Constellation Affirmative - MinnesotaUrbanDebateLeague

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Nov 18, 2013 (7 years and 11 months ago)

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Minnesota

Urban Debate League


Constellation





Affirmative



1

INDEX

***The 1AC***

Observation I: Inherency
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2

Advantage I: The Aerospace Industry

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4

Advantage II: Space Exploration

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8

The Plan:

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12

Observation II: Solvency

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13


***Extensions***

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15


***Inherency Extensions***

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15


***Solvency Extensions***

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16

Constellation Key to NASA
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16

NASA Key to Commercial Development
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17

Constellation Saf
est Option

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18

Commercial Space Fails

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19


***Economy Advantage Extensions***

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25

Economic Collapse Inevitable Now
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25

Constellation Key to Economy

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26

Constellation Key to Aerospace Industry

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28

US Key to Global Economy

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33

Aerospace Key to Economy
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34

Aerospace
Collapse Quick Timeframe

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36

Economy Impacts


Global Nuclear War

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37


***Space Exploration Advantage Extensions***

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38

Constellation Key to US Leadership
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38

Leadership Key to Peace

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42

Constellat
ion Key to International Cooperation

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43

Cooperation Solves Space Debris

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44

Constellation Key to Global Space Exploration

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45


***Add Ons***

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47

Overview Effect

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47

Russia/ China

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48

Space Ethic
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53

Hegemony

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55


***AT: Politics***

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58

Minnesota

Urban Debate League


Constellation





Affirmative



2

Constellation

1AC


Observation I: Inherency


First, t
he Obama administration has
left the future of space policy
. Obama abandoned the
Constellation policy in favor of a path that is without goals or vision


Dinerman, Writer on Space policy,

20
10


[T
aylor, Space Review Columist, has written on space and defense issues for the Wall Street Journal, National Review, Ad Astra,

Space Society and Space News; Senior Editor at the Hudson Institute, consultatnt for the DOD, “The Collapse of NASA?”
Hudson New Y
ork, June 9,
http://www.hudson
-
ny.org/1366/the
-
collapse
-
of
-
nasa
, access 7/17/11]


The attempt to kill
George W. Bush's
Constellation

Program
has thrown NASA and the US space industry
into

chaos
. If the next human to set foot on the Moon is not a US astronaut,
that change will be seen by the rest of
the world as a major humiliation
for this country. Those who say, "Been there, done that" will be answered with, "Can't
go there, can't do that
."

In his testimony at the May 12th hearing, former astronaut
Neil Armstrong said, "If the leadership we have
acquired through our investment is allowed to simply fade away, other nations will surely step in
where we have faltered
. I do not believe that th
is would be in our best interest."

Although the Constellation Program may have been modestly underfunded, it was based on
technological and political reality.

The new "Obama Program
," however, currently proposed as a substitute for the Constellation,
recom
mend a
"flexible path" to human space exploration, yet provides no solid goals or timelines
, and only a few vague
promises that, with "game changing technology," NASA will someday be able to visit an asteroid or, in the very long term, sen
d
people to the m
oons of Mars.
It is
,
as
Apollo
Astronaut

Gene
Cernan

before a US Senate Committee on May 12th
put it
,
"
a travesty which flows against the grain of over 200 years of our history." The proposal is also based
on the idea that the US cannot be the world's lead
er in space technology
. It must now seek to subordinate its
space ambitions to the international community. Even to the extent of
killing off large segments of the space industry.


Minnesota

Urban Debate League


Constellation





Affirmative



3

Second
, Obama’s policy relied on redirecting funds to a commercial solutio
n that does not exist


the
privatized approach to space is doomed to fail


Newton & Griffin


2011

[Elizabeth & Michael D., Center for System Studies, University of Alabama in Huntsville, “Viewpoint: United States space
policy and international partnershi
p,” Space Policy 27, 7e9]


2.4. Market creation

The president’s new policy endeavors to jump
-
start a private sector
-
led space transportation market
by canceling plans for a government transportation system

to deliver cargo and crew to low
-
Earth
orbit and
r
edirecting the funds toward procuring a yet
-
to
-
be developed commercial solution

which proponents
purport will be more cost
-
efficient. This decision has its curious origins in a juncture of circumstances: first, the Office of
Management and Budget’s drive to downsize the agency; second, ascendant special interests over
-
anxious for market

conditions
that do not yet exist and frustrated with a status quo manifested in a mature bureaucracy’s methodical execution.
Commercial
demand for cargo and crew transport to low
-
Earth orbit is currently non
-
existent, and will be so for
the foreseeable fu
ture
, so it is specious to characterize the government’s paying for system development to meet limited
government demand as ‘market creation’.
Historically, market creation has occurred when the government’s
long
-
term needs guaranteed a predictable and rel
atively high
-
volume of purchases, or when the
government served as an anchor

tenant, establishing a long
-
term need for service,
rather than serving as an
‘investor of last resort’

to underwrite the entirety of system development because private capital mar
kets will not. Space
will only truly be brought into the USA’s economic sphere when some commercially viable enterprise is invented that either
serves a stable user
-
base in space or that uses the resources of low
-
Earth orbit, the lunar surface, or other de
stinations. It is worth
noting that an international, government lunar base would have constituted one such stable market for logistics and supplies
that
could have spawned a commercial market. ISS utilization, in contrast, will not require a comparable ma
gnitude or frequency of
service.


Minnesota

Urban Debate League


Constellation





Affirmative



4

Advantage I
:

The
Aerospace Industry


Cancellation of Constellation resulted in catastrophic job loss
--
exacerbates the national
unemployment rate


Air Force Association



2010

[AFA is a 501c(3) nonprofit educational found
ation. Your contributions help support AFA initiatives to

educate

the public about
the need for a strong national defense, AFA; Cancellation of NASA’s Constellation Program
, accessed June 27, 2011,
http://www.afa.org/edop/2010/nasas_constellation_program.a
sp
]


There is no question that the cancellation of the Constellation program will result in the elimination of
tens of thousands of jobs around the country
. Not only will major suppliers feel the impact, but so will second and
third tier suppliers, not to
mention other collateral business fallout.
The magnitude of the job loss is catastrophic
enough, particularly when the nation is experiencing an unemployment rate of nearly 10%, but
compounding the effect is
the fact that jobs being lost are exactly the ty
pes we would like to retain if we are serious about
remaining in a position of world leadership
…highly technical design, engineering, and manufacturing jobs, most of
which are fairly high paying.
There is also a significant negative impact on the United St
ates aerospace
industrial base.

As an example, we currently have but one or two companies in this country that can reliably produce large
scale solid rocket boosters. The elimination of Constellation eliminates the need to produce those boosters, and as a
result, the
capability to do so will likely wither away. There is money in the NASA budget for research on large rockets, but there is a
huge
difference between R&D capability and production capability. Let us also not forget that our Armed Forces depend o
n these same
companies to produce large missiles and boosters for our national defense. The DOD is not currently procuring enough large
missile or booster systems to keep these companies afloat, either. In fact, it was the combination of military and NASA
business
that enabled a booster production capability to be maintained in this country.
Since the NASA aerospace industrial
base and the DOD aerospace industrial base are inherently intertwined, a significant negative impact
on one has the same impact on t
he other.


Minnesota

Urban Debate League


Constellation





Affirmative



5


Economic collapse is inevitable in the status quo

the benefits of the stimulus will run out absent
massive new public projects


W
hitney
, Writer citing Nobel Economists, 2010

[Mike, Freelance Writer Citing Jospeh Stiglitz, Novel Prize Winning
Economist, And Quotes From Moody Analysis, , 1
-
6
-
2010
“The Stimulus Killer” Available Online At:
HTTP://WWW.COUNTERPUNCH.ORG/WHITNEY01062010.HTML
]


The economy is getting better, but will it

last? Many
economists

don't think so, including those at opposite ends of the
ideological spectrum,
like

Paul
Krugman and

Martin
Feldstein
. They
think the economy will begin to fizzle
sometime in the latter part of 2010 when Obama's

$787 billion fiscal
st
imulus runs out

and consumers are
forced to pick up the slack in demand. That's a safe bet, too, considering that unemployment will still be somewhere in the
neighborhood of 9 per cent and households will still be digging out from the $13 trillion they los
t during the crisis. The fact that
the Fed is planning to end its quantitative easing (QE) program in early April, doesn't help either. That will just suck more

liquidity out of the system and push long
-
term interest rates higher. When that happens, housin
g prices will fall, inventory will
rise, and a surge in foreclosures will put more pressure on the banks balance sheets. That's why the pros are so glum, becaus
e they
know
the economy needs a second dose of stimulus to stay on track, but the politicos are
dead
-
set
against it.

Congress is afraid of the backlash from voters in the upcoming midterm elections. They'd rather drive the economy
back into recession then risk losing their jobs.
Despite the propaganda in the media
,
stimulus works
. In fact,
Goldman Sa
chs attributes all of last quarter's (positive) growth to Obama's stimulus. Here's how
Nobel prize winning
economist

Joseph
Stiglitz sums it

up in his China Daily article "Harsh lessons we may need to learn again": "
Keynesian
policies do work. Countries
, l
ike Australia,
that implemented large, well
-
designed stimulus programs
early emerged from the crisis faster.

Other countries succumbed to the old orthodoxy pushed by the financial wizards
who got us into this mess in the first place. “Whenever an economy g
oes into recession, deficits appear, as tax revenues fall faster
than expenditures. The old orthodoxy held that one had to cut the deficit
-

raise taxes or cut expenditures
-

to ‘restore confidence.’
But those policies almost always reduced aggregate deman
d, pushed the economy into a deeper slump, and further undermined
confidence."
When consumers are forced to cut back on spending, because they're too far in debt or
worried about their jobs, the government has to step in and make up the difference or the e
conomy
goes into a tailspin.

The deficits need be big enough to maintain aggregate demand while the private sector regains its
footing. Otherwise, consumer spending declines, which lowers earnings and forces businesses to lay off more workers. It's a
vicou
s circle. But if the stimulus is distributed wisely, multipliers kick in and help to lift the economy out of the doldrums. He
re's
a good breakdown of how it works from an article in the New York Times: "
Every dollar of additional infrastructure
spending me
ans $1.57 in economic activity, according to Moody’s,

and general aid to states carries a $1.41
‘bang’ for each federal buck. Even more effective are increases for food stamps ($1.74) and unemployment checks ($1.61),
because recipients quickly spend their
benefits on goods and services. “By contrast, most temporary tax cuts cost more than the
stimulus they provide, according to research by Moody’s. That is true of two tax breaks in the stimulus law that Congress, pr
essed
by industry lobbyists, recently exte
nded and sweetened


a tax credit for homebuyers (90 cents of stimulus for each dollar of tax
subsidy) and extra deductions for businesses’ net operating losses (21 cents)." ("New Consensus Sees Stimulus Package as
Worthy Step " Jackie Calmes and Michael C
ooper, New York Times) So far,
the stimulus has done exactly what it was
designed to do; give the economy a big enough boost to get through a deflationary rough patch
.
Unemployment is flattening out, manufacturing is expanding again, the stock market keeps

climbing higher, and a recent survey
of individual investors shows the highest ratio of bulls
-
to
-
bears since 2007. That's a good start,
but the economy is still
weak and needs more help
.

Minnesota

Urban Debate League


Constellation





Affirmative



6

And aerospace is the key to ending the US’s current economic gridl
ock. Space exploration is the
future of the new global economy


Hsu and Cox of the Aerospace Working Group, 2009

[Feng, Ph.D. Sr. Fellow, Aerospace Technology Working Group, Ken, Ph.D. Founder & Director Aerospace Technology
Working Group, 2
-
20, “Sustain
able Space Exploration and Space Development
-

A Unified Strategic Vision”,
http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=30702
)]


Technology innovations have always lifted human society ou
t of the economic gridlocks, and have led
mankind from many of the worst economic crises to
vast industrialization and
enduring prosperity and
growth
. The history of human civilization has shown that technology innovations and human ingenuity are our best
hope to
power humanity out of any crisis, and
especially a U.S.
-
lead human economic development into low earth
orbit that will not only lift us out of the current acute global depression, but will
most certainly
bring
about the next economic and industrial

revolution
beyond the confinement of Earth gravity. Commercial aircraft
transportation and operations in the past 100 years since the Wright Brothers' first successful test flight have advanced
significantly in all areas, and have contributed tremendously

to the world economy and modern civilization. Nonetheless, space
access capability and associated LEO infrastructure has generally not advanced in nearly half a century. Particularly, as ela
borated
in the previous sections, given the current plans under t
he Bush VSE for the next generation of human space transportation being
pursued by NASA, there exists little hope of making any substantial improvements in safety, affordability, or commercial
operations of any LEO transportation infrastructure for another

generation.
With the impact of the upcoming
termination of Space Shuttle operations
, as guided by the Bush VSE, it is very clear that
the U.S. needs
substantially improved
crew and cargo
space access capabilities
, and such improved space access capabiliti
es are
largely represented by a two
-
stage, fully reusable launch vehicle (RLV) system (in the short
-

to mid
-
term). An evolutionary
infrastructure buildup of such a RLV system that is largely based on existing heritage or capabilities should be a key elemen
t of a
reliable and low
-
cost cargo/crew space transportation development. Indeed, development and government investment in such an
affordable space transportation infrastructure in the Earth
-
Moon system is of paramount importance;
it's all about the
crossr
oads the U.S. is at with the current economic crisis and how Space could be a key part of the
answer
. A key component of a sound strategic space vision that was missed almost entirely by the Bush VSE is the vision for
space development (VSD), or a space
-
ba
sed economic and commercial expansion into low earth orbit.
Such a vision
should be
to place the highest priority on embarking on a national and international strategic space development goal that
will ensure the
technological, and
with it, the
economical
leadership of America for the 21 century and the next few
hundred years ahead.

Minnesota

Urban Debate League


Constellation





Affirmative



7

US Economic leadership is key to
economic interdependence, and multilateral cooperation on all
global problems. The alternative is competitive mercantilism and frac
tured inte
rnational
cooperation
-
ensures global conflict


Posen, Fellow @ Peterson Institute, 2009


[Adam, deputy director and senior fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics Adam, “Economic leadership
beyond the crisis,”
http://clients.squareeye.com/uploads/foresight/documents/PN%20USA_FINAL_LR_1.pdf
]


In the postwar period,
US power and prestige
, beyond the nation’s military might,
have been based la
rgely on American

relative
economic

size and
success
.
These facts enabled the US to promote economic openness and buy
-
in to a set of economic
institutions
, formal and informal,

that resulted in increasing international economic integration.

With the except
ion of the immediate post
-
Bretton Woods oil
-
shock period (1974
-
85),
this combination
produced generally growing prosperity at home and abroad, and underpinned the idea that there were benefits to other countrie
s of following the American model

and playing
by American rules. Initially this system
was most influential and successful in those countries in tight military alliance with the US, such as Canada, West Germany,
Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. With the collapse of Soviet communism in
1989,

and the concomitant switch of important emerging economies, notably Brazil, China, India, and Mexico, to increasingly free
-
market capitalism, global integration on American terms through American
leadership has been increasingly dominant for the last two
decades. The global financial crisis of 2008
-
09, however, represents a challenge to that world order.
While overt financial panic
has been averted
,

and most economic forecasts are for recovery to begin in the US and the major emerging markets well before e
nd of 2009 (a belief I share),
there remain
significant risks for the US and its leadership
.

The global financial system, including but not limited to US
-
based entities, has not yet been sustainably reformed. In
fact, financial stability will come under st
rain again when the current government financial guarantees and public ownership of financial firms and assets are unwound ov
er the next couple of years. The growth rate of
the US economy and the ability of the US government to finance responses to future
crises, both military and economic, will be meaningfully curtailed for several years to come. Furthermore, the crisis will ac
celerate
at least temporarily two related long
-
term trends eroding the viability of the current international economic arrangements
. First, perhaps inevitably, the economic size and importance of China, India, Brazil, and other
emerging markets (including oil
-
exporters like Russia) has been catching up with the US, and even more so with demographically and productivity challenged Eu
ro
pe and northeast Asia. Second, pressure has been
building over the past fifteen years or so of these developing countries’ economic rise to give their governments more voice
and weight in international economic decision
-
making. Again, this implies a transf
er of
relative voting share from the US, but an even greater one from overrepresented Western Europe. The near certainty that Brazi
l, China, and India, are to be less harmed in real economic terms by the current crisis than
either the US or most other adva
nced economies will only emphasise their growing strength, and their ability to claim a role in leadership. The need for capi
tal transfers from China and oil
-
exporters to fund deficits
and bank recapitalisation throughout the West, not just in the US, incr
eases these rising countries’ leverage and legitimacy in international economic discussions. One aspect of this particular cr
isis is that American
economic policymakers, both Democratic and Republican, became increasingly infatuated with financial services

and innovation beginning in the mid
-
1990s. This reflected a number of factors, some ideological, some
institutional, and some interest group driven. The key point here is that export of financial services and promotion of finan
cial liberalisation on the U
S securitised model abroad came to dominate the US international
economic policy agenda, and thus that of the IMF, the OECD, and the G8 as well. This came to be embodied by American multinat
ional commercial and investment banks, in perception and in practi
ce. That particular
version of the American economic model has been widely discredited, because of the crisis’ apparent origins in US lax regulat
ion and over
-
consumption, as well as in excessive faith in American
-
style financial
markets. Thus,
American glo
bal economic leadership has been eroded

over the long
-
term by the rise of major emerging market economies, disrupted in the
shortterm by the nature and scope of the financial crisis, and partially discredited by the excessive reliance upon and overs
elling
of US
-
led financial capitalism.
This crisis

therefore

presents
the possibility of the US model for economic development being displaced
,
not only deservedly tarnished,
and the US
having limited resources in the near
-
term to try to respond to that challenge
.

Additionally, the US’ traditional allies and co
-
capitalists in Western Europe and Northeast Asia have been at least as damaged economically by the crisis (though less damage
d reputationally). Is there an alternative economic model? The preceding descript
ion
would seem to confirm the rise of the Rest over the West. That would be premature. The empirical record is that economic reco
very from financial crises, while painful, is doable even by the poorest countries, and in
advanced countries rarely leads to s
ignificant political dislocation. Even large fiscal debt burdens can be reined in over a few years where political will and i
nstitutions allow, and the US has historically fit in that
category. A few years of slower growth will be costly, but also may put
the US back on a sustainable growth path in terms of savings versus consumption. Though the relative rise of the major emergi
ng markets will
be accelerated by the crisis, that acceleration will be insufficient to rapidly close the gap with the US in size,
let alone in technology and well
-
being. None of those countries, except perhaps for China, can think in
terms of rivaling the US in all the aspects of national power. These would include: a large, dynamic and open economy; favora
ble demographic dynamics; m
onetary stability and a currency with a global role; an ability
to project hard power abroad; and an attractive economic model to export for wide emulation. This last point is key.
In the area of alternative economic models, one cannot beat something with
nothing


communism
fell not just because of its internal contradictions,

or the costly military build
-
up,
but because
capitalism presented a clearly superior alternative
. The Chinese
model is in part the American capitalist

(albeit not high church financi
al liberalisation) model,
and is in part
mercantilism
. There has been concern that some developing or small countries could take the
lesson from China that building up lots of hard currency reserves through undervaluation and export orientation is smart. T
hat
would erode globalisation, and lead to
greater conflict with

and criticism of
the US
-
led system
.

While in the abstract that is a concern, most emerging markets


and notably Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa, and
South Korea


are not pursuing that e
xtreme line. The recent victory of the incumbent Congress Party in India is one indication, and the statements about openness

of Brazilian President Lula is another. Mexico’s
continued orientation towards NAFTA while seeking other investment flows (outside

petroleum sector, admittedly) to and from abroad is a particularly brave example. Germany’s and Japan’s obvious crisis
-
prompted
difficulties emerging from their very high export dependence, despite their being wealthy, serve as cautionary examples on th
e
other side. So unlike in the1970s, the last time that the US economic performance and
leadership were seriously compromised, we will not see leading developing economies like Brazil and India going down the impo
rt substitution or other self
-
destructive and

uncooperative paths. If this assessment is
correct, the policy challenge is to deal with relative US economic decline, but not outright hostility to the US model or dis
placement of the current international economic system. That is reassuring, for it leav
es us in
the realm of normal economic diplomacy, perhaps to be pursued more multilaterally and less high
-
handedly than the US has done over the past 20 years. It also suggests that adjustment of current international
economic institutions is all that is re
quired, rather than desperately defending economic globalisation itself. For all of that reassurance, however,

the need to get buy
-
in from the rising new players to the current system
is more pressing on the economic front than it ever has been before.

Due

to the crisis, the ability of the US and the other advanced industrial democracies to put up money and markets for rewards an
d side
-
payments to
those new players is also more limited than it has been in the past, and will remain so for at least the next f
ew years. The need for the US to avoid excessive domestic self
-
absorption is a real concern as well, given the
combination of foreign policy fatigue from the Bush foreign policy agenda and economic insecurity from the financial crisis.
Managing the post
-
cr
isis global economy Thus, the US faces a challenging but not truly
threatening global economic situation as a result of the crisis and longer
-
term financial trends. Failure to act affirmatively to manage the situation, however, bears two significant and re
lated risks: first, that China and
perhaps some other rising economic powers will opportunistically divert countries in US
-
oriented integrated relationships to their economic sphere(s); second, that
a leadership vacuum will
arise in international financial

affairs

and in multilateral trade efforts,
which will over
time

erode support for a globally
integrated economy
. Both of

these risks

if realised

would diminish US foreign policy influence, make the
economic system less resilient in response to future shoc
ks

(to every country’s detriment),
reduce economic growth and
thus the rate of reduction in global poverty, and conflict with other foreign policy goals like
controlling climate change

or managing migration and demographic shifts. If the US is to rise to t
he challenge, it should concentrate on the following priority measures.


Minnesota

Urban Debate League


Constellation





Affirmative



8

Advantage

II: Space Exploration


The Cancellation of the Constellation program sent an international signal that the U.S. is
abandoning leadership in space
---

this will lock the U.S
. out of cooperative ventures


Newton, Professor Physics @ Alabama, 2011

(Elizabeth K., Professor of Physics


University of Alabama, Huntsville and Michael D. Griffin, Former Administrator


NASA
and Eminent Scholar and Professor


University of Alabama,

Huntsville, “United States Space Policy and International
Partnership”, Space Policy, 27(1), February, p. 8
-
9)


President Obama’s 2010 policy is notable for the shift over the 2006 version, which most agree to be more a stylistic change
of
tone, rather th
an one of substance. The messages conveying the need for multilateral action are likely to be welcome to external
audiences’ ears and suggest a more consultative approach. That said,
the cancellation of
the
Constellation

program
was
done without prior noti
ce or consultation with international partners
, and much of the debate on the subject
has centered on the domestic repercussions of the decision, not the impact on the partners.
There is
evidently
a mismatch
between intent and
such
unilateralist actions
.

3
.2. Perceptions of reliability as a partner

The president’s request and congressional authorization for continued funding of the ISS’s operations delivers on commitments

made to international partners beginning in the mid
-
1980s when the program was conceiv
ed. However,
without a successor
system to the Shuttle, the USA has abrogated intergovernmental agreements to provide crew and
cargo transportation, and crew rescue
, as partial compensation for partner investments in the ISS’s infrastructure and
operations
. Reliance on the Russian Soyuz for limited down
-
mass cargo transport seriously inhibits the value that can be realized
from ISS utilization until a commercial solution is available. In addition,
the USA’s unilateral abandonment of the
Moon as a near
-
term
destination shakes partners’ political support

for their exploration plans, some of
which
were carefully premised on US intentions, and more than five years of collaborative development of
lunar base plans.

3.3. Leadership

The USA is a majority funder for
many space programs and is a technology leader, two features
which have provided sufficient motivation for partners to accept US leadership
, even when unfortunately
high
-
handed.
It is a stunning failure of political will to lack a successor system to the re
tiring Space
Shuttle, and so the US cedes leadership in human spaceflight with its inability to access the ISS
independently
, for itself or for its partners, until a new commercial capability has been demonstrated. The USA further
relinquishes leadership wh
en abandoning years of work on strategic planning and guidance, the evaluation of alternatives, and
orchestration of diverse but important contributions that were manifested in the Global Exploration Strategy. Sudden redirect
ions
without consultation are n
ot hallmarks of leadership and will no doubt motivate partners to do more unilateral planning and
execution, at least for a while. Finally,
leadership in the future is at risk: how can the USA
hope to
influence
outcomes and protect interests
---
strategic, commercial, and cultural
---
on the Moon if it is not
present?

Minnesota

Urban Debate League


Constellation





Affirmative



9

Space leadership is vital to resolve international disputes over the use of space and developing
cooperation over space debris


Newton, and G
riffin, Space Policy Experts @ University of Alabama, 2011

*director for Space Policy in the Center for System Studies at the University of Alabama in Huntsville, former strategist at
NASA
Marshall Space Flight Center, AND **physicist & space engineer, for
mer Administrator of NASA, eminent scholar and professor
of mechanical and aerospace engineering at the University of Alabama in Huntsville (Elizabeth and Michael, Space Policy,
“United States space policy and international partnership” ScienceDirect)


How
ever, it would be naive to think that the landscape is identical to times past or that the US mindset does not need to evolve
,
and Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn has gone so far as to claim that
we are at a “historical inflection
point
”.1 In its
origins, the space program was a tool of foreign policy in the Cold War between the USA and USSR, a tool which
existed only in the two superpowers’ toolbox. Today
the number of countries with independent space capabilities
has grown tremendously in the pas
t ten years. Space is “congested, competitive, contested”, with over
60 nations having assets in orbit
. When coupled with the globalization of capital, labor, markets, and information, it is
certainly a different landscape from that 60 years ago. Further,
space capabilities have become tightly integrated
into the way the global economy functions
, whereas in the early days it was unclear what social and economic benefits
might materialize. One can only conclude, then, that different national strategies and
policies are called for in these conditions,
and certainly Apollo era mindsets or expectations are demodé.
There are more players, more options, more
potential for unintended consequences, and higher stakes; unilateral action is more limited in its
effecti
veness. One would think that such conditions and global interdependence would be a boon to
creating incentives for international partnership
, which is built on shared interests and their stability. So, is the
USA’s current space policy optimal for these co
nditions? Is it the right way to go? Space policy’s performance in the national
interest should be evaluated against the outcomes it is supposed to achieve under the given conditions. What might a scorecar
d
look like, in terms that an average taxpayer woul
d care about without having to be an aficionado of space policy’s intricacies?
Before delving into details, it is worth noting that US space policy is most accurately viewed as an aggregate of White House

issuances and legislative policy making codified in

law, as well as of executive branch agencies’ translation of these broad or
narrowdirections into programs, operating budgets, and processes. Indeed, agencies’ deeds are more telling than any White
House
-
level rhetoric about intent. For this reason, it ma
y be that currently we can only judge the potential for the policy to deliver
results, allowing sufficient time to see whether policy’s implementation succeeds or fails. Evaluating whether or not the USA
’s
overall strategic position is improved
-
that is, wh
ether its ability to influence positively the conditions of its existence and play the
role it chooses is enhanced
-

can be distilled down to questions about security, political economy, and influence. These three
dimensions are coupled, of course, but the
y can provide a way of disaggregating space policy for closer inspection.

1. Will the USA be more secure?

As stated in the White House’s space policy and Lynn’s preview of the National Security Space Strategy,
US security hinges
on fostering a cooperative,

predictable space environment where countries can operate in a stable,
sustainable way
. Planned
debris tracking standards, considerations of international ‘rules of the road’,
and shared data sets for collision avoidance and debris mitigation are measures

that undoubtedly will
contribute to the security of space as a shared venue for national activities
. The stated desire to develop a
Combined Space Operations Center for coalition operations could expand access to information, awareness, and services.
Leve
raging partner capabilities, integrating them into system architectures, and increasing the
interoperability of systems are important

planned
steps

as well.

These new strategies do not diminish the USA’s current strengths in the national security space rea
lm
and quite likely stand to capitalize on international interest in multilateral solutions
. Further information
will doubtless be forthcoming in the Space Posture Review.

Minnesota

Urban Debate League


Constellation





Affirmative



10

Without international cooperation, space debris threatens accidental global nuclear

war


Lewis, Postdoctoral Fellow, 2004

[postdoctoral fellow in the Advanced Metods of Cooperative Study Program; worked in the office of the Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy (Jeffrey, Center for Defense Information, “What if Space were Weaponized?” J
uly 2004,
http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf
) // DCM


This is the second of two scenarios that consider how U.S. space weapons might create incentives for America’s opponents to

behave in dangerous

ways. The previous scenario looked at the systemic risk of
accidents that could arise from keeping nuclear weapons on high alert to guard against a space weapons attack. This secti
on focuses on the risk that a single accident in space, such as

a pi
ece of
space debris striking a Russian early
-
warning satellite, might be the catalyst for an accidental nuclear war.

As we have noted in an earlier section, the United States canceled its own ASAT program in the 1980s over concerns that the

deployme
nt of these weapons might be deeply destabiliz
-

ing. For all the talk about a
“new relationship” between the United States and Russia,

both sides retain thousands of nuclear forces on alert and configured to fight a
nuclear war
.
When briefed about th
e size and status of U.S. nuclear forces, President George W. Bush reportedly asked “What do we need all these weapons for?
”43 The answer, as it was during the Cold War, is that the forces remain on
alert to conduct a number of possible contingencies
, including a nuclear strike against Russia.

This fact, of course, is not lost on the Rus
-

sian leadership, which has been increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for the country’s declining milita
ry might. In the mid
-
1990s, Russia

dropped its pledge to refrain from the “first use” of
nuclear weapons and conducted a series of exercises in which Russian nuclear forces prepared to use nuclear weapons to rep
el a NATO invasion. In October 2003, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivano
v reiter
-

ated that Moscow might use nuclear weapons
“preemptively” in any number of contingencies, including a NATO attack.44


So, it remains business as usual with U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. And business as usual includes the occasional fals
e alarm of a nuclear attack. There have been several of these incidents over the years.

In September 1983, as a relatively new Soviet early
-
warning satellite moved into position to monitor U.S. missile fields in North Dakota, the sun lined up in just such a way as

to fool the Russian satellite into reporting that half a dozen U.S. missile
s had been
launched at the Soviet Union. Perhaps mindful that a brand new satel
-

lite might malfunction, the officer in charge of the command center that monitored data from the early
-
warning satellites refused to pass the alert to his superiors. He
reportedly
explained his caution by saying: “When people start a war, they don’t start it with only five missiles. You can do little
damage with just five missiles.”45

In January 1995, Norwegian scientists launched a sounding rocket on a trajectory si
milar to one that a U.S.
Trident missile might take

if it were launched to blind Russian radars with a high altitude nuclear detonation. The incident was apparently serious
enough that, the next day, Russian
President Boris

Yeltsin stated that he had

activated his “nuclear football”



a device that allows the Russian president to communicate with his military
advisors and review his options for launching his arsenal. In this case, the Russian early
-
warning satellites could clearly see that no a
ttack was under way and the crisis passed without incident.46

In both cases, Russian observers were confi
-
dent that what appeared to be a “small” attack was not a fragmentary picture of a much larger one. In the case of the Norw
egian sounding rocket,

space
-
based
sensors played a crucial role in assuring the Russian leadership that it was not under attack.
The Russian command sys
-
tem, however, is no longer able to provide such reliable, early warning. The dissolution of the Soviet Union cost Mosc
ow several radar stations in newly independent states, creating “attack cor
-
ridors” through
which Moscow could not see an attack launched by U.S. nuclear submarines.47

Further,

Russia’s constellation of early
-
warn
-
ing satellites has been allowed to de
cline



only one or two of the six satellites remain
operational,

leaving Russia with early warning for only six hours a day
.
Russia is

attempting

to reconstitute its constellation of early
-
warning satellites, with several launches planned in the ne
xt few years. But

Russia will still have limited warning
and will depend heavily on its space
-
based systems to provide warning of an American attack.
48

As the previous section explained, the Penta
-

gon is contemplating military missions in space th
at will improve U.S. ability to cripple Russian nuclear forces in a crisis before they can execute an attack on the United
States. Anti
-
satellite weapons, in this
scenario, would blind Russian reconnaissance and warning satellites and knock out commu
nications satellites. Such strikes might be the prelude to a full
-
scale attack, or a limited ef
-

fort, as attempted in a war game at Schriever Air Force Base, to conduct
“early deterrence strikes” to signal U.S. resolve and control escalation.49

B
y 2010, the United States may, in fact, have an arsenal of ASATs (perhaps even on orbit 24/7) ready to conduct these kinds
of missions


to coerce opponents and, if necessary, support preemptive attacks. Moscow would certainly have to worry that thes
e
ASATs could be used in conjunction with other space
-
enabled systems


for example, long
-
range strike systems that could attack targets in less than 90 minutes


to disable Russia’s nuclear deterrent before the Rus
-

sian leadership understood what wa
s
going on.

What would happen if a piece of space debris were to disable a Russian early
-
warning satel
-
lite

under these conditions?
Could the Russian military distinguish between an accident in space and the first phase of a U.S. attack? Most Russian

early
-
warning satellites are in elliptical Molniya orbits (a few are in GEO) and thus difficult to attack from the ground or air.

At a
minimum, Moscow would probably have some tactical warn
-
ing of such a suspicious launch, but given the sorry state o
f Russia’s warning, optical imaging and signals intelligence satellites there is reason to ask the question. Further, the
advent of U.S. on
-
orbit ASATs, as now envisioned50 could make both the more difficult orbital plane and any warning systems moot.


The unpleasant truth is that the

Russians likely would have to make a judgment call.

No state has the ability to definitively deter
-
mine the cause of the satellite’s failure
.

Even the United States does not maintain

(nor is it likely to have
in pla
ce by 2010)
a sophisticated space surveillance system that would allow it to distin
-

guish between a
satellite malfunction, a debris strike or a deliberate attack


and Russian space surveillance capabilities are
much more limited by comparison
.

Even

the risk assessments for col
-
lision with debris are speculative, particularly for the unique orbits in which Russian early
-
warning satellites operate.

During peacetime, it is easy to imagine that the Russians would conclude that the loss of a satelli
te was either a malfunction or a debris strike. But how confident could U.S. planners be that the Russians would be so cal
m if the accident in space occurred in
tandem with a second false alarm, or occurred during the middle of a crisis?

What might
happen if the debris strike oc
-
curred shortly after a false alarm showing a mis
-
sile launch? False alarms are appallingly common


according to information obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, the U.S.
-
Canadian North American
Aerospace Defens
e Command (NORAD) experienced 1,172 “moderately seri
-
ous” false alarms between 1977 and 1983


an average of almost three false alarms per week. Comparable information is not available about the Russian system, but th
ere is no
reason to believe that i
t is any more reliable.51

Assessing the likelihood of these sorts of co
-

incidences is difficult because Russia has never provided data about the frequency or duration of false alarms; nor indicate
d how seriously early
-

warning data is taken by Russia
n leaders. More
-

over, there is no
reliable estimate of the debris risk for Russian satellites in highly elliptical orbits.52 The important point, however,
is that such a coincidence would only appear suspicious if the United States were in the bus
iness of disabling satellites


in other words,
there is much less risk if Washington does not develop ASATs.

The loss of an early
-
warning satellite could look rather ominous if it occurred during a pe
-

riod of major tension in the relationship. Whi
le NATO no longer sees Russia as much of a threat, the same cannot be said of the converse. Despite the warm talk,
Russian leaders remain wary of NATO expansion, particularly the effect expan
-

sion may have on the Baltic port of Kaliningrad. Althoug
h part of Russia, Kaliningrad is separated from the rest of Russia by Lithuania and Poland. Russia has already
complained about its decreas
-

ing lack of access to the port, particularly the uncooperative attitude of the Lithuanian govern
-

ment.53 Ne
ws reports suggest that an edgy Russia may have moved tactical nuclear weapons into the enclave.54 If the Lithuanian
government were to close access to Kaliningrad in a fit of pique, this would trigger a major crisis between NATO and Russia
.

Under t
hese circumstances
,

the loss of an early
-
warning satellite would be extremely suspi
-
cious. It is any military’s nature
during a crisis to interpret events in their worst
-
case light
.
For ex
-

ample, consider the coincidences that occurred in early Sept
ember 1956, during the extraordinarily tense
period in international relations marked by the Suez Crisis and Hungarian uprising.55 On one evening the White House recei
ved messages indicating: 1. the Turkish Air Force had gone on alert in response to
unidentified aircraft penetrat
-

ing its airspace; 2.
one hundred Soviet MiG
-
15s were flying over Syria; 3. a British Canberra bomber had been shot down over Syria, most likely by a MiG; and 4. The Ru
ssian fleet was moving through the Dardanelles. Gen. A
ndrew Goodpaster was reported to have worried
that the confluence of events “might trigger off … the NATO operations plan” that called for a nuclear strike on the Soviet

Union.

Yet, all of these reports were false. The “jets” over Turkey were a floc
k of swans; the Soviet MiGs over Syria were a smaller, routine escort returning the president from a state visit to Mos
-

cow; the bomber crashed due to mechanical difficulties; and the
Soviet fleet was beginning long
-
scheduled exercises. In an importan
t sense, these were not “coincidences” but rather different manifestations of a common failure


human er
-

ror resulting from extreme tension of an interna
-

tional crisis. As one author
noted, “The detection and misinterpretation of these events, aga
inst the context of world tensions from Hungary and Suez, was the first major example of how the size and complexity of wor
ldwide electronic warning systems could, at certain critical times,
create momentum of its own.”

Perhaps most worrisome, the Un
ited States might be blithely unaware of the degree to which the Russians were concerned about its actions and inadvertent
ly escalate a crisis. During the early 1980s, the Soviet Union suffered a major “war scare” during
which time its leadership co
ncluded that bilateral relations were rapidly declining. This war scare was driven in part by the rhetoric of the Reagan a
dministration, fortified by the selective reading of intelligence. During this period, NATO conducted a major
command post exerc
ise, Able Archer, that caused some elements of the Soviet military to raise their alert status. American officials were stu
nned to learn, after the fact, that the Kremlin had been acutely nervous about an American first strike during this
period.56

Minnesota

Urban Debate League


Constellation





Affirmative



11

A
ll of these incidents have a common theme


that

confidence is often the difference between war and peace
. In times of crisis
, false
alarms can have a momentum of their own
.
As in the second scenario in this monograph, the lesson is that

commanders r
ely on the steady
flow of reli
-
able information. When that information flow is disrupted


whether by a deliberate attack or
an accident


confidence collapses and the re
-

sult is panic and escalation.

Introducing ASAT weapons into this mix is all the m
ore
dangerous, because such weapons target the elements of the command system that keep leaders aware, informed and in control
. As a result, the mere presence of such weapons is corrosive to the confidence that
allows national nuclear forces to opera
te safely.


Minnesota

Urban Debate League


Constellation





Affirmative



12


The Plan:


The United States federal government should fully fund and reinstitute the Constellation Program.


We will clarify our intent.

Minnesota

Urban Debate League


Constellation





Affirmative



13

Observation

I
I
:

Solvency


First, the plan is critical to reversing the loss of US space leadership


NA
SA is key to commercial
development of space.


Representative Wolf, 2010

(Frank, United States Representative and Ranking Member


House Appropriations Committee, “Don’t Forsake US Leadership in
Space”, Space News, 4
-
25, http://spacenews.com/commentaries/
100425
-
dont
-
forsake
-
leadership
-
space.html)


S
pace exploration has been the
guiding

star

of American innovation. The Mercury, Gemini, Apollo
and shuttle programs have rallied generations
of Americans

to devote their careers to sc
ience
and
engineering,

and NASA’s achievements in exploration and manned spaceflight have rallied our nation
in a way that
no

other

federal

program



aside from our armed services


can
.

Yet today our country
stands

at

a

crossroad

in the future of U.S. le
adership in space
.
President Barack

Obama’s

2011

budget

proposal

not only scraps
the
Constellation

program
but radically scales back U.S.
ambition, access, control and exploration in space. Once we forsake these opportunities, it will be
very

hard

to

win

t
hem

back
.
As Apollo astronauts Neil Armstrong, Jim Lovell and Gene Cernan noted on the eve of the president’s
recent speech at Kennedy Space Center, Fla.: “For The United States, the leading space faring nation for nearly half a centur
y, to be without
carr
iage to low Earth orbit and with no human exploration capability to go beyond Earth orbit for an indeterminate time into the
future, destines
our nation to become one of second or even third rate stature.”

In terms of

national security and

global leadersh
ip, the

White House’s

budget

plan

all but abdicates U.S.
leadership in exploration and manned spaceflight

at a time when

other countries, such as
China and Russia, are
turning to space programs to drive innovation and promote economic growth.

Last month,
China Daily

reported that
China is accelerating its

manned
spaceflight development while the U.S. cuts back
. According to
Bao Weimin with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, “A moon landing program is very necessary, because it could drive the countr
y’s scien
tific
and technological development.”

In a recent special advertising section in
The Washington Post
, the
Russia
n government
boasted of its renewed commitment to human
spaceflight and exploration
. Noting the White House’s recent
budget proposal, the piece said, “NASA has long spent more money on more
programs than Russia’s space agency. But President Barack Obama has slashed NASA’s dreams of going to the moon again. … At th
e same
time, the Russian space industry is feeling the war
m glow of state backing once again. There has been concerted investment in recent years, an
investment that fits in well with the [Vladimir] Putin doctrine of trying to restore Russian pride through capacity.”

Manned

spaceflight a
nd exploration are one of the
last

remaining

fields

in which the
U
nited
S
tates
maintains
an undeniable competitive advantage over other nations. To walk away is shortsighted
and irresponsible.

Our global competitors have no intention of scaling back their
ambitions in space.


James A. Lewis with the Center for Strategic and International Studies recently said that the Obama administration’s proposal

is “a confirmation
of America’s decline.”

The

2011
budget

proposal
guarantees

that

the

U
nited

S
tates

will

be

grounded

for

the

next

decade

while
gambling

all of our exploration money on unproven research
-
and
-
development experiments.

Although I am an ardent supporter of federal R&D investments, I believe it is unacceptable that the administration would gamb
le our
entire
space exploration program for the next five years on research.

The dirty little secret of
this

budget

proposal is that it
all but

ensures that the
U
nited
S
tates
will not have an
exploration system for at least two decades. That is a
fundamental

abd
ication

of

U.S.

leadership

in
space



no matter how much the administration tries to dress it up. Our international competitors are not slowing down, and neither s
hould
we.

Minnesota

Urban Debate League


Constellation





Affirmative



14

Finally
, US Leadership is critical to the global push to space


US possesses uni
que assets in space and
prevents accidents, attacks, and the failure of other nations.


AIAA, 2010

(Aerospace Industries Association of America, “Aerospace and Defense: The Strength to Lift America”,
April, http://www.nationalaerospaceweek.org/wp
-
content/
uploads/2010/04/whitepaper.pdf)


Space Technology is an Investment in U.S. Global Leadership, Competitiveness and Innovation

Space systems drive
our nation’s
competitiveness, economic growth and innovation
. U.S. soldiers in the
mountains of Afghanistan, fa
rmers, bankers and emergency responders here at home all have a common reliance on a space
infrastructure in orbit above the Earth.
Everyday activities
, taken for granted by many Americans,
are

supported or even
driven by space systems
. These systems are h
idden to us and rarely noticed unless the services they provide are interrupted.
However, the lack of visibility of space systems doesn’t diminish their importance


both
our nation’s economy and
national security are tied directly to this critical infrast
ructure
. Communications drive today’s commerce, and
space systems are a chief global conduit of
our nation’s
commercial and national security
communications.
The Internet, e
-
mail and wireless devices have all become the standard for businesses and recreati
on. Direct
-
to
-
home television
and satellite radio have become standard in many American homes and automobiles. These all depend on our satellite
communications systems. Similarly, the Global Positioning System, originally designed for military use, is now
relied on for
banking transactions, ATMs, improved agriculture, air traffic and ground transportation systems and by emergency responders.
All of these applications add up to substantial economic activity. Of $214 billion in aerospace industry sales in 200
7, direct space
system industry sales topped $40 billion.14 Total direct and indirect global space activity for 2008 was $257 billion.15 Even

harder to quantify


but no less valuable


is the impact that technology spinoffs from space activities bring to
our economy. In
2009 alone, NASA entered into more than 250 agreements with private and other external entities for development of dual
-
use
technologies.16
Space is certainly becoming more contested, congested and competitive. More than 60
nations are enga
ged in space efforts

and tens of thousands of man
-
made objects orbit the Earth. In January 2007,
the
Chinese used a ballistic missile to destroy a
n aging weather
satellite
. This anti
-
satellite test demonstrated the very
real ability of a foreign power to a
ttack and destroy space assets and resulted in a dangerous debris cloud. In addition, the
February 2009 collision of a commercial U.S. satellite and Russian satellite showed that space systems not only face disrupti
on
from intentional attack, but are also
at risk from unintentional events in an increasingly crowded environment. Using systems
developed by America’s aerospace industry, the Defense Department currently tracks more than 21,000 man
-
made objects in the
Earth’s orbit


many of which could threaten

civil and national security space systems, as well as our nation’s efforts to increase
the commercial use of space.17 In such an environment,
investments

in rapid reconstitution, sensors, tracking, threat
assessment and other space protection and situatio
nal awareness capabilities
are needed to mitigate the impacts of an
unexpected catastrophic space system failure
. The cost and difficulty involved in developing and deploying space
systems as well as the severe consequences of their loss necessitates that
our nation’s space infrastructure be adequately protected.
Part of ensuring robust space capabilities means that
America must routinely replace and update its space
infrastructure
. It is highly problematic


if not infeasible


to perform maintenance or ev
en refuel them.
Space systems
have limited life spans and, at today’s pace of technology, can quickly become obsolete. Critical space
systems
that
provide missile warning, global communications
, positioning, navigation and timing
and

weather
are in need of

upgrade at a time when other nations are rapidly modernizing their own space
infrastructure. The United States must remain a leader in human and robotic space


a position that
is perishable if not properly supported. Research aboard the International Spa
ce Station and
human
and robotic
exploration beyond low Earth orbit must remain national priorities. These activities
demonstrate global leadership
, sharpen our expertise for future long
-
range space travel, add to our scientific knowledge
and inspire our y
outh to pursue engineering and science disciplines. Space systems often go unnoticed in our daily lives, but their
impact is very real. It is imperative that we as a nation have the right plans, strategies and budgets in place to keep our s
pace
industry co
mpetitive and our space systems, and their supporting Earth
-
based infrastructure, operating when we need them. It is
increasingly important that the United States develop and maintain a cohesive national approach to our efforts in space


one
that crosses
civil agencies, the Defense Department and the intelligence community.

Minnesota

Urban Debate League


Constellation





Affirmative



15


***Extensions***

***
Inherency Extensions
***


The commission recommending cancellation of Constellation was rigged


it inflated the predicted
future costs and it failed to provide a U
S commitment to get back to the moon. With reinstated funds,
we can get back to the moon by 2022.


Horowitz, Former NASA Adminstrator, 2011

[Scott, former NASA Associate Administrator of Exploration Systems Missile Directorate; re
-
published by AmericaSpac
e via Jim
Hillhouse, prolific space columnist and shuttle technician, “A Trajectory to Nowhere, May 8,
http://www.americaspace.org/?p=7621
]


The commission also used data provided to them by the Aerospac
e Corporation to come to the conclusion that the Constellation
Program was on an “unsustainable trajectory”.
The commission took the budget estimates for the Constellation
Program and added 50% to the costs.

While this may be appropriate for a brand new pr
ogram in the early formulation
stages,
this is completely inappropriate for a program that has passed its early milestones

and has a very
detailed basis of estimate appropriate for having completed its Preliminary Design Review (PDR). So
the combination of

a
reduced budget

(FY 2010)
and an inflated cost estimate produced the desired result

(the program would take
forever to complete).
The fact is
, that with the FY 2011 top
-
line budget submit (the best top
-
line budget NASA has had since
the inception of Cons
tellation)
there are plenty of funds available for NASA to complete Ares I/Orion by
2015 and to return astronauts to the moon by 2022

using the Ares V
as a first step to moving further out
into the solar system

(NEOs, Mars, LeGrange Points, etc.)
The presi
dent’s

FY 2011 NASA budget
request doesn’t
save the taxpayers any money
, in fact
it

increases NASA’s budget and
proposes to spend it on technology
development projects, robotic missions, and increased earth
-
science missions. While these are worthy
endeavor
s, they are not “sustainable
”.
Every time NASA has gone down the “technology
development” path without a clearly defined mission

to focus “technology development”,
the result has been
the same: no operational system gets developed, and NASA’s

top
-
line
budg
et becomes a target

for OMB
and Congress
and gets reduced

by 25%.



Minnesota

Urban Debate League


Constellation





Affirmative



16


***
Solvency

Extensions
***

Constellation Key to NASA


Cancellation of Constellation has set NASA on a path towards infighting and irrelevance


the agency
will cease to function


Dinermam

2010

Taylor, senior editor at the Hudson Institute’s New York branch, 10, (Janury 4, “NASA’s dangerous new year”,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1538/1
)


Inside NASA

the
problems could g
et nasty

in a quiet and insidious fashion.
Centers such as Huntsville, if
ordered to slow down or cancel work on Ares 1, would work hard to find ways to undermine the
decision. Institutional insubordination is not unknown inside the federal government
; we
certainly saw a
lot of it over the last eight years. In the 1980s and early 1990s NASA certainly suffered from a bad case of it. The “One NAS
A”
concept that Sean O’Keefe tried to put in place was reluctantly accepted, but it didn’t change many long
-
held at
titudes.

Holding the agency together in the face of a painful disappointment
, such as we may see when the White House
makes its decision,
will be an exceptionally difficult job. The temptation will be for

every man and woman, and
for
the Centers and progra
ms, to scramble indiscriminately to grab what they can. Any unified vision
will disappear and it would be years before NASA could regain the relative balance it has built up
since recovering from the loss of Columbia.

In an ideal world the White House woul
d support a bigger budget for NASA, along the lines of
“Constellation Plus”. Such a program would provide reasonable support for a commercial crewed
access system for the International Space Station and for other destinations in low Earth orbit. It
would a
lso continue work on the Ares 1/Orion combination as the best and safest way to send
American astronauts to the ISS and to the Moon as well as possibly beyond
. Above all, it would concentrate
on getting back to the Moon on a reasonable schedule: between 20
20 and 2025.

The Augustine committee report quotes a National Research Council report that stated, “Lack of knowledge about the biological

effects of and responses to space radiation is the single most important factor limiting the prediction of radiation
risk associated
with human space exploration.” For the moment, the best place to perform such risk reduction work is on the surface of the Mo
on.
It is also the one place where NASA and the US can begin practical work on things like in situ resource utiliza
tion that could
mine water, hydrogen, and oxygen as well as other useful products.

Budget
-
driven changes in NASA’s main human spaceflight programs have done plenty of harm in the
past, beginning with the way that early design work on the shuttle was shortc
hanged. It would be a
tragedy if the administration and Congress were to repeat the mistakes of the Nixon era
.

Minnesota

Urban Debate League


Constellation





Affirmative



17

NASA Key to Commercial Development


NASA is key to spur commercial development of space


Griffin


2006

Mike
,
former NASA administrator, Oct 20,

“X Prize Comments by Mike Griffin,” Commercial Space Watch,
http://www.comspacewatch.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=22396


But
the kind of things we need to do have been done before
. We k
now how it should go. Many of you have in the past
heard me allude briefly to the story of how
the U.S. Post Office Department
, with the help of the War Department,
helped
spur our nation's aviation industry when it started the air mail service routes

in 1
918. I very strongly believe that
we can
, and
should,
draw

certain
lessons from this event
; that
it can be a historical paradigm for how NASA might fill a similar role in
spurring our emerging commercial space industry

in concert with the goals of the Visi
on for Space Exploration. However,
a review of this history shows that it was not an easy proposition then, and it is likely to be just as difficult to pursue
in the present era. But, as President John Kennedy said at Rice University in 1962,
we do these t
hings, "not because they
are easy, but because they are hard
." So let us look again at what was once done, and then let us think about what might
yet be done.

Minnesota

Urban Debate League


Constellation





Affirmative



18

Constellation Safest Option


The Constellation components are by far the safest vehicle launch o
ption


Horowitz


2011

[Scott, former NASA Associate Administrator of Exploration Systems Missile Directorate; re
-
published by AmericaSpace via Jim
Hillhouse, prolific space columnist and shuttle technician, “A Trajectory to Nowhere, May 8,
http://www.amer
icaspace.org/?p=7621]


Myth 3: The Commercial Orbital Transportation System (COTS) is capable of safely transporting our astronauts to
the ISS sooner and for significantly less money than the government developed system.

Safety: Basically,
the Augustine Co
mmission chose to ignore all of the data that showed that Ares I/Orion were significantly
safer than any other alternatives. The Valador report commissioned by NASA

to support the Augustine Commission
stated:
“the Ares I launch vehicle… is clearly the safe
st launch vehicle option
, and the only one having the potential to meet a target
of 1 in 1000 probability of LOC (Loss of Crew).” “The simplicity of the Ares I design makes the mature Ares I
clearly superior to all other vehicles,
no matter what choice of
quantification method…”

It also determined the Probability
of a Loss of Crew (LOC) for the Ares I rocket is 1 in 1,918, which is more than ten times better than the Space Shuttle
and over twice as good as any other alternative even with “human
-
rating” modi
fications.


Commercial vehicles too dangerous


Young, 10

[A. Thomas,
former Director of NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center and President and Chief Operating Officer of Martin
Marietta

(TESTIMONY TO THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY May 26, 2010,
http://science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/hearings/052610_Young.pdf
]


Commercial crew is a risk too high
,

not a responsible course and should not be approved.

Continuation of the International Space Station is an area of apparent consensus.
A launch vehicle and crew capsule for
transportation to and from the Space Station are required.

I believe
the most appr
opriate option is Ares
1 and Orion. NASA should be directed to develop a plan for transporting humans to and from Earth
orbit. The Ares 1 and Orion elements of Constellation should not be cancelled.

The results of the NASA plan
development may suggest chan
ges to Constellation. A disappointing truth is the proposed NASA FY 2011 budget, in my opinion,
is not adequate to support a credible, implementable Space Station Program and a credible, implementable beyond

Earth

orbit
exploration program.

A credible Spac
e Station program, without commercial crew, needs to be defined.
An exploration program with a
heavy lift launch capability, an exploration capsule, a focused technology program and an exploration
concept with destinations and dates also needs to be determ
ined
. Cost estimates, with substantive independent
systems engineering and independent cost assessment, need to be developed. Timely completion of these proposed actions is
necessary to allow resolution of current human spaceflight uncertainties. Only then

can credible decisions be made as to the future
of human spaceflight.

In summary,
do not approve commercial crew, continue the Ares 1 and Orion programs
and do the necessary
in depth analysis and study that was absent from the proposed FY 2011 budget to d
efine the human exploration program worthy
of a great nation. Only then can the value of the program be judged against credible plans and budget.
Above all else, do not
approve a human spaceflight program without adequate resources to assure success. We ha
ve
traveled that road too many times with the same unsuccessful result.

Minnesota

Urban Debate League


Constellation





Affirmative



19

Commercial Space Fails


Commercial crew development has a history of failure and it risks the collapse of the entire space
program


Young, 10

[A. Thomas,
former Director of NASA's God
dard Space Flight Center and President and Chief Operating Officer of Martin
Marietta

(TESTIMONY TO THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY May 26, 2010,
http://science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/hearings/052610_Young.pdf
]


We have developed a mission success methodology that maximizes the probability of success, a methodology that has evolved
over the li
fe of the space program and continues to improve with the experience gained with the execution of each new project. A
hallmark of the methodology is the recognition that spaceflight is a "one
-
strike
-
and youare
-
out" business.
Thousands of
individuals can do

everything perfectly and one human error can result in a mission catastrophe
. While
minimizing human errors is certainly an objective, human errors cannot be totally eliminated. The challenge is to prevent a h
uman
error from causing a mission failure.
Exp
erience has shown this is accomplished by test
-
as
-
you
-
fly and flying
-
as
-
you
-
test in combination with independent review and analysis, appropate technical and
management debate and experienced leadership
. For five decades we have invested billions of dollar
s and the
expertise of our best and brightest in NASA and industry to evolve our current mission success methodology.
NASA has the
continuity of human spaceflight expertise that is unique in our country and competitive with the best
that exists globally
. O
ur space industry is second to none in the ability to implement complex projects. It is the marriage of
NASA's continuity of expertise with the implementation capability of industry that results in our proven mission success
methodology which maximizes the

probability of success. Space Shuttle and International Space Station are products of this
methodology. The Air Force and the Aerospace Corporation in combination with their industrial partners use this methodology t
o
produce the highly successful EELV. N
ASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory uses this methodology in implementing the challenging
planetary exploration program.

A fundamental flaw in the proposed human spaceflight program is a commercial crew initiative
which abandons the proven methodology
I have d
escribed.
NASA's role is reduced to defining safety
requirements and general oversight
. An argument for pursuing this new human spaceflight approach is that the proven
methodology is too expensive.
This same rationale caused the Air Force and NASA to try s
imilar
approaches in the 1990's
.The Air force implemented a program called "Acquisition Reform." System responsibility for
national security space programs was ceded to industry. Air Force and NRO project managers were told to step back, not to
interfere a
nd to let industry have total responsibility. Additionally, the Air Force and NRO essentially eliminated their systems
engineering capabilities since the responsibility would reside with industry.

The results were devastating and the adverse impact is stil
l with us today
. Good project managers and project
management personnel left and an exceptional systems engineering capability was eliminated.
Projects were a disaster
and the approach was judged by all to be a total failure.

Problems were not isolated to
one project or to one company, the impact was systemic
. As examples, FIA
managed by Boeing was cancelled after the expenditure of about 10B$. SIBRS High, managed by Lockheed Martin, has been
referred to as "a case study in how not to execute a space progra
m." NPOESS, managed by Northrop

Grumman, is a story that is
still evolving.
On average, programs implemented using this approach resulted in half the intended
program for twice the cost and six were years late
. NASA implemented a similar approach called
'F
aster

Better

Cheaper." Mars '98 is the most significant example of this approach. Mars '98 was a total failure with the loss
of
an orbiter, lander and two probes. The orbiter managed by Lockheed Martin, under contract to JPL, failed because of confusion

be
tween metric and English units. This confusion resulted in errors large enough during


Minnesota

Urban Debate League


Constellation





Affirmative



20


Low demand, high cost barriers and minimal returns mean that government incentives won’t create
an effective private launch market.


Sterner, 10


Eric,
fellow at the
George C. Marshall Institute,
national security and aerospace consultant in Washington, DC. He has held senior
Congressional staff positions as the lead Professional Staff Member for defense policy on the House Armed Services Committee
(“
Worthy of a Great
Nation? NASA’s Change of Strategic Direction,” April, http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/797.pdf)


NASA seems to assume that buying human spaceflight services will lead to lower prices. Typically, in a free market, price fal
ls as the result of competiti
on among suppliers to offer
better goods and services for any given number of customers. Is that a reasonable expectation in the case of commercial human

spaceflight? The short answer is no. Simply put,
a
competitive, free
-
market in commercial human spacef
light is unlikely to develop for several reasons.

1. First,
developing a spacecraft capable of safely launching people into orbit, operating there, and
returning them safely to the planet is extraordinarily difficult, with extremely low tolerances for risk
.
For comparison purposes, launching SpaceShip 1, a privately
-
developed and revolutionary spacecraft capable of carrying people to suborbital space, requires roughly 2% of the total
energy required to take the same mass to low
-
earth orbit.24 Solving such c
omplex problems is not beyond the wherewithal of the private sector. After all, the bulk of NASA’s spacecraft
were developed by contractors, and the private sector developed, owns and operates much of the nation’s infrastructure.