Borders Affirmative and Negative - Gonzaga 2013 - Open Evidence ...

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Nov 30, 2013 (3 years and 11 months ago)

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Borders 1ac

We begin with the

story of Prudenica Martin Gomez, who died while
attempting to cross the US
-
Mexico border
.

Doty, Associate Professor School of Politics & Global Studies, 11

[Roxanne Lynn, Published April 12, 2011. “Bare life: border
-
crossing deaths and spaces of moral
alibi.” Page 601
-
602.
http://www.envplan.com/openaccess/d3110.pdf
. RH]

On Friday, 6 July 2007, volun
teers with two local humanitarian groups in Tucson, Arizona,
Humane Borders and Samaritans, went in search of Prudencia Martin Gomez, age 18 from
Guatemala
.
She was headed to Oakland
, California, to join her boyfriend/fiance¨
and had been
missing since 11
June in the Ironwood National Forest
, a 129 000
-
acre expanse of land,
in the
Sonoran Desert 25 miles northwest of Tucson. There are no facilities in the Ironwood National
Forest, and visitors are warned of the hazards of the extreme heat.

Human beings simp
ly
cannot survive in this part of the southwestern deserts for as long as Prudencia had been
missing, so
there was no pretense that they would find her alive, and they did not. The official
location of her body was recorded as GPS: N32 0 25.455/W1110307.80

(Arizona Daily Star
2010).
Prudencia had fallen ill and had been unable to continue
. Her fellow travelers left her
with water, but it was not enough.
She was only a mile south of a Humane Borders' water
station, but a mile can be a very long way in the de
sert, in the month of June, when one has
already walked a long distance
. Authorities determined that Prudencia had died on 15 June.
The recorded high temperature on that day was 115˚F. Prudencia was a contemporary version
of what Agamben (1998) refers to a
s bare life, life that can be taken without apology,
classified as neither homicide nor sacrifice. She was US border policy stripped to its essence
.
And hers, tragically, is not an isolated example.
In 2004 Mario Alberto Diaz, 6 feet tall with a
black belt

in karate and working on a masters degree in biology crossed the border near
Sasabe, Arizona. His body was discovered twenty days later in a creek in the foothills of the
Sierrita Mountains

(Bourdeaux, 2004
). In the summer of 2005 the Pima County medical
examiner in Tucson, Arizona, had to rent a refrigerated tractor
-
trailer to store the bodies of
migrants due to the record number of deaths that year

(Arizona Republic 2005).
The deadly
trend continues. Even as apprehensions have steadily declined, deaths c
ontinue to rise

(McCombs, 2009).(6) The migrant death count for fiscal year 2009 is the third highest since
1998.
In the fifteen
-
year period since ``prevention through deterrence'' was first introduced
approximately 5000 migrants have died, though near uni
versal agreement exists that
estimates of migrant deaths are undercounts and the actual number is likely much higher

(Coalicion de Derechos Humanos, 2007).
When they debated, formulated, and put into effect
the various border control operations collectivel
y known as prevention through deterrence,
policy makers likely had never heard of GPS: N32 025.455/W1110307.80 or the Ironwood
National Forest or the Sierrita mountains or the many other locations at which migrant bodies
have been, and continue to be, foun
d.

However,
it is arguably inconceivable that they did not
know of the harsh conditions to which migrants would be subjected under this border
strategy.

The Border Patrol's own blueprint for one of the early and well
-
known
manifestations of the new operati
ons, Operation Gatekeeper, noted that it would channel
migrants to locations where ``the days are blazing hot and nights freezing cold''
.(7) In this
section I argue that
the prevention through deterrence border control strategies exemplify
Foucault's theor
etical writings on how biopower, sovereign power, and racism can be
articulated with one another thus to function in concert
. While
biopolitics,

as formulated by
Foucault, is generally understood as being concerned with the governance and regulation of a
p
opulation in matters such as health and sexuality, it
is also consistent with what Agamben
refers to as bare life.
For Foucault the emergence of the ``problem of the population'' coincided
with the development of an art of government wherein the main conce
rns of government were
on the wealth, longevity, health, and sexuality of the population, giving rise to the notion of
biopower as ``making life live'' (Foucault, 1991).

Through regulations in these matters, subjects
become entangled in the practices of st
atecraft
.
Agamben

has critiqued what he calls
Foucault's ``progressive disqualification of death'' (ie the circumscription of the issue of death to
discussions of classical sovereign power),
offering a conceptualization of biopower which
focuses on the way
s in which sovereign power produces a radical exposure abandoning
subjects
,
stripping their identities to that of bare life, and thereby creating spaces of exception
or a ``juridical void'' which permits abuses and killings without punishment
.(8) While
Aga
mben's theorizations of biopower and its relation to bare life are invaluable for
understanding how modern power works, he arguably draws a bit of a strawman when it comes
to Foucault. In
Society Must be Defended
, Foucault poses the following question. How

can
biopower, whose function is to improve life and prolong its duration, kill? ``How can the power
of death, the function of death, be exercised in a political system centered upon biopower? ''
(2003, page 254). His definition of `
killing' is not ``simpl
y murder as such, but also every form
of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for
some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejections, and so on'
' (page 256).
Clearly Foucault recognizes tha
t biopower does not preclude the taking of life. He responds to
his own question by turning to race, suggesting that
race performs two functions: (1) it
introduces a break in the domain of life under power's control between what must live and
what must die

thus fragmenting the field of the biological that power controls, and (2) it
establishes a relationship between life and death. ``If you want to live, you must take lives,
you must be able to kill''
(2003, pages 254 ^ 255).

Death and suffering on the bord
er is increasing with each passing day

the
government formulates border security in ways that funnel migrants into the
harshest conditions of nature and most dangerous passageways into the US.
Thousands of deaths can be attributed to US border security.

Johnson 2007
(Dean and Mabie
-
Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o
Studies, “Opening the Floodgates”, New York University Publication)

As of March
2006
, the California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation attributed
more than
3
,
000
deaths to

a single southern California border operation known as Operation Gatekeeper.97

Numerous
other operations

have been put into place in the U.S.
-
Mexico border region.
All
have had similar deadly impacts
. Despite the death toll, the
U.S. government contin
ues to
pursue enforcement operations with great vigor
. Indeed, Congress consistently enacts
proposals designed to bolster border enforcement, with such proposals often representing the
only items of political consensus when it comes to immigration refor
m.
Operation Gatekeeper
demonstrates the U.S. government’s callous indifference to the
human

suffering

caused by
its aggressive border enforcement policy
. In the words of one informed commentator, “[t]he
real tragedy of [Operation] Gatekeeper . . . is
the direct link . . . to the staggering rise in the
number of deaths among border crossers. [
The U.S. government] has forced these crossers to
attempt entry in areas plagued by extreme weather conditions and rugged terrain that
[the
U.S. government] kn
ows to present mortal danger.

98 In planning Operation Gatekeeper,
the
U.S
. government knew that its strategy would risk many lives but proceeded nonetheless. As
another observer concludes, “Operation Gatekeeper, as an enforcement immigration policy
fi
nanced and politically supported by the U.S. government, flagrantly
violates international
human rights
because
this

policy

was

deliberately

formulated

to

maximize

the

physical

risks

of Mexican migrant workers, thereby
ensuring

that

hundreds

of

them

wou
ld

die.”
99
Apparently,
the government rationalized the deaths of migrants as collateral damage in the
“war” on illegal immigration
. Even before the
1990
s, the Border Patrol had a reputation for
committing human rights abuses against immigrants and U.S.

citizens of Mexican ancestry.100
Created to police the U.S.
-
Mexican border,
the Border Patrol has historically been plagued by
reports of
brutality,

shootings,

beatings,

and

killings
.101 Amnesty International, American
Friends Service Committee, and H
uman Rights Watch have all issued reports documenting
recent human rights abuses by the Border Patrol.102

Furthermore, the politics of border crossing and border security are thoroughly
steeped in biopolitics

the border manages the distinction between des
irable
and undesirable life

and delineates the contours of bare life.

Zylinska, Professor of New Media and Communications at the University of
London, 2004
(Joanna, “The Universal Acts: Judith Butler and the biopolitics of immigration,”
Cultural Studies
18.4, pg. 526) MM

Performativity of the public sphere:
The ‘issue’ of
asylum

seekers

lies

at

the

very

heart

of

the

broader

issue

concerning

the

constitution

of

the

public

sphere
.

For Butler democratic
participation in the public sphere is enabled by the pr
eservation of its boundaries
, and
by the
simultaneous establishment of its ‘constitutive outside’
. She argues that in contemporary
Western democracies numerous
singular

lives

are

being

barred

from

the

life

of

the

legitimate

community
, in which standards of

recognition allow

one
access to the category of ‘
the
human
’. In order to develop a set of norms intended to regulate the state organism,
biopolitics
needs to establish a

certain
exclusion from the
se
norms, to protect the

constitution of the
polis
and dist
inguish

it from
what does not ‘properly’ belong
to it. The biopolitics of immigration
looks after the bodies of the host community and protects it
against

parasites

that

might

want

to

invade

it, but
it needs to equip itself with tools that
will
allow it to

trace
, detect
and
eliminate these parasites
. Technology is mobilized to probe and scan the bare life of those
wanting to penetrate the healthy body politic: through the use of
fingerprinting, iris recognition
and scanners

in lorries travelling, for exampl
e, across the English Channel, the presence and
legitimacy of ‘asylum seekers’ can be determined and fixed.4
The bio
-
politics of immigration is

thus performative in the sense of the term used by Butler; through the probing of human
bodies,
a boundary betwe
en legitimate and illegitimate members of the community

is
established. This process depends on a truth regime already in place, a regime that classifies
some

bodies
as ‘genuine’ and others

(be it emaciated bodies of refugees squashed in lorries in
which t
hey have been smuggled to the ‘West’, or confined to the leaky Tampa ship hopelessly
hovering off the shores of Australia)
as ‘bogus’.

The

bare

life

of

the

host

community

thus

needs

to

be

properly

managed

and

regulated
, with its unmanageable aspects placed

in what
Agamben (1998) calls a relation of exception. But
the question that remains occluded in these
processes of ‘life management’ is ‘[w]hich bodies come to matter
-

and why?’

(Butler 1993, p.
xii).

This border biopolitics results in several impacts: t
he first is that border manage

is a murderous enterprise that results in political death, exclusion, and a loss of
value to life.

Ajana, Lecturer in Culture, Digital Humanities & Creative Industries at King’s
College London. 2005
[Btihaj, 2005 “Surveillanc
e and Biopolitics,” Electronic Journal of
Sociology. RH]

Embedded within this biopolitical overdetermination is a murderous enterprise.

Murderous
not insofar as it involves extermination (although this might still be the case) but inasmuch as
it
exerts a b
iopower that exposes ‘someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some
people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on’

(Foucault 2003 [1976]:
256), and inasmuch as
it is ‘based on a certain occluded but inevitable and thu
s constitutive
violence’

(Zylinska, 2004: 530); a
symbolic violence

(manifested, for instance, in the act of
‘naming’

as Butler (in Zylinska, 2004) and Derrida argue ‘
asylum seekers’, ‘detainees’,
‘deportees’, ‘illegal immigrants’
, etc)
as well as

a material one (for example,
placing ‘asylum
seekers’ and ‘illegal immigrants’ in detention centres), attesting to that epistemic impulse to
resuscitate the leftover of late modernity and the residual of disciplinary powers that seek to
eliminate and ostr
acise the unwanted
-
other through the insidious refashioning of the ‘final
solution’ for the asylum and immigration ‘question’
. Such an image has been captured by
Braidotti (1994: 20): Once, landing at Paris International Airport, I saw all of these in bet
ween
areas occupied by immigrants from various parts of the former French empire; they had arrived,
but were not allowed entry, so they camped in these luxurious transit zones, waiting.
The dead,
panoptical heart
of the new European Community
will scrutini
ze them and not allow them in
easily: it is crowded at the margins and non
-
belonging can be hell. The biopolitics of borders
stands as the quintessential domain for this kind

of

11
sorting, this kind of racism pervading
Western socio
-
political imaginary an
d permeating the rhetoric of national and territorial
sovereignty despite its monolithic use of euphemism. It is precisely this task of sorting

and this
act of fragmenting
that contemporary modes of border security and surveillance are designed
making ‘the

management of misery and misfortune … a potentially profitable activity’

(Rose,
1999: 260) and evaporating the political into a perpetual state of technicism (Coward, 1999: 18)
where ‘
control’ and ‘security’ are resting upon vast investments in new inform
ation and
communications technologies in order to

filter access and minimise, if not
eradicate, the
infiltration and ‘riskiness’ of the ‘unwanted’
. For instance, in chapter six of the White Paper,
‘Secure Borders, Safe Haven’ (2002), the UK government outl
ines a host of techniques and
strategies aimed at controlling borders and tightening security including the use of Gamma X
-
ray
scanners, heartbeat sensors, and millimetric wave imaging to detect humans smuggled in
vehicles.

We internalize border
-
thinking

t
he disciplinary capacities of border security
reach into the very core of human being and reduce life to mere calculability.

Ajana, Lecturer in Culture, Digital Humanities & Creative Industries at King’s
College London. 2005
[Btihaj, 2005 “Surveillance an
d Biopolitics,” Electronic Journal of
Sociology. RH]

Subtle, internalised, and smooth (but not all too smooth) as it is, (post)
panoptical surveillance
induces a certain conscious relation to the self and organises the ‘criteria’ for inclusion and
exclusion

(Rose, 1999: 243).
Borders are thus the spatio
-
temporal zone par excellence where
surveillance gives substance to the working of biopolitics

and the manifestation of biopower. In
this case mobility itself becomes intrinsically linked to processes of the ‘
sorting’ of individualised
citizens from massified aliens. We can almost forgive theorists such as Bauman (1998, in Boyne,
2000: 286) for wanting to articulate a dichotomous logic that hinges on the notion of border,
for, at times and at least with regard
to circulation (that is, the circulation of ‘people’, for as far
as ‘commodities’ and ‘capital’ are concerned, their free movement is encouraged and sustained
by the global capitalist machine),
the world seems to be divided into two. Those who have
Europea
n/American/Australian/Canadian passports and those who do not.

We all know all
too well what difference this makes in terms of border crossing.

Nevertheless, such
conceptualisation misses the point that
borders are not merely that which is erected at the
e
dges of territorial partitioning and spatial particularity, but more so borders are ubiquitous

(Balibar, 2002: 84)
and infinitely actualised within mundane processes of ‘internal’
administration and bureaucratic organization 1 blurring the dualistic logic
of the inside and
the outside on which Western sovereignty is calibrated.

The point is that in addition to this
crude dual division within the global world order there are further divisions, further
segmentations,
a ‘hypersegmentation’

(Hardt, 1998: 33) at

the heart of that monolithic
(Western) half which
functions by means of excluding the already
-
excluded on the one hand
and incorporating the already
-
included and the waiting
-
to
-
be
-
included excluded on the other.
This is done more or less dialectically, mo
re or less perversely, including and excluding
concurrently ‘through a principle of activity’ (Rose, 1999: 240) and interwoven circuits of
security. Surveillance is the enduring of exclusion for some and the performance of inclusion
for others to the point

where it becomes almost impossible to demonstrate one’s ‘inclusion’
without having to go through the labyrinth of security controls and identity validation,
intensified mainly, but not solely, at the borders
. It is in similar contexts that Balibar (2002:
81)
invokes the notion of ‘world apartheid’ in which the dual regime of circulation is creating
different phenomenological experiences for different people through the ‘polysemic nature’
(Balibar, 2002: 81) of borders. For as we have discussed,
borders are

not merely territorial
dividers but spatial zones of surveillance designed to establish ‘an international class
differentiation’ and deploy ‘instruments of discrimination and triage
’ (Balibar, 2002: 82)
whereby the rich asserts a ‘surplus of right’ (Balib
ar, 2002: 83) and
the poor continue to
exercise the Sisyphean activity of circulating upwards and downwards until the border
becomes his/her place of ‘dwelling’

(Kachra, 2005: 123)
or

until

s/he

becomes

the

border

itself.

Sadly, to be a border is to ‘live
a life which is a waiting
-
to
-
live, a non
-
life’

(Balibar, 2002:
83).
The biopolitics of borders is precisely the management of that waiting
-
to
-
live, the
management of that non
-
life
(the waiting
-
to
-
live and the non
-
life of those who are forcibly
placed in de
tention centres),
and at times, it is the management of death.

The death of
thousand of refugees and ‘clandestine’ migrants

drowned in the sea (for instance, in the Strait
of Gibraltar which is argued to be becoming the world’s largest mass grave), asphyxi
ated in
trucks (as was the fate of 58 Chinese immigrants who died in 2000 inside an airtight truck at the
port of Dover), crushed under trains (the case of the Channel Tunnel) and
killed in deserts (in
the US
-
Mexican border for example). It is the manageme
nt of ‘bodies that do not matter’
. It is
the management of the bodies of those to whom the status of the ‘homo sacer’ (Agamben,
1998: 8) is attributed
. It is the management of those whose death has fallen into the abyss of
insignificance and whose killing
is not sacrificial (except to the few). On the other hand, the
biopolitics of borders is also the management of ‘life’; the life of those who are capable of
performing ‘responsible self
-
government’

(Rose, 1999: 259) and self
-
surveillance i.e.
those who
can

demonstrate their ‘legitimacy’ through ‘worthy’ computer
-
readable passports/ID cards
that provide the ontological basis for the exercising and fixing of identity and citizenship at the
border.

The fulcrum of biopolitics at the border is racism.

Milchman a
nd Rosenberg 2005
[Alan & Alan, “Michel Foucault: Crises and
Problemizations”, The Review of Politics, Volume 67, p. 340]

“Society
Must Be Defended”culminates
in
Foucault’s chilling account of a tendency immanent
to bio
-
politics, a tendency to what he has
elsewhere designated as Athanato
-
politics,” and its
basis in what he here terms state racism
.
The question

that Foucault raises in his final lecture in
this course,
is how can mass murder and extermination become instantiated in a regime of
biopower:

If

it

is true that the
power of sovereignty is

increasingly
on the retreat and that
disciplinary

or regulatory disciplinary
power is on the advance, how will the power to kill and
the function of murder operate in this technology of power, which takes life as b
oth its object
and its objective
? ...
How
, under these conditions
, is it possible for a political power to kill, to
call for deaths, to demand deaths, to give the order to kill

... ?
Given

that
this power’s
objective is essentially to make live, how can it

let die? How can the power of death, the
function of death, be exercised in a political system centered upon biopower
? (p. 254) For
Foucault,
it is here that racism
, which, indeed, has a long history,
intervenes, and now becomes
inscribed in the basic mec
hanisms of the modern state
. According to Foucault: … broadly
speaking,
racism justifies the death
-
function in the economy of biopower by appealing to the
principle that the death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is a member
of a ra
ce or a population, insofar as one is an element in a unitary living plurality.
… The
specificity of modern racism

… is
not bound

up
with mentalities, ideologies, or the lies of
power
.
It is bound up with the techniques of power, with the technology of pow
er
. We are
dealing with a mechanism that allows biopower to work. So
racism is bound up with the
workings of a state that is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of
the race, to exercise its sovereign power. The juxtaposition
of
-

the way biopower functions
through
-

the old sovereign power of life and death implies the workings, the introduction and
activation of racism.

And
it is
, I think,
here that we find the actual roots of racism

(p. 258).
State racism then emerges, when
in a regime of biopower, internal or external threats lead
the state to engage in mass death: “Once the State functions in the biopower mode, racism
alone can justify the murderous function of the State”

(p. 256).

Racism outweighs all other impacts

Joseph
Barndt
, Dismantling Racism: The Continuing Challenge to White America,
1991
, p. 155
-
56

To study racism is to study walls. We have looked at barriers and fences and limitations, ghettos
and prisons.
The prison of racism confines us all
, people of color and
white people alike. It
shackles the victimizer as well as the victim. The walls forcibly keep people of color and white
people separate from each other; in our separate prisons we are all prevented from achieving
the human potential that God intends for us
.
The limitations imposed on people of color by
poverty, subservience, and powerlessness are cruel, inhuman, and unjust; the effects of
uncontrolled power, privilege, and greed, which are the marks of our white prison will
inevitably destroy us as well. Bu
t we have also seen that the walls of racism can be
dismantled.

We are not condemned to an inexorable fate, but are offered the vision and the
possibility of freedom. B
rick by brick, stone by stone, the prison of individual, institutional, and
cultural rac
ism can be destroyed. You and I are urgently called to join the efforts of those who
know it is time to tear down, once and for all, the walls of racism. The danger of self
-
destruction seems to be drawing ever more near.

The results of centuries of nationa
l and
worldwide conquest and colonization, of military buildups and violent aggression, of
overconsumption and environmental destruction may be reaching the point of no return
.
A
small and predominantly white minority of global population derives its power

and privilege
from sufferings of the vast majority of peoples of color. For the sake of the world and
ourselves, we dare not allow it to continue.

Furthermore, biopolitics culminates in genocide.

Smith 11
(Robert, “Endgame Nearing an End: The Production o
f Bare Life under the U.S.
Deportation Regime”, pg. 9, BW)

Agamben writes that
the sovereign nomos is the principle that joins law and violence to
establish the territorial of order.
The sovereign occupies the point indistinction between
violence and law. In The Production of Space, Henri Lefebvre wrote that
sovereignty
demarcates a space established and constituted by violence
.
This

violence
cannot be
separated from a

principle of
uni
fication that subordinates all social practices.

Through its
monopolization of vio¬lence
the state claims to create a space where society is perfected for
all, though in fact it is the interests of a minority class that are enforced. The

Westphalian
state
system
, held as a defining element of modernity,
established the principle of territorial
sovereignty in international law
. Galina Cornelisse defines the concept of “territoriality”
as the
founding of political authority on demarcated territory

(Cornelisse

2010). Though the idea of
universal human rights

emerged after 1945, these rights
became inextricably tied to national
citizenship and

hence
state sovereignty
. It is this
sovereignty

that finds itself
under attack by

globalization,
the free movement of la
bor across borders.

Under globalization,
the State must
fight irrelevancy by reconstituting itself through the production of bare life
.
This is why
,
according to Schinkel,
deportation and detention are

not shortcomings of
the state

under
globalization but
its
fulfillment

(Schinkel 2009). According to Foucault,
another decisive event
of modernity was the inclusion of bare life in the political realm as a subject.

The focus on this
bare life as an object of the calculations of state power is the practice
know
n as biopolitics
,
which
finds its ultimate expression in the “camp.”

Agamben understands this causal chain as
crucial to addressing modern democratic state’s contradictions.
The most horrific events of the
20th century
,
especially Nazism and the death camp
s, can be traced to this stumbling block of
Western democracy: that it seeks to bring about people’s happiness in the realm of bare life,
which

tragically brings democracy into collusion with totalitarianism.

The camp is thus the
“nomos of the political sp
ace in which we live
,” leading Agamben to the disturbing conclusion
that the state of exception has become the rule, and in truth
we are all homo sacer.

The
absolute biopolitical space of the “camp
”, which establishes the “political space” of modernity
(Sc
hinkel 2010: 8),
is topologically different from the prison because the prison is securely
embedded in the juridical realm, while the camp is the space of the exception which makes
the juridical realm possible.

As the localization of the state of exception

where sovereign power
confronts bios, bare life, without mediation,
the camp is a “realm of experimentation, exercise
and

symbolic
reproduction of the violence of sovereign power
” that also sends an ambiguous,
threatening message to the outside world (Min
ca 2005). We shall see below how these concepts
are tangibly realized in the deportation regime of the United States.

Thus the plan: the United States federal government should open its border
toward the United Mexican States.

Opening the border gives up o
n the notion that we, as a nation, are in control
of who we are. This refusal is the core of redefining our relationship to
biopolitics.

Ajana 2006
[Btihaj, “Immigration Interrupted,” Journal for Cultural Research, 10.3]

Although it is often argued that
L
evinas as well as Derrida’s unconditional hospitability

cannot
be unproblematically (or even possibly) translated into a political action (Metselaar 2003, p. 9)
insofar as it is merely articulated at the level of the dual self
-
Other relationship rather tha
n
sociality as a whole (this being particularly true of Levinasian ethics), their vision
is
, nonetheless,
salient in terms of provoking a radical transformation in social and political imaginaries and
invoking the exigency of a ‘politics of generosity that

would foster rather than close off
different ways of being’

(Diprose 2002, p. 172
). Such politics will not proceed from ‘a
hermeneutics of depth’

(Rose 1999, p. 196)
in which subjectivity is wrought around self
-
containment, self
-
sufficiency and
self
-
determinacy, presented as a project to be
accomplished. Instead, it might find its point of departure in the potential encounter with the
other and the total exposure to embodied alterity
.
For it is the experience of encountering
and being
-
exposed
-
to
that infuses the crisis ‘into the hyphen at the heart of the nation
-
state’

(Coward 1999, p. 12)
and undoes any immanentist attempt to essentialise identity,
commonality and belonging. Whilst it is unclear as to how such an ethico
-
political vision may
be pu
t into practice

(perhaps this ‘not
-
knowing
-
how’ would save this alternative vision from
being turned into yet another figure of immanentism),
it may be that the rejection,
transgression and obliteration of immigration controls are to be regarded as the tou
chstone of
this radical ethico
-
politics and an epitome of the necessary shift from politics of borders to
politics of singularities where ‘No One Is Illegal’

(Cohen 2003).

In a world of biopolitics, our aff is a radical ethical act. The only ethical
ques
tion in the context of politics dominated by the Camp is how we can
acknowledge and reconfigure our relationship to the Other.

Zylinska, Professor of New Media and Communications at the University of
London, 2004
(Joanna, “The Universal Acts: Judith Butler

and the biopolitics of immigration,”
Cultural Studies 18.4, pg. 533
-
35) MM

The problem of openness which is to be extended to our current and prospective guests
-

even,
or perhaps especially , unwanted ones
-

is, according to Derrida, coextensive with th
e ethical
problem. ‘
It

is

always

about

answering

for

a

dwelling

place
, for one’s identity, one’s space,
one’s limits, for
the ethos as abode,
habitation, house, hearth, family, home’

(Derrida 2000, pp.
149/151, emphasis added). Of course,
this absolute and

unlimited hospitality can be seen as
crazy, self
-
harming or even impossible. But ethics

in fact
spans two different realms: it is

always
suspended between

this
unconditional hyperbolic order of the demand to answer for
my place
under the sun
and open to t
he alterity of the other that precedes me
, and the
conditional order of ethnos, of singular customs, norms, rules, places and political acts.
If we see
ethics as situated between these two different poles, it becomes clearer why we always
remain in a relat
ionship to ethics, why we must respond to it,

or, in fact, why we will be
responding to it no matter what. Even if we respond ‘nonethically’ to our guest by imposing on
him a norm or political legislation as if it came from us ;
even if we decide to close
the door in
the face of the other, make him wait outside for an extended period of time, send him back,
cut off his benefits or place him in a detention centre, we must already respond to an ethical
call.

In this sense,
our

politics

is

preceded

by

an

ethic
al

injunction
, which does not of course
mean that we will ‘respond ethically’ to it (by offering him unlimited hospitality or welcome).
However, and here lies the paradox, we will respond ethically to it (in the sense that the
injunction coming from the ot
her will make us take a stand, even if we choose to do nothing
whatsoever and pretend that we may carry on as if nothing has happened).
The

ethics

of

bodies

that

matter

also

entails

the

possibility

of

changing

the

laws

and

acts

of

the

polis

and

delineating

some

new

forms

of

political

identification

and

belonging
. Indeed, in their
respective readings of Antigone, Butler and Derrida show us not only that the paternal law
towards the foreigner that regulates the idea of kinship in Western democracies can be al
tered
but also that we can think community and kinship otherwise. If traditional hospitality is based
on what Derrida calls ‘a conjugal model, paternal and phallocentric’, in which ‘[i]t’s the familial
despot, the father, the spouse, and the boss, the mast
er of the house who lays down the laws of
hospitality’ (2000, p. 149), openness towards the alien and the foreign changes the very nature
of the polis , with its Oedipal kinship structures and gender laws. Since, as Butler shows us, due
to new family affil
iations developed by queer communities but also as a result of developments
in genomics it is no longer clear who my brother is, the logic of national identity and kinship that
protects state boundaries against the ‘influx’ of asylum seekers is to be left
wanting.
This is not
necessarily to advise a

carnivalesque
political strategy of

abandoning all laws, burning all
passports and
opening all borders

(
although such actions should at least be considered ), but
to point to the possibility of resignifying thes
e laws through their

(improper)
reiteration.

Enacted by political subjects whose own embodiment remains in the state of tension with the
normative assumptions regarding propriety, gender and kinship that underlie these laws, the
laws of hospitality are nev
er carried out according to the idea/l they are supposed to entail (cf.
Butler 1993, p. 231).It is precisely Butler’s account of corporeality and matter, of political
subjectivity and kinship, which makes Levinas’ ethics (and Derrida’s reworking of it) par
ticularly
relevant to this project. Although the concepts of the body and materiality are not absent from
Levinas’ writings
-

indeed, he was one of the first thinkers to identify embodiment as a
philosophical blindspot
-

Butler allows us to redraw the boun
daries of the bodies that matter
and question the mechanisms of their constitution. Her ‘others’ are not limited to ‘the stranger’,
‘the orphan’ and the ‘widow’ of the Judeo
-
Christian tradition, the more acceptable others who
evoke sympathy and generate pi
ty.10 It is also the AIDS sufferer, the transsexual and the drag
queen / people whose bodies and relationships violate traditional gender and kinship structures
-

that matter to her.
By investigating the contingent limits of universalization, Butler mobili
zes
us against naturalizing exclusion from the democratic polis and thus creates an opportunity
for its radicalization

(1997, p. 90).
The ethics of bodies that matter

does not thus amount to
waiting at the door for a needy and humble asylum seeker to knock
, and extending a helping
hand to him or her. It also involves realizing that the s/he may intrude, invade and change my
life to the extent that it will never be the same again, and
that I may even become a stran
ger in
the skin of my own home.

We control a
ll the internal links to their policy and framework impacts



as long
as the paradigm of modern politics is biopolitics, the aff is the only way to
overcome the demonic nature of the management of life.

Dean, 04


professor of sociology at the University o
f Newcastle (Mitchell, “Four Theses on the
Powers of Life and Death,” Contretemps 5, December 2004,
http://sydney.edu.au/contretemps/

5december2004/dean.pdf)//HK
)

Fourth thesis:
Bio
-
politics captures life
stripped naked

(or the zoē that was the exception of
sovereign power) and makes it a matter of political life (bios). Today, we seek the good life
though the extension of the powers over bare life to the point at which they become
indistinguishable. In thi
s formulation,
the emergence of a government over life in the
eighteenth century does mark a rupture in forms of rule
, which the search for an ʻoriginary
structureʼ of sovereignty cannot capture. For Foucault, the nature of this rupture is the
displacement
, articulation or re
-
inscription of sovereignty within a peculiarly modern form of
politics, bio
-
politics. However, this capture of the government of the state by bio
-
powers is
already present in the structure of sovereignty. It would be a mistake, in this

sense, to view
Agambenʼs quest for the structure of sovereignty, with its multiple thresholds, as ahistorical,
that is, as insensitive to temporal thresholds. His thesis offers a kind of history of modernity.
Here,
the demonic character of modern states l
ies in the possibility that the thresholds that
maintained bare life as a state of exception are breaking down
. Zoē is entering into a sphere of
indistinction with bios in modern politics. For Agamben
the paradigm of modern politics

the
new Nomos

is not th
e liberal governing of freedom, but the concentration camp. The camp
is the material form of the stabilization of the state of exception
, the excluded inclusion, both
inside and outside modern political and legal ordering. Because
the camp is established b
y law
as a space of exception, it is subject to no order itself, only direct police command. It is thus a
space of ordered disorder in which bare life enters into a zone of indistinction with legal
order.

While such views may appear to lead to a kind of ra
dical condemnation of many
instances of bio
-
politics, such as the attempt to develop humane processing procedures for
asylum seekers, the idea of mapping zones of indistinction would seem to locate arenas of
analysis and spheres of contestation rather than

a site of dogmatic rejection.
We have become
used to a style of criticism in which liberal notions of the individual citizen have been revealed
to be constituted through a series of exclusions

(of women, the disabled, prisoners, the insane,
the poor, the
indigene, the refugee, etc). Note that Contretemps 5, December 2004 28 bio
-
power today holds the promise of extraordinary solutions to disability, criminality and insanity.
The inclusion of women through their state of exclusion, also, would appear to rais
e interesting
questions concerning sovereign violence given womenʼs historic biological relationship to the
reproduction and care of human life. This relationship, itself excepted under the universality of
law, is thus produced as bare life; and women are
required to take responsibility for sovereign
decisions. If we are to take Agamben seriously,
this desire for inclusion may have the effect

not
simply of widening the sphere of the rule of law but also
of hastening the point at which the
sovereign exceptio
n enters into a zone of indistinction with the rule. Our societies would then
have become truly demonic
, not because of the re
-
inscription of sovereignty within bio
-
politics,
but
because bare life which constituted the sovereign exception begins to enter a

zone of
indistinction with our moral and political life and with the fundamental presuppositions of
political community.

In the achievement of inclusion in the name of universal human rights, all
human life is stripped naked and becomes sacred. Perhaps in

a very real sense we are all homo
sacer. Perhaps what we have been in danger of missing is the way in which
the sovereign
violence that constitutes the exception of bare life

that which can be killed without
committing homicide

is today entering into the
very core of modern politics, ethics, and
systems of justice.

Borders Aff
irmative Core

Border Conditions
Inherency

Migrant Conditions Bad

The mobility regime creates a social division, segregating those that seem
suspicious into prisons, ghettos, and quara
ntines
-

sometimes detaining them
indefinitely on nothing more than a suspicion of a threat.

Shamir 05

(Ronen, Professor of Sociology at Tel
-
Aviv University, 2005 “Without Borders?
Notes on Globalization as a Mobility Regime,” Sociological Theory 23.2
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=a38a1096
-
53e7
-
4f5d
-
8fb2
-
678c41fae19b%40sessionmgr10&vid=4&hid=26
)


T
he mobility regime also operates within the perimeters of privileged localities, countries, and
economic and political blocs.

It is useful to distinguish between those elementary forms that
work through the prevention of exit (e.g., prisons) and those elem
entary forms that work
through the prevention of entry (e.g., gated communities)
. While these two forms of social
isolation address and manage different social strata, and while they operate on the basis of
almost diametrically opposite logics, they
may be

sociologically located along a continuum of
practices designed to consolidate a mobility regime in general and to strategically distance
suspect social elements in particular
. Indeed, while there are strong sociological reasons not to
collapse such distin
ct phenomena as prisons and gated communities into a single category,
there are also other sociological reasons to treat them both as products of distinct strategies of
group power; in the former case, the power of dominant groups to stigmatize, isolate, a
nd
immobilize suspect groups by controlling their exit rights, and in the latter case, the power of
dominant groups to isolate themselves from suspect groups by controlling their rights of entry
into certain designated social spaces. Specifically, we may t
hus see
the

integrated

risk
-
management

system

of

the

mobility

regime

as

predicated

upon

two

pillars:

segregating

suspect

social

elements

in

prisons,

urban

ghettoes,

and

quarantines

on

the

one

hand,

and

sheltering

privileged

groups

in

gated

communities,

sec
ured

work

places,

and

guarded

shopping

malls

on

the

other

(Davis 1990). In this section, the concept of quarantines refers to
multiple forms of containment and imprisonment. Quarantine, in general, operates by
identifying and distancing people perceived as

dangerous by subjecting them to particular
treatment protocols. Foucault (1980)

while not specifically discussing a mobility regime

theorized the development of modern governance in relation to various forms of quarantine.
Medieval cities, wrote Foucault,

already relied on two types of measures to deal with perceived
threats such as leprosy and plague: exclusion and quarantine (Curtis 2002).
Urban authorities in
later times, pressured by the bourgeoisie, dealt with the politicosanitary menace by perfecting

the instrument of quarantine. Yet what started as urban politics of health later converged
with other forms of containment to become an important element of modern
“governmentality”

(Foucault 1991, 1980). Also on the privileged side of border fences,
the
mobility regime still relies on the old methods of using prisons, penitentiaries, detention
camps, and a host of other types of quarantines to isolate social elements perceived to be
dangerous.

With the world’s largest prison population, the United States
imprisons at a far
greater rate than both rich and many impoverished and authoritarian countries. On a per capita
basis, the United States has three times more prisoners than Iran, four times more than Poland,
five times more than Tanzania, and seven times

more than Germany
12
(Garland 2001; Wacquant
2001).
Affirming

a

no
-
compromise

approach

to

jailing,

as

well

as

a

conceptual

fusion

between

immigration

and

terrorism,

the

U.S.

Department

of

Justice

also

announced

that

undocumented

immigrants

could

be

detaine
d

indefinitely,

without

bond,

if

the

government

provided

evidence

that

their

release

might

threaten

national

security.

In order to counteract the deportation efforts of the states they live in,
migrants destroy their identity documents, essentially renderi
ng themselves
without any rights. The migrants live bare lives and suffer from inhumane acts
of violence.

Ellerman 9

(Antje, Dept of Politics @ U of British Columbia, Undocumented Migrants and
Resistance in the State of Exception, p 12, http://aei.pitt.edu
/33054/1/ellermann._antje.pdf)


As liberal states have stepped up their deportation efforts, migrants
, in particular

unsuccessful asylum seekers,
have sought to escape the state’s reach by destroying or
hiding their identity documents.

This act of resistance is far from exceptional. While the
following

figures and illustrations all refer to immigration enforcement in Germany, they
could easily

apply to control contexts elsewhere in the advanced democratic world.
German interior

official
s estimate that, in the mid
-
1980s, immigration authorities had to
obtain travel

documents for about 30 to 40 percent of all asylum seekers. By the year
2000, the population

of “undocumented” asylum applicants is estimated to have
increased to 85 percent (B
öhling

2001).

The dilemma that an unknown identity poses to
the state is aptly captured by a

deportation officer’s account of the resistance strategies
of illegal migrants: “People have

started to realize, ‘if they don’t know who I am, they
can’t touch me.

1
What is important to

note is that
homo sacer’s ability to render herself
unidentifiable is ultimately contingent on bare life. The lives of illegal migrants and refugees in
many ways exemplify the condition of rightlessness that marks bare life
.

“The
territorialization of life means that the refugee is put in a position where

she lacks
apportioned rights but depends on the charity or goodwill of aid workers or the police. The
refugee is outside the law. Levels of innuendo and violence unthinkable to re
gular human
beings, citizens, are regularly perpetrated against the refugee or asylum seeker.

The refugee
as homo sacer describes the

condition of exclusion that those exempt from the normal
sovereignty are

subject to.” (Rajaram and Grundy
-
Warr 2004, 41)

G
overnment border operations have empirically been strategized to increase
human suffering and death tolls and strips crossers of their human rights

Johnson 2007
(Dean and Mabie
-
Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o
Studies, “Opening the Fl
oodgates”, New York University Publication)


As of March
2006
, the California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation attributed
more than
3
,
000
deaths to a single southern California border operation known as Operation Gatekeeper.97

Numerous
other operations


have been put into place in the U.S.
-
Mexico border region.
All
have had similar deadly impacts
. Despite the death toll, the
U.S. government continues to
pursue enforcement operations with great vigor
. Indeed, Congress consistently enacts
proposals desi
gned to bolster border enforcement, with such proposals often representing the
only items of political consensus when it comes to immigration reform.
Operation Gatekeeper
demonstrates the U.S. government’s callous indifference to the
human

suffering

ca
used by
its aggressive border enforcement policy
. In the words of one informed commentator, “[t]he
real tragedy of [Operation] Gatekeeper . . . is the direct link . . . to the staggering rise in the
number of deaths among border crossers. [
The U.S. gov
ernment] has forced these crossers to
attempt entry in areas plagued by extreme weather conditions and rugged terrain that
[the
U.S. government] knows to present mortal danger.

98 In planning Operation Gatekeeper,
the
U.S
. government knew that its strategy would risk many lives but proceeded nonetheless. As
another observer concludes, “Operation Gatekeeper, as an enforcement immigration policy
financed and politically supported by the U.S. government, flagrantly
violat
es international
human rights
because
this

policy

was

deliberately

formulated

to

maximize

the

physical

risks

of Mexican migrant workers, thereby
ensuring

that

hundreds

of

them

would

die.”
99
Apparently,
the government rationalized the deaths of migrants
as collateral damage in the
“war” on illegal immigration
. Even before the
1990
s, the Border Patrol had a reputation for
committing human rights abuses against immigrants and U.S. citizens of Mexican ancestry.100
Created to police the U.S.
-
Mexican borde
r,
the Border Patrol has historically been plagued by
reports of
brutality,

shootings,

beatings,

and

killings
.101 Amnesty International, American
Friends Service Committee, and Human Rights Watch have all issued reports documenting
recent human rights
abuses by the Border Patrol.102


Poor law enforcement along the border feeds the human trafficking business
which results in slavery and prostitution

Johnson 2007
(Dean and Mabie
-
Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o
Studies, “Opening th
e Floodgates”, New York University Publication)


Today, because of the money to be made in this black market,
criminal syndicates thrive in the
trafficking of human beings.
A

product

of

ill
-
considered

law

enforcement
, these syndicates
resemble the crime
networks that emerged in response to the federal government’s efforts
during Prohibition’s ban on the commerce in alcohol.

Criminal elements grew and asserted
control over a new lucrative industry. But it gets worse. Some
undocumented immigrants have
b
een enslaved. Reports of slavery have increased dramatically
in the past few years. One
2005
report concluded as follows: Our
research identified
57
forced labor operations in almost
a dozen cities in
California between
1998
and
2003
,

involving more th
an
500
individuals from
18
countries
. . . . Victims labored in several economic
sectors including prostitution and sex
services (
47
.
4
%), domestic service (
33
.
3
%), mail order brides (
5
.
3
%), sweatshops (
5
.
3
%), and
agriculture

Bordering on the Immoral
|
113
(
1
.
8
%)
. . . .
Victims
of forced labor often suffer
severe hardships and deprivations. Their
captors often subject them to beatings, threats, and
other forms of physical and psychological abuse. They live in conditions of deprivation and
despair. Th
eir captors

may
threaten their families.

Perpetrators exert near total control over
victims, creating a situation of dependency. Victims come to believe they cannot leave. . . . They
are terrified of their captors but also fear law enforcement, a fear o
ften based on bad
experiences with police and other government officials in their countries of origin.105

The immigrant’s plight in making it to the “Land of the free” paradoxically risks
life and limb and sells themselves into a probable slavery

Johnso
n 07
(Kevin, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, School of Law, and Mabie
-
Apallas
Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o Studies at the University of California, Davis.
“Opening the Floodgates”, pg. 200, BW)


Although immigration reform has been t
he topic of extensive public discussion, there has been
no legislative proposal put on the table that would address the fact that the

U.S. immigration
laws are dramatically out of synch with the social, economic, and political realities of modern
immigrati
on in the global economy.

Moreover, today’s immigration laws are wholly
inconsistent with the moral underpinnings of the United States of America. Put simply,
the U.S.
immigration laws are broken and
must be fixed.
Fixing them requires true comprehensive
i
mmigration reform, not mere tinkering at the margins.

Consider the incontrovertible facts.
Immigrants make up about 10 percent of the U.S. population. As many as 12 million
undocumented immigrants live in the United States. This large population exists eve
n though, in
the 1990s, the U.S. government dramatically bolstered border enforcement with Mexico and
engaged in a number of high profile, military
-
style operations in border cities like El Paso, Texas,
and San Diego, California.
In an attempt to avoid the

Border Patrol, undocumented immigrants
today travel through isolated deserts and mountains, literally risking life and limb in hopes of
making it to the land of the free and the home of the brave.
As a result, over the past decade,
thousands of migrants,
almost all of them citizens of Mexico, have died attempting to cross
the Southwest border. Besides its deadly consequences, heightened immigration enforcement
has spurred a booming industry in the trafficking of human beings.

Criminal
smugglers today
charg
e undocumented immigrants thousands of dollars for passage to the United States.
Smugglers
show little respect for the safety of their human cargo and, at times, abandon
migrants to die in the desert or on the high seas.

Many
migrants fortunate enough to s
urvive
the journey are forced to work as indentured servants to pay off the debts of passage to
smugglers
. Because trafficking arrangements are not in the least bit regulated, exploitation and
abuse run rampant.

Trafficking results in abuse and forced labo
r

Johnson 2007
(Dean and Mabie
-
Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o
Studies, “Opening the Floodgates”, New York University Publication)


Besides its deadly consequences, heightened immigration enforcement has spurred
a booming
industry i
n the trafficking of human beings
. Criminal smugglers
today charge undocumented
immigrants thousands of dollars for passage

to the United States.
Smugglers show little
respect for the safety of
their

human

cargo

and, at times, abandon migrants to die in the
desert or on the high seas. Many migrants fortunate enough to survive the journey are
forced

to

work

as

indentured

servants

to pay off the debts of passage to smugglers. Because
trafficking arrangements are

not in the least bit regulated,
exploitation

and

abuse

run
rampant.

Exclusion of economic equality infringes on international human rights

Johnson 2007
(Dean and Mabie
-
Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o
Studies, “Opening the Floodgat
es”, New York University Publication)


The most frequently invoked substantive ground for excluding noncitizens is that they are
“likely at any time to become public charges.”11 The public
-
charge exclusion squarely conflicts
with the anticaste foundation
s of U.S. law.12
One of the promises of America is

the potential
for upward economic mobility.
No person’s station in life is dictated by class or caste
. To that
end, the framers of
the U.S. Constitution prohibited titles of nobility. Nonetheless, the
public
-
charge exclusion cements economic disparities in place for those denied entry into the United
States. Through this barrier, the United States slams the door on poor and working people
and thus denies access to the American Dream to those most in

pursuit of it
. Immigration law
allows the United States to do at its borders what it cannot do within them. Because the
Constitution guarantees free movement between the United States, individual states cannot
erect borders to limit entry. Therefore,
efforts by individual states

to
prevent the poor living
in other states from migrating

into their jurisdictions
have been

Bordering on the Immoral
|
89
found to be unconstitutional infringements on the right to travel.


Immigrant Detainees Suffering

Immigration detainees are skyrocketing, meanwhile the conditions in these
prisons remain inhumane

Griesbach 2010

(Kathleen UC San Diego “Immigration Detention, State Power, and
Resistance: The Case of the 2009 Motín in Pecos, Texas” pgs. 8
-
10) TYBG


The in
carceration of men like Galindo reflects the recent trend to turn over illegal immigrants to
the justice system for criminal prosecution since 9/11, rather than deporting them as
previously22, particularly with the advent of Operation Streamline.
On Decemb
er 2, 2009, the
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse
(TRAC) released a report that in 2009, 369, 483
people were held in custody by the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(ICE) in 2009, which
is double the number of immigrants detained ten years ago
23.
This reflects the increase in
border and immigration enforcement following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001
,
particularly through initiatives like Operation Streamline, the 2005 Bush initiative which dictated
federal criminal charges for any
one detained crossing the US
-
Mexico border illegally”.24
The US
maintains the largest immigration detention center in the world; by the end of 2007, 961 jails
and prisons housing detainees were either directly owned by or under contract with the
federal go
vernment
.25
Rampant human rights abuses include particularly poor or nonexistent
medical services, a lack of legal services for detained immigrants, and squalid living conditions
.
Detained migrants face imprisonment in county jails, privately run federal d
etention centers, or
other privately run federal prisons


often with convicted criminals26.
The success of private
prison management as an unregulated capitalist enterprise explains the inhumane living
quarters, lack of medical services

(so glaringly obvi
ous in the case of José Manuel Galindo’s
death),
and lack of legal resources for detainees
.27 Another policy in common practice by ICE is
the transfer of countless prisoners from detention center to detention center, often at great
distances from each othe
r and without informing family or the detainee’s legal counsel if he/she
has one (effectively destroying the inmate’s defense).28

Immigrants Excluded

The system of immigration control creates exclusionary social hierarchies that
are clear in society, with
the 3rd border of exclusion of “inferior” Latinos. They
are then forced into a grey where they are stripped of their basic rights

Griesbach 2010

(Kathleen UC San Diego “Immigration Detention, State Power, and
Resistance: The Case of the 2009 Motín in Pecos
, Texas” pgs. 14
-
15) TYBG


Uneven power relations multiply and endure within the system of immigration control
.
Luibhéid stresses that “
relations of power and inequality at the border cannot be separated
from inequitable global relations that structure mig
ration patterns from social hierarchies
within the United States
”38.
These relations of exclusion have been more dramatically
enforced in recent years, with the increase in criminal punishment for illegal immigrants,
without consideration of extensive tran
snational familial relations.

Immigrants are completely
beholden to a system of power relations directly dictated by documentation status,

as
Galindo’s story illustrates
. Foucault stresses that power emanates through discourse
, which is
internal to the pow
er relations that pervade society. Mike Davis’s discussion
of the “3rd border”
beyond the border zone and interior enforcement to Latino social exclusion

(through the
racialization of space) in Southern California
illuminates the extension of disciplinary
power
and the creation of “Other”ness from the political regime to informal society
39. Davis
discusses and the recent segregationist tactics of wealthy neighborhoods to exclude working
-
class Latinos from formerly public venues.
A main strategy is the incur
sion of high fees for
“non
-
residents” of wealthy neighborhoods

in the San Gabriel Valley, for example. This “Third
Border” aims to keep Latinos away from public destinations like parks in affluent white
neighborhoods like San Marino’s Lacy Park.40
This exc
lusion extends a long trend of
discriminatory policing, working as a “magnification” of disciplinary power exercised
unequally toward Latinos

(many of them immigrants). The third border’s segregation
complements the first and second borders’ attempt to “ex
clude Mexican immigrants from entry
into the U.S” through force. Thus, “
the third border serves as a new form of racial segregation
deep within the country
”, 41 multiplying and perpetuating the power of the State and its upper
echelons over immigrants. Thi
s latter definition of the normalizing quality of disciplinary power
within institutions characterizes many recent immigration laws and particularly the treatment of
US immigrant detainees both within the US and abroad. Yet
as Giorgio Agamben argues, the
l
egal treatment of immigrant detainees in some cases operates in a gray area outside the law,
which becomes normalized in the “State of Exception
”.
Agamben argues that under the USA
Patriot Act immigrant detainees like the Taliban captured in Afghanistan do

not even have the
status of persons charged with a crime according to American laws.

Neither prisoners nor
persons accused, but
simply “detainees”, they are the object of a pure de facto rule
, of
a
detention that is indefinite not only in the temporal sen
se but in its very nature as well, since
it is entirely removed from the law and from judicial oversight
.44Though most immigrants
detained within the US for minor offenses like Galindo are a different case than suspected
terrorists,
the record of legal and

human abuses within the prisons and in the justice system
reflect the same lack of judicial and human oversight to which Agamben refers
. The disturbing
fact that
the majority of detainees have not been convicted of any crime demonstrates the
exercise of d
isciplinary power far outside the spirit of “normal” law
. The official Immigration
and Customs Enforcement database showed on January 25, 20009
that of 32,000 total
immigrants in detention, 18,690 had no criminal conviction, even for illegal entry
; 400 of
those
without convictions had been in detention for at least a year.

Social services have been withheld from “aliens” solely because of their social
standing in an unregulated utopian society.

Lee 2010,
works at the interface of critical theory, cultural

studies, and
citizenship/democracy studies. focuses on the cultural politics, practices, and discourses
of migrant domestic workers [Charles, “Bare Life, Interstices, and the Third Spaces of
Citizenship,” Women’s Studies Quarterly, 38.1/2]



For Rancière,

democracy is about “the power of those who have no


qualification for
exercising power.” It is “the count of the uncounted

or


the part of those who have
no part” (2004, 304

5). As McNevin sums up:


“Resistance occurs as outsiders attempt
to recast their identity as politically


legitimate subjects of justice” (2006, 138).


Inside
Isin and Rygiel’s abject spaces, immanent outsiders have enacted


themselves as
political by exercising rights that they
do not have, thereby


turning bare life into
political life (2007, 186). Scholars have termed these


political stagings as widely as
“insurgent citizenship” (Isin 2002), “acts of


citizenship” (Isin and Nielsen 2008), “non
-
citizen citizenship” (Gordon


200
5), “democratic cosmopolitanism” (Honig 2001), or
“abject cosmopolitanism”


(Nyers 2003). For instance, Isin and Rygiel point to acts of


suturing mouths by refugees in protest against state asylum laws and setting


boats on
fire in order to avoid being se
nt off to offshore detention centers


(2007, 193). They
also find acts of resistance in the “sanctuary city”


movements across Europe and
Canada where state law is suspended to


provide hospitality to aliens, as well as the
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” campaign
s


in the United States that forbid city workers to
inquire into a person’s


status to ensure access to social services (198

99). In his study
of


the antideportation campaigns by the refugee group, Action Committee


of Non
-
Status Algerians (CASS) in Montr
eal, Peter Nyers further cites


political acts such as
regular assemblies, weekly information pickets, delegation


visits to immigration
offices, public demonstration and marches,


and leafleting against deportations at
airports (2003, 1083). Through


thes
e public and collective demonstrations,
undocumented subjects mark


themselves as visible and audible and write themselves
into a status of recognition.

The paradigm of suspicion criminalizes the mobility of immigrants, the
impoverished and other agents of

suspect.

Shamir 05

(Ronen, Professor of Sociology at Tel
-
Aviv University, 2005 “Without Borders?
Notes on Globalization as a Mobility Regime,” Sociological Theory 23.2
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=a38a1096
-
53e7
-
4f5d
-
8fb2
-
678c41fae19b%40sessionmgr10&vid=4&hid=26
)


In speaking about a paradigm of suspicion, I mean that
the

primary

principle

for

det
ermining

the

“license

to

move,”

both

across

borders

and

in

public

spaces

within

borders,

has

to

do

with

the

degree

to

which

the

agents

of

mobility

are

suspected

of

representing

the

threats

of

crime
, undesired immigration, and terrorism, either independentl
y or, increasingly,
interchangeably. Apart from terrorism, being a newly articulated form of organized trans
-
national violence (Tilly 2004),
6
the perceived threats of crime and immigration, and particularly
their mutually constitutive interplay, are part o
f the history of modernity. The residents of the
modern cities that absorbed Europe’s new urban proletariat in the 19th century retained a
profound mistrust of people without established connections. This
mistrust has been an
important engine in the
increasing formal criminalization of mobility itself, from the concept
of “criminal vagabondage
” in France, where mobility was the crime, through a series of
vagrancy panics in Britain, to increasing legal hostility to vagrants and anxiety about “crimes of

mobility” in the United States (Cole 2001:9). It is also no coincidence, therefore, that early
efforts to create reliable identification systems were based on the simultaneous development of
police records, photographic methods, and the perfection of the
passport system (Deflem 2002).
The conceptual link between immigration and social vices such as crime, disease, and moral
contamination has gripped the public mind long before the present era and continually shapes
immigration policies and border
-
control m
easures. Mobility is perceived as a suspicious
activity especially when it relates to those without property
. Immigration seekers aside,
consider the policy that guides the grant of nonimmigrant visas to the United States. The
standard reason for refusing
to issue a visa, when such a reason is given, is that the applicant did
not qualify under Section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This section is premised
upon
a paradigm of suspicion

that
stipulates that every foreigner seeking to enter the

United
States is considered an immigrant as long as he or she did not convince the immigration
officer that at the time of the application he or she was eligible for a nonimmigrant status
. To
convince the immigration officer, one has to show proof of “str
ong ties” to the country of origin,
such as a permanent job or ownership of property, in fact identical in nature to the old need to
establish “settled connections.” Both the European and American
media are flooded with
reports and studies that link immigr
ation and crime, often mediated through indicators of
poverty
. In the Netherlands, for example, reports abound about such links, citing scientific
evidence that illegal immigrants are by far more likely to be involved with crime and singling out
Moslem “cu
lture of religious extremism” as a factor. While crime records are not kept according
to ethnicity, Dutch police and government officials have publicly linked a rise in crime to
immigrants, and according to criminologist Chris Rutenfrans, 63 percent of tho
se convicted of
homicide are immigrants

Moroccans, Antilleans, and sub
-
Saharan Africans being the chief
culprits.
7
In the United States, a senior policy analyst at the Center for Immigration Studies
published a study showing that
immigrants and their minor

children now account for almost
one in four persons living in poverty
. The proportion of immigrant
-
headed households using at
least one major welfare program is 24.5 percent compared to 16.3 percent for native
households and the poverty rate for immigrant
s and their U.S.
-
born children (under 18) is
twothirds higher than that of natives and their children, 17.6 percent versus 10.6 percent

Border Policies Bad

Closed borders punish human beings for their unlucky birthplace, contributing
to eternal human suffe
ring, inequality, human trafficking, slavery and death

Johnson 2007
(Dean and Mabie
-
Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o
Studies, “Opening the Floodgates”, New York University Publication)


Although arbitrary constructs that are nothing
more than legal fictions,
borders

contribute

to

human

suffering

and

economic

inequality.

The accident of place of birth may effectively
create a life of relative opportunity or deprivation.

Today, however,
it is far easier than ever
before to rectify t
hat accident.

Migration between nations is more common in the twenty
-
first
century than it ever has been. Goods, services, and people regularly flow across borders.
Elaborate transportation networks exist to move people and goods quickly and inexpensive
ly all
over the world.
A fundamental question for

any body of
immigration law and policy

therefore
is

whether it should

facilitate migration and increased access to economic opportunity and
social mobility or whether
it

simply should reinforce the ineq
ualities
attributable to the luck of
the draw
. At a fundamental level
,
“[a]n open entry policy is a broad attack on the problem of
morally arbitrary suffering and inequality
.”55

Open entry
is more egalitarian than closed
borders,

allows for the possibili
ty of a more just world, and recognizes that people should not
be trapped for life by the random occurrence of place of their birth.
Consequently, an
anticaste justification for open borders, which has also been an important basis for much of U.S.
const
itutional law, warrants the most serious consideration.
Other moral justifications

exist as
well, many of them
stem
ming
from the immoral consequences of current U.S. immigration
law. Open borders can help

eliminate the immoral consequences that
directly

result

from
the nation’s efforts to close the borders
, including
racial discrimi
-

102
|
Bordering on the
Immoral
nation, exploitation in the labor market,
human

trafficking

and

slavery,

and

deaths

resulting from border enforcement.

Government Policies render immigrants exploitable, change is vital for the
system

Johnson 2007
(Dean and Mabie
-
Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o
Studies, “Opening the Floodgates”, New York University Publication)


Labor exploitation i
s a special problem with respect to immigrants from Mexico. Mexican
citizens are the largest group of immigrants in the United States. The U.S.
government’s
policies have
, over time,
encouraged

their
entry

into this country,
using them to supply an
i
nexpensive, exploitable labor force beneficial to American employers and consumers
.
But

the same government that encourages their migration
has

wholly
failed to protect them from
exploitation and abuse
. It has persistently
allowed

these poor people

to remain
vulnerable

to
exploitation. Moral obligations grow out of such treatment but have yet to be recognized by
the U.S. government.
In order to bring U.S. immigration law into line with the nation’s moral
compass,

change

is

essential
. The sys
tem
, by almost all accounts,
is broken.

The fundamental
question about which there is serious difference of opinion is the solution. The
immigration
issues

that face the United States
will not go away due to wishful thinking or tough talk
.
Such res
ponses, unfortunately, dominate public discussion of immigration in the United States.

Closed borders promotes isolation and the profound acknowledgement of “the
other”

Johnson 2007

(Dean and Mabie
-
Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o
Studies, “Opening the Floodgates”, New York University Publication)

Open borders could help ameliorate some of the problems experienced by Mexican immigrants
and Mexican
-
American citizens.
Legal distinctions

between immigrants and citizens, which are
cur
rently central to the immigration laws,
serve to create in
-
groups and out
-
groups, promote
interethnic tension, and breed discrimination against perceived
outsiders.

By tending to
render such distinctions irrelevant, liberal admission policies would pro
mote full community
membership for all people living and working in U.S. society.

By minimizing, if not wholly,
eliminating, the importance of immigration distinctions between people in the United States,
a
liberal admissions system would also tend to
dampen the institutionalized stigmatization of
domestic minorities, such as Mexican
-
Americans
, who share
into
ancestries with disfavored
immigrants. In so doing,
the law would help to promote the integration of noncitizens and
certain groups of U.S. cit
izens
U.S. society
.


Borders are Discriminating

Border controls serve discriminatory intentions of segregation

Johnson 2007
(Dean and Mabie
-
Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o
Studies, “Opening the Floodgates”, New York University Publi
cation)


Another way of evaluating immigration restrictions proves instructive in evaluating their racial
impacts.
Border controls have been characterized as a form of
employment

discrimination

against noncitizens
because
they
effectively

bar
many
foreigners from accessing the U.S. labor
markets
.63

Under the existing border controls,

the persons barred from seeking domestic jobs
are

predominantly people of color from the developing world. Border controls

thus

serve to
racially segregate internati
onal labor markets.

The
discriminatory impacts of immigration
regulation can be seen
starkly in the
post

September 11

heightened scrutiny of noncitizens.
Almost all of the legal measures taken in the war on terror have been directed at the immigrant
c
ommunity, resulting in racially disparate consequences.
The recent governmental targeting of
Arabs and Muslims demonstrates how immigration law conveniently can be employed to fo
-

104 | Bordering on the Immoral
cus upon disfavored minority groups
. This

targeting was
accompanied by

a precipitous rise in private
racial discrimination and hate crimes

directed
against Arabs and Muslims in the United States.64

Immigration laws label immigrants as disposable and racially unequal in the
class system

Johnson
2007
(Dean and Mabie
-
Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o
Studies, “Opening the Floodgates”, New York University Publication)
.



Not coincidentally,
the
disposable

labor force that immigration law has helped to create in
the U
nited

S
ta
tes

is composed

primarily
of immigrants of color

from the developing world.133
In effect, we see
the existence of a new racial caste system

in the United States that
has
replaced

the old system that existed in the days of
Jim Crow
. The current immigrant

labor
system is nothing less than a variant of the old sharecropping system in the South.
Poorly paid,
exploitative jobs are reserved for marginalized immigrants of color.

Immigration law

thus
contributes to racial stratification

in the U.S. labor mar
ket. In this way
, labor exploitation
overlaps with concerns about the racial discrimination embedded in the U.S. immigration
laws
and their enforcement.

Closed borders purposely target people of color, the disabled and ill

Johnson 2007
(Dean and
Mabie
-
Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o
Studies, “Opening the Floodgates”, New York University Publication)


The poor are not the only group that,

although enjoying the protection of the laws within the
country
, is denied that protec
tion at the border. Joining

the poor
as inadmissible “aliens” who
are barred from entry into the country are disabled persons
. In the United States, they are
protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act.14
At the border
, however,
the disabled can
b
e denied admission into the country simply
on

account

of

the

fact

that

they

are

disabled
.15
Congress also has acted to exclude persons with

the Human Immunodeficiency Virus
(HIV
),
even though

the U.S. Public Health Service concluded that
HIV
-
positive no
ncitizens do not
pose a
significant

health risk to the
general
population
.16 Despite technically complying with
the colorblindness demanded by the U.S. Supreme Court,17 modern immigration laws also
have racially disparate impacts.
People of color are d
isproportionately barred from entering
the country
. Such a result is in tension with the nation’s stated commitment to equality under
the law.18
Although discrimination against the poor, the disabled, HIV
-
positive persons, or
racial minorities would be

patently unlawful if directed against citizens in the United States, it
is
nothing

less

than
routine

under the U.S. immigration laws. One is left to wonder what the
moral justifications could be for keeping these groups out of the United States
. The e
laborate
system of controls that inflicts disparate impacts on people of
90
|
Bordering on the Immoral
color raises similar questions.
All of these excluded groups

seem to
fall squarely within

the
category of the
“huddled masses” for whom the nation ha