
six terms as a Senator for

the state of Delaware beginning in 1972, at which

point he became
one of the youngest people ever

elected to the U.S. Senate. During his tenure as

Senator, he
served as a Chair
man and Ranking

Member of the Senate Judiciary and Foreign

Relations
Committees, for seventeen and twelve

years
respectively. On the Judiciary Committee, he

made himself known for his work on criminal justice

issues, especially through the 1994 Crime
Bill
and

the Violence Against Women Act. On the Foreign

Relations Committee, he was widely
recognized for

his understanding of and role in shaping U.S. foreign

policy; he took a leading
role in debates and

legislation on subjects such as the Middle East,

Southw
est Asia, post
-
Cold
War Europe, terrorism,

and weapons of mass destruction.

Upon Biden’s ascension to the Vice
Presidency in

2009, President Obama indicated that he wanted the

Vice President to be one of
his chief advisers and

trouble
-
shooters in the admin
istration. He thus was

not given a specific
portfolio of issues to handle


unlike former Vice President Gore, who focused

heavily on
environmental issues, among other

things

and was instead given full access to the

president’s
schedule and authorization to

come to

any meeting he desired to attend. Among the duties

given to him by President Obama, Vice President

Biden has been responsible for overseeing the

distribution of the $787 billion of stimulus funds

authorized by the American Recovery and

Reinvestmen
t Act, chairing the White House’s

Middle Class Task Force, and providing focus and

guidance on Iraq and Afghanistan policy within the

administration. More recently, in 2011, Vice

President Biden was asked by President Obama to

lead negotiations with Congre
ssional
Republicans as

the two parties endeavored to make a deal on the

federal budget. He also
advises the president

regularly on a broad range of foreign policy issues,

given his knowledge
and expertise accumulated

during his years on and chairing the Se
nate Foreign

Relations
The
Vice President’s

cUi敦

constitutional responsibility

is to preside over the United States Senate. This
includes voting to break ties when
they
occur

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24

United States National Security Council

|
SWCHSMUN 2012


Committee.

Vice President Biden’s personal life since becoming a

Senator has been beset with
tragedy. A month after

his election to his first term in the Senate in 1972, his

first wife and
young daughter were killed in a car

crash th
at also seriously injured his two sons. In

1988, his
pursuit of the Democratic nomination to

the presidency was cut short by accusations that his

remarks at a debate were copied from those of a

British Labour Party leader. Only months after
that

political
disgrace, he collapsed from a brain

aneurysm, forcing him to undergo two serious

surgeries. Vice President Biden affirms that he has

learned lessons from each of his life crises,
including

that one must, “always let the people you love know

you love them,
and never let
something go unsaid.”

This life lesson may have helped to determine his

approach to politics, as
he is widely known for his

direct

and sometimes impulsive

manner of

speech, in spite of his
own professional emphasis on

diplomacy and discussion
.




Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State









Secretary for the

Obama administration in 2009, Secretary Clinton

spent nearly four decades in
public service

most

notably as a First Lady and a member of the United

States Senate, but also
as a public issue advocate and

an attorney. As First Lady of the S
tate of Arkansas

for 12 years,
she chaired the Arkansas Education

Standards Committee, co
-
f
o
unded the Arkansas

Advocates
for Children and Families, and served as a

member on the boards of the Arkansas Children’s

The
Secretary of State

is the head of the United
States Department of State and serves on the
cabinet as the
President’s chief adviser on

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.



25

United States National Security Council

|
SWCHSMUN 2012


Hospital and the Children’s Defense Fund. Up
on her

husband Bill Clinton’s election to the
presidency in

1992, Secretary Clinton used her position as First

Lady to promote issues such as
healthcare reform

and social welfare, especially related to children and

families. She was
heavily involved in bip
artisan

efforts to improve the adoption and foster care

systems, reduce
teen pregnancy, and provide more

wide
-
reaching healthcare to children across the

country
through the Children’s Health Insurance

Program. As First Lady, she traveled to more than

eight
y countries around the world as a

representative of the United States, garnering

respect as a champion of human rights, democracy,

and civil society. In conjunction with then
Secretary

of State Madeleine Albright, she launched the

government’s Vital Voices

Democracy
Initiative,

which has resulted in the training and organization

of women leaders across the
globe.

After the end of President Clinton’s second term,

Secretary Clinton made history as the first
former

First Lady elected to the United States Senat
e and as

the first woman elected statewide
to represent New

York. As a Senator, she served on the Armed Services

Committee; the Health,
Education, Labor, and

Pensions Committee; the Environment and Public

Works Committee; the
Budget Committee; and the

Sele
ct Committee on Aging, in addition to acting as a

Commissioner
on the Commission on Security and

Cooperation in Europe. In the Senate, Clinton

worked
across party lines to build support for a

variety of causes, ranging from the expansion of

economic opport
unities to access to quality,

affordable heal
thcare. Following the terrorist
attacks

of September 11th, 2001, she strongly advocated for

allocating funds to the rebuilding
of New York and to

the first responders whose lives and health were

risked working
at Ground
Zero. She highlighted her

own support for the military, fighting for improved

health care and
benefits for wounded service

members, veterans, and members of the National

Guard and
Reserves. It is worth noting that she was

the only Senator member
of the Transformation

Advisory Group to the Department of Defense’s

Joint Forces Command.

One year after being reelected to the Senate in 2006,

she announced her intention to run for
President,

losing the Democratic nomination in a historically

close prima
ry race against Barack
Obama and later

being nominated to serve as Secretary of State, in a

move touted by many as
Obama assembling a

modern day “Team of Rivals.” Although their

campaign battle was one of
the most polarizing and

bitter in recent decades, S
ecretary Clinton and

President Obama have
forged a strong and credible

partnership since taking office. She has proved to be

a team player
and a tireless defender of the

administration, deferential to the President and

careful to
balance the public actions

and persona of

her husband, the former president, with that of

President Obama.

However, her relationship with the President is not

characterized by the
same tight bond as those of

former Secretary
-
President pairs such as

Condoleezza Rice and
George W.
Bush. Secretary

Clinton has not yet made clear a core foreign policy

issue for her
tenure, which could enable her partnership with the President to join the ranks of

those historic
predecessors. Regardless, she has fully

supported the President’s policies
on the world

stage,
including his message of engagement, his

aspiration to improve the U.S.
-
Russia relationship,

and to maintain a functional relationship with China

by soft
-
pedaling human rights when there,
in spite of

the fact that she had fervently advo
cated the cause

there at the Beijing women’s
conference in 1995. In

recent months, she played a crucial role in

convincing the President of
the need for U.S.

intervention in Libya, and has been forced to juggle

the complexities


and
inconsistencies
-

of U
.S.

foreign policy in the Middle East.


26

United States National Security Council

|
SWCHSMUN 2012


S
pecific duties of the Secretary of State include:



Organizes and supervises the entire United States Department of State and the United
States Foreign Service.



Advises the President on matters relating to U.S. foreign

policy, including the
appointment of diplomatic representatives to other nations, and on the acceptance or
dismissal of representatives from other nations.



Participates in high
-
level negotiations with other countries, either bilaterally or as part
of an i
nternational conference or organization, or appoints representatives to do so.
This includes the negotiation of international treaties and other agreements.



Responsible for overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental
activities of

the U.S. Government overseas.



Providing information and services to U.S. citizens living or traveling abroad, including
providing credentials in the form of passports and visas.



Supervises the United States immigration policy abroad.



Communicates issues r
elating the United States foreign policy to Congress and to U.S.
citizens.




Leon Panetta, Secretary of Defense



confir
mation as Secretary of Defense,
Secretary Panetta s
erved in various public service
roles,
both elected

and non
-
elected. His political
career began when he won election as a Democratic

The
Secretary of Defense

is the principal
adviser to the
President on defense policy

and is responsible for the formation and of all
policy of direct concern to the
Department
of
Defens
e. The Secretary’s constitutional duties
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偲楯i W漠U楳




27

United States National Security Council

|
SWCHSMUN 2012


Representative from C
alifornia from 1977 until 1993,
at which t
ime he
was appointed by
President Bill
Clinton to be Direc
tor of the Office of Management
and Budget, in l
ight of his
years of experience
acquired on the
House Budget Committee. He then
served as Presiden
t
Clinton’s Chief of Staff from
1994 to 1997, follow
in
g the humiliating defeat of the
Democratic
Party in
the 1994 midterm elections, and
is credited with organizing and consolidating what

had previously
been considered a chaotic White
House. In 2009, he w
as appointed to be the
Director
of the Central I
ntel
ligence Agency by President
Obama, who cited Panet
ta’s sharp
managerial skills,
well
-
recognized b
ipartisan reputation on Capitol
Hill, keen understandi
ng and
familiarity with foreign
policy as a result
of his experiences in the White
House and his servi
ce
on the Iraq Study Group, and
crucially pertinent budgeting skills.

In the role of Director of the C.I.A., he was charged

with leadin
g the Agency and managing
human
intelligence and ope
n source collection programs on
behalf of the U.S.

Intelligence
Communit
y. During
his tenure, the C.I.A. underwent a trans
formation
from its original st
ructure
as a human intelligence
agency to something
of a paramilitary organization,
as it became
responsi
ble for overseeing an escalated
drone aircraft bombing campaign in
Pakistan and an

increase in the number of covert bases

and
operatives in Afghanistan.

Director Panetta’s

appointment to his new role as
Secretary of Defense
has placed him in
charge of the
final stages of the w
ithdrawal in Iraq and the Obama
administration
’s mil
itary
policy in Afghanistan. As
concern over the g
rowing public debt has grown in
recent months,
Secre
tary Panetta will be struggling
with Congress to se
ttle the Pentagon budget, which
many
-

includ
ing himself and his predecessor
Secretary Gates
-

ho
p
e to reduce in spite of already
in
-
place national secur
ity budget cuts of $400 billion
through the 2023
fiscal year. Although
Secretary
Panetta is not
trained as a classical military
strategist, highly f
amiliar with the
intricacies of
weapons system
s and
the inner workings of the
Pentagon, he is renowned for

his
managerial skills
and his approachable and jovial personality, both of which are expected to

assist him in his direction of
the Defense Departme
nt and in his interactions with
Congress.


The Secret
ary of Defense by statute also exercises "authority, direction and control" over the
three Secretaries of the military departments (Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy,
and Secretary of the Air Force), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, th
e other members of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army Chief of Staff,
Commandant of the Marine Corps, Chief of Naval Operations, and Air Force Chief of Staff), the
Combatant Commanders of the Unified Combatant Comma
nds, the Directors of the Defense
Agencies (for example the Director of the National Security Agency) and of the DoD Field
Activities.



28

United States National Security Council

|
SWCHSMUN 2012





General Martin E. Dempsey
, Chairman of the



Joint

Chiefs of Staff

Dempsey attended John S. Burke Catholic High School in Goshen, New York, and views himself
as Irish American. He has
a Master's degree in literature from Duke University
.
He received a
commission as an Armor officer upon graduation from the United States Military Academy in
1974. As a company
-
grade officer, he served in 1st Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment as
the
S
-
1 OIC. He went on to be the Executive Officer of the 3rd Brigade 3rd Armored Division
during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. He then commanded the 4th Battalion of the 67th
Armored Regiment "Bandits" from 1992

1995 in the 1st Armored Division in Friedberg
, Hesse,
Germany.

In June 2003, then Brigadier General Dempsey assumed command of 1st Armored Division. He
succeeded Ricardo S. Sanchez who was promoted to command V Corps. Dempsey's command
of the 1st Armored Division lasted until July 2005 and included 1
3 months in Iraq, from June
2003 to July 2004. While in Iraq, 1st Armored Division, in addition to its own brigades, had
operational command over the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment and a brigade of the 82nd
Airborne Division; the command, called "Task Force
Iron" in recognition of the Division's
nickname, "Old Ironsides", was the largest division
-
level command in the history of the United
States Army.

It was during this time that the U.S. intervention in Iraq changed dramatically as Fallujah fell to
Sunni ex
tremists and supporters of Muqtada Sadr built their strength and rose up against
American forces. Then Major General Dempsey and his command assumed responsibility for
the Area of Operations in Baghdad as the insurgency incubated, grew, and exploded. On Ma
rch
27, 2007, Dempsey was promoted from commander of Multi
-
National Security Transition
The

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

is
the highest ranking uniformed member of
the Armed Forces of the United S
tates of
America. In
this capacity, he serves as the

chief military adviser to the National
Command Authority of the United
States,
which comp
rises the
President and the
Se
cretary of Defense. Despite his
ranking
status, he does not have direct command

capacit
y over troops; that capacity is
exercised by the President and implemented
through Unified
Combatant Commands.
Nevertheless, he serves a

crucial function in h
is capacity both as head
of the
JCS as well as a
dviser to the National
Security
Council.

Ge
neral Dempsey assumed
his current assignment on October 1, 2011.




29

United States National Security Council

|
SWCHSMUN 2012


Command
-
Iraq, to be reappointed as a lieutenant general and assigned as deputy commander
of U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

On February 5, 2008,
Dempsey was nominated to head the Seventh United States Army/U.S.
Army, Europe, and was nominated for promotion to four
-
star general upon Senate approval.

On March 11, 2008, Dempsey's commander, Admiral William J. Fallon, retired from active
service. U.S.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates accepted this as effective on March 31.
Dempsey took over command as acting commander CENTCOM.

On March 13, 2008, Dempsey was confirmed by the United States Senate as Commander,
Seventh United States Army/U.S. Army, Europe
.

On December 8, 2008, Dempsey took
command of United States Army Training and Doctrine Command.

On January 6, 2011, Defense
Secretary Robert Gates announced that he would nominate General Dempsey to succeed
General George Casey as the Army Chief of Staff
.

On February 8, 2011, Gates announced that President Barack Obama nominated Dempsey to
be the 37th Chief of Staff of the United States Army.

On March 3, 2011, Dempsey testified before the United States Senate Committee on Armed
Services for reappointment
to the grade of general and to be the 37th Chief of Staff of the
United States Army
.

On March 15, 2011, the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services affirmatively reported
Dempsey's nomination to serve as the 37th Chief of Staff of the United States Army to

the floor
of the Senate. On March 16, 2011, the Senate confirmed Dempsey's nomination by unanimous
consent.

On April 11, 2011, Dempsey was officially sworn in as 37th Chief of Staff of the United States
Army at a ceremony at Fort Myer.

With Admiral Mike M
ullen set to retire as Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in September 2011, President Obama needed to select his replacement. The
Vice
-
Chairman, Marine General James Cartwright, who was initially believed to be the front
runner for the job, had fallen
out of favor among senior officials in the Defense Department.
Obama administration officials revealed on May 26, 2011, that the President would nominate
Dempsey to the post of Chairman.

In August 2011 General Dempsey was confirmed by
unanimous consent to
succeed Admiral Mike Mullen as the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.

On August 2, 2012, the U.S. Senate blocked an Obama administration
-
backed cyber
security bill. Dempsey had said that the bill was needed to safeguard national defense by
protect
ing key infrastructure like power grids and the transportation network. “Because the
military relies on this infrastructure to defend the nation, we cannot afford to leave our
electricity grid and transportation system vulnerable to attack,” Dempsey had sa
id in a letter
written to Senators. The bill had called for a National Cybersecurity Council to assess
vulnerabilities and would have created a voluntary system of reporting attacks.


The Chairman convenes the meetings and coordinates the efforts of the J
oint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS), an advisory body comprising the Chairman, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the chiefs of staff of the United States Army and United States Air Force, the Chief of Naval
Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Cor
ps, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.




30

United States National Security Council

|
SWCHSMUN 2012
















He told a Senate panel in 2010 that he did not believe that deregulation led to the financial
crisis. He said that "the problems in the financial industry preceded deregulation," and after
discussing those issue
s, added that he didn't "personally know the extent to which

deregulation
drove it, but I don't believe that deregulation was the proximate cause."

Jacob Lew is an
Orthodox Jew, and has extensive connections to the American Jewish community. It is hoped
th
at
he might be able to help President Obama "build a more friendly rapport" with Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
.

The
White House Chief of Staff

is the highest ranking employee of the White House Office
inside the Executive Office of the President of the United States and is an Assistant to the
President.

The roles of the Chief of Staff are both managerial and advisory and can include the
followin
g



Select key White House staff and supervise them



Structure the White House staff system



Control the flow of people into the Oval Office



Manage the flow of information



Protect the interests of the President

The current White House Chief of Staff is
Jacob
Lew
, who assumed the position on January 27,
2012, after William M. Daley resigned.

Lew
graduated from Harvard and earned a law
degree from Georgetown.
He
worked as an aide
to Rep. Joe Moakley (D
-
Mass.) from 1974 to
1975. He then was a senior policy adviser to
House Speaker Thomas (Tip) P. O'Neill Jr. (D
-
Mass.) from 1979 to 1987.

Lew served as
Deputy Director of Office of Management and
Budget in the Clinton

Administration from 1995
to 1998 and Director from 1998 to 2001. He
served as executive vice president of New York
University from 2001 to 2006.

Lew worked at
Citigroup from 2006 to 2009. The Huffington
Post reported that in 2008, he served as chief
opera
ting officer of Citigroup Alternative
Investments, investing in a hedge fund that bet
on the housing market to collapse.
From 2009
to 2010, Lew worked for Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton as deputy secretary for
management and resources.






Jacob
Lew
, White House Chief of Staff


31

United States National Security Council

|
SWCHSMUN 2012




Negotiate with Congress, other members of the
executive branch, and
extragovernmental political groups to implement the President's agenda











He also frequently clashed with
former
Secretary of Def
ense Robert Gates, with Donlion
advocating a more rapid withdrawal, speaking out

s
pecifically against the idea of “endless war.”


Shortly after
-

a
nd reportedly hastened by


the
publicat
ion of that book, General Jones
announced
his resignation
and retirement, and Donilon was
named as his su
ccessor. Since his
appointment,
Donilon has advocated a

more balanced approach to
America’s national sec
urity,
with focuses not just on
present

American

involvement in Afghanistan and
Pakistan but als
o on
threats


both military and
otherwise

from riv
als like China and Iran. During
the Arab Spring, he
helped co
nstruct the
administration’s

position of support from afar, leading from behind, and
sof
t power action

tenets
which the administ
ration has been tested on since
the start of the
Thomas E. Donilon

has roots as a lawyer and a
lobbyist. He served as an Executive Vice
President at Fannie Mae from 1999 through
2005,
a
nd got his start as a po
litical operative
while organizing the 1980 and 1984 Democratic
presidential
campaigns. Th
is makes him
perhaps a curious choice as
the president’s to

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獥捴楯nⰠ
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Woodward’s book
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Tom Donilon, National Securit
y Adviser



32

United States National Security Council

|
SWCHSMUN 2012


allied involvement in Libya. As
Director of the NSC, he also played a crucial r
ole in
the decision
-
maki
ng surrounding the action taken
against Osama bin Laden in May 2
011
.


The
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
,

commonly referred to as the
National Security Advisor

(abbreviated
NSA
,

or sometimes
APNSA

or
ANSA

to avoid confusion
with the abbreviation of the National Security Agency), is a senior of
ficial in the Executive Office
of the President who serves as the chief advisor, stationed in the White House, to the President
of the United States on national security issues. This person also participates in the meetings of
the National Security Council
. The National Security Advisor's office is located in the West Wing
of the White House. He or she is supported by the National Security Council staff that produces
research, briefings, and intelligence for the APNSA to review and present either to the Nat
ional
Security Council or directly to the President. The Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs is appointed by the President without confirmation by the United States Senate.
However, the APNSA is a staff position in the Executive Office

of the President and does not
have line authority over either the Department of State or the
Department of Defense
, but is
able, as a consequence thereof, to offer advice to the President
-

unlike the
Secretary of State

and the
Secretary of Defense

who are senate
-
confirmed officials with line authority over their
departments
-

independently of the vested interests of the large bureaucracies and clientele of
those departments. The influence and role of the National Security Advisor varies from
admini
stration to administration and depends heavily on the qualities of the p
erson appointed
to the position.








Denis McDonough,

Deputy National Security

Adviser


Denis McDonough

began as

a foreign policy adviser in

the legislative branch, rising

through the staff of the

House Foreign Affairs

Committee and ser
ving as a

foreign policy staffer for

former Senate Majority

Leader Tom Daschle (D
-
SD).

After Daschle’s defeat in
瑨W

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33

United States National Security Council

|
SWCHSMUN 2012


of

Jones’ deputy Tom Donilon to the position of NSA,

McDonough was elevated to serve as
Donilon’s

deputy. Since he joined the
Obama
Administration, he has

been known to be
intensely protective of the

President, which
can be explained by the fact that

their working
relationship existed long before

Obama sought election to the White House. Indeed,

a 2010
profile of McDonough in the
New York Times

suggested that many in the White House consider

McDonough to be a sounding
board that they can try

their opinions before they bring them to
the

President, as the Deputy National Security Adviser’s

opinions align closer to those of the
Commander
-
in
-

Chief than almost anyone else in the administration.

McDonough has not made
many w
aves with his

policy positions, but his general opposition to both

the war in Iraq and
extended American involvement

in Afghanistan are well known, with McDonough

having
assisted in constructing those campaign

planks for Obama in 2007 and 2008. At CAP, he

advocated for more intense congressional scrutiny of

American intelligence work abroad. More
broadly

speaking,
McDonough has advocated for a

“common
-
good” attitude towards foreign
policy,

which
includes not just (relatively) smaller scale

issues like Afgha
nistan and Iraq but also
placing

issues like global warming in the context of national

and international
security. He is
one of the more
progressive foreign policy experts in the White

House to have the President’s
ear.







flows. Alt
hough some

regulations of the financial

system

have already been

tightened through the Dodd
-
Frank legislation and

will likely be made
even tougher under his watch the

Secretary has been quick to assure bankers that the

government does not wish to impose
too many

controls, which might discourage private
investors,

and that the government is not mandating how the

banks that receive financial
Previously the president of the
Federal Reserve
Bank of New

York,
Secretary Geithner

also

worked for the Council on Foreign Relations and at
the International Monetary Fund. In his tenure as
Secretary of the Treasury, he has been largely
responsible for
decisions regarding the

amelioration of the 2007
-
2011 financial crisis and

restoration of a stron
g economy, the restructuring
of
the regulatory syste
m for the finance industry,
and
international cooperat
ion on global financial
issues.
One of Secretary Ge
ithner’s main concerns
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34

United States National Security Council

|
SWCHSMUN 2012


assistance use the funds.

The Secretary, working with the financial leaders of

other nations, has
aimed to curb money

laundering

and the cash flows between terror groups, while still

encouraging foreign investment. The U.S.

government has implemented economic sanctions

on rogue nations, most notably Iran, by freezing

assets and forbidding transactions with
national

banki
ng institutions, companies, and individuals in

foreign governments. Secretary
Geithner and the

Obama administration more broadly have criticized

China for its present
policy of currency

manipulation, which they argue hurts American

businesses. Moreover, th
ey
have asserted that China

must also liberalize their economy from the grips of

the government
lower barriers to free trade,

especially those tariffs on imports from the United

States, and
pursue and penalize those who pilfer

American technologies


a maj
or point of contention

between the two somewhat friendly rivals.


Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland
Security
,

former Arizona governor and

former
chair of the National
Governors Association, is

responsible for expanding

the nation’s security
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Janet Napolitano,

Secretary of the Department of
Homeland
Security

such threats to national security is to work with

state and local law enforcement, individual

Americans, the private sector, and
even international

allies in tight partnerships with shared
responsibility

for the protection of the American people.

Largely in response to the 2010 Yemen
bomb plot

and the Christmas Day underwear bomb plot, the

United States has implemented

under Napolit
ano’s

oversight

enhanced airport security led by the

Transportation Security
Administration, including

controversial new scanners and enhanced pat

downs.

Under
Napolitano, the Department of Homeland

Security has grown more capable of deterring
cyberattacks
,

promoting cooperation within its own

agencies as well as collaborating with the

Department of Defense, the National Security

Agency and the private sector, in the face of
cyber

threats including the Denial of Service attacks in

July of 2010 and the Confi
cker computer

35

United States National Security Council

|
SWCHSMUN 2012


worm.

The Project Global Shield initiative, launched by the

Department of Homeland Security in
partnership

with the World Customs Organization, has aimed to

increase the security of the
global supply chain by

identifying and protecting the
most sensitive points

and preventing “the
theft or diversion of precursor

chemicals that can be used by terrorists to make

improvised
explosive devices.” Secretary Napolitano has expressed concern about

the lack of security
presence at U.S. border crossing
s

and other domestic ports of entry, through which

terrorists
and international criminals might enter

and smuggling and human trafficking could take

place.
Under her direction, human, monetary, and

technological resources have flooded to the

southwest bord
er, leading to a decrease in illegal

cr
ossings and the seizure of much
contraband, as

well as the deportation of illegal aliens with criminal

records and a slight decline
in spillover violence

from the Mexican drug cartels. Still, the Secretary

has focused

on punishing
businesses that knowingly

hire illegal workers as much as, or even more than,

illegal aliens
themselves. Although much of her focus

has been on the U.S.
-
Mexican border, she has also

expressed worries about the weaknesses of the U.S.
-

Canadian

border, which is far less
militarized.

Secretary Napolitano and others within the

government are also working to expand
and improve

information sharing among state/local governments

and federal agencies. She
recently oversaw the end of

the color
-
coded ter
ror alert system in favor of a new

National
Terrorism Advisory System, in which the

Department of Homeland Security will advise the

necessary people of specific heightened threats to

national security but will not issue broad
statements

on the overall dang
er level to the country, finding

them to be superfluous and
counterproductive.



General David Pe
traeus,

Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency


General David Petraeus
,
former commander of

American forces and the
NATO International
Security

Assistance Force in Afghanistan,
commander of
United States Central

Command,
and architect of
the 2007 surge of American

forces in Iraq, was
nominated to be the director
of the Central

Intelligence Agency by President
Obama in April of

2011 and
confirmed
in July of
that year.
While a leader in

the military,
General Petraeus
supported the use o
f Special
Operations forces and
private security
contra
ctors to carry out intelligence
missions
and colle
ct information even outside the
zone
of operations of the war
s in Afghanistan and

Iraq. He is thus familiar with the sort of
information

gathering
and m
ilitary operations
that he will
administer in his new position at
the C.I.A.

As Director o
f the C.I.A., Petraeus
oversees
information
-
g
athering efforts and
covert an
d
paramilitary operat
ions carried out
by the agency,
using this informatio
n to advise
public policymakers
on issues suc
h as
-

but not

36

United States National Security Council

|
SWCHSMUN 2012



limited to


the
Taliban insurgency in
Afghan
istan, terrorist threats
from countries
like Yemen and Pakistan, drug

trafficking, and

the futures of the governments

involved in the Arab uprisings in the spring of 2011.

General
Petraeus will have direct control over the

controversial armed drone campaigns carried out in

Pakistan and Afghanistan by the C.I.A. He has

recently criticized Pakistan’s Inter
-
Services

Intelligence Directorate (ISI) for supporting

insurgents hiding in Pakistan and attacking

American troops in Afghanistan. He has also

expressed fear that complete U.S. withdrawal from

Afghanistan may destabiliz
e the region, and thus

advocates a long
-
term commitment in the
country,

including the possibility of joint military bases with

local forces even after the
projected troop

withdrawal in 2014. General Petraeus has proposed

that American troops
should be reas
signed to focus

on training Afghan security forces, which would

allow more
Americans to withdraw in the future

after the security transition. He has also advocated a

counterinsurgency strategy that focuses on

rebuilding Afghan institutions


A retired Air
Force general,
Director Clapper

has a long

history of working in

intelligence,
including stints
as Director of the Defense

Intelligence Agency (1991
-
1995), Director of
the
National Geospatial
-
Intelligence Agency
(2001
-
2006), Under Secretary of
Defense for
Intelligence (2007
-
2010) and Director of

Defense Intelligence i
n the Office of the
Director of
National Intelli
gence (2007
-
2010)
before he was
nominated b
y President Obama
and confirmed
unanimously by the Senate to
become the Director of

National Intellige
nce.

In the wake of the i
ntelligence failure
surrounding
the September 11th a
ttacks, the
Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prev
ention
Act of 2004 replaced the
position of the
Directo
r of Central Intelligence (DCI)
with the
new, more powerful position of Di
rector of

National Intelligenc
e (DNI) in an attempt to
better
coordinate the activities of the sixteen
disparat
e
members of the U.S. Intelligence
Community.

Though the DNI serves as the
de
facto
and
de jure

head of the intelligence
community, the DNI’s
慣au慬

authority is
limited to establishing intelligence


Lieutenant General (Ret.) James Clapper, Jr.,

Director of National Intelligence



community
-
wide priorities, developing the budget

for the National Intelligence Program,
monitoring

the performance

of the agencies within the

intelligence community, and serving as
the

president’s principal intelligence advisor. The DNI

cannot micromanage other agency’s
operations, but

the position does maintain some authority to move

funds from one agency to

37

United States National Security Council

|
SWCHSMUN 2012


another,

though

restrictions exist: the transfer must receive the

authorization of the Director of
the Office of

Management and Budget and the funds cannot

exceed $150 million without the
head of the affected

agency’s permission. Furthermore, DNI can transfer

up t
o one hundred
intelligence community

personnel to staff a new intelligence center, provided

that the transfer
occurs within twelve months of the

center’s creation.

Clapper believes that Afghanistan
represents “a

classic counterinsurgency campaign” that “th
e

United States will win…on a
village
-
by
-
village basis.”

In his view, the United States should concentrate on

local security and
nation
-
building instead of

directing its efforts towards the killing or capture of

high
-
value
targets. Clapper also testified t
o the

Senate Armed Services Committee that China and

Russia,
because of their nuclear arsenals, potentially

pose “a mortal threat” to the United States,
though

he did add that he does not think that “either

country today has the intent to mortally
attack u
s.”

Clapper also noted that Iran and North Korea were

“of great concern,” but he
argued that they do not

currently pose a threat to the continental United

States.


The
Director of National Intelligence

(
DNI
) is the United States government official (subjec
t to
the authority, direction, and control of the President) required by the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 to:



Serve as principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the
Homeland Security Council about in
telligence matters related to national security;



Serve as head of the sixteen
-
member Intelligence Community; and



Direct and oversee the
National Intelligence Program
.




Eric Holder, Attorney General


Prior
to joining the Obama administration as
Attorney
General
,
Eric
Holder

served as

Associate Judge of the

District of Columbia
Superior Court (1988
-
1993), U.S. Attorney for
the District
of Columbia (1993 to 1997),

and
Deputy Attorney

General (1997 to 2001).

As the federal gov
ernment’s chief law
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-

38

United States National Security Council

|
SWCHSMUN 2012


narcotics, and counterterrorism, as we
ll as
investigations into other
federal crimes.

In line with his belief that the, “criminal justice

system has proven to be one of the most
effective

weapon
s…for both incapacitating terrorists and

collecting intelligence,” Holder
supports a policy of

trying accused terrorists in civilian courts instead of

military tribunals. As
such, the Justice Department

charged Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian

man a
ccused
of attempting to bomb an airliner en

route to Detroit on December 25th, 2009, in federal

court.
However, Holder did cave in to public

opposition to his plan to try Khalid Sheikh

Mohammed in
a civilian court in New York City. In

response to charges t
hat the government could have

declared Abdulmutallab an enemy combatant, held

him indefinitely, and denied him access to
an

attorney, Holder asserted that, “the government’s

legal authority to do so is far from clear.”
Holder also

raised controversy when h
e appointed a prosecutor

to investigate potenti
al C.I.A.
interrogation abuses.


Before taking on the role of
White House
“drug czar,”

Gil
Kerlikowske

spent
37
years in
law
enforcement. He worked for
nine years as
Chief of Police

in Seattle, where he succeeded
in dropping crime
to a forty
-
year low, and also

served as Police
Commissioner of Buffalo,

New York; the Deput
y Director of the
Department of
Justice’s Office

of Community
Oriented Policing
Services; and vario
us roles in
the
St. Petersburg,
Florida Police Department.

As head of the
White House Office of National
Drug Control Policy
, K
erlikowske creates the
National
Drug Control Strategy, a document
tha
t outlines the
country’s drug c
ontrol goals
and prescribes the
means for ach
ievin
g those
goals. Kerlikowske also

submits the Nati
onal
Drug Control Budget, which
allocates
resources to five categories of drug control

spending (prevention, treatment, domesti
c
law
enforcement, inter
diction, and
international) and
further allocates fu
n
ding to
the various departments
and agencies t
hat
participate in drug control
activities.

Lastly,
Kerlikowske advises the president on drug
policy. The authority to change drug control
laws, however, rests solely with Congress.


Gil Kerlikowske,

Di
rector of White House Office of
National
Drug Control Policy

When it comes to drug policy, Kerlikowske ranks as

a reformer who favors prevention and
treatment

over the traditional, incarceration
-

and interdictioncentric

model. When Kerlikowske
ran the Sea
ttle

Police Department, arresting people who possessed

marijuana for personal use
did not qualify as a

departmental priority. Additionally, his fiscal year

2012 budget request

39

United States National Security Council

|
SWCHSMUN 2012


included a 7.9 percent increase

in funds used for prevention. Indeed, Kerlikowsk
e

has even
rejected the term “war on drugs,” arguing

that citizens would misconstrue the war on drugs as

“a war on them.” Nonetheless, he has emphasized

that he does not favor legalizing drugs.


Susan E. Rice,
U.S. Ambassador to the United

Nations

A
graduate of Stanford and

Oxford, Susan Rice began

her government career in

1993 as the
NSC’s Director

for International

Organizations and

Peacekeeping. She then

ascended to the
position of

Special Assistant to the

President and later U.S.

Assistant
Secretary of State for
African Affairs.

During the second Bush administration, she

specialized in transnational security
threats and

global poverty at the Brookings Institution. She

re
-
entered public service as a
national security

advisor for the Obama cam
paign, and was appointed

Ambassador to the
United Nations (U.N.) in January

2009. As Ambassador to the United Nations, Rice is

responsible for representing the interests of the

United States at the U.N. and communicating
the

concerns of her fellow ambassad
ors to the U.S.

government. The current administration
restored

the Ambassador to the U.N. as a cabinet
-
level

position; it was not considered cabinet
-
level under

President Bush.



Susan E. Rice,
U.S. Ambassador to the Unit
ed

Nations


The Ambassador’s most important

function is representing the U.S. on the U.N.

Security
Council, as well as in most meetings of the

General Assembly. Rice can provide key insight for

the U.S. National Security Council on the attitudes

and
actions of foreign governments.

Susan
Rice believes strongly in the ability of

international institutions, such as the U.N., and

other
forms of international cooperation to create

and maintain global peace. She has identified four

key areas of focus in her

policies: climate change,

U.N. peacekeeping capacity, nuclear non
-
proliferation,

and the fight against global poverty

and violence. Rice is committed to making the
U.N.

more effective for collective action in these areas and

all global issues, and feels t
hat

40

United States National Security Council

|
SWCHSMUN 2012


reform is a more

viable option than desertion to solve problems

within international
institutions.


Daniel B. Shapiro

specialized
in the
Middle East and

Judaic affairs throughout
his

education, eventually earning a
master’s degree
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Daniel B. Shapiro, NSC Senior Director for the Near


East and North Africa

Department official in the United Arab

Emirates. He has worked closely on the Middle East

peace process, and has a strong working relationship

with Israeli

Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu.

As NSC Senior Director for the Near East and North

Africa, Shapiro is responsible for
advising the NSC

on matters relating to the Israeli community and the

Middle East peace
process, as well as

communicating with senior
diplomats and military

officials and visiting the
Middle East. Shapiro is also

a chief advisor to the President on Israeli affairs and

Israeli relations
with its neighbors.

It has been speculated that a large part of Shapiro’s

importance to the
Obama admin
istration are found

in his links to Israel, given recent doubts aired in the

political
arena over the President’s commitment to

the U.S.
-
Israeli partnership. Shapiro has had

extensive involvement in the administration’s plans

and policies in the Levant and

continues to
maintain

close contact to evolving issues in the region.


John Brennan
, a specialist in

Middle Eastern studies,
spent
much of his career in

the Central
Intelligence Agency, both in
clandestine
service and
intelligence

analysis. His C.I.A.
career

highlights include station

chief in Saudi Arabia during
the
Khobar Towers incident

(1996),
Chief of Staff to then
-

Director
George Tenet

(1999
-
2001), deputy
Executive Director (2001
-

2003), and Director of the National

Counterterrorism Ce
nter (2004
-
2005). After a brief
stint
in the
private sector with such
organizations as

the Intelligence


John Brennan, Assista
nt to the President and


Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland


Security and Counterterrorism



41

United States National Security Council

|
SWCHSMUN 2012


and National Security Alliance and

the Analysis Corpo
ration, Brennan
returned to the
government as
Chief Counterterrorism Adviser

to


President Obama, and was closely involved with the

mission to apprehend Osama Bin Laden in
April 2011. He was responsible for briefing the
press and

the public on the results of the raid,
and many of the

otherwise unknown details about the operation were

revealed by Brennan.

As
Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland

Security and Counterterrorism, Brennan is

responsible for supervising
plans for national

defense against both terrorism and natural
disasters.

Additionally, he serves as the chief advisor to the

President on these issues and meets
with him daily.

Brennan is often the first to notify the president of

serious national security

incidents. His position is

sometimes known as the “Homeland Security

Advisor,” as he is the
point person for the NSC

response to domestic threats. He has been cited as a

leading figure for
the entire intelligence community

on issues of terrorism.

Brennan
carries a certain stigma in
political circles.

He was initially considered by the President as a

possible C.I.A. director. His
name was withdrawn

due to concerns of his ability to pass the Senate

confirmation process, as
he had spoken out in

support of the

Bush administration’s practice of

transferring prisoners to
foreign countries for

interrogation, a sensitive topic among many

Democrats. Despite this, he
believes that

waterboarding and similar controversial

interrogation practices may have
increased stat
e and

non
-
state opposition to American policy and

decreased support for U.S.
counterterrorism efforts

abroad. Specifically, he fears that the practice could

have stimulated
recruitment for terrorist groups. He

supports the effort to focus counterterrorism
efforts

on
“extremists,” and not “jihadists” due to his

experience with the Middle East. Finally, Brennan

strongly and vocally spurns the use of national

security issues as political tools


which may
pose a

challenge as the President increasingly looks to

use

his national security victories as
ammunition in his

upcoming re
-
election campaign.


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“Prepared Remarks by Secretary
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44

United States National Security Council

|
SWCHSMUN 2012


Center for American Progress.” Department of

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This background guide is largely based on a background guide that was originally published for
NAIMUN. It has since been revised to reflect changes in the world politics.