Topicality 1NC Increase Requires Pre-existing

fallenleafblackbeansOil and Offshore

Nov 8, 2013 (3 years and 7 months ago)

328 views

fallenleafblackbeans_1de6bb69
-
3fd5
-
4b67
-
b79a
-
e4405fbd5597.doc



DDW

2011

1

Last printed
11/9/2013 7:52:00 AM





1

Topicality 1NC


Increase Requires Pre
-
existing

A.

Increase requires a pre existing program

Jeremiah
Buckley et al
, (attorney Amicus Curiae Brief, Safeco Ins. Co. of America et al v. Charles Burr et al) 20
06
.

http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/brief
s/06
-
84/06
-
84.mer.ami.mica.pdf)


First, the court said that the ordinary meaning of the word

increase” is “to make something greater
,”

which it believed
should not “be limited to cases in which a company raises the rate that an individual has previously b
een charged.” 435
F.3d at 1091. Yet the definition offered by the Ninth Circuit compels the opposite conclusion. Because “increase” means
“to make something greater
,”
there must necessarily have been an existing premium
, to which Edo’s actual premium
may
be compared,
to determine whether an “increase” occurred
. Congress could have provided that “ad
-
verse action” in the
insurance context means charging an amount greater than the optimal premium, but instead chose to define adverse action
in terms of an

“increase.” That def
-
initional choice must be respected, not ignored. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379,
392
-
93 n.10 (1979) (“[a] defin
-
ition which declares what a term ‘means’ . . . excludes any meaning that is not stated”).
Next, the Ninth Circ
uit reasoned that because the Insurance Prong includes the words “existing or applied for,” Congress
intended that an “increase in any charge” for insurance must “apply to all insurance transactions


from an initial policy of
insurance to a renewal of a l
ong
-
held policy.” 435 F.3d at 1091. This interpretation reads the words “exist
-
ing or applied
for” in isolation. Other types of adverse action described in the Insurance Prong apply only to situations where a consumer
had an existing policy of insuranc
e, such as a “cancellation,” “reduction,” or “change” in insurance.

Each of these forms
of adverse

action presupposes an already
-
existing policy, and under usual canons of statutory construction the term
“increase” also should be construed to apply to

increases of an already
-
existing policy
. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88,
101 (2004) (“a phrase gathers meaning from the words around it”) (citation omitted).


B.

The aff creates a new program


that’s not topical


C.

Voting Issue for predictable limits
: all
owing the creation of new programs explodes limits by
allowing for hundreds of unpredictable programs to be implemented


explodes limits and creates
an impossible research burden


fallenleafblackbeans_1de6bb69
-
3fd5
-
4b67
-
b79a
-
e4405fbd5597.doc



DDW

2011

1

Last printed
11/9/2013 7:52:00 AM





2


Security K 1NC

The affirmative hides their drive for security behind the
mask of cooperation

it’s only a political tool

Sheehan 7

(Michael Sheehan is Professor of International Relations at Swansea University. His publications include The International
Politics of Space (2007), International Security: An Analytical Survey (2005
) and National and International Security (2000). His
current research focuses on European space policy, and on the relationship between liberalism, democracy and war. "The intern
ational
politics of space"
http://books.google.com/books?id=5LUR6CiBwusC&pg=P
A55&dq="outer+space"+exploration+David+Campbell+and+Der+Derian
&lr=&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q&f=false
, jt)

The drama of the space race between the superpowers in the 1950s and 1960s, Together
with the

overwhelming
use of
space for military purposes
, easily creates an impression of space as a realm of conflict and danger. However, the reality of
the space age has been that space activities have been characterised by

an enormous amount of
international cooperation
.
This can be
seen in the programmes o
f individual states
, in various
multilateral

international
programmes
, in the dramatic
cooperation of the western
European countries
, and in the work of international organisations, particularly those that
operate under the structure of
the United Nations
.

The U
nited
S
tates
recognised this

even during the Star Wars tension
during the mid
-
1980s, the Office of Technology Assessment
noting

that, '
[s]pace is by nature and treaty an international
realm about which cooperation between nations on some level is ess
ential
, if only
to avoid

potential
conflict

over its
resources'
.1

However,
it was the Soviet Union that first seriously exploited this feature for political purposes
. For the Soviet
Union under Khruschcv, the space programme had been
a weapon of the Cold W
ar competition
between the superpowers,
but once the USSR had lost the race to the Moon, his successors turned the programme into an instrument for the promotion
of detente and international cooperation. As with the earlier phase,
symbolism was all
-
importa
nt, and propaganda was used

to ensure that the message the USSR was attempting to convey was clearly understood. Thus,
although it took a rather more
benign form, propaganda continued to be at the heart of the space programme as the Soviet Union once again

sought to
exploit it for political purposes and the advantages it could yield in foreign policy
.
Two clear themes are

notable
in

the
post
-
1969 Soviet programme
.
One was international cooperation
,
but the second was the

steady
increase in the exploitation
of
space for
military purposes
, most notably for
reconnaissance and early warning
. These two themes are reflected in the
tone and content of Soviet space
-
related propaganda in this period.
On

the
one hand
,
Soviet

space
achievements were

eulogised as reflec
ting
humanistic

principles.
On the other

hand,
in order to deflect attention away from the military aspects
of the Soviet programme, Soviet propaganda

continuously
argued that the U
nited
S
tates
was seeking to 'militarise' space
.
Within this overall pattern
, there was a shift in the sub
-
theme present under Khruschev. Khruschev had sought to identify
the successes of the programme with himself. Under his successors, the Soviet propaganda machine consistently sought to
identify Soviet achievements with the Com
munist Party of the Soviet Union, and with the Soviet Government as a whole,
emphasising that both, but particularly the Party, were the source of the Soviet successes. In a state that was an uneasy
combination of many nationalities besides the dominant Ru
ssians, space achievements were used to solidify Russian
support for the Communist Party, and to encourage an incipient Soviet nationalism, by evoking the pride of the population
in a successful and international prestigious endeavour. Soviet spokesmen con
fidently asserted that 'the Communist Party
and the Soviet government created the necessary economic, social, scientific and technical
conditions for the development of
cosmonautics, and as a result of this the world's first socialist state opened the road

to the stars for mankind'.2 The space programme
continued to benefit the Soviet Union's image as a technologically dynamic industrial superpower, and a leader in the most ad
vanced
fields of science and technology. In addition, the international missions t
hat were
to become a feature of the 1970s and 1980s
presented a positive image of the USSR. The inclusion of foreign cosmonauts in Soviet manned space missions presented
the USSR as a country open to cooperation, with nothing to hide in its space programme
, and happy to share the prestige of
space exploration and its tangible benefits with other countries.
The
political importance

attached

to this
cooperation was
stressed by

President
Brezhnev

in a speech to the 26th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party i
n 1981,
when he insisted
that 'the cosmonauts of the fraternal countries are working not only for science and for the national economy
,
they are

also
carrying out a political mission of immense importance
*.1 The Soviet Union continued to use the successes
of the space
programme for political advantage in a number of ways. One such was the use of cosmonauts as ambassadors
-
at
-
large,
using their fame and recognisability to promote a positive image of the USSR, and to give encouragement and public
support to co
mmunist governments and parties around the world. Their fame was deliberately linked with the particular
political ideas and policy lines being advocated by Moscow and, more broadly, with historic communist traditions.
The
Soviet Union, like the U
nited
S
ta
tes,
used its remote sensing satellites to build
cooperative links

with other countries
.
From 1966

onwards
the USSR began to share imagery

from its meteorological satellites through the World Meteorological
Organisation. Imagery obtained from Salyut missio
ns was also made available to developing countries, some of which were
Soviet allies, and some that were not, for example Cuba, Vietnam, Morocco and Angola."1

Security K 1NC

fallenleafblackbeans_1de6bb69
-
3fd5
-
4b67
-
b79a
-
e4405fbd5597.doc



DDW

2011

1

Last printed
11/9/2013 7:52:00 AM





3

The Dream of Security Ensures Apocalypse

From Now On


Constructions

of Existentia
l Risk ensures the
Enactment
of Annihilation
.

Pever
Coviello
, Prof. of English @ Bowdoin,
2k
[
Queer Frontiers
, p. 39
-
40]

Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is i
n
any way
postapocalyptic.
Apocalypse
, as I began by saying,
changed
-
it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my
second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything
with (in Jacques Den
-
ida's

suitably menacing phrase) "remairiderless and a
-
symbolic destruction,," then in the postnuclear
world
apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local
. In shape and in substance,
apocalypse is defined now
by the affliction it brings somewhe
re else,
always to an "other"
people whose very presence might then be written as a
kind of dangerous
contagion, threatening the safety
and prosperity
of a cherished "general population
." This fact seems
to me to stand behind Susan Sontag's incisive observ
ation, from 1989, that, 'Apocalypse is now a long
-
running serial:
not
'Apocalypse Now' but 'Apocalypse from Now On.""

The decisive point here
in the perpetuation of the threat of
apocalypse

(the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss)
is that apocalypse
is ever present because
, as an element in a vast
economy of power,
it is ever useful
. That is,
through the perpetual threat of
destruction
-
through the constant
reproduction of the figure of apocalypse
-
agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and
through the bodies of a
particular population
. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first
volume of The History of Sexuality addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than

productive, less
life
-
threatening than, in his words, "life
-
administering."
Power
, he contends, "
exerts a positive influence on life land
,
endeavors to administer
, optimize,
and multiply

it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations?
' In his
brief comments on what he calls "the atomic situation;' however, Foucault insists as well that
the productiveness of modern
power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent

or even lethal
means
. For
as "managers of life and
survival
, of bodies and the race," agencies of
modern power presume to act 'on the behalf of the existence of everyone."
Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to

life and
survival

in this way
serves to authorize any expression of force, no
matter how invasive
or,

indeed,
potentially annihilating
. "
If genocide is indeed the dream of modem power
," Foucault
writes, "this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill;
it is because power is situated and exercised at the
level of life
, the species,
the race, and the large
-
scale phenomena of population." For a state that would arm itself not with
the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patterns and functioning of its collective
life,
the threat of an apocalyptic
demise
, nuclear or otherwise,
seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.


fallenleafblackbeans_1de6bb69
-
3fd5
-
4b67
-
b79a
-
e4405fbd5597.doc



DDW

2011

1

Last printed
11/9/2013 7:52:00 AM





4

Sec
urity K 1NC

Alternative


Reject the affirmative’s security logic


only resistance to the discourse of security can
generate genuine political thought

Mark
Neo
cleous
, Prof. of Government @ Brunel,
2008

[
Critique of Security
, 185
-
6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether

-

to reject it
as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that a
ny real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary
should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought
and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security

intellectual. It is also something that

the constant iteration
of

the refrain
'this is an insecure world
'

and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another
will

also

make it
hard to do
. But it is something that the critique of security sug
gests we may have to consider if we want a political way out
of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because
security has

now

become so all
-
encompassing that it
marginalises
all
else,

most notably

the constructive conflicts
,
debates
and discussion
s

that animate political life
.
The constant
prioritising of a mythical security as a political end
-

as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful
sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be arti
culated, in which the conflicts and struggles
that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world
is possible
-

that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security

politics simply removes this; worse, it
remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it
suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into
debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security'
, despite the fact that we are
never quite told
-

never could be told
-

what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti
-
politics,"' dominating political discourse
in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforci
ng security fetishism and the
monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add
yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state int
ervention in yet more and
more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co
-
editor of the important
text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if
you take away security, what do you put in the h
ole that's left
behind?

But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby:
maybe there is no hole
."
'
The mistake has been to think that there is a hole
and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re
-
mapped or civilised

or
gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and
consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security.
The

real

task is

not to
fill

the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but

to fight for an
alternative political
language which
takes us
beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore
does not constantly

throw us into the arms of the
state
.
That's th
e point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want.
Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that
the
negative may be as s
ignificant as the positive in setting thought on new paths.

For if security really is the supreme concept
of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then
to keep harping on about insecurity

and to keep
demanding 'more security' (whil
e meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty)
is to
blind
ourselves

to

the possibility of building real

alternatives

to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics.
To situate
ourselves against security politics would
a
llow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant
securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the exi
sting
forms of social domination and justifies the shor
t
-
circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also

allow us to
forge another kind of politics centred on a
different conception of the good.

We need a new way of thinking and talking
about social being and politics that moves us beyond security.

This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the
word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an
illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising tha
t security is not the same as solidarity
; it requires

accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition
,
and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and
instead
learning to tolerate the uncertainties
,
ambiguities and 'insecurities'

t
hat come with being human
;

it requires
accepting that
'
securitizing'

an issue
does not mean dealing with it politically, but
bracketing it out

and handing it to the
state;
it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

fallenleafblackbeans_1de6bb69
-
3fd5
-
4b67
-
b79a
-
e4405fbd5597.doc



DDW

2011

1

Last printed
11/9/2013 7:52:00 AM





5

LSP/Treaty 1NC

Text:

(1) Th
e United States federal government should deploy a lunar solar power system.
(
2
)
The United
States federal government should initiate a strategic dialogue with the
People’s Republic

of China where
it will offer to lift restrictions on Internation
al Traffic

in Arms Regulations, joint space exploration,
create licensing for Chinese launches
and attempt to make China a partner in the International Space
Station in exchange for Chinese agreement to negotiate

and support

a code of conduct over acceptable
uses of

outer space, including an agreement to not engage in intentional behavior to release space debris
or other measures that contribute to the weaponization of space. The United States should broaden this
dialogue to other outer space parties and offer to neg
otiate a similar offer, and seek reciprocal,
conditional verification agreements with all parties.


Lunar solar power is substantially cheaper and has no environmental impacts


solves the affirmative

Al
Globus
, chairman of the Space Settlement Committee o
f the National Space Society, also works for contractors at NASA Ames
Research Center Online Journal of Space Communication, Winter 20
10
, “Space Solar Power, Lunar Mining and the Environment,”

(http://spacejournal.ohio.edu/issue16/globus2.html)


Let's con
sider Space Solar Power

(SSP) from an environmental point of view. Note that
we are concerned with costs over
many decades and centuries and financial costs are dependent on unpredictable factors on these time scales but
environmental costs can be predicte
d from the physical characteristics of the system.

Any SSP system will consist of
satellites in orbit beaming power to antennas on earth.
From an environmental point of view, the principal costs have to do
with constructing and launching the satellites, th
e interaction of the beams with earth's atmosphere, and the construction
and operation of the transmitting and receiving antennas.

The ground antennas are likely to be simple metal structures with
some electronics.

The metal in the antennas can be easily r
efabricated at end of life to make replacement antennas, so the mining and manufacture of the ground segment
should have a relatively minor environmental impact. The receiving antennas block essentially all of the beam's radiation but

typical designs allow

most of the sunlight to pass
through, so the land area under antennas can go wild or even be farmed. Thus, the antennas, while large (perhaps kilometers i
n diameter) and consuming a great deal of space,
that same land can support natural ecosystems and fo
od cultivation. Repair crews will need to enter such areas from time to time, but that can be accomplished with minimal
disruption
.

The power beam will be designed to interact with the atmosphere as little as possible. Interaction involves loss of
power to

the ground and therefore represents loss of revenue.

While there is every reason to believe that the power beams
will do little environmental damage,
this has not been fully assessed and a rigorous environmental impact report will be
needed before SSP dev
elopment proceeds very far.

Unlike the ground antennas and power beams,
an SSP satellite segment

(the aggregated powersat infrastructure
) large enough to deliver a substantial part of the 15 terawatts of power we use today
may have significant environmenta
l impact if launched from the ground. This 15TW figure includes all energy use, not just
electricity, but with sufficient R&D and infrastructure development, electricity can in most cases be substituted for other
energy forms, as with electrical cars. Also

note that much of the world's population does not now have access to significant
energy resources. These people are unlikely to accept that condition forever; thus, energy production will need to increase.

Ten (10) TW continuously supplied will provide so
mewhat more than half of today's energy use. This number will be used
for our comparisons.

Assuming a powersat mass of 5kg/kw, 40% end
-
to
-
end efficiency and 500 tons/launch using the large Sea
Dragon booster (a large, robust, reusable, ocean
-
launched rocke
t design from the 1960s),[1]
some 250,000 launches will be needed.
Such an enormous number of launches from earth would dump a great deal of rocket exhaust into the atmosphere.

In
addition,
when space structures are launched from earth, all the mining, pro
cessing and construction must take place on
earth with the usual environmental costs.

While there are ways to minimize the impact of lifting these satellites into space, for example using
hydrogen/oxygen propellant which produces only water in the exhaust,

from an environmental perspective it would be better to eliminate
the launches altogether. These costs can be eliminated entirely by taking the lunar option.

The Lunar Option

At 5 kg/kw,
some 125 million tons of satellite material will be required to prod
uce 10TW of continuous power. Most of powersat mass
will undoubtedly consist of metals for structure and mirrors and perhaps silicon for solar cells.

As Figure 2
-
4[2] shows, metals and
silicon are abundant in all lunar regolith (soil) sampled to date.

Plan
s for mining and processing lunar regolith have been developed.[3]
Converting
lunar regolith on the surface into powersats in orbit is an extremely demanding engineering problem, but that's the fun part.

The pay off is eliminating the terrestrial environme
ntal cost of the SSP space segment entirely, leaving only the cost of the
power beam and the receiving antenna. These appear to have minor environmental impact relative to their contribution to
developing a continuous non
-
polluting source of energy.

As the

largest environmental impact of a non
-
fuel
-
based energy
source is generally the construction and eventual disposal of terrestrial power plants,

including mining and processing the materials,
completely eliminating the environmental impact on earth of the
most demanding portion of the system should give SSP
built from lunar materials a substantial environmental cost edge over other systems.

Those tradeoffs can also be calculated.


fallenleafblackbeans_1de6bb69
-
3fd5
-
4b67
-
b79a
-
e4405fbd5597.doc



DDW

2011

1

Last printed
11/9/2013 7:52:00 AM





6

LSP/Treaty 1NC

China would say yes to the CP and end weaponization

Hitchens
and Chen 08
[T
heresa Hitchens,
President of the Center for Defense Information

and David Chen,
executive at
CENTRA technology
, “Forging a Sino
-
US Grand Bargain in Space” 8/1/08 PHK]

Considering Chinese investment in its space program as a center piece of n
ational prestige and as a lever for economic
development, the USA has the opportunity to link a variety of related economic incentives with opening, and concluding ,
negotiations on a code of conduct in space, including Chinese abandonment of destructive a
nti
-
satellite weapon s program
s
.
These potential bargaining chips include such opt ions as participation in the

International Space Station (
ISS
) , joint
exploration missions
, reform in US policies restricting sales of commercial satellite hardware, and l
icensing of Chinese
launch services
. In exchange,
China might willingly restrict behaviors that could lead to strategic miscalculation in spa ce,
as well as certain
forms of counter
-
space capabilities. Pr
oviding what the Ch
ine se want in civil and commer
ci
al space
arguabl y woul d cost the USA little
, and in this value

cost differential exists the potenti
al

of a mutually beneficial
agreem
ent
.
In international prestige, no great
er
prize current ly exists for China than to be reco
gnized and be admit ted as a
p
a rtner in the ISS. While the ISS p
rogram would benefi
t from Chinese investment an

d the potential use of Shenzho
u mod
ules for crew or cargo trans port, the reality is that Chin a needs ISS more than ISS needs the Chinese
,
even with the imminent
retirement

of the Shuttle fleet. With the success ful docking and cargo transfer of the European Space Agency ’s Automatic Transfer Vehic
le in March
2008, the need for a backup to Soyuz is not yet a dire urgency [10] . The app roach can be grad ual, with perhaps the
visit of a Chin ese space tourist to the
station, before the doc king of a Shenzhou cargo vehicl e, then perhaps the inclusion of a Chi nese module to the station, cu
lminating in a routine rotation
of Chi nese personn el on the station. Indeed, ISS partic
ipation offers a stepwis e schedule of incentives in negotiations wi th the Chinese.

After the
1998 Strom Thurmond Defense Authorization Act imposed rest
r
ictions on the export of commer
cial

satellites and related
technologies unde
r

the State Depart
-
ment’s
Mu nitions List and the Inter nationa l Traffic in Arms Regula tions (
ITA R
),
Beijing considered such policies as primarily an effort to contain Chi
na’s rise as a space power and to pre vent its space
industry from compet ing

with US industry on the interna
tiona
l market

. The congress ional ration ale for the move was , and remains,
concern about the trans fer of space technol ogy that could be used by the Chi nese to impr ove their interco ntinental balli
stic missiles, even though
technol ogy migr ation has

traditio nally gone the other way around , from ba llistic missiles to space launch vehicle s.
Whatever the motivation, the
imm
ediate effect of the exp ort control sh ift

was to all but close the Western satel
lite and launch market to Chi na and vice
vers
a, since US export law extends to all space systems that use US parts

. US export laws may ha ve slowed, but have demon strably
failed to ‘‘cont ain’’ Chi na’s progres sive developm ent of space launch and satellite technol ogy. They have also failed to

pr
event

and some argu e
have inst ead provok ed


Sino
-
Europea n cooperat ion in space, leadin g to the g rowth of an ‘‘ITAR
-
free’’ bus iness model in both Euro pe and China,
to the detrimen t of the US space industry. As noted by a recen t report by the Ce
nt er for Strateg ic and Internati onal Stud ies, ‘‘
No t onl y have
these requirements harmed our domestic technol
ogical and manu facturing b
ase, but they have ha d a drastic ne
gative effect
on both th
e hard an d soft power utilizat
ion of
space
’ ’ [11] . F
urther, the co mmercial satel lite indust ry ha s long advocate d the exempt ion of
certa in technol ogies from the list, arguing that these technol ogies are alrea dy avail able off
-

the
-
shelf
.
It seems that US government offici
als
are
finally

listening
, a
s the Pentagon ’s Defense Techn
ology Security Adm
i
nistration and the Nat
ional Security Space
Office
are working to review satellite components with an eye to removing at least some of them from the Mu nitions List
[12]
. Thus , the cost of ITAR refor
m,
with regard to commercial space, is in reality likely to be much less than some fear,
and may be necessa ry for maint aining the viability of the US satelli te indust ry. Finally, lifti ng the ITAR rest rictions
, in
whole or at least in large part, ope ns
the pre viously blocked pa th of coop eration wi th Chi na in space explora tion
.
Cooper ation on civil space traditio nally has been seen in the USA as a tool of soft power and a metho d of dampening
tensions betwe en pot ential adversa ries, da ting back

to the Apol lo


Soyuz Test Project .
Enabl ing, for ex ample, a multi
-
n ation coop erative program in lunar explora tion woul d again be a ‘‘presti ge’’ incent ive for Chin a, which want s very
bad ly to be seen as a worl d
-
class space power . Argua bly s
uch broad intern ationa l coo peration on space explora tion
would also benefi t the USA directly by allowi ng NASA to more wid ely share the nontri vial cost bur dens at a time when
budg etary pressur e on the US governm ent is g rowing rapidly
.
There wi l
l no doubt be those in the US Congress who oppos e ope ning
commercial satel lite trade with China


some on the basis of the milit ary technol ogy trans fer argume nt an d some out of concern abou t another low
-
cost compet itor to US launch firms on the int
er nationa l market place. Yet, given the above facts and the fact that doing so woul d remove a lon g an d
deeply held thorn from Chi na’s space ha nd and thus provide a power ful incent ive for Chin ese coop eration regardi ng a co
de of con duct, this op
tion
should be strong ly co nsidered by the next admin
-
istrati on.

The relat ionship be tween the USA and Chin a will remai n a complex one
and perhap s the world’s most impor tant bilateral relation ship in the 21st century . The issue of space securi ty,

while only
one of many issue s of content ion, is a high
-
s takes one that can eithe r stabili ze or furth er destabili ze the relationshi p. A
co de of condu ct establ ishing clear bounda ries deline ating the be haviors of responsi ble stakehol ders in s
pace would be
an
important step toward impr
oving Sino
-
U S ties. By using

a two
-
pronged approach of mitigating US space systems’
vulner
ability, and nego tiating Chi nese accepta nce of a space code of conduct

using incent ives like joint space mis sions
an
d commer cial space policy reform,
the

ne xt
presid ent

could open a window to avoid an incipient space race with China.
Managing such a feat woul d not only serve peace and stabili ty on Earth and in the heave ns, but also it
woul d make a
fittin g legacy to Nixon’ s ope ning of China
.


fallenleafblackbeans_1de6bb69
-
3fd5
-
4b67
-
b79a
-
e4405fbd5597.doc



DDW

2011

1

Last printed
11/9/2013 7:52:00 AM





7

LSP/Treaty 1NC

The counterplan demilitarizes space


there’s overwhelming international support for it and it’s different
from formal arms control so verification is

actually

possible.

Krepon 07

[
Michael Krepon, founder of the Stimson Center, “Will the Bush Administration Endorse a Space Code of Conduct?”
Space News. 3/05/07
http://www.st
imson.org/summaries/will
-
the
-
bush
-
administration
-
endorse
-
a
-
space
-
code
-
of
-
conduct/

PHK]

Support is growing for a specific kind of multilateral space agreement

that borrows heavily from the Bush administration's
own preferences.
The mechanism in question is

a Code of Conduct for responsible spacefaring nations that could either take
the form of political compacts or executive agreements among like
-
minded states that wish to continue to enjoy the national
security and economic benefits that satellites provide
.

Like the Bush administration's Proliferation Security Initiative, a
Code of Conduct for space could be designed by a core group of states to clarify responsible and irresponsible behavior.
The core group might then invite any other spacefaring nation tha
t wishes to abide by these high standards to join the
group.

The European Union has now joined Canada in endorsing a Code of Conduct for responsible spacefaring nations
.
The commercial satellite industry also has expressed a strong interest in "rules of th
e road" for space.

The

Bush
administration has further distanced itself from America's friends and allies by continuing to insist that new multilateral
agreements related to space are "unnecessary and counterproductive." No other nation in the world has ad
opted such a
negative stance
. Saying "hell no" to new multilateral agreements for space seems particularly questionable after China's
irresponsible test of an anti
-
satellite (A
-
Sat) weapon that endangers spaceflight in low Earth orbit for decades to come.

George Washington's farewell address warned against indulging in "habitual hatred" resulting in a slavish animosity that
leads the United States to "stray from its duty and interest."
Rejecting a Code of Conduct for space because it smacks of
arms control
would seem to violate Washington's sound admonition
. The Bush administration has not yet taken a position
towards a Code of Conduct for responsible spacefaring nations. Because rules of the road for space make so much sense,
and
because the
Bush
administra
tion has championed other codes of conduct to prevent proliferation, it might still join in
the emerging consensus on this issue
.


Contention 2 is the Net Benefit

fallenleafblackbeans_1de6bb69
-
3fd5
-
4b67
-
b79a
-
e4405fbd5597.doc



DDW

2011

1

Last printed
11/9/2013 7:52:00 AM





8

LSP/Treaty 1NC

A.
Minimal environmental impact from launches now

launches required for the p
lan destroy the
atmosphere

Jeff
Foust
, editor and publisher of The Space Review, operates the Spacetoday.net web site and the Space Politics and

Personal
Spaceflight weblog,

June 15, 20
09
, The Space Review. “Space and (or versus) the environment,”

(http:/
/www.thespacereview.com/article/1395/1)


Launch vehicles

don’t emit CFCs, but they do
release other combustion byproducts that can affect the ozone layer. Moreover,
these materials are injected directly into the ozone layer as rockets ascend into space, a
far more efficient delivery mechanism
than the atmospheric processes that slowly waft ground emissions into the stratosphere.

“It would be disingenuous for anyone in
this arena to tell you that they’re going to do a ‘100% green everything’ launch,” Pickens

said.

Right now
, such emissions are
insignificant.

In a paper published earlier this year in the journal Astropolitics, researchers at the Aerospace Corporation,
University of Colorado, and Embry
-
Riddle Aeronautical University noted
that rocket launches w
orldwide deplete the ozone layer
currently at a rate of 0.03%, a rate they described as “insignificant”.

Different rockets, and different combinations of propellants,
have varying contributions: solid
-
fuel rockets have a greater impact than liquid
-
propella
nt engines, and systems that use liquid
oxygen (LOX) as an oxidizer (in combination with liquid hydrogen or kerosene) have a greater effect than hypergolics. The
paper notes that the Ariane 5, which has solid
-
rocket boosters and a LOX/liquid hydrogen main
engine, likely causes about 25
times the ozone loss as one of its biggest competitors on the commercial launch market, the Proton, which uses unsymmetrical
dimethyl hydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide

a combination that, ironically, is usually considered envi
ronmentally unfriendly
given

the propellants’ toxic nature.
While the current rate of ozone loss is considered insignificant, the paper examined what
would happen if there was a sharp increase in launch rates. If launch rates doubled every decade, they fou
nd, rising emissions
from rockets would offset the decline in other ozone
-
depleting substances by around 2035, causing ozone depletion rates to rise
again. The effect would be sooner and sharper if launch rates tripled every decade. The authors conclude th
at, in such a scenario,
there would be a move to regulate rocket emissions that could, in the worst case, sharply restrict launch activity.

With today’s
launch systems, though, such an outcome seems unlikely:
most forecasts for the next decade project rela
tively flat levels of
launch activity

about 60

70 orbital launches a year

that is far short of a doubling or tripling.

However,
a wild card here is
space tourism and other suborbital
launch activity
, which is projected to grow from effectively zero today t
o hundreds or even
thousands of launches a year by the end of the next decade, if systems enter service as planned and demand for such flights
matches existing projections.

The Astropolitics paper doesn’t take such missions, or interest in point
-
to
-
point s
uborbital or
hypersonic travel, into account. Martin Ross, lead author of the paper at the Aerospace Corporation, said in an email last we
ek
that this is an area they will be looking at. They will also be studying the effect on ozone by emissions from hybr
id rocket motors
like the one being developed for SS2, something that he said there currently isn’t any information about.

In an op
-
ed in last
week’s issue of Space News, Ross urged the space industry to address this issue head
-
on rather than avoid it in t
he hopes it might
go away on its own.
“It is clear that the risk of regulation that would cap or even tax space systems according to the amount of
ozone depletion they cause is small, but it is real,”

he wrote. He added: “Historically, technical activities

with high visibility

such as space operations

often excite unpredictable public and regulatory attention.
Combined with a lack of scientifically
reliable environmental effects data, the risk of idiosyncratic and overly restrictive regulation is high.”

The

aerospace industry in
general has not had a good track record in being environmentally friendly
, Tim Pickens, CEO of Orion Propulsion, said in a
speech on “greening aerospace” at the International Space Development Conference (ISDC) in Orlando last month.

Launch
vehicles for many years used toxic propellants and left behind contamination like perchlorates. “
They did that for good reasons at
the time,” he said. “We’re still paying the price for that today in a lot of ways.”

Orion, he said, was trying to avo
id that legacy by
developing systems that were more environmentally friendly. One example is an attitude control system the company is
developing for Bigelow Aerospace’s Sundancer module. Rather than use a storable hypergolic like hydrazine

a common choice

for such thrusters

Orion will take waste water from the module’s environmental control and life support system (ECLSS) and
break it down into hydrogen and oxygen, which will be used as the thrusters’ propellants. “Some people say, ‘so you’re burnin
g
urine
?’” Pickens said. “And I say, well, we’re burning urine. Yeah, we’re going to be doing that. And that’s pretty cool.”

He is,
though, critical of space ventures that try to wrap themselves in an environmental cloak. “I don’t think it’s genuine to say,

‘I am

saving the environment by hauling people up for fun,’” he said in comments after his ISDC speech, not mentioning any specific

company. “I don’t think it will be anything you can sell to the public by saying that you’re only putting out so much CO2 and

you
’re green. No one’s going to buy into that.”

“It would be disingenuous for anyone in this arena to tell you that they’re going
to do a ‘100% green everything’ launch,”

Pickens said in his speech. The question remains, though, just how green

in terms of
car
bon footprint,
emission of ozone
-
depleting substances, and other matters

existing and emerging space ventures have to be to
satisfy a society that has become increasingly concerned about civilization’s impact on the environment.

fallenleafblackbeans_1de6bb69
-
3fd5
-
4b67
-
b79a
-
e4405fbd5597.doc



DDW

2011

1

Last printed
11/9/2013 7:52:00 AM





9

LSP/Treaty 1NC

B. SPS woul
d require a minimum of 100,000 launches to meet current energy demand


and a million
launches to provide for future rates

Al
Globus
,
Chair of the NSS Space Settlement Advocacy Committee and recipient of the NASA Public Service Medal, “On the
Moon”, Ad Ast
ra,
2008
,
www.nss.org/adastra/AdAstra
-
SBSP
-
2008.pdf
)


While it has been suggested that in the long term, space solar power (SSP) can provide all the clean, renewable energy
Earth could possibly

need (and then some), there has been less discussion on the most economic way to produce that power.
If we want to build two or three solar power satellites, one

obvious
approach is to manufacture the parts on the ground,
launch them into orbit, and assem
ble them there
, just like the International Space Station.
But a few power satellites won’t
solve our energy or greenhouse gas problems. We’ll need more. To generate all the energy used on Earth today

(about 15
terawatts)
would require roughly 400 solar po
wer satellites

10 kilometers across
.
Assuming advanced, lightweight space
solar power technology,

this will require at least 100,000 launches to bring all the materials up from Earth
.
But even
400 satellites won’t be enough. Billions of people

today
have t
otally inadequate energy supplies

and the population is
growing. Providing everyone with reasonable quantities of energy might take

five to ten times more than we produce today
.
To supply this energy from solar power satellites requires a
staggering launch

rate
. There are two major issues with a very
high launch rate.


C.
Ozone depletion result
s

in extinction.

Greenpeace
,

non
-
governmental environmental organization with offices in over 40 countries and with an international
coordinating body,
1995
,


Full
of Holes: Montreal Protocol and the Continuing Destruction of the Ozone
Layer,
http://archive.greenpeace.org/ozone/holes/holebg.html


When chemists Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina first postulated a link between chlorofluorocarbons and ozone layer
depleti
on in 1974, the news was greeted with scepticism, but taken seriously nonetheless. The vast majority of credible
scientists have since confirmed this hypothesis.


The ozone layer around the Earth shields us all from harmful ultraviolet
radiation from the
sun. Without the ozone layer, life on earth would not exist. Exposure to increased levels of ultraviolet
radiation can cause cataracts, skin cancer, and immune system suppression in humans as well as innumerable effects on
other living systems
. This is why

Rowland's and Molina's theory was taken so seriously, so quickly
-

the stakes are literally
the continuation of life on earth.


fallenleafblackbeans_1de6bb69
-
3fd5
-
4b67
-
b79a
-
e4405fbd5597.doc



DDW

2011

1

Last printed
11/9/2013 7:52:00 AM





10

Deterrence 1NC

1.

Collapse of society is inevitable

it’s better to have it now than to have a catastrophic one in the
future

Mac
Kenzie, ’08
,

(Debora, Are We Doomed, New Scientist, Vol. 197 Issue 2650, p32
-
35, 4p, 4 May 2005, EBSCO, DKreus)


DOOMSDAY. The end of civilisation. Literature and film abound with tales of plague, famine and wars which ravage the
planet, leaving a few sur
vivors scratching out a primitive existence amid the ruins.
Every civilisation in history has
collapsed, after all. Why should ours be any different
? Doomsday scenarios typically feature a knockout blow: a massive
asteroid, all
-
out nuclear war or a catastr
ophic pandemic (see "The end of civilisation"). Yet there is another chilling
possibility: what if
the very nature of civilisation means that

ours
, like all the others,
is destined to collapse

sooner or later?

A few
researchers have been making such claims

for years. Disturbingly, recent insights from fields such as complexity
theory suggest that they are right. It appears that
once a society develops beyond a certain level of

complexity it becomes
increasingly fragile
. Eventually, it reaches a point at whi
ch
even a

relatively
minor disturbance can bring everything

crashing
down
. Some say we have already reached this point, and that it is time to start thinking about how we might
manage collapse. Others insist
it is not yet too late, and

that
we can
-

we mus
t
-

act now
to keep disaster at bay.

Environmental mismanagement

History is not on our side
. Think of Sumeria, of ancient Egypt and of the Maya
. In his 2005
best
-
seller Collapse, Jared Diamond of the University of California, Los Angeles, blamed environmen
tal mismanagement
for the fall of the Mayan civilisation and others, and warned that
we might be heading the same way unless we choose to
stop destroying our environmental support systems.

Lester Brown of the Earth Policy Institute in Washington DC agrees.

He has long argued that governments must pay more attention to vital environmental resources. "
It's not about saving the
planet. It's about saving civilisation
," he says. Others think
our problems run deeper. From the moment our ancestors started
to settl
e down and build cities, we have had to find solutions to the problems that success brings. "For the past 10,000 years,
problem solving has produced increasing complexity

in human societies,"

says Joseph Tainter, an archaeologist at the
University of Utah,

Salt Lake City, and author of the 1988 book The Collapse of Complex Societies
. If crops fail because
rain is patchy, build irrigation canals. When they silt up, organise dredging crews. When the bigger crop yields lead to a
bigger population, build more c
anals
. When there are too many for ad hoc repairs, install a management bureaucracy, and
tax people to pay for it. When they complain, invent tax inspectors and a system to record the sums paid. That much the
Sumerians knew.

Diminishing returns

There is
, h
owever,
a price to be paid.
Every extra layer of organisation imposes a cost

in
terms of energy
, the common currency of all human efforts, from building canals to educating scribes. And
increasing
complexity
, Tainter realised,
produces diminishing returns
.

The extra food produced by each extra hour of labour

-

or joule
of energy invested per farmed hectare
-

diminishes as that investment mounts
. We see the same thing today in a declining
number of patents per dollar invested in research as that research inv
estment mounts.
This law of diminishing returns
appears everywhere, Tainter says. To keep growing, societies must keep solving problems as they arise. Yet each problem
solved means more complexity. Success generates a larger population, more kinds of speci
alists, more resources to manage,
more information to juggle
-

and, ultimately, less bang for your buck. Eventually
, says Tainter,
the point is reached when
all the energy and resources available to a society are required just to maintain its existing leve
l of complexity. Then when
the climate changes or barbarians invade,
overstretched institutions break down

and civil order collapses
. What emerges is a
less complex society, which is organised on a smaller scale or has been taken over by another group.
Tai
nter sees
diminishing returns as the underlying reason for the collapse of all

ancient
civilisations
, from the early Chinese dynasties to
the Greek city state of Mycenae.
These civilisations relied on the solar energy that could be harvested from food, fod
der
and wood, and from wind. When this had been stretched to its limit, things fell apart
.

An ineluctable process

Western industrial
civilisation has become bigger and more complex than any before it by exploiting new sources of energy, notably coal and
oi
l, but these are limited
. There are increasing signs of diminishing returns:
the energy required to get each new joule of oil
is mounting and although global food production is still increasing, constant innovation is needed to cope with
environmental degr
adation

and evolving pests and diseases
-

the yield boosts per unit of investment in innovation are
shrinking. "
Since problems are inevitable
," Tainter warns, "
this process is in part ineluctable
.
" Is Tainter right?
An analysis
of complex systems has led Y
aneer Bar
-
Yam, head of the New England Complex Systems Institute in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, to the same conclusion that Tainter reached from studying history
. Social
organisations become steadily
more complex as they are required to deal both with enviro
nmental problems and with challenges from neighbouring
societies that are also becoming more complex,

Bar
-
Yam says.
This eventually leads to a

fundamental
shift in the way

the
society is organised
. "To run a hierarchy, managers cannot be less complex than
the system they are managing," Bar
-
Yam
says.
As complexity increases, societies add ever more layers of management but, ultimately in a hierarchy, one individual
has to try and get their head around the whole thing, and this starts to become impossible. At

that point, hierarchies give
way to networks in which decision
-
making is distributed. We are at this point. This shift to decentralised networks has led
to a widespread belief that modern society is more resilient than the old

hierarchical systems. "I don
't foresee a collapse in

fallenleafblackbeans_1de6bb69
-
3fd5
-
4b67
-
b79a
-
e4405fbd5597.doc



DDW

2011

1

Last printed
11/9/2013 7:52:00 AM





11

Deterrence 1NC

society because of increased complexity," says futurologist and industry consultant Ray Hammond. "Our strength is in our
highly distributed decision making." This, he says, makes modern western societies more resil
ient than those like the old
Soviet Union, in which decision making was centralised.

Increasing connectedness

Things are not that simple, says Thomas
Homer
-
Dixon
, a political scientist at the University of Toronto, Canada, and author of the 2006 book The U
pside of Down.
"
Initially, increasing connectedness and diversity helps
: if one village has a crop failure, it can get food from another village
that didn't."
As connections increase
, though,
networked systems become increasingly tightly coupled
. This mean
s the
impacts of failures can propagate: the more closely those two villages come to depend on each other, the more both will
suffer if either has a problem. "Complexity leads to higher vulnerability

in some ways," says Bar
-
Yam. "This is not widely
underst
ood." The reason is that
as networks become ever tighter, they start to transmit shocks rather than absorb them. "
The
intricate networks

that tightly connect us together

-

and move people, materials, information, money and energy
-

amplify
and transmit any

shock
," says Homer
-
Dixon. "
A financial crisis, a terrorist attack or a disease outbreak has almost instant
destabilising effects, from one side of the world to the other
." For instance, in 2003 large areas of North America and
Europe suffered blackouts wh
en apparently insignificant nodes of their respective electricity grids failed. And this year
China suffered a similar blackout after heavy snow hit power lines.
Tightly coupled networks

like these
create the potential
for propagating failure across many c
ritical industries
, says Charles Perrow of Yale University, a leading authority on
industrial accidents and disasters.

Credit crunch

Perrow says
interconnectedness in the global production system has now
reached the point where "a breakdown anywhere increa
singly means a breakdown everywhere".
This is especially true of
the world's financial systems, where the coupling is very tight
. "Now we have a debt crisis with the biggest player, the US.
The consequences could be enormous
." "A networked society behaves
like a multicellular organism," says Bar
-
Yam,
"random damage is like lopping a chunk off a sheep." Whether or not the sheep survives depends on which chunk is lost.
And while we are pretty sure which chunks a sheep needs, it isn't clear
-

it may not even b
e predictable
-

which chunks of
our densely networked civilisation are critical, until it's too late. "When we do the analysis, almost any part is critical i
f you
lose enough of it
," says Bar
-
Yam. "
Now that we can ask questions of such systems in more soph
isticated ways, we are
discovering that
they can be very vulnerable. That means civilisation is very vulnerable
." So what can we do? "The key
issue is really whether we respond successfully in the face of the new vulnerabilities we have," Bar
-
Yam says. Tha
t means
making sure our "global sheep" does not get injured in the first place
-

something that may be hard to guarantee as the
climate shifts and the world's fuel and mineral resources dwindle.

Tightly coupled system

Scientists in other fields are also
wa
rning that complex systems are prone to collapse. Similar ideas have emerged from the study of natural cycles in
ecosystems
, based on the work of ecologist Buzz Holling, now at the University of Florida, Gainesville. Some ecosystems
become steadily more co
mplex over time: as a patch of new forest grows and matures, specialist species may replace more
generalist species, biomass builds up and the trees, beetles and bacteria form an increasingly rigid and ever more tightly
coupled system. "
It becomes an extre
mely efficient system for remaining constant in the face of the normal range of
conditions,
" says Homer
-
Dixon.
But unusual conditions

-

an insect outbreak, fire or drought
-

can trigger dramatic changes
as the impact cascades through the system. The end re
sult may be the collapse of the old ecosystem and its replacement by
a newer, simpler one. Globalisation is resulting in the same tight coupling and fine
-
tuning of our systems to a narrow range
of conditions
, he says.
Redundancy is being systematically eli
minated as companies maximise profits
. Some products are
produced by only one factory worldwide.
Financially, it makes sense
, as mass production maximises efficiency.
Unfortunately,
it also minimises resilience
. "We need to be more selective about increasi
ng the connectivity and speed of
our critical systems
," says Homer
-
Dixon. "Sometimes the costs outweigh the benefits." Is there an alternative?
Could we
heed these warnings and start carefully climbing back down the complexity ladder
? Tainter knows of only

one civilisation
that managed to decline but not fall. "After
the Byzantine empire

lost most of its territory to the Arabs, they
simplified their
entire society
. Cities mostly disappeared, literacy and numeracy declined, their economy became less monetise
d, and they
switched from professional army to peasant militia."

Staving off collapse

Pulling off the same trick will be harder for our more
advanced society
. Nevertheless, Homer
-
Dixon thinks
we should be taking action now
. "First, we need to encourage
dis
tributed and decentralised production of vital goods like energy and food
," he says. "Second, we need to remember that
slack isn't always waste. A manufacturing company with a large inventory may lose some money on warehousing, but it
can keep running even

if its suppliers are temporarily out of action." The electricity industry in the US has already started
identifying hubs in the grid with no redundancy available and is putting some back in, Homer
-
Dixon points out.
Governments could encourage other sector
s to follow suit. The trouble is that in a world of fierce competition, private
companies will always increase efficiency unless governments subsidise inefficiency in the public interest. Homer
-
Dixon
doubts we can stave off collapse completely.
He points t
o what he calls "
tectonic" stresses that will shove our rigid, tightly
coupled system outside the range of conditions

it is becoming ever more finely tuned to. These include population growth,
the growing divide between the world's rich and poor, financial

instability, weapons proliferation, disappearing forests and
fisheries, and climate change.
In imposing new complex solutions we will run into the problem of diminishing returns

-

just

fallenleafblackbeans_1de6bb69
-
3fd5
-
4b67
-
b79a
-
e4405fbd5597.doc



DDW

2011

1

Last printed
11/9/2013 7:52:00 AM





12

Deterrence 1NC

as we are running out of cheap and plentiful energy.
"This is the fundamental challenge humankind faces.
We need to allow for the
healthy breakdown
in natural function
in our societies

in a way that doesn't produce catastrophic collapse, but instead leads to healthy
renewal
," Homer
-
Dixon says. This is what h
appens in forests, which are a patchy mix of old growth and newer areas created by
disease or fire. If the ecosystem in one patch collapses, it is recolonised and renewed by younger forest elsewhere.
We must allow
partial breakdown here and there, followed

by renewal
, he says,
rather than trying so hard to avert breakdown

by increasing
complexity that any resulting crisis is actually worse
.

Tipping points

Lester Brown thinks
we are fast running out of time. "The world
can no longer afford to waste a day
. We

need a Great Mobilisation, as we had in wartime," he says. "There has been tremendous
progress in just the past few years. For the first time, I am starting to see how
an alternative economy might emerge. But it's now a
race between tipping points
-

which

will come first, a switch to sustainable technology, or collapse?" Tainter is not convinced that
even new technology will save civilisation in the long run
. "I sometimes think of this as a 'faith
-
based' approach to the future," he says.
Even a society rei
nvigorated by cheap new energy sources will eventually face the problem of diminishing returns once more.
Innovation itself might be subject to diminishing returns, or perhaps absolute limits.

Studies of the way cities grow by Luis
Bettencourt of the Los A
lamos National Laboratory, New Mexico, support this idea. His team's work suggests that an ever
-
faster rate
of innovation is required to keep cities growing and prevent stagnation or collapse, and
in the long run this cannot be sustainable
.


fallenleafblackbeans_1de6bb69
-
3fd5
-
4b67
-
b79a
-
e4405fbd5597.doc



DDW

2011

1

Last printed
11/9/2013 7:52:00 AM





13

Deterrence 1
NC

2.

Growth makes eco
-
collapse inevitable

Speth, law prof, ’08

Served as President Jimmy Carter’s White House environmental adviser and as head of the United
Nations’ largest agency for international development Prof at Vermont law school. Former dean of th
e Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies at Yale University . Former Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, teaching environmenta
l
and constitutional law. .Former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality in the Executive O
ffice of the President. Co
-
founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council. Was law clerk to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo L. Black JD, Yale. (James
Gustave, The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to S
ustainability, Gigapedia, 6
-
9, DKreus)


But the
much larger and more threatening impacts stem from the economic activity of

those of us participating in
the modern,
increasingly prosperous world economy. This activity is consuming vast quantities of resou
rces from the environment and
returning to the environment vast quantities of waste products.
The damages are

already huge and are
on a path to be
ruinous in the future
. So, a fundamental question facing societies today
--

perhaps the fundamental question
--

is
how can the operating
instructions for the modern world economy be changed so that economic activity both protects and restores the natural
world
? With increasingly few exceptions, modern capitalism is the operating system of the world economy. I use

"modern capitalism" here in a broad
sense as an actual, existing system of political economy, not as an idealized model. Capitalism as we know it today encompass
es the core economic
concept of private employers hiring workers to produce products and servi
ces that the employers own and then sell with the intention of making a profit.
But it also includes competitive markets, the price mechanism, the modern corporation as its principal institution, the consu
mer society and the
materialistic values that susta
in it, and the administrative state actively promoting economic strength and growth for a variety of reasons.
Inherent in
the dynamics of capitalism is a powerful driv
e to earn profits
, invest them, innovate, and thus
grow the economy
, typically at
exponen
tial rates, with the result that the capitalist era has in fact been characterized by a remarkable exponential expansion
of the world economy
. The capitalist operating system, whatever its shortcomings, is very good at generating growth.
These features

of
capitalism
, as they are constituted today,
work together to
produce a
n economic and political
reality that is highly destructive of the
environment
.

An unquestioning society
-
wide
commitment to economic growth

at almost any cost; enormous investment in tech
nologies
designed
with little regard for the environment; powerful corporate interests whose overriding objective is to grow

by generating
profit,
including profit from avoiding the environmental costs they create; markets that systematically fail to recog
nize
environmental costs

unless corrected by government;
government that is subservient to corporate interests and the growth
imperative
; rampant consumerism spurred by a worshipping of novelty and by sophisticated advertising; economic
activity so large i
n scale that
its impacts alter the fundamental biophysical operations of the planet
-

all combine to deliver an ever
-
growing world
economy that is undermining the planet's ability to sustain life
.

The fundamental question thus becomes one of transforming c
apitalism as
we know it: Can it be done? If so, how? And if not, what then? It is to these questions that this book is addressed. The larg
er part of the book proposes a
variety of prescriptions to take economy and environment off collision course. Many of
these prescriptions range beyond the traditional environmental
agenda. In Part I of the book, Chapters 1
-
3, I lay the foundation by elaborating the fundamental challenge just described. Among the key conclusions,
summarized here with some oversimplificatio
n, are: **
The vast expansion of economic activity that occurred in the twentieth century
and continues today is the predominant

(but not sole)
cause of the environmental decline that has occurred to date.

Yet the world
economy, now increasingly integrated

and globalized, is poised for unprecedented growth. The engine of this growth is modern capitalism or, better, a
variety of capitalisms. **
A mutually reinforcing set of forces associated with today's capitalism combines to yield economic
activity inimica
l to environmental sustainability
. This result is partly the consequence of an ongoing political default
--

a failed politics
--

that
not only perpetuates widespread market failure
--

all the nonmarket environmental costs that no one is paying
--

but exace
rbates this market failure with
deep and environmentally perverse subsidies. The result is that our market economy is operating on wildly wrong market signal
s, lacks other correcting
mechanisms, and is thus out of control environmentally. ** The upshot is
that
societies now face environmental threats of unprecedented
scope and severity, with the possibility of various catastrophes, breakdowns, and collapses looming as distinct possibilities
,
especially as environmental issues link with social inequities and

tensions, resource scarcity, and other issues
. ** Today's
mainstream environmentalism

--

aptly characterized as incremental and pragmatic "problem solving"
--

has proven insufficient to deal
with current challenges and is not up to coping with the larger
challenges ahead
.

Yet the approaches of modern
-
day environmentalism,
despite their limitations, remain essential: right now, they are the tools at hand with which to address many very pressing p
roblems. **
The momentum
of the current system

--

fifty
-
five t
rillion dollars in output in 2004, growing fast, and headed toward environmental disaster
--

is so great that
only powerful forces will alter the trajectory
. Potent measures are needed that address the root causes of today's destructive
growth and transfor
m economic activity into something environmentally benign and restorative
.
In short, my conclusion, after much
searching and considerable reluctance, is that most
environmental deterioration is a result of systemic failures of the capitalism that we
have t
oday

and that long
-
term solutions must seek transformative change in the key features of this contemporary
capitalism
. In Part II, I address these basic features of modern capitalism, in each case seeking to identify the transformative change
s needed.


fallenleafblackbeans_1de6bb69
-
3fd5
-
4b67
-
b79a
-
e4405fbd5597.doc



DDW

2011

1

Last printed
11/9/2013 7:52:00 AM





14

De
terrence 1NC

3.

Ecological collapse and human extinction are inevitable without an economic collapse



growth also causes
warming

Barry ’08,
Dr.
Barry
, PhD in Land Resources from UW
-
Madison and President and Founder of Ecological Internet, 1/14/
2008

(Glen, “E
conomic Collapse and Global Ecology,” http://www.countercurrents.org/barry140108.htm)


Given

widespread
failure to pursue policies

sufficient
to

reverse deterioration of the biosphere and
avoid ecological
collapse, the best we can hope for may be that the
growth
-
based economic system crashes

sooner rather than later
Humanity and the Earth are faced with an enormous conundrum
--

sufficient climate policies enjoy political support only in
times of rapid
economic
growth
. Yet this growth
is the primary factor
driving greenhouse gas emissions and

other

environmental ills. The growth machine has pushed the planet well beyond its ecological carrying capacity, and unless
constrained, can only lead to human extinction and an end to complex life
. With every economic

downturn, like the one
now looming in the United States, it becomes more difficult and less likely that policy sufficient to ensure global ecologica
l
sustainability will be embraced. This essay explores the possibility that from a biocentric viewpoint of
needs
for

long
-
term
global
ecological
, economic and social
sustainability; it would be better for the economic collapse to come now

rather than
later. Economic growth is a deadly disease upon the Earth
, with capitalism as its most virulent strain. Throw
-
a
way
consumption and explosive population growth are made possible by using up fossil fuels and destroying ecosystems.
Holiday shopping numbers are covered by media in the same breath as Arctic ice melt, ignoring their deep connection.
Exponential economic
growth destroys ecosystems and pushes the biosphere closer to failure. Humanity has proven itself
unwilling and unable to address climate change

and other environmental threats
with necessary haste and ambition
. Action
on coal, forests, population, renewa
ble energy and emission reductions could be taken now at net benefit to the economy.
Yet, the losers
--

primarily fossil fuel industries and their bought oligarchy
--

successfully resist futures not dependent upon
their deadly products.
Perpetual economic

growth, and necessary climate

and other ecological
policies, are fundamentally
incompatible
. Global ecological sustainability depends critically upon establishing a steady state economy
, whereby
production is right
-
sized to not diminish natural capital.
W
hole industries like coal and natural forest logging will be
eliminated even as new opportunities emerge in solar energy and environmental restoration.



fallenleafblackbeans_1de6bb69
-
3fd5
-
4b67
-
b79a
-
e4405fbd5597.doc



DDW

2011

1

Last printed
11/9/2013 7:52:00 AM





15

Deterrence 1NC

4.

Growth
causes war


Trainer, ’02
,

Senior Lecturer of School of Social Work @ Universit
y of New South Wales (Ted, If You Want Affluence, Prepare
for War, Democracy & Nature, Vol. 8, No. 2, EBSCO, DKreus)

If this limits to growth analysis is at all valid the implications for the problem of global peace and conflict and security
are
clear and

savage.
If we all remain determined to increase our living standards
, our level of production and consumption, in
a world where resources are already scarce, where only a few have affluent living standards but another 8 billion will be
wanting them too, a
nd which we the rich are determined to get richer without any limit,
then nothing is more guaranteed
than that there will be increasing levels of conflict

and violence. To put it another way, if we insist on remaining affluent
we will need to remain heavil
y armed. Increased conflict in at least the following categories can be expected.
Firstly
the
present conflict over resources between the rich elites and the poor majority in the Third World must increase
, for example
as "development" under globalisation t
akes more land, water and forests into export markets.
Secondly there are conflicts
between the Third World and the rich world, the major recent examples being the war between the US and Iraq

over control
of oil. Iraq invaded Kuwait and the US intervened,
accompanied by much high
-
sounding rhetoric, (having found nothing
unacceptable about Israel's invasions of Lebanon or the Indonesian invasion of East Timor.) As has often been noted, had
Kuwait been one of the world's leading exporter of broccoli, rather t
han oil, it is doubtful whether the US would have been
so eager to come to its defence. At the time of writing the US is at war in Central Asia over "terrorism". Few would doubt
that a "collateral" outcome will be the establishment of regimes that will giv
e the West access to the oil wealth of Central
Asia. Following are some references to the connection many have recognised between rich world affluence and conflict.
General M.D. Taylor, U.S. Army retired argued "...U.S. military priorities just be shifted
towards insuring a steady flow of
resources from the Third World." Taylor referred to "...fierce competition among industrial powers for the same raw
materials markets sought by the United States" and "... growing hostility displayed by have
-
not nations to
wards their
affluent counterparts."
62

"Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of
the world product; within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets".
63

"
That more th
an half
of the people on this planet are poorly nourished while a small percentage live in historically unparalleled luxury is a sure

recipe for continued and even escalating international conflict.
"
64

The oil embargo placed on the US by OPEC in the early
1970s prompted the US to make it clear that it was prepared to go to war in order to secure supplies. "President Carter last
week issued a clear warning that any attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf would lead to war." It would "…be
regarded as an a
ssault on the vital interests of the United States."
65

"
The US is ready to take military action if Russia
threatens vital American interests in the Persian Gulf
, the US Secretary of Defence, Mr. Brown, said yesterday."
66

Klare's
recent book Resource Wars d
iscusses this theme in detail, stressing the coming significance of water as a source of
international conflict. "
Global demand for many key materials is growing at an unsustainable rate
." "…the
incidence of
conflict over vital materials is sure to grow
."
"
The wars of the future will largely be fought over the possession and control
of vital economic goods.
" "…resource wars will become, in the years ahead, the most distinctive feature of the global
security environment
."
67

Much of the rich world's participa
tion in the conflicts taking place through out the world is driven
by the determination to back a faction that will then look favourably on Western interests. In a report entitled, "The rich
prize that is Shaba", Breeze begins, "Increasing rivalry over a s
hare
-
out between France and Belgium of the mineral riches
of Shaba Province lies behind the joint Franco
-
Belgian paratroop airlift to Zaire." "These mineral riches make the province
a valuable prize and help explain the West’s extended diplomatic courtship
,..."
68

Then there is potential conflict between the
rich nations who are after all the ones most dependent on securing large quantities of resources. "The resource and energy
intensive modes of production employed in nearly all industries necessitate cont
inuing armed coercion and competition to
secure raw materials."
69

"Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of
he world product, within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources an
d markets…"
70

Growth, competition,
expansion…and war. Finally, at the most abstract level, the
struggle for greater wealth and power is central in the

literature
on the
causes of war
. "...warfare appears as a normal and periodic form of competition within
the capitalist world
economy." "...
world wars regularly occur during a period of economic expansion
."71 "War is an inevitable result of the
struggle between economies for expansion."72

Choucri and North say their most important finding is that
domestic gro
wth
is a strong determinant of national expansion and that this results in competition between nations and war.73. World Wars I
and II can be seen as being largely about imperial grabbing. Germany, Italy and Japan sought to expand their territory and
resou
rce access. But Britain already held much of the world within its empire
…which it had previously fought 72 wars to
take! "
Finite resources in a world of expanding populations and increasing per capita demands create a situation ripe for
international viole
nce
."
74

Ashley focuses on the significance of the quest for economic growth. "War is mainly explicable in
terms of differential growth in a world of scarce and unevenly distributed resources…" "…
expansion is a prime source of
conflict
. So long as the dynam
ics of differential growth remain unmanaged, it is probable that these long term processes
will sooner or later carry major powers into war."75

Security The point being made can be put in terms of security.
One

fallenleafblackbeans_1de6bb69
-
3fd5
-
4b67
-
b79a
-
e4405fbd5597.doc



DDW

2011

1

Last printed
11/9/2013 7:52:00 AM





16

Deterrence 1NC

way to seek security is to d
evelop greater capacity to repel attack. In the case of nations this means large expenditure

of
money, resources and effort
on military preparedness
. However
there is a much better strategy
; i.e., to live
in ways that do
not

oblige you to take more than yo
ur fair share and therefore that do not
give anyone any motive to attack you
. Tut this is
not possible unless there is global economic justice. If a few insist on levels of affluence, industrialisation and economic
growth that are totally impossible for al
l to achieve, and which could not be possible if they were taking only their fair
share of global resources, then they must remain heavily armed and their security will require readiness to use their arms to

defend their unjust privileges
. In other words i
f we want affluence we must prepare for war. If
we insist on continuing to
take most of the oil and other resources while many suffer intense deprivation because they cannot get access to them then
we must be prepared to maintain the aircraft carriers and
rapid deployment forces
, and the despotic regimes, without which
we cannot secure the oil fields and plantations.
Global peace is not possible without global justice
, and that is not possible
unless rich countries move to "The Simpler Way."


5.

Extinction

Ch
ase
-
Dunn ’96
,

Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Director of the Institute for Research on World
-
Systems at the
University of (Christopher, Conflict Among Core States: World
-
System Cycles and Trends, 23 January 1996,
http://wsarch.ucr.edu/archive/papers/c
-
d&hall/warprop.htm
, DKreus) Note
-
figure omitted

Late in the K
-
wave upswing

(i.e. in the 2020s),
the world
-
system schema predicts a window of vulnerability to another round
of
world war
. This is when world wars have occurred in the past
. Intensified rivalry and competition for raw materials and markets will
coincide with a multipolar distribution of military power among core states.
The world
-
system model does not predict who th
e next
hegemon will be. Rather it designates that there will be structural forces in motion that will favor the construction of a ne
w
hierarchy. Historical particularities and the unique features of the era will shape the outcome and select the winners and

losers.

If it were possible for the current system to survive the holocaust of another war among core states, the outcome of the war
would be the main
arbiter of hegemonic succession.

While the hegemonic sequence has been a messy method of selecting globa
l "leadership" in the
past,
the settlement of hegemonic rivalry by force in the future will be a disaster that our species may not survive
. It is my
concern about this possible disaster that motivates this effort to understand how the hegemonic sequence ha
s occurred in the past and the factors affecting
hegemonic rivalry in the next decades. What are the cyclical processes and secular trends that may affect the probability of
future world wars? The world
-
system model is presented in Figure 1.
This model dep
icts the variables that I contend will be the main influences on the probability
of war among core states.
The four variables that raise the probability of core war are the K
ondratieff
cycle, hegemonic
decline, population pressure (and resource scarcity) a
nd global inequality
. The four variables that reduce the probability of core war are
the destructiveness of weaponry, international economic interdependency, international political integration and disarmament.

The probability of war may
be high without a
war occurring, of course.
Joshua Goldstein's

(1988)
study of war severity

(battle deaths per year)
in wars among the
"great powers" demonstrated the existence of a fifty
-
year cycle of core wars
.

Goldstein's study shows how this "war wave" tracks
rather clo
sely with the Kondratieff long economic cycle over the past 500 years of world
-
system history. It is the future of this war cycle that I am trying
to predict. Factors that Increase the Likelihood of War Among Core States The proposed model divides variable
s into those that are alleged to increase the
probability of war among core states and those that decrease that probability. There are four of each. Kondratieff waves The
first variable that has a
positive effect on the probability of war among core powers

is the Kondratieff wave
--

a forty to sixty year cycle of economic growth and stagnation.
Goldstein (1988) provides evidence that the most destructive core wars tend to occur late in a Kondratieff A
-
phase (upswing). Earlier research by
Thompson and Zuk (1
982) also supports the conclusion that core wars are more likely to begin near the end of an upswing. Boswell and Sweat's (19
91)
analysis also supports the Goldstein thesis. But several other world
-
system theorists have argued that core wars occur primaril
y during K
-
wave B
-
phases.
This disagreement over timing is related to a disagreement over causation. According to Goldstein
states
are war machines that always have a
desire to utilize military force, but wars are costly and so statesmen tend to refrain fr
om going to war when state revenues
are low. On the other hand, statesmen are more likely to engage in warfare when state revenues are high (because the states
can then afford the high costs of war).

Boswell and Sweat call this the "resource theory of war.
"


fallenleafblackbeans_1de6bb69
-
3fd5
-
4b67
-
b79a
-
e4405fbd5597.doc



DDW

2011

1

Last printed
11/9/2013 7:52:00 AM





17

Deterrence 1NC

6.

Squo solves fuel dependency


the military is transitioning to green fuel

Friedman ’10
, Thomas Friedman, winner of 3 Pulitzer prizes, 12
-
4
-
10, “Military is leading the green revolution”,
http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/editorials/stories/2010/12/24/military
-
is
-
leading
-
the
-
green
-
revolution.html
, DKreus


The thing I love most about America is that there’s al
ways somebody here who doesn’t get the word


and they go out and
do the right thing or invent the new thing, no matter what’s going on politically or economically.
And what could save
America’s energy future



at a time when a fraudulent, anti
-
science cam
paign funded largely by Big Oil and Big Coal has
blocked Congress from passing any clean energy/climate bill


is the fact that
the Navy and Marine Corps
just didn’t get
the word. Spearheaded by Ray Mabus, President Barack Obama’s secretary of the Navy and

the former U.S. ambassador to
Saudi Arabia, the Navy and Marines
are building a strategy for “out
-
greening
” al
-
Qaida, “out
-
greening” the Taliban and
“out
-
greening” t
he world
’s petro
-
dictators.
Their efforts are based in part on a recent study from 2007 da
ta that found that
the

U.S.
military loses one person,

killed or wounded,
for every 24 fuel convoys

it runs in Afghanistan
. Today, there are
hundreds and hundreds of these convoys needed to truck fuel


to run air
-
conditioners and power diesel generators


to
remote bases all over Afghanistan. Mabus’ argument is that if
the U.S. Navy and Marines could
replace
those
generators

with renewable power

and more energy
-
efficient buildings, and
run its ships on nuclear energy, biofuels and hybrid
engines, and fly i
ts jets with biofuels
, then it could out
-
green the Taliban


the best way to avoid a roadside bomb is to not
have vehicles on the roads


and out
-
green all the petro
-
dictators now telling the world what to do.


7.

Primacy doesn’t solve conflicts

Nina
Hachiga
n

and Monica
Sutphen
, Stanford Center for International Security, 20
08
, Simon & Schuster, “The Next American
Century”. (
http://www.amazon.com/Next
-
American
-
Century
-
Thriv
e
-
Powers/dp/0743290992
).

In practice,
the strategy of primacy failed to deliver
. While the fact of being the world’s only superpower has substantial
benefits, a national security strategy based on suing and ratiaing primacy has not made America more secu
re
.
America’s
military might has not been the answer to terrorism, disease, climate change, or proliferation. Iraq, Iran, and North Korea
have become more dangerous in the last seven years
, not less. Worse than being ineffective with transnational threats
and
smaller powers, a strategy of maintaining
primacy is counterproductive when it comes to pivotal powers
. If America makes
primacy the main goal of its national security strategy, then why shouldn’t the pivotal powers do the same? A goal of
primacy signa
ls that sheer strength is most critical to security. American cannot trumpet its desire to dominate the world
military and then question why China is modernizing its military.

fallenleafblackbeans_1de6bb69
-
3fd5
-
4b67
-
b79a
-
e4405fbd5597.doc



DDW

2011

1

Last printed
11/9/2013 7:52:00 AM





18

1NC Deterrence

8.

No impact to hegemony


regional powers can fill in

Friedman, ’
10

research fellow in defense and homeland security, Cato. PhD candidate in pol sci, MIT (Ben, Military Restraint
and Defense Savings, 20 July 2010,
http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct
-
bf
-
072020
10.html
, DKreus)


Another argument

for high military spending
is that U.S. military hegemony underlies global stability
. Our forces and
alliance commitments dampen conflict between potential rivals like China and Japan, we are told, preventing them from
f
ighting wars that would disrupt trade and cost us more than the military spending that would have prevented war.
The
theoretical and empirical foundation for this claim is weak
. It overestimates

both
the
American
military's contribution to
international
st
ability

and the danger that instability abroad poses

to Americans
. In Western Europe,
U
.S. forces now
contribute little

to peace
,

at best making the tiny odds of war among states there slightly more so.
7

Even in Asia
, where
there is more tension,
the histo
ry of international relations suggests that
without U.S
. military
deployments potential rivals
,
especially those separated by sea like Japan and China,
will

generally
achieve a stable balance

of power

rather than fight
.
In
other cases
, as with our bases in

Saudi Arabia between the Iraq wars,
U.S. forces

probably
create more unrest than they
prevent
.

Our force deployments

can
also
generate instability by prompting states to develop nuclear weapons
. Even when
wars occur, their economic impact is likely to be
limited here.8 By linking markets, globalization provid
e
s supply
alternatives for the goods we consume, including oil. If political upheaval disrupts supply in one location, suppliers
elsewhere will take our orders. Prices may increase, but markets adjust.

That makes American consumers less dependent on
any particular supply source, undermining the claim that we need to use force to prevent unrest in supplier nations or secure

trade routes.9 Part of the confusion about the value of hegemony comes from misun
derstanding the Cold War.
People tend
to assume, falsely, that our activist foreign policy
, with troops forward supporting allies, not only caused the Soviet Union's
collapse but
is obviously a good thing

even without such a rival.
Forgotten is the sensibl
e notion that alliances are a
necessary evil occasionally tolerated to balance a particularly threatening enemy
.
The main justification for creating our
Cold War alliances was the fear that Communist nations could conquer or capture by insurrection the ind
ustrial centers

in
Western Europe and Japan
and then harness enough of that wealth to threaten us



either directly or by forcing us to
become a garrison state at ruinous cost.
We kept troops in South Korea after 1953 for fear that the North would otherwis
e
overrun it. But
these alliances outlasted the conditions that caused them
.
During the Cold War,
Japan, Western Europe
and South Korea grew wealthy enough to defend themselves
.
We should let them
. These alliances heighten our force
requirements and threat
en to drag us into wars, while providing no obvious benefit.


9.

Empirically proven

Geller, ’99

Geller and Singer, 99


*Chair of the Department of Political Science @ Wayne State University (Daniel S and Joel
David, Nations at war: a scientific study of inte
rnational conflict, p. 116
-
117)

Hopf

(1991)
and Levy

(1984)
examine the frequency, magnitude and severity of wars using polarity

(Hopf) and “system
size” (Levy)
as predictors
. Hopf’s database includes warfare in the European subsystems for the restricted t
emporal period
of 1495

1559.
The system is classified as multipolar

for the years 1495

1520
and
as
bipolar
for the years 1521

1559.
Hopf

reports that the amount of warfare during those two periods was essentially equivalent. He
concludes that
polarity
has

little

relationship

to patterns of war

for the
historical
period

under examination
.
Levy

(1984)
explores a possible linear
association between the number of great powers (system size) and war

for the extended temporal span of 1495


1974
.
Hi
s
findings coin
cide

with those of Hopf;
he reports that the frequency, magnitude and severity of war

in the international
system
is unrelated to the number of major powers

in the system
.

fallenleafblackbeans_1de6bb69
-
3fd5
-
4b67
-
b79a
-
e4405fbd5597.doc



DDW

2011

1

Last printed
11/9/2013 7:52:00 AM





19

1NC Soft Power

1.

Soft Power High
-

US remains most powerful

Joseph
Nye
,

professor and

former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
,
6/23,
2011
, The Seesaw of Power, New
York Times,
http://www.nyt
imes.com/2011/06/24/opinion/global/24iht
-
june24
-
ihtmag
-
nye
-
36.html?_r=1&ref=ihtGlobalAgendaSummer2011

Joseph Nye

: There are two great power shifts going on in this century that I describe in my book. One is West to East, on
which I agree with Kishore.
Be
fore the industrial revolution, Asia was more than half the world’s population and more than
half the world’s product, and by the middle of the 21st century Asia will return to what you might call normal proportions
.
But the second shift is quite differen
t, and I don’t think we’ve wrapped our minds around it enough, and that is the shift
away from governments, East or West, to nongovernmental actors, which is powered by the information revolution.
When I
think about the distribution of power in the world,
I think of a three
-
dimensional chess board. The top board is military
power: I think the
Americans are the only global superpower,

and I think
it’ll stay that way for a couple of decades
.

If you
go to the second board, of economic power among states, the w
orld is multipolar. If you go to the bottom board


transnational relations, things outside the control of governments


power is chaotically distributed, and this is where the
diffusion of power comes in. You have flows of financial reserves and resources

that are larger than the budgets of most
countries. You have not only terrorists, but you have cyberterrorists who stay at home and send electrons across borders,
and you don’t have any idea where they came from. You have

climate change. You have pandemic
s.

In these areas,
it’s not
a question of East vs. West.

Unless East and West


and South


cooperate, you can’t deal with these issues. Y
ou have to
use soft
and hard
power to create networks and institutions, a
nd if you ask what country is best placed to

create them, I
think
it’ll remain the U
nited
St
ates. So I think the Americans will remain the most powerful
, but it’ll be a different sort of
power.



2.

Space conflict with China not inevitable


China pays for our military and champions weapons
bans.

Moore

06

(Mike
Moore
, Senior Consultant at Sapient Government Services, Winter 20
06
, “A Debate About Weapons in Space:
Against A New Cold War?” SAIS Review, Volume 26, Number 1, pg.184
-
185)


Nevertheless,
space warriors continue to wring their hands about the p
otential military
-
space capabilities of China
. The
penultimate paragraph of an article published in the Winter 2005 issue of High Frontier, a quarterly produced by Air Force
Space Command, distilled the conventional wisdom regarding the Middle Kingdom: “Ch
ina possesses both the intent and a
growing capability to threaten U.S. space systems in the event of a future clash between the two countries.”15
Yet this
analysis overstates the threat posed by China and misses the real threat. Consider a few ironies.
Ch
ina persists in
underwriting America’s instant
-
gratification lifestyle

by exporting cheap consumer goods to the United States
while

financing a substantial part of the U.S. national debt by
buying hundreds of billions of dollars of U.S. Treasury notes
. On
the other hand, China is regularly portrayed by U.S. hardliners as the next great threat.
In its

continuing
enthusiasm

for
buying Treasury notes,
China underwrites the further development of America’s

new
high
-
tech way of war. This is
distinctly odd behavi
or for a nation that is presumed to be preparing for a High Noon confrontation with the U
nited
S
tates.
China is

intent on
integrating itself into the

global economic
system


strange behavior indeed for a nation that is regularly
depicted as a military thre
at to the United States and, by extension, the West. A final irony is that China has long been the
lead player in the global effort to negotiate a ban on all space
-
oriented weapons. This inconvenient fact is seldom
mentioned

in the United States by Air For
ce Space Command, by the Pentagon, by the White House, by hard
-
line think
tanks, by cable
-
news pundits, by America
-
first newspaper editorialists, or
by the assortment of triumphalists and
neoconservatives determined to eliminate evil empires everywhere.



3.

Their I/L evidence is normative and descriptive


it says that if we do SPS we
should

increase
cooperation with China and
should

increase transparency


there is no guarantee that will occur
fallenleafblackbeans_1de6bb69
-
3fd5
-
4b67
-
b79a
-
e4405fbd5597.doc



DDW

2011

1

Last printed
11/9/2013 7:52:00 AM





20

Space conflict with China not inevitable


empirics and economics

Moore 06

(Mike
Moore
, Senior Consultant at Sapient Government Services, Winter 20
06
, “A Debate About Weapons in Space:
Against A New Cold War?” SAIS Review, Volume 26, Number 1, pg.180
-
181)


On the surface, such threat estimates are not unreasonable. Even

a casual look at the literature of the People’s Liberation
Army

since Gulf War I in 1991
suggests an obsessive pursuit of ways to counter U.S. high
-
tech military power
, including
U.S. assets in space. The American “revolution in military affairs” and its
new way of precision war haunts the leaders of
the PLA, a force that had long relied on sheer numbers of troops to prevail in a military conflict. Now the PLA is
attempting to modernize by cutting back manpower and making the “informationalization” of its
forces

its version of the
revolution in military affairs

the highest priority.
Hardliners in the Chinese government and the PLA assume that a
military confrontation short of all
-
out war with the United States is virtually inevitable. Similarly, U.S. hardli
ners believe
that a future military showdown of some sort with China is likely
. Are China’s hardliners winning the battle to shape
China’s official policy toward the United States? That’s an uncertainty that bedevils analysts in Washington and perhaps
even

in Beijing.
Before President Nixon began to mend U.S. relations with China in 1972, the Middle Kingdom spoke
incessantly of U.S. “hegemonism” in starkly lurid terms. But in the post
-

Nixon years, China greatly moderated its official
rhetoric, partly becau
se
t
he Chinese government came to realize that communism simply was not working as an economic
system
. During Mao’s Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s and early ‘60s, as many as 30 million people may have died
amid the Great Famine.8 Mao’s Cultural Revol
ution, launched in 1966, did not lead to mass death, but it did produce a
near
-
total breakdown of society. By the early 1970s, China was effectively bankrupt and the machinery of the Communist
Party had been shredded. After much inner turmoil at the highes
t levels during the 1970s,
Beijing initiated a policy of free
enterprise with “Chinese characteristics”


or as Deng Xiaoping tirelessly put it, “To get rich is glorious!” The result has
been sustained economic growth
. While hundreds of millions of peasants

in rural areas barely make it from day to day, the
economic boom in the coastal cities as well as in many inland cities is staggering.
The Chinese government

may be corrupt
and repressive, but it
is not
collectively

stupid. China learned a

vital
lesson

fr
om the collapse of the Soviet Union:
In a
direct arms competition with the U
nited
S
tates,
the U
nited
St
ates
wins
. The Soviet Union sought to create an alternate
universe, a socialist paradise with Muscovite characteristics. It failed.
China has chosen
, alb
eit cautiously,
to join the global
community
, and it expects the payback will be a modest degree of national prosperity.
Does China actively seek to initiate a
cold war
-
style competition with the United States? Several factors would suggest it does not. Ma
nufacturing consumer
goods

for export to the West
drives China’s boom and provides employment for tens of millions
in a nation in which
unemployment is still dangerously high
.
A cold war
-
style confrontation would sap China’s economic vitality by diverting
huge amounts of capital away from the making of consumer goods

(mainly for export)
into China’s arms industries
, thus
threatening China’s main business: the Wal
-
Marting of America
.
That Red
China and

capitalist
America ar
e now
joined at
the hi
p in the econ
omic sphere is a fact that few politicians care to acknowledge fully. The overriding fact is that China
needs U.S. consumers
, the biggest single market for its made
-
in
-
China products, and American consumers seem
comfortable with that. “The China price,” wh
ich denotes the lowest possible price for manufactured goods, is now part of
the American lexicon. The downward competition among American manufacturers to meet the China price means that
American consumers buy manufactured goods far more cheaply at discou
nt stores than they could have bought comparable
American
-
made goods.
A quid pro quo relationship has developed between Washington and Beijing. Washington generally
accepts that China will continue to supply inexpensive products to U.S. consumers; in turn,

China continues to help finance
the growing U.S. national debt by buying hundreds of billions of dollars of low
-
interest Treasury bonds that private
investors in the United States and elsewhere no longer covet
.9

4.

China will not militarize


white paper an
d joint treaty

Mo 11
[
Mo

Honge, writer for Centre for Research on Globalisation, an independent research and media organization, March 31,
20
11
“China Opposes Arms Race in Outer Space: White Paper”, http://www.gov.cn/english/2011
-
03/31/content_1835476.htm]

The Chinese government advocates the peaceful use of outer space, and opposes any weaponization of outer space and any
arms race in outer space, says a white paper on the country's national defense. "China believes that the best way for the
international c
ommunity to prevent any weaponization of or arms race in outer space is to negotiate and conclude a relevant
international legally
-
binding instrument,"

says the white paper, issued by the Information Office of the State Council
Thursday. According to the d
ocument,
in February 2008, China and Russia jointly submitted
to the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) a draft
Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat or Use of
Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT).
In August 200
9, China and Russia jointly submitted their working paper
responding to the questions and comments raised by the CD members on the draft treaty.

China is looking forward to
starting negotiations on the draft treaty at the earliest possible date, in order t
o conclude a new outer space treaty, says the
white paper.

fallenleafblackbeans_1de6bb69
-
3fd5
-
4b67
-
b79a
-
e4405fbd5597.doc



DDW

2011

1

Last printed
11/9/2013 7:52:00 AM





21

1NC Energy

1.

New NASA data makes all other warming cards irrelevant

more heat is being lost into space
than previously thought

scientific consensus

James
Taylor
, senior fellow for environment polic
y at The Heartland Institute and managing editor of Environment & Climate
News,
7
-
27
-
11, Forbes, “New NASA Data Blow Gaping Hole In Global Warming Alarmism,” reports a new study in the peer
-
reviewed science journal Remote Sensing, (
http://news.yahoo.com/nasa
-
data
-
blow
-
gaping
-
hold
-
global
-
warming
-
alarmism
-
192334971.html
)

NASA satellite data from the years 2000 through 2011 show the

Earth's atmosphere is al
lowing far more heat to be released
into space

than
alarmist computer

models have predicted
, reports a new study in the peer
-
reviewed science journal Remote
Sensing.
The study indicates

far less future global warming will occur than

United Nations computer

models have
predicted, and supports prior studies indicating increases in
atmospheric carbon dioxide trap far less heat than
alarmists
have

claimed.

Study co
-
author Dr. Roy Spencer, a principal research scientist at the University of Alabama in Huntsville

and U.S. Science
Team Leader for the Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer flying on NASA's Aqua satellite, reports that real
-
world
data from NASA's Terra satellite contradict multiple assumptions fed into alarmist computer models.

"The satellite observa
tions suggest there is much more energy lost to space during and after warming than the climate
models show,"
Spencer said in a July 26 University of Alabama press release. "
There is a huge discrepancy between the
data and the forecasts that is especially
big over the oceans."

In addition to finding that far less heat is being trapped than alarmist computer models have predicted
, the NASA satellite
data show the atmosphere begins shedding heat into space long before United Nations computer models predicted.

The new findings are
extremely

important and should dramatically alter the global warming debate.

Scientists on all sides of the
global warming

debate are in
general
agreement about how much heat is being
directly
trapped
by human emissions
of carbon diox
ide
(the answer is "
not much"
). However
,

the

single
most important issue

in the global
warming debate

is whether carbon dioxide emissions will indirectly trap

far
more heat by causing
large

increases in
atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds
.
Alarmist comp
uter
models assume human carbon dioxide emissions indirectly
cause substantial increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds

(each of which are very effective at trapping heat),
but real
-
world data have long shown that carbon dioxide emissions are no
t causing as much atmospheric humidity and
cirrus clouds as the alarmist computer models have predicted.

The new NASA Terra satellite data are consistent with long
-
term
NOAA and NASA

data indicating atmospheric humidity
and cirrus clouds are not increasing

in the manner predicted by alarmist computer models. The Terra satellite data also
support data collected by NASA's ERBS satellite showing far more longwave radiation (and thus, heat) escaped into space
between 1985 and 1999 than alarmist computer models
had predicted.

Together, the NASA ERBS and Terra satellite data
show that for 25 years and counting,
carbon dioxide emissions have directly and indirectly trapped far less heat than
alarmist computer models have predicted.

In short,
the central premise of
alarmist global warming theory is that carbon dioxide emissions should be directly and
indirectly trapping a certain amount of heat in the earth's atmosphere and preventing it from escaping into space
. Real
-
world
measurements
,

however,

show far less heat i
s being trapped
in the earth's atmosphere than the alarmist computer
models predict
, and far more heat is escaping
into space than the alarmist computer models predict.

When

objective NASA satellite data, reported in a peer
-
reviewed scientific journal, sho
w a "huge discrepancy" between
alarmist climate models and real
-
world facts
, climate scientists, the media and our elected officials would be wise to take
notice.

Whether or not they do so will tell us a great deal about how honest the purveyors of global
warming alarmism truly
are.

fallenleafblackbeans_1de6bb69
-
3fd5
-
4b67
-
b79a
-
e4405fbd5597.doc



DDW

2011

1

Last printed
11/9/2013 7:52:00 AM





22

1NC Energy

2.

Warming inevitable without solving for deforestation.

Daniel
Howden
, deputy foreign editor of The Independent, 5
-
14
-
07
, “Deforestation: The Hidden Cause Of Global Warming,”
(http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/c
limate
-
change/deforestation
-
the
-
hidden
-
cause
-
of
-
global
-
warming
-
448734.html)

The

accelerating
destruction of the rainforests

that form a precious cooling band around the Earth's equator,

is
now being

recognised as one of the main causes of climate change. C
arbon emissions from deforestation far outstrip damage caused by
planes and automobiles and factories
.

The rampant slashing and burning of tropical forests is second only to the energy
sector as a source of greenhouses gases according to report published t
oday by the Oxford
-
based Global Canopy
Programme, an alliance of leading rainforest scientists. Figures from the GCP, summarising the latest findings from the
United Nations, and building on estimates contained in the Stern Report,
show
deforestation accou
nts for up to 25 per cent
of global emissions of heat
-
trapping gases
, while transport and industry account for 14 per cent each; and aviation makes up
only 3 per cent of the total. "Tropical forests are the elephant in the living room of climate change,"

s
aid Andrew Mitchell,
the head of the GCP. Scientists say one days'
deforestation is equivalent to the carbon footprint of eight million people
flying to New York
. Reducing those catastrophic emissions can be achieved most quickly and most cheaply by haltin
g the
destruction in Brazil, Indonesia, the Congo and elsewhere. No new technology is needed, says the GCP, just the political
will and a system of enforcement and incentives that makes the trees worth more to governments and individuals standing
than fell
ed. "The focus on technological fixes for the emissions of rich nations while giving no incentive to poorer nations
to stop burning the standing forest means we are putting the cart before the horse," said Mr Mitchell.

3.

Technology innovations and oil reserv
es sustain us for the next 300 years

Dr.
Michael

J., Economides Professor of Chemical and Biomolecular Engineering, 20
08
, VOA News, “Is the world running out of
oil?,” (http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a
-
13
-
2008
-
03
-
05
-
voa7
-
66810217.html)


Some analysts
maintain that
after large oil fields are explored, it becomes harder and more expensive to drill deeper for
increasingly smaller amounts of oil. But chemical and bio
-
molecular engineer Michael Economides of the University of
Houston says
oil will not run o
ut
anytime soon.
"The first time that people said we were running out of oil was in 1866,
four years after the first purposeful well was drilled in Pennsylvania.
The
whole
concept

that we are running out of oil
has
been repeated on

at least
si
x major
occas
ions in the last 15
0
-
some
years. Peak will happen,
" says Economides. "But my
calculations suggest that peak oil may happen
around 2040
, perhaps 2050. And then after that,
it will linger on for decades

-
-

perhaps

two, t
hree centuries.

We are still going to
be producing commercial quantities of oil."
Technology to the Rescue?
Economides says
technology and new drilling techniques have extended the world's known

oil
reserves.
As a result, many
experts say estimates for oil reserves have been rising, with this
year's global reserves estimated at one
-
and
-
a
-
third trillion
barrels.
"The introduction of modern geo
-
sciences has probably added 20 percent [more oil] to the United States' reserves.
Fifteen years ago, it was a good strike if we drilled ten wells and one
well was good. Today, seven out of ten drilled wells
are commercial successes.
All of that is because of technology," says Economides. "
We have gone below 10
-
thousand feet
of water, which would have been unthinkable 15 years ago.

So all of these things ext
end reserves and world production
capacity."


4.

New technologies are economically feasible and will increase production.

Lynch 9
(Michael, Former Director for Asian Energy and Security at the Center for International Studies at MIT, 8
-
24,
http://www.nytime
s.com/2009/08/25/opinion/25lynch.html, 7
-
6
-
11, AH)

In the end, perhaps
the most misleading claim of the peak
-
oil advocates is that the earth was endowed with only 2 trillion
barrels of “recoverable” oil. Actually, the consensus among geologists is that
the
re are

some
10 trillion barrels out there.

A
century ago,
only 10 percent of it was considered recoverabl
e
, but improvements in technology should allow us to recover
some 35 percent


another 2.5 trillion barrels


in an economically viable way. And this d
oesn’t even include such
potential sources as tar sands, which in time we may be able to efficiently tap.
Oil remains abundant, and t
he price will
likely come down closer to the historical level of $30 a barrel
as new supplies come forward in the deep wat
ers off West
Africa and Latin America, in East Africa, and perhaps in the Bakken oil shale fields of Montana and North Dakota. But that
may not keep the Chicken Littles from convincing policymakers in Washington and elsewhere that oil, being finite, must
i
ncrease in price. (That’s the logic that led the Carter administration to create the Synthetic Fuels Corporation, a $3 billio
n
boondoggle that never produced a gallon of useable fuel.)



fallenleafblackbeans_1de6bb69
-
3fd5
-
4b67
-
b79a
-
e4405fbd5597.doc



DDW

2011

1

Last printed
11/9/2013 7:52:00 AM





23

1NC Energy

5.

There will be no peak anytime soon.

Foss 5

(Brian, AP Bus
iness Writer, 6
-
24, http://www.rense.com/general66/ssobn.htm, 7
-
2
-
11, AH)

Global oil production is not likely to peak

anytime soon, contrary to
talk
that has
helped propel prices close to

$
60 a barrel,

although lower prices may still be a few years away
, a

prominent energy consultancy said Tuesday. Cambridge Energy
Research Associates said that, instead of a crest being reached sometime this decade, an inflection point in world oil output

will occur sometime beyond 2020, after which production will plateau

for several more decades.

6.

China makes warming inevitable

Joanna I.
Lewis
, senior international fellow at the Pew Center on Global Climate Change and an adjunct professor in the School of
Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 20
08
, The Washington Quart
erly, 31:1 pp. 155

174, “China’s Strategic Priorities in
International Climate Change Negotiations,” (http://www.twq.com/08winter/docs/08winter_lewis.pdf)


China’s

role in an international climate change solution cannot be overstated.
Now likely the world’
s largest emitter of
greenhouse gases, China has become the focus of scrutiny as climate change has become ever more important as a global
issue.

Increased international attention to the issue is reflected in China’s domestic policy circles as well, primar
ily through
institutional restructuring aimed at better government coordination on climate
-
related policy activities. China released its
first national climate change plan this year, composed of measures being taken across the economy that may help slow
Ch
ina’s greenhouse gas emissions growth. Yet,
China faces substantial challenges in mitigating its increasing contribution
to global greenhouse gas emissions
, which will require a much higher level of effort than what may be achieved by
measures already in p
lace. Understanding the nature of these challenges in the Chinese context helps to clarify China’s
negotiating position in international forums and can provide insights into how the international community might best
engage China to address global climate
change.
Chinese leadership has shown the ability to adapt to or resist both internal
and external changes and pressures over time.

Yet,
the causes of climate change, namely greenhouse gas emissions from
fossil fuels and land use, are inherently linked to e
conomic development in the Chinese context.

Continued growth in the
prosperity of the population is viewed as fundamental to maintaining political stability, and progress to date in this regard

has been impressive.
China’s economic growth over the past two

decades
, marked by a quadrupling in its gross domestic
product (GDP) from 1980 to 2000,
has been credited with

pulling roughly 50 million people out of poverty.2 The
relationship between economic growth and energy utilization matters greatly not only from

an emissions perspective, but
from an energy security perspective as well. Although China quadrupled its GDP between 1980 and 2000, it did so while
merely
doubling the amount of energy it consumed over that period
, marking a dramatic achievement in energy
-
intensity
gains not paralleled in any other country at a similar stage of industrialization. This allowed China’s energy intensity (rat
io
of energy consumption to GDP) and consequently the emissions intensity (ratio of carbon dioxide [CO2]

equivalent
emis
sions to GDP) of its economy to decline (see figure 1). Without this reduction in the energy intensity of the economy,
China would have used more than three times the energy that it did during this period. Between 2002 and 2005, however,
this trend reverse
d, and energy growth surpassed economic growth for the first time in decades. This reversal has had
dramatic emissions implications, with China’s greenhouse gas emissions growing very rapidly since 2002. Although
official data for 2006 are not yet availabl
e, estimates show that emissions from energy use are up 9 percent from the
previous year,
which would make China the largest emitter on an annual basis, surpassing U.S. emissions that year by 8
percent.
3 In 2006, global carbon emissions from fossil fuel us
e increased by about 2.6 percent, driven by a 4.5 percent
increase in global coal consumption, of which China contributed more than 66 percent.4 Currently,
China emits 35 percent
more CO2 per dollar of output than the United States and 100 percent more tha
n the European Union. China’s increase in
energy
-
related emissions in the past few years has been driven primarily by industrial energy use, fueled by an increased
percentage of coal in the overall fuel mix.
Industry consumes about 70 percent of China’s energy, and China’s industrial base
supplies much of the world. For example, China today produces 35 percent of the world’s steel and 28 percent of aluminum, up
from 12
percent and 8 percent, respectively, a de
cade ago. China relies on coal for more than two
-
thirds of its energy needs, including
approximately 80 percent of its electricity needs. Currently, more coal power plants are installed in China than in the Unite
d States and
India combined. China’s coal po
wer use is expected to more than double by 2030, representing an additional carbon commitment of
about 86 billion tons.6 Although China is also expanding its utilization of nuclear power and nonhydroelectric renewables, th
ese sources
comprise 2 percent and

0.7 percent of China’s electricity generation, respectively, whereas hydroelectricity contributes about 16
percent.7 China’s overall economic development statistics reveal that, despite the emergence of modern cities and a growing m
iddle
class, China is s
till largely a developing country. Although rapid economic growth has made China the fourth
-
largest economy in the
world, its GDP per capita is still below the world average. More than one
-
half of China’s population lives in rural areas where GDP per
capit
a lags that of urban areas. The gap between the best available technologies worldwide and what exists in China is still large
,
although advanced energy technology is increasingly available and in many cases being developed indigenously. China’s per cap
ita
greenhouse gas emissions are below the world average and almost one
-
fifth those of the United States.