Initial Lessons Learned - GlobalSecurity.org

friendlybathMobile - Wireless

Nov 12, 2013 (3 years and 11 months ago)

77 views

Initial Lessons
Learned

Lessons Learned Operation Iraqi
Freedom EXSUM

Table of Content:

1)

C
2

of Patriot Forces


1
-
1 Patriot Defense Design Considerations


1
-
2 Table VIII Qualifications Insufficiently Prepare
Units for Combat


assigned missions

2)

Patriot Engagement Operations


2
-
1 Patriot Engagement Operations


2
-
2 Patriot System Knowledge

3)

Communications (AMD)


3
-
1 Force XXI Battle Command Requirements


3
-
2 Software Compatibility of AMDWS with the Other
ATCCS


3
-
3 Division Command via TACSAT


3
-
4 Long
-
haul communication equipment shortfall


3
-
5 Integration PATRIOT into the Joint Data Network
in KU

4)

Personnel and Logistical Support


4
-
1 FAADC3I Contractor Support and Class IX
Availability

5)

Joint Air Operations


5
-
1 Tactical Ballistic Missile Early Warning


5
-
2 Information Flow Regarding Anomalies
Experienced

6)
Information on CID Lessons Learned

Lessons Learned 1
-
1



Issue:

Integration/Defense Design with other PATRIOT BNs
(US and Allied) and other weapon systems was done on the fly.



Discussion:
No information, documentation, or test results
were available to the war fighter on how to successfully integrate
multiple PATRIOT BNs or other endospheric weapon systems.
Units within Israel and Kuwait (KU) have been operating with
Host Nation PATRIOT and other weapons systems for a number
of years. However, no data on the impact of operating in this
manner was available prior to the start of OIF. Two critical areas
that need closer review:


-

Having two units in separate BNs linked via PATRIOT
Automated Data Information Link (PADIL) providing coverage of
the same asset resulted in the inefficient use of FUs in
maximizing coverage of additional assets


-

Impact of having two separate endospheric weapon systems
sharing the same battle and space covering the same assets



Recommendation:
The Lower Tier Project Office (LTPO)
should assess the impact of employing the system the way it
was used during OIF and publish the results. USAADASCH
branch must analyze results and determine how to best employ
the weapon system to maximize effective coverage of multiple
assets

based on these results and produce the appropriate
updates to TTP.



Lead:

TSM
-
LT/DOTD

Sustain

Improve

X

General Issue

ADA Issue

X

Lessons Learned 1
-
2



Issue:
PATRIOT units’ focus on Table VIII qualifications limits their ability
to execute assigned missions



Discussion:
For the majority of PATRIOT units table eight gunnery
certification is viewed as an end point in the unit training cycle. Table eight
focuses on only 5 mission essential tasks: march order the FU/BN fire
distribution section (FDS), emplace the FU/BN FDS, conduct air defense
operations, conduct missile reload operations, and conduct
Reconnaissance, Selection and Occupation of Position (RSOP). These
tasks are for the most part conducted in a controlled environment with no
other distractions.



This narrow focus on a limited number of tasks fails to train units on
how to operate in a war time environment. The fixed site TBM only
mentality has led PATRIOT units to believe that if they are successful at
Table VIIIs they will be successful at war. Operation OIF highlighted some
of the problems this approach has caused. PATRIOT units are not
assessed on their ability to fight as part of an integrated task force. Units
are not evaluated on their ability to provide highly qualified ADAFCOs to
higher echelon units. Units are not assessed on their ability to develop
and execute complex defense designs. Units are not assessed on their
ability to receive a mission and execute it.



Table VIII certification is only one part of a unit’s training as it
prepares for its annual external evaluation. At some point, a PATRIOT
battery/ BN needs to be assessed on its ability to execute its mission and
fight as part of a BN Task Force and / or higher echelon integrated task
force.



Recommendation:
USAADASCH relook what it takes to be “qualified”.


For a unit to be considered qualified, it should not only be trained in the
key Air Defense Tasks, but it should also be trained and qualified to
operate as part of a larger, integrated and most likely joint task force.

This
approach may lead to a totally new training model. Review, update, and
change current battery / BN requirements and establish measurable tasks,
conditions, and standards for PATRIOT Gunnery Tables. Key to raising
the level of expertise across the PATRIOT force is the use of external
evaluations that will be used to assess the ability of unit to successfully
execute Air Defense missions under a variety of conditions. USAADASCH
establish policies and standards for conducting external evaluations that
require they be

conducted by a team of certified experts that have been
assembled and trained for this purpose.



Lead:

DOTD

Sustain

Improve

X

General Issue

ADA Issue

X

Lessons Learned 2
-
1



Issue:

Patriot Engagement operations (D)(T)



Discussion:


Bridging the gap between MDMP (doctrinal and situational templates)
and Patriot tactics, tabular entries, and firing doctrine


Reduce target identification uncertainty with engagement criteria
tied to threat and friendly platforms


Increase friendly protect; procedurally and technically


Remote Launch Operations


capture technical and tactical
requirements


Autonomous operations


“TBM Only” is no longer an option


Redundant Coverage


advantages and disadvantages


Based upon EMI, how far apart should Patriot Batteries be placed
defending an asset


Incorporate tactical reasoning/decision making: Counter
-
TBM is not
automatic; WCS “Free” for TBMs presents risk in the SRBM fight


Airspace Control and deconfliction remains a Joint problem


METT
-
TC relationship with tabular settings


Combat operations routine


verification of Mode IV; updating
OPTASKLINK, radar registration



Recommendation:

Include in new Patriot TTPs, doctrine during Joint
Training Exercises and MRE standards



Lead:

DOTD


Sustain

X

Improve

General Issue

ADA Issue

X

Lessons Learned 2
-
2



Issue:

General knowledge of PATRIOT Initialization tabular data and its
origin/impact on how the air battle is fought is minimal.



Discussion:
PATRIOT operators did not understand how the values for the
systems initialization tabular entries were established. During discussion
with soldiers in the area of responsibility (AOR) prior to and during OIF, it
became clear that the operators did not understand the various tabular
entries required for their system as outlined in the Tactical Standing
Operating Procedure (TSOP), Area Air Defense Plan (AADP), and Special
Instructions (SPINS). Operators did not know the purpose of the
parameters, where it came from or why it was needed. When asked why a
tabular entry was set to a specific value, the soldiers normally responded
because the TSOP or the PATRIOT Information and Coordination Central
(ICC) told us to set it to that number. The operators did not know why it was
a particular number, who had established the value or what the setting would
accomplish.




Lack of expertise in this area limited the PATRIOT unit’s ability to
modify/change the weapon system parameters as the threat changes and

provide accurate and timely input for the AADP and SPINS. Operators did
not know what their system can and cannot do.



Recommendation:

USAADASCH develop a formal training program to
provide the PATRIOT operator with intermediate and advance level weapons
system training. Recommend development of exportable training packages
or courses that can be conducted via distance learning. Prior to assuming
the duties of a PATRIOT TCO, TD, TCA, or TDA; soldiers should be required
to complete these courses. These courses should be annotated in their
training record.



Lead:

DOTD


Sustain

X

Improve

General Issue

ADA Issue

X

Lessons Learned 3
-
1



Issue:

The Patriot battalion does not have a Force XXI battle command
brigade and below (FBCB2) required for battle tracking. (MO)



Discussion:

The division fielded FBCB2 as the standard for blue force
tracking. The ADA battalion was not included in the fielding. During combat
operations, the battalion had to locate an FBCB2 on the battlefield to get
situational awareness. Even this was limited since none of the air defense
assets were displayed on the FBCB2 screen. Not only did the lack of
FBCB2 systems in the battalion hinder situational awareness, all division
fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) and graphics were issued over FBCB2 ,
making it difficult for the battalion to track the battle and conduct
simultaneous planning in support of the division.



Recommendation:

At a minimum, issue one FBCB2 terminal to each
battery, the battalion TOC, and the battalion commander; also ensure that
each air defense weapon and radar system is displayed on the FBCB2
screen.



Lead:
TSM
-
LT



C2 / Interoperability Branch Comment

3
-
1


PAT was/is not organic to DIV & therefore did not receive FBCB2.


Avail. of

FBCB2s and addit. EPLRs will be a real problem at this pt.



Sustain

Improve

X

General Issue

ADA Issue

X

Lessons Learned 3
-
2



Issue:

Software compatibility of AMDWS with the other ATCCS. (M)



Discussion:

During operational planning and execution, the battalion is
required to provide the division a current air picture superimposed over the
current airspace control measures (ACMs). On demand, the division’s
leadership may also request that maneuver graphics be projected so that
they can see where aircraft are in relation to the ground forces. Currently,
these products are manually input into AMDWS by either the Army
airspace command and control (A2C2) or air battle management
operations center (ABMOC) operators, a slow and tedious process. These
operators are duplicating the efforts of other operators who are entering the
same graphic control measures into the Maneuver Control System (MCS),
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), and the other
ATCCSs.



Recommendation:

Make the required software and hardware upgrades so
AMDWS can communicate with the other ATCCSs so all the different
graphic control measures can be uploaded via floppy disk or through the
local area network (LAN).



Lead:
TSM
-
LT



C2 / Interoperability Branch Comment

3
-
2 This is about making ABCS work....several systems still lack integration sw.



Sustain

Improve

X

General Issue

ADA Issue

X

Lessons Learned 3
-
3



Issue:

Division command via TACSAT. (M/O)



Discussion:

From the time we destroyed the enemy’s observation posts
on the international border to the division’s closure on OBJ LIONS, the
battlespace was so dispersed in width and depth that FM communications
between any units larger than infantry or armor battalion/task force
-
sized
elements was unfeasible. BCTs were often more than 40 kilometers apart,
forcing the division command to conduct all command and control functions
via TACSAT. Though extremely effective in allowing the BCTs to
communicate with each other and with the division over great distances,
many of the other division assets were left in the dark because they did not
have the ability to monitor the network. Though the air defense battalion
commander and his tactical operations center (TOC) had one TACSAT
radio each to monitor the division command network, the battalion was not
able to monitor any of the other TACSAT networks, such as division
operations and intelligence (O&I), fire support, etc. The battalion also
experienced the same problems the division had in trying to communicate
through the depth and width of the division’s battlespace. Though it has the
same communication requirements in terms of distance and number of
networks as the division, the battalion was not allocated any resources to
improve its ability to communicate internally. Though the battalion has a
number of PRC
-
213 HF radios by MTOE, these radios are supposed to be
used to pass SEW information and are unreliable at best. Although the
division did receive some PRC
-
150 Harris HF radios that proved to be
more reliable, only one was given to the battalion, hardly enough to assist it
in conducting command and control within the unit. TACSAT radios proved
reliable throughout the operation for the division. The same resources need
to be provided to the division’s subordinate commands that have much the
same requirements, to include the Air Defense Artillery Fire Control Officer
(ADAFCO). Additionally, this issue highlights the need to have qualified
ADAFCOs at higher echelon units to serve as an interface between them
and Air Defense BNs and BDEs.



Recommendation:

TACSAT radios need to be provided to the battalion
and each battery so all battalion
-
level networks can be established as per
our doctrine. If TACSAT radios are not available, then PRC
-
150 Harris HF
radios must be fielded to replace these same networks.


Lead:
DCD/TSM
-
LT


Sustain

Improve

X

General Issue

ADA Issue

X

Lessons Learned 3
-
4



Issue:

Long
-
haul communication equipment is a major shortfall in current
Patriot Brigades. (M/O)



Discussion:

2
-
43 ADA Battalion was with the battalion responsible for
coverage of assets from northern Kuwait to central Iraq, it became impossible
for firing batteries of 2
-
43 to transmit their Patriot Air Defense Information Link
(PADIL) with organic UHF/line of site radios. The ability to command and
control a battery is the battalion’s primary focus and the communication tying
the battery to the battalion is the single point of failure in preventing a fully
mission capable ICC from controlling the fires and providing a higher level of
ID engagement authority.



2
-
43’s MTOE authorized communication limited C2 connectivity as the
maneuver piece spread firing batteries out over 340 kilometers. Because the
Brigade was tasked to provide direct support to the 1st Marine Expeditionary
Force, the Brigade S6 sought assistance from IMEF G6 to support the
requirement for long
-
haul communications. Unfortunately, the IMEF had no
AN/TRC
-
170 (TROPO) systems to spare.



TROPO is the ideal form of long
-
haul communication for battery to
battalion in Patriot because of the issue with time delay over SATCOM that
could make the link less accurate if the information sent from the ECS isn’t
received by the ICC in 0.4 seconds or less. Because of the critical nature of
command and control and the commander’s intent to keep batteries from
performing autonomous operations, the Brigade S6 procured a deal with 11th
Signal Brigade to receive 2 manned TROPO shelters and 2 unmanned
TROPO shelters. The brigade manned the unmanned shelter with personnel
assigned to 108th who had experience in the past with TROPO systems.



If a Patriot Battalion is given a mission to extend resources to the
limits experienced, measures should be taken to ensure they have the ability
to maintain C2 over the distance spanned and also provide the direct support
maintenance to the equipment providing the service.



Recommendation:

An MTOE and doctrinal change to ensure communication
equipment is available



Lead:
32
nd

AAMDC/DCD/CORP Bde’s

Sustain

Improve

X

General Issue

ADA Issue

X

Lessons Learned 3
-
5



Issue:
Integrating PATRIOT into the Joint Data Network (JDN) in KU
remained a significant challenge throughout the conflict



Discussion:
Integrating PATRIOT into the JDN was accomplished; however,
false tracks and ghost tracks caused by PATRIOT degraded the overall air
picture to a point that for safety of flight issues their tracks were dropped.
Limited attempts were made at radar registration to resolve this issue. Units
were not allowed to transmit on the JDN until after they crossed the LD. This
issue is even more disturbing given the high probability that PATRIOT may be
the only sensor to pick up SRBMs.



Recommendation:

USAADASCH participate in working groups/forums to
integrate ground based air defense systems into the JDN. The joint
community must be made aware of its importance. Air Defense Artillery Fire
Control Officers (ADAFCOs) must be trained on how to integrate PATRIOT
into the NET and on procedures to trouble shoot problems that may arise.



Lead:
TSM
-
LT/DOTD


C2 / Interoperability Branch Comment

3
-
3


Harris PRC
-
150 are not avail., limited qty avail. for SBCTs.


TACSAT radio

per btry being worked initally between TSM and DCD...initial draft "think Paper"

exists...meeting of SMEs to be held next week.


3
-
4


Army should have and provide long haul comms...this shortcoming makes the

argument for a SIG BN [with robust capab., to include long haul] organic/belonging

to AMD.


3
-
5 This was/is a JTTP issue. If allowed, PAT could/would have participated

In JDN.


Sustain

Improve

X

General Issue

ADA Issue

X

Lessons Learned 4
-
1



Issue:

Inadequate FAADC3I contractor support and Class IX availability
and delivery. (M)



Discussion:

Because many of the FAAD/STC/Sentinel parts were under
contractor control through the Contractor Logistics System (CLS), our
ability to sustain combat power for Linebackers, Avengers, and Sentinels
was problematic. The battalion had to rely upon telephone calls to CONUS
and the use of FEDEX to secure and ship parts
. Due

to FAAD C3I.



Recommendation:

The battalion experienced problems with the FAADC3I
equipment and worked with civilian contractors to fix the problems. Some of
the problems can and would have been fixed locally, if the necessary parts
were available. Currently, the only contract support within theater is at
Camp Doha, Kuwait, and they could not support the battalion once
hostilities began.



Recommendation:

Battalion needs to stock an authorized stockage list
(ASL) from the Project Office for FAADC3I equipment (video cards,
network cards, etc.).



Lead:
TSM
-
LT/Units


Sustain

Improve

X

General Issue

ADA Issue

X

Lessons Learned 5
-
1



Issue:

Failure to receive TBM early warning (EW) through LINK
-
16 and
mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) network. (M/O)
*



Discussion:

When Iraq launched the first TBMs against Kuwait City and
the 101st Air Assault division’s assembly area on G
-
1, the division received
no TBM EW via the LINK
-
16 and MSE network. Though we had a great
tactical digital information link (TADIL)
-
J/Link 16 connection throughout the
battle and regularly tracked well over 100 aircraft simultaneously, we were
not able to receive any TBM EW digitally. In fact, the only TBM EW we
received throughout the battle was by monitoring the Air Force EW tactical
satellite (TACSAT) network. There are only two ways the division can
receive digital TBM EW through the Air and Missile Defense Work Station
(AMDWS) system: 1) directly from an Air Defense System Integrator
(ADSI) and, 2) from another AMDWS that is hooked directly into an ADSI
via MSE. Both have their shortfalls. First, the MSE based system required
an MSE feed that was never stable and could not provide EW to AMDWS
while on the move. Second, even though a TADIL
-
J feed can be received
on the move and does not require MSE support, the relative short flight
time of the missiles the enemy used and the time it took for joint tactical
ground station (JTAGS) to identify and release the information through the
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) network resulted in
no TBM EW information to be distributed via TADIL
-
J.



Recommendation:

The Army must invest in additional software and
hardware improvements that would shorten the time it takes to process
TBM EW information and release it to the units.



Lead:
DCD/TSM
-
LT/TSM
-
UT


C2 / Interoperability Branch Comment

5
-
1


How to effect/do TBM EW is a JTTP issue.


This could have gone/been

done

any of many ways via any/multiple means...PSC
-
5s, CTT/JTTs,

etc.


JTIDS not usual means for getting this info to non
-
ADA.…they don't have

means to receive.


Sustain

Improve

X

General Issue

ADA Issue

X

Lessons Learned 5
-
2



Issue
Information flow between Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB), Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait (KU), and Jordan did not occur. Information regarding
anomalies experienced in various PATRIOT locations throughout the
theater was not shared with each other.



Discussion:

Spurious TBMs injected over the JDN by the Marine TAOC
was observed in Jordan for a number of months prior to the start of OIF.
TF 1
-
7 had experienced it since their arrival. This information was not
shared with PATRIOT units supporting the Marine Expeditionary Force
(MEF) in KU. When the TAOC in KU came on line the injection of
spurious tracks was not expected. Had the 1
-
7 experience been shared
throughout the AOR then the problem with spurious TBMs injected by
outside sources could have been minimized.



During discussions with soldiers in the AOR, ARM and TBM
anomalies experienced by units in KU were not shared with units coming
into theater or units in Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or Bahrain.
Methods for disseminating information throughout the PATRIOT force and
a system to conduct theater
-
wide training to counter anomalies as they
were observed not in place.



Recommendation:

LTPO and USAADASCH establish a real time
PATRIOT data collection site. Upon observing an anomaly or system
failure units should be able to log on to the site and enter the information.
Units would also be able to search the site for similar problems
experienced by other units. LTPO and the US Army Air Defense Artillery
School (USAADASCH) would be responsible for reviewing the information
entered on the site and recommending solutions to the unit’s problems.



Lead:

DOTD/6x

Sustain

Improve

X

General Issue

ADA Issue

X

TSM
-
LT Comments


The issue in 1
-
1 was simply we have never modeled the
interaction between Patriot and Arrow.


Therefore
operators did not have sufficient information to develop
TTPs.


That modeling and the development of the TTPs
was done just before the war.


The second issue was
the defense design in KU.


We have never modeled,
and therefore explored the dynamics, of defense design
of 2
-
1 with KU units under them in a MICC/SICC
relationship.


Again, we did that modeling and analysis
just before the war and discovered some possible
unintended consequences with the defense design the
unit had established.


3
-
1 The recommendation the originator makes, may not
be the appropriate solution for the problem he
describes.



2
-
1 We have been heavily engaged in the Army locking
down the ABCS version and decided what is “Good
Enough” funding and fixing and putting in the field next
year.


Those AMDWS issues will be fixed in our January
version which will go to test at Ft Hood in April.



USAADASCH CID Insights From OIF Slide:


Although
implied, I would simply state that all Army AMD
platforms need the same PHID technologies used by
other Joint Services.

Center for Army Lessons Learned

USAADASCH CID Insights From OIF

Ground to Air CID Insights:




The low reliability of positive electronic means of identification continues to
mandate the upgrading of equipment
,
training and use of procedural methods
of identification.



Exercising the Joint Identification Authority from the Area Air Defense
Commander down to the lowest fight element is critical.



Every effort must be made to avoid autonomous fire units. Robust
communications are key to CID.



Tactical Control Officers must continuously maintain situational awareness of
all friendly and enemy activity.



Tactical Control Officers must continuously work to resolve and report

all
unknown tracks on their scopes.



Joint datalink architectures must be designed to support the identification
and engagement authority functions.



New technologies/techniques as well as IFF and ESM upgrades must be
explored to provide positive friendly/hostile identification at the lowest
command level possible
.

Source: USAADAC

Review of Significant Actions

19/20 March: G
-
Day


Two Iraqi surface
-
to
-
surface missiles fired at Coalition forces in
Kuwait were reported to have been successfully intercepted by air
defenses. Another missile was reported to have landed near
Camp Commando in Kuwait; no casualties were suffered. The
Patriot batteries successfully intercepted and destroyed two
tactical ballistic missiles during an attack on Kuwait at
approximately 12:24 p.m. and 1:30 p.m. (4:24 a.m. and 5:30 a.m.
EST). Their guidance and control system locked onto the ballistic
missiles, successfully engaging the targets with Hit to Kill PAC III
and Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM).

22/23 March


An RAF GR4 Tornado aircraft from RAF Marham, which was
returning from an operational mission, was engaged near the
Kuwaiti border by a Patriot missile battery. Both aircrew were
killed. The next of kin have been informed.

23/24 March


Also in the vicinity of An
-
Nasiriyah, a United States Army supply
convoy was ambushed by irregular Iraqi forces. A number of
American service members were wounded in that action. As a
result of that action, 12 U.S. service members are reported
missing.





Review of Significant Actions

24/25 March


During combat air operations at approximately 3:40 p.m. local time Monday,
a U.S. F
-
16 fighter engaged a U.S. Patriot battery approximately 30 miles
south of An
-
Najaf, Iraq. The F
-
16 pilot executed the strike against the Patriot
while en
-
route to a mission near Baghdad. No soldiers were injured or killed
by the strike. The incident is under review to ensure the future safety of the
Patriot crews and aircrews.

28/29 March


USCENTCOM describes missile defense activity as follows: about 12
missiles have been fired. We believe them to be in the Ababil
-
100 or Al
-
Samoud family, and those have been launched from within Iraq toward
Kuwait. We're seeing a rate of about one per day at this point, and all of the
threatening launches have been intercepted by Patriot missiles. Additionally,
we have established combat air patrols near the areas where most of the
launches are occurring. We have been successful in destroying a number of
launchers before and after they're fired, and we're actively hunting for them.”

1/2 April


US troops rescued a female soldier held prisoner by the Iraqis. US Marines
captured at Al Hillah two of the Al Samoud II missiles which contravened UN
resolutions.