Accession of Turkey in the EU

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Oct 28, 2013 (3 years and 1 month ago)

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EU & Political Integration exam


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Michael Frausing Jensen





Accession of Turkey in the EU

Political & Economic impacts and theories of EU Enlargement.



STU count: 23109














EU & Political Integration exam


Summer 2012
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Michael Frausing Jensen




INTRODUCTION

3

ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
TR IN EU AND ON TR I
TSELF

3

A large poor country with potential

3

Budgetary concerns

4

Political impacts of the Turkish accession on EU institutio
ns

5

TR as an important Foreign Policy player

6

The process and delay of enlargement

6

Economic Situation in TR after the formal accession talks
initiating.

9

THEORIES OF EUROPEAN

INTEGRATION ON THE A
CCESSION OF TR

10

Rationalist choice

11

Constructivism

13

CONCLUSION

14

BIBLIOGRAPHY

15












EU & Political Integration exam


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Michael Frausing Jensen




Introduction

Turkey's application to accede to the
European Union (EU)

was made in ‘87.
Turkey

(TR)

has been a strong associate
with the EU
since ‘63, and have been
part of several international organisations for d
ecades.

In ’95
TR

signed a
Customs Union agreement with the EU. Though official membership negotiations
did not commence before ’05 and the process have gone through many
controversies and obstacles and the future for accession seems bleak or at least
far
in the future.


The aim is to identify the economic situation before and after the neg
otiations with
the EU commenced and

to which extend a
n

impact of a such would
have to Turkey

and the EU. Th
e

analysis will be followed by
an elaboration of
the obstacles

and
controversies that have caused the negotiations to be lengthy and it will culminate
in EU enlargement theories

on

the Turkey accession
.

Economic impacts of
TR

in EU

and on
TR

itself


A large poor country
with potential


The situation in
TR

before accession negotiations began was that c
ompared to its

size and population
TR

was a very

poor country.
In terms of GDP

pr. capita
, it

averaged

in 2004

only 26,9 % of average EU25 GDP

pr. capita

and only 1.9% of
total EU25.
(Hughes 2004)
. Potentially
TR

had

a relati
ve substantial growth
potential, with
annual growth

of 7.8%

of GDP

in 2002
,

and 5.3 %

in 2003
compared

to the growth rate of the EU27 in that same period of 1.5
%.
(Hughes
2004, Eurostat 2012)



In 2002 FDI inflows accounted for only 0.3 % of GDP, this was especially
due to political and macro
-
economic instability in
the
TR

region. Furthermore is
was emphasised that bureaucratic barriers, co
rr
uption and high corporate tax
rates were dominant barriers extending to a inefficient educational system,
unfair judicial system and
constraint on
competition.
F
or FDI to significantly
increase not only macro
-
economic stability needed to be secured, but
also
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Michael Frausing Jensen




national reforms of institutional and economic nature needed to be undertaken
.

(Hughes 2004)


Demographic

features of
TR

economy gave

somewhat hope for a “golden
age” like that of the Asian Tigers.

(Hughes 2004)
. The reason for this is the very
high ratio of young people in
TR
1

and this combined with a relatively high,
stabile economic growth rate could turn out to be a winning combination,
especially when combined with

the possibilities of migration to the rest of the
EU

if admitted.
TR

h
as a very positive demographic profile compared to that of
especially the EU15, which in a short amount of time will face problems of
a
n

aging demographic profile.
So if
TR

manages to get their young population
adequ
ately educated there could be a positive migration effect into the EU labour
market.

(Hughes 2004)



Budgetary

concerns


Some concerns have been about the EU budgetary im
pact of Turkish
accession, despite the potential rapid growth in
TR

they will still be b
elow the EU
average GDP per capita
, if admitted in 2015 and therefore be a candidate of
substantial economic assistance regarding structural and regional matters.
Espec
ially regarding the Turkish agriculture, where 7,5 million of its workforce
is situated compared to that of
EU15 of only 6,5 million combined. An estimate of
gross budget receipts of
TR

if admitted in 2015 would from this year and 3 years
forth an estimate
d €45.55 billion.
2

The budgetary receipts of
TR

are compared to
those of the

2013

total budget
of the EU27 and amounts to 10.8 %.
These figures,
although only an approximate, shows that accessing
TR

is manageable because it
would have about the same financ
ial implications as the Enlargement of the
CEECs had on the budget.


(Hughes 2004)






1

50 % under the age of 25

2

Budget estimates for Turkey based on 4% GDP limit structural funds and on the
financial package

for Bulgaria & Romania in 1999 prices.

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Political impacts of the Turkish accession on EU institutions


By the possible accession date of 2015
TR

will have a population
of

approximate

82.1 million, and will constitute a 14 % of
EU
-
union population in
2015. T
his itself does not constitute a problem in terms of population size
variations in
the EU

as Germany account for 16.6 %

today.
(Wikip
edia 2012)

It

will have effects on the political balance in a EU28 union with the Qualifi
ed
Majority Voting (QMV) system, that insured

55 % of th
e members in the
European Council
representing at least 65 % of the EU’s citizens is

required to
apply a policy in almost all policy areas.
(Bache, George et al. 2011)
TR

together
with Germany will constitute about 30 % of the votes and will be able to block
any proposal with a third large
country (UK, France or Italy). This will make
TR

a
powerful political player and further complicate the alliances and blocking
combinations in the Council.
(Hughes 2004)


TR

will have an even greater impact in the
European Parliament, where
its population size matters a great deal
. If
TR

were accessed into the EU today it
would constitute the second largest MEPs in the

EP
.

And by 2020 it would exceed
to
have
the largest
group of
MEPs. Adding a large country to the E
P

would
make
it more

difficult for major countries to
vote by ‘national interest’ comp
ared to
that of party groups.
(Hughes 2004)
There will be little effect in th
e Commission
though, as the Commission consist of 1 m
ember of two
-
thirds of the total
MSs(MS)
.


Even the positive
economic development possibilities
, and the
manageable budgetary implication of

TR

taken into account, the future effect

of
allowing
TR

into
the EU

is that the largest popul
ation contributors to

the EU

so
far
(Germany, UK, France and Italy) also have

had

the largest economies.
Thereby
TR

entering
the EU

with a

relatively small

economy

will have great
influence on the political versus economic balance.
So the
impact

will
mostly
be
of a political
not economic kind
.
(Hughes 2004)
.



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TR

as an important Foreign Policy player


Many political
scientists

have stressed the importance that
TR

will play if
assessed in the field of Foreign Policy.

(Bache, George et al. 2011, Hughes 2004)

A
t first
TR

borders with the Middle East and the Caucasus. This will sharpen
the
EU
’s foreign policy and internal security concerns in these areas, and will occupy
a lot attention in issues ranging from

border control, diplomatic recognition and
disputes over resources.
(Hughes 2004)
Furthermore the 2011 Progress Report
on
TR

stresses that “
Turkey’s central role as the EU energy corridor for Caucasian
and Caspian
oil and gas resources and its strategic proximity to Iraq and its
developing crude oil market; stresses the strategic role of the planned Nabucco
pipeline and other gas pipelines, such as the ITGI (Interconnector Turkey
-
Greece
-
Italy)


(Oomen
-
Ruijten 2011)
.
Bulmer et al. adds to this that Britain emphasises
the role
TR

could play in settling disputes about EU being biased against the
Muslim world in general, because allowing
TR

into
the EU

with its 98

% of its
population being Muslims.

(Bache, George et al. 2011, Wikipedia 2012)

TR

has
also increased its regional powers being the second largest military force in the
NATO, becoming a member of G
-
2
0

major economies
,

and being part of the U.N.
Security Council since 2009.


(Wikipedia 2012)

T
he EU cooperation with
TR

can
be seen as a way of trying to stabilise unsecure borders to a pre
-
authoritarian
region and work

as a source of inspiration for democratising Arab States in
stabilizing their newly evolved, albeit partly, democratic societies.
(Oomen
-
Ruijten 2011)
.


The process and

delay of
enlargement



Before starting official accession negotiations with a state in the EU, the
applicant state must fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria. These include 3 major
criteria; at first an applicant must have stable institutions, a guarantee of
democracy, the rule of law,

securing human rights and protection of minorities.
Added to these political criteria is some of economic nature; an applicant must
have a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition
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within the common market. At last is must fulfi
l the aquis communautaire
3
, the
ability of an applicant to take on the obligations of membership.

(Bache, George
et al. 2011)


The road of European integration of
TR

has been one of a long and bumpy
one. The first indication of European integration was through

the application for
a associated membership in the
EU
s
predecessor, the EEC in 1959, by signing the
Ankara Agreement. Further amandments were done in 1963 and 1
970 that laid
the pathway for a
TR
’s membership of a Customs Union. Military invention in
1970 and 1980 because of political disputes suspended the Association
Agreement, and therefore negotiations were postponed.

Finally
TR
’s

application
to accede to the

EU

was made in 1987

when
TR
’s democracy was sufficiently
stable.
Furthermore they
signed an agreement of a Customs Union with the EU in

95
and finally becoming a candidate for full membership in ’99.


But it was not
until 2005 that they were granted negotiations for future membership.


(Bache,
George et al. 2011)

The earliest
possible
accession of
TR

is when the next
EU

Budget period begins in 2013, and

the
TR
’s foreign minister Ali Babacan is cited

We have a full determination to join the EU. By the year 2013, Turkey will say it is
ready, but we don't know if the EU will be ready for it
.”
(Hurriet 2012)

Tod
ay the
TR

accession have yet not been completed
,
and the

accession
see
ms

to be far out in the future.

As
the President of the Commission Jose Manuel
Barosso
states in an interview in 2006
“No, Turkey's a long term problem. It's a
long term

issue. We cannot expect Turkey to become a member let's say in less than
fifteen, twenty years


(Sunday AM 2006)

Three major issues regarding this aspect
will be examinated; the growing opposition to
TR
’s mem
bersh
ip, the Cyprus
dispute

and the

lack of living up to

the aquis.


The Cyprus dispute concerns
“Turkey’s refusal to fulfil its obligation of full,
non
-
discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the EC
-
Turkey
Association Agreement towards all

MS
s”


(Oomen
-
Ruijten 2011)
.
TR

will not
acknowledge Cyprus as an official
MS

of
the EU
, and thereby opening its airports
and harbours to Cyprus trade. T
his refusal continues to deeply affect
and delay
the proc
ess of negotiations
.

It also adds to the growing political opposition for



3

35 chapters of

accumulated legislation, legal acts, and court decisions which
constitute the body of European Union law

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the accession of
TR
, because more and more countries, including Finland, Italy
and Greece, has stressed that
TR
’s membership depends highly upon their future
line against Cyprus, and

they will not support a
TR
’s membership without the
obligations to the Ankara Agreement being withheld.
(Henderson 2010)

Political o
pposition against
TR
’s membership has it roots in several
matters. Especiall
y France
and Germany
have been in opposition the most of
the
time,
with the geographical
and cultural
reasoning that
TR

is not a European
country. E
xemplified by former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing
expressing that allowing
TR

into Europe would be “
the end of European Union
”.


(Bache, George et al. 2011)

Nicholas Sa
rkozy agreed in this point, stating

TR

should not be allowed into the
EU
, but only stay as a

strong partner. The Ge
rman
Chancellor Angela Merkel
agre
es with Sarkozy and states,

w
hen it comes to
Turkey, we want ... very close relations but not full membership,"
(Expatica 2009)
.

The first President of the Council Herman Van Rompu
y took the critique even
further to religious manors,
saying,


the universal values which are in force in
Europe, and which are also fundamental values of Christianity, will lose vigour with
the entry of a large Islamic country such as Turkey
.”
(Bache, George et al. 2011)
.
So far Britain has been an advocate of
TR

accession
(Bache, George et al. 2011)
,
but recent signs have turned the attitude against its former advocacy. British
MEP Marina
Yannakoudakis said in a plenary meeting on Turkish accession in
the
EP "Turkey still has a long way to go before it meets the criteria to become a
member of the EU.

Until Turkey makes the necessary improvements, I cannot
support its accession to the EU."
(Banks 2012)
.
Yannakoudakis
goes further and
explains why Britain has turn
ed

on a plate; inequalities between women and
men,
insufficient

protect
ion of

minorities,
larger effort in stopping
attacks
against women such as honour killings and to incriminate forced marriages.
(Banks 2012)
.


The above concerns of the British MEP is greatly in

line with that of t
he
Committee on Foreign Affairs

in their 2011 progress report on
TR
. The
y

line up
several improvements of especially the political branch of the aquis

that the
TR
’s
government needs to take care of
.


-

Securing

democracy and freedom of e
xpression further

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-

Improved

reforms of the judicial system

-

lacking rule of law and independence

of the judiciary in
TR

-

Eliminate discrimination of all religious and minority communities in the
educational system

-

Improve gender equality

-

Urgent need to bring

legal framework on labour and trade union righ
ts up
to

EU standards.

-

Despite the
TR
’s refusal to oblige to the Additional Protocol to the EC
-
TR

Association Agreement; the case with Cyprus

(Oomen
-
Ruijten 2011)


All of the above criteria need to be improved before any further accession on the
TR

application will be done.


Economic
Situation in
TR

after the formal accession talks initiating.


In October 2005 the Council agreed upon a “negotiation framework” with
TR
, but
with the understanding that a “full membership” would not be guaranteed


a
so
-
called

open
-
ended negotiation.
(Morelli, Migdalowitz 2011
)

This negotiation framework was
recognition

of
TR

having improved in most of
the areas of the aquis

and having improved greatly in terms of comprehending to
the Copenhagen Criteria, which then initiated
the accession process

of becoming
a
MS
.


It has
been emphasised that the progress of accession
could have great
economic effects on the
TR
’s economy
, as was the case with the new members of
the Eastern Enlargement, where members experienced
high
growth rates
,
increased FDI

and substantial fall in unempl
oyment rates

in the wake of
accession
.
(Henderson 2010)
.

Even the opening of negotiations with
TR

seems to
have had great impact on the economy.
Looking at the “
FDI in
Turkey (USD
Billion)” table below:


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4

Before negotiations
began

TR

ha
d a low FDI of $2.8 Billion,

this amount
increased excessively to a peak of
$
22
billion

before the global financial crisis in
2008. Even through the crisis the amount of FDI exceeds the FDI
before the
negotiation process by f
ar. Furthermore
TR

experienced an annual average
growth rate in the years 2002
-
2011 of 5,2 %

(ISPAT )

of GDP
.

TR

have also
managed to
decrease
Public debt stock
from 74
%

of GDP to 39.4
%

of GDP

in
that same period and decreased

their budget deficit from 10 to 3 % of
GDP.
(ISPAT )
.
Moreover
TR
’s economy has tripled in size, has grown by almost
10% in
2011

and is considered one of the fastest growing economies in the
world

with cross
-
border
trade between

the
EU

and
TR

totalled EUR 103 billion
in 2010

and

80% of FDI

in
TR

coming from the
EU
.
(Oomen
-
Ruijten 2011)
.
This

indicates to some point, that there have been great impacts on the
TR

economy
with accession negations.


Theories of European Integration on the accession of
TR





4

Source:
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey


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F. Schmmelfenning and U. Sedelmeier

(Sch & Sed)

introduce different
integration
th
e
ories

to analyse the EU enlargement. I have chosen two,
the rational c
hoice
and

social constructivism
,
which I will elaborate on.

It shall be noted that the
purpose of a distinction between a rationalist/constructivist axis is not to create
mutually exclusive explanations
, as many of the contributions combine
rationalist and constru
ctivist views.
(Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2002)


Rationalist choice


Rational choice

hypotheses

about enlargement
can be divided in two steps. The
first step involves explanations of enlargement preferences

of applicant and
MS
s.
Secondly it involves an explanation of organizational c
ollective enlargement
decisions.


In applicant and
MS

politics the classical rules of rational choice theory
exist, being that
“expected individual costs and benefits determine
the applicants’
and the
MS
s enlargement preferences. States favour the kind and degree of
horizontal institutionalization that maximizes their net benefits.”

(Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2002)
.
A cost
-
befinit

analyses lies in the nature of
rational choice theory
.
The cost and benefits, though, can vary a great deal. They
could be that of economic nature, but also other aspects of e.g. security could be
the case.

Sch and Sed distinguish between transaction, po
licy and autonomy cost
and benefits.


In the case of
TR

accession transaction cost could be increased
cost with
organizational infrastructure and communication, especially those of
multilingualism, which
“The EU sees the use of its citizens’ languages as
one of the
factors which make it more transparent, more legitimate and more efficient”

(EUR
-
Lex 2012)
.
The process of translating everything within
the EU

to 23 official
languages, maybe with one more if
TR

should enter,
increases cost in some way.
Increasing the members will usually also increase the heterogeneity of the
membership and will lead to
TR

having to establish headquarter in Brussels,
leading to cost of communication, co
-
ordination and
supervision

of the
relat
ionship headquarter
-
capital.
These costs

will have to
weight

against the
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benefits of provisions from the EU and benefits of faster communication.
(Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2002)


Other cost concern
s

the cost of policy.
Current
MS
s
it
will have to share
collective goods

with the new members
, a good example could be those subsidies
of CAP, which will have to be further revised if

TR

is allowed membership. For
TR

it would mean the cost of contributing t
o the EU budget and the cost of
implementing EU regulative into domestic law


and even before the accession
they would incur cost of implement the aquis. The effect will work the opposite
way, when looking at benefits.
(Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2002)


Autonomy costs for
MS
s consist of giving equal decision rights to new
MS
s. Especially under the QMV enlargement decreases autonomy. It has been
stressed that
France’s opposition to
TR

lays in the nature of not

wanting to loose
more political influence in the EU, as the Eastern Enlargement already did
impose.
(Bache, George et al. 2011)
. This could also be argued to be root motives
by the statements of
d’Estaing,

Sarkozy and Merkel earlier mentioned.
For
TR

the
cost will be loss of policy
-
making autonomy e.i. having to live up to the aquis.
Benefits for
MS
s will be greater control of
TR
’s political development, securing
greater stability and benefits for
TR

will
be protection of state autonomy and
domestic society.
(Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2002)


Secondly i
f a distinction between the
TR

interests

in joining
the EU

should
be

based on either a neo
-
liberal or a realist background. The distinction is
between the kind of cost/benefit calculations that states make. Neo
-
liberalist
emphasise that states act mainly on their own absolute material cost/benefit
calculations, and autonomy is of secondary prior
ity. Whereas realists by contrast
assume that states act concerned about their external autonomy and power.
(Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2002)

I
t would be arguable that the decision to
apply for membership is
that of a neo
-
liberal one. The positive economic effect
that the accession negotiations have had on the economy is non
-
arguable, as
stressed earlier. The
refore I argue that the
TR

application have been on
e

mainly
based on absolute economic gain, because it

will benefit from increased market
access, large FDI growth and budgetary net receipts.
If we try to look at it from
the
MS
s, it gets a bit more difficult, as it would be difficult to explain

why initial
negotiations were undertaken based on a cost/benefi
t analyses, as the cost of
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accessing
TR

exceed the benefits., at least in the short to medium term.

(Henderson 2010)



This leads us to the collective organizational decisions on enlargement.
The outcome of su
ch
decisions depend on more than cost/benefit analysis. Sch &
Sed indicates that unequal bargaining power can explain why decisions in the EU
are made even though the decision is not beneficial to each member. The

MS
s
that expect losses form enlargement w
ill only agree
to enlargement if their
bargaining power is sufficient to obtain full compensations through side
-
payments
by the winners
.”
(Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2002)
. An example of this
bargaining power

is identified in The IGC and the British Beef Dispute, where
Britain got several opt
-
outs and changes to policies.

(Bache, George et al. 2011)

.


Constructivism

According to
this theory social identity, values and norms and not that of
cost/benefit will shape enlargement politics, i.e.
the

degree actors inside and
outside the EU share a collective identity and fundamental beliefs.
(
Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2002)
in the applicant vs.
MS

politics the
desirability of enlargement depends on the degree of cultural match they share.
The more the applicant identifies with the community that EU represents and
the more it shares the value

and norms that define this community and their
policies, the stronger the incitement for joining and the more members of the EU
are willing to institutionalize with this state.

(Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier
2002
)
based on these assumptions, when looking at the statements by
d’Estaing,
Sarkozy, Merkel and especially Van Rompuy going as far as saying that the
universal values in Europe
,
which are also fundamental values of Christianity
,
will lose vigour with the
entry of
TR
. This can indeed be seen as a constructivist
argument for the opposition to
TR
. But also looking at the aquis, where
democracy and human rights are central, will give further ground to those of a
constructivist mind
-
set.


With constructivism a low degree of variation in enlargement preferences
would be expected because of Europeanization at the organizational level and
therefore few conflicts between
MS
s.
But this assumption is not always present
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in the EU. Reasons for this

can be tensions among community values and norms
and the identification and internalization of these values may vary among the
organizational level (the Commission) and the individual
MS
s.
These tensions

have indeed intensified with the enlargement for EU
15 to EU27, making the
definition of a collective identity among the members much more complex. The

Conclusion

The situation with
TR

in 2004, before the accession of the negotiation
framework,
TR

was a large poor country, with low FDI, large public debt,
high
public spendings
but with some economic development features and
possibilities. Regarding budgetary concerns in EU it showed that accessing
TR

is
manageable because it would have about the same financial implications as the
Enlargement of the CEECs h
ad on the budget.


Looking at the political impacts of the EU, the accession of
TR

would have
some impacts in both the Council and the EP, but not the Commission.
TR

would
shift the balance of the political balance in the Council with regards to QVM and
be
come the second largest MEP country in the EP. For a foreing policy point of
view,
TR

is seen as a important strategic player in the Mediterranean and
Caucasus with regards to the foreign and security policies and with regards to
securing an powerful playe
r in the energy sector, furthermore
TR

could become
a inspiration for aspiring democracies in the Middle East.


The process and delay section showed that three major issues for
delaying further accession on
TR

were present. Those were the neglect
of the
Cyprus as a MS
,
MS

opposition and difficulties and reluctance to live up to the
Copenhagen Criteria and aquis.


The predicted positive effects of accession showed to be valid, with the
TR

economy having greatly improved over the last decade with high FDI inflows,
GDP growth and the lowering of public debt and public spending, leading
TR

to
become a G
-
20 economy.


The theoretical framework of rational choice and constructivism showed
that
being used together the can account for some of the motivations for actions
of both applicant and member states. From the Turkey view, a rational choice
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approach seemed to be
arguable for their initial application, looking at a
cost/benefit analysis and fo
r that of the member states both the rational and
constructivist approach seemed applicable, bringing in values, norms and a
collective identity in the arguments against Turkey’s accession.

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