Hegemony Core - Summerx - SCFI

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Nov 8, 2013 (5 years and 2 months ago)


Hegemony Good


Hegemony High


US primacy unmatched

, Co
Founder Center for a New American Security,
and Davidson
, Professor Public
Policy George Mason,


Former US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and Janine

US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, July/August, “Obama’s New Global Posture” Foreign
Affairs, Vol 91 Issue 4, EbscoHost)

TOUGH ECONOMIC times have often been met
in the United States by calls for a more modest foreign policy. But
despite the
global economic downturn,

in today's interdependent world, retrenchment would be misguided.
The United
States' ability to lead the international community is still invaluable a
nd unmatched. Its
economy is still by far the largest, most developed, and most dynamic in the world. Its
military remains much more capable than any other. The United States' network of
alliances and partnerships ensures that the country rarely has to act

. And
its soft
power reflects the sustained appeal of American values
. The United States should not reduce its overseas
engagement when it is in a position to actively shape the global environment to secure its interests.

US primacy unmatched

ary and relative economic clout

, Editor of Ethics and International Affairs,
’12 (Zach, “What We Talk About When We
Talk About Isolationism” Dissent Magazine,

The rise

of China notwithstanding,
the United States remains the world's sole superpower. Its
military (and

to a considerable extent,
political) hegemony extends not just over North America
or even the Western hemisphere, but also Europe, large swaths of Asia, and

Africa. Its
interests are global; nothing is outside its potential sphere of influence
. There are an estimated
660 to 900 American military bases in roughly 40 countries worldwide, although figures on the matter are notoriously difficul
t to
ascertain, lar
gely because of subterfuge on the part of the military. According to official data
there are active
duty U.S.
military personnel in

148 countries, or
over 75 percent of the world's states. The United States
checks Russian power in Europe and Chinese power
in South Korea and Japan and
Iranian power in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey.

In order to maintain a frigid peace between Israel and
Egypt, the American government hands the former $2.7 billion in military aid every year, and the latter $1.3 billion. It als
o gives
Pakistan more than $400 million dollars in military aid annually (not including counterinsurgency operations, which would dri
the total far higher), Jordan roughly $200 million, and Colombia over $55 million.

U.S. long
term military
commitments a
re also manifold. It is one of the five permanent members of the UN
Security Council, the only institution legally permitted to sanction the use of force to
combat "threats to international peace and security
." In 1949, the United States helped found NATO,

first peacetime military alliance extending beyond North and South America in U.S. history, which now has 28 member states. T
United States also has a trilateral defense treaty with Australia and New Zealand, and bilateral mutual defense treaties wi
th Japan,
Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea. It is
this sort of reach


Albright to call the United
States the sole "indispensable power" on the world stage

Hegemony High


US military primacy unmatched

, Foreign Poli
cy at Carnegie, 1

(Robert, “Not Fade Away: Against the Myth of American
Decline” http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2012/0117_us_power_kagan.aspx)

Military capacity matters
, too, as early nineteenth
century China learned and Chinese leaders know toda
y. As Yan Xuetong recently noted,

military strength underpins hegemony
Here the United States remains unmatched. It is
far and away the most powerful nation the world has ever known, and there has been no
decline in America’s relative military capacity

at least not yet.
Americans currently spend less
than $600 billion a year on defense, more than the rest of the other great powers
. (This figure does not include the deployment in Iraq, which is ending, or the combat forces in Afghanistan, which
are likely to diminish steadily over the
next couple of years.) They do so, moreover,
while consuming a little less than 4 percent of GDP annually

a higher
percentage than the other great powers, but in historical terms lower than the 10 percent of GDP tha
t the United States spent on defense in the mid
1950s and the 7 percent it
spent in the late 1980s.
The superior expenditures underestimate America’s actual superiority in
military capability. American land and air forces are equipped with the most advance
weaponry, and are the most experienced in actual combat
. They would defeat any competitor in a head
head battle.
American naval power remains predominant in every region of the world

Rising powers don’t reduce US power projection capabilities


Foreign Policy at Carnegie, 1

(Robert, “Not Fade Away: Against the Myth of American
Decline” http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2012/0117_us_power_kagan.aspx)

what about the “rise of the rest”

the increasing economic clout of nations like China

India, Brazil, and Turkey? Doesn’t that cut into American power and influence? The answer is, it depends.
The fact that other nations in the
world are enjoying periods of high growth does not mean that America’s position as the
predominant power is declin
, or even that “the rest” are catching up in terms of overall power and influence.
Brazil’s share of
global GDP was a little over 2 percent in 1990

and remains a little over 2 percent today. Turkey’s share was under 1 percent in 1990
and is still under
1 percent today.
, and especially businesspeople,
are naturally excited about these emerging
markets, but just because a nation is an attractive investment opportunity does not
mean it is a rising great power
. Wealth matters in international politics
, but there is no simple correlation between economic growth and
international influence.
It is not clear that a richer India today wields greater influence on the global
stage than a poorer India did in the 1950s under Nehru
, when it was the leader of the

Aligned Movement, or that
Turkey, for all the independence and flash of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, really wields more influence than it did a

decade ago. As for the effect of these growing
economies on the position of the United States, it a
ll depends on who is doing the growing. The problem for the British Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century was not
its substantial decline relative to the United States, a generally friendly power whose interests did not fundamentally confl
ict wi
th Britain’s. Even in the Western hemisphere,
British trade increased as it ceded dominance to the United States. The problem was Britain’s decline relative to Germany, wh
ich aimed for supremacy on the European
continent, and sought to compete with Britain

on the high seas, and in both respects posed a threat to Britain’s core security. In the case of the United States, the drama
tic and
rapid rise of the German and Japanese economies during the Cold War reduced American primacy in the world much more than t
he more recent “rise of the rest.” America’s
share of the world’s GDP, nearly 50 percent after World War II, fell to roughly 25 percent by the early 1970s, where it has r
emained ever since. But that “rise of the rest” did not
weaken the United States. If a
nything, it strengthened it. Germany and Japan were and are close democratic allies, key pillars of the American world order.

The growth of their
economies actually shifted the balance irretrievably against the Soviet bloc and helped bring about its demise
. When gauging the impact of the growing economies of other
countries today, one has to make the same kinds of calculations.
Does the growth of the Brazilian economy, or of the
Indian economy, diminish American global power? Both nations are friendly
, and
India is
increasingly a strategic partner of the United States.
If America’s future competitor in the world is likely to be
China, then a richer and more powerful India will be an asset, not a liability
, to the United States.
Overall, the fact that Brazil,

India, Turkey, and South Africa are enjoying a period of economic growth

which may or may not last indefinitely

is either irrelevant to America’s
strategic position or of benefit to it. At present, only the growth of China’s economy can be said to have im
plications for American power in the future, and only insofar as the
Chinese translate enough of their growing economic strength into military strength.

Hegemony High


US Navy supremacy high

no current challengers

Maritime Security, ’11

8, “US navy still eclipses China’s expanding fleet”

China’s navy has hundreds of vessels at its disposal
, among them nuclear submarines and an aircraft carrier
but it
still does not come close to the huge naval firepower wielded by the United States.
President Hu Jintao called Tuesday for the country’s navy to “make extended preparations for military combat”, further fuelli
ng fears over Beijing’s ambiti
ons in the highly
strategic maritime area that surrounds it.
The United States, which recently reasserted its role as a Pacific
power and said it will post troops in Australia, responded by saying China had the right
to develop its military capabilities, b
ut should do so “transparently
”. China maintains a high level of secrecy
around its People’s Liberation Army, the largest armed force in the world with an estimated 2.3 million troops. Around 300,00
0 of those are thought to serve in the navy, which
es three fleets and has around 30 large missile destroyers, half a dozen nuclear
powered attack submarines and a small number of nuclear
powered ballistic missile
submarines. This year it unveiled its first aircraft carrier, a 300
long (990
foot) for
mer Soviet naval vessel that had its first sea trial on August 10. By contrast, India

another major military power in the region

has around 132 warships, including an aircraft carrier, and 16 submarines, one of which is a nuclear submarine undergoing s
trials. Earlier this year,
the Pentagon warned that the PLA

still primarily a land force

was increasingly focused
on its naval power and had invested in high
tech weaponry that would extend its reach
in the Pacific and beyond.
say China’s naval capability pales in
comparison with America’s huge and technically highly sophisticated maritime force
The US Pacific fleet is the country’s largest
, with 79 ships and submarines off America’s west coast, 29 in Hawaii, 19 in Japan and fo
in the Pacific territory of Guam.
Six of America’s 11 aircraft carriers have their base in the Pacific
, including the
USS George Washington, which is docked at the Yokosuka naval base in Japan. At any given point, there are around 50 US naval
ships in t
he west Pacific.
huge naval operations combined with its geopolitical alliances in the region have
enabled it to contain China within

what is known as
a “brown water navy”.

Hemmed in by an arc of powerful rivals in
South Korea, Japan and Taiwan,
China suffers from severely limited access to the oceans that surround

“The Chinese are also acutely aware of US military capabilities, as demonstrated in combat actions every year since 1991, and

the gap between their capabilities and those of
the US
and its allies,” said Dennis Blasko, a Chinese military expert with the Washington
based Jamestown Foundation think tank.
“The Chinese are
conducting their modernisation process with no recent combat experience, no
experience in fighting the kind of inform
ationised war they are preparing to fight

Hegemony High

No Challengers

US primacy unmatched

no nation is a real threat

, Defense Fellow at Cato,
and Logan
, Director of Foreign Policy at Cato,


PhD Candidate PolSci at MIT, and Ju
stin; Spring, “Why the U.S. Military Budget is ‘Foolish and
Sustainable’” Orbis)

The dirty little secret of U.S. defense politics is that
the United States is


probably the most
secure great power in modern history. Weak neighbors, vast ocean barriers,

weapons and the wealth to build up forces make almost nonexistent the threats that
militaries traditionally existed to thwart. Americans cannot seriously fear territorial
conquest, civil war, annexation of peripheral territories, or blockade. What

passes for
enemies here are small potatoes

compared with what worried most states at most times. 4

military interventions affect

security at best marginally
. We have hopes and
sometimes interests in the places where we send troops, but no m
atter how much we repeat it to honor
the troops, it is untrue that they are fighting to protect our freedom.

No challengers to US primacy

, Fellow at AEI, 3

(Dan, “Why it’s Still a Unipolar Era”

Sometimes it takes a crisis to dispense with intellectual fads. The world’s response to Libya has made clear that
currently fashionable arguments
about the “rise of the Rest” and the world’s new “nonpolarity” are s
imply untrue.

Krauthammer was wrong about one thing in his description of the “unipolar moment” at the end of the Cold War:
We are not living in a unipolar
moment, we are witnessing a unipolar era
. Why?
Because the “rest

China and India

are unable

unwilling to lead
The current fashion

in foreign policy argumentation
is to explain that America is in
, particularly relative to Asia. The new declinists

usually line up an impressive array of statistics that tell a story of India and China’s high rates of economic
growth, military spending, energy consumption, and so on. The new declinists have a point

the raw numbers are impressive. But
power is about mu
more than raw numbers
. It is the most elusive concept in politics. It usually cannot be measured accurately until it is used. The recent example o
f the
West’s decision to use force against Libyan leader Muammar
Qaddafi is a case in point. The United Sta
tes was
supposed to be entering a new era of constraints
, perhaps even decline, bound by a severe financial debt crisis and an
unwillingness to properly fund our military forces. Moreover, we have a president as ambivalent about exercising American pow
er a
s we have seen in a generation. President
Obama did all he could to dither and procrastinate while Qaddafi butchered his people. After all the hand
wringing, President
Obama understood

two things:
the world order Washington needs demands that Qaddafi be st
opped, and only America
could stop him
. Obama’s rhetoric about the United States not being in the lead against Qaddafi is just that: rhetoric meant to further a bi
zarre public relations
agenda (Does anyone in the Middle East really believe we are not leadi
ng the effort in Libya? What purpose does pretending to take a back seat serve except to satisfy the
Western left
wing intelligentsia?). Until President Obama directed his staff to secure a UN Security Council resolution and commit the U.S
. military to sto
pping Qaddafi, the
“international community” was paralyzed by inaction. The United Kingdom and France admirably made a strong moral and strategi
c case for intervention, but could not act
without U.S. leadership. What about China and India, countries that t
he new declinists identify as the future guardians of world order? The best that could be said is they did not
get in the way. Of the two, India is the greater disappointment. Washington applauds the potential of the relationship based
in part on India’s i
mpressive democracy. India’s
democratic character is supposed to bind it with the West to keep strong the liberal order that characterizes international p
olitics. But with its decision to abstain from a
resolution that would end Qaddafi’s treachery, Delhi
demonstrated that shared values do not extend to preventing a dictator from butchering his people. Delhi’s multicultural
democracy is impressive and there may be great potential for cooperation with Washington. But until Delhi sheds the vestiges
of its sel
indulgent and sentimental non
alignment policies, the chances that it will exercise power on the world stage in a positive and meaningful way remain low. F
or the foreseeable future, Washington and Delhi are
fated to cooperate on a narrow set of issues mu
ch closer to India’s borders. Then there is China. Who knows why China decided to abstain rather than threaten a veto. Perhap
Beijing did not want another confrontation with Washington. But
the idea that China will rise to world leadership
presupposes tha
t Beijing has some vision of world order beyond protecting its material
. But so long as a committee of nine dictators rule China, this idea is a fantasy. In a country in which citizens are blocked

from Internet searches of the words
“Arab” and “d
emocracy,” it is farfetched to expect any help in felling extremists. Even closer to China’s borders, in Afghanistan

a country whose failure can have serious
deleterious consequences for China

Beijing has not seen fit to shed a drop of its blood or spend a

yuan of its treasure. Instead, while NATO and the United States fight and die
for stability in South Asia, China has been building a military that can challenge the United States in the Pacific. The net
effect is a less peaceful world. Instead of contribu
ting to
the stability from which it benefits, China has made it more costly for the United States to provide the public goods upon wh
ich Asia’s prosperity depends. In turns out that
while measures of power such as gross domestic product growth, numbers of
and engineers, and shares of decision
making in international bodies may tell us
something about a country’s power, they do not tell us enough. These crude calculations
of power miss the intangibles of leadership: political culture, values, and

The West
has a set of ideas about how the world should run.
This vision includes the sometime necessity of deposing a
brutal dictator
. India and China do not see a purpose for international politics beyond advancing narrow self
interest. The fact
that India is democratic means that
it may one day decide to join the ideological West and exercise international power for grander purposes. China is run by dic
tators. Until that changes,
the most
Washington should expect is for Beijing not to make proble
ms worse.

Forget about China becoming a
responsible stakeholder in the international system. Our diplomacy should encourage China to become a less irresponsible powe
r. What the new declinists miss is that
while the United States is not as far ahead of Indi
a and China in material strength as it
used to be, the vision of world order it shares with its NATO allies provides it with a
moral strength and legitimacy impossible to measure
. The new declinists point to the ways in which the “Rest” can make life
nally more difficult for the West. But
while the “Rest” may carp from the sidelines and gum up the
works on international trade and financial agreements, when it comes to upholding
international order, Delhi and Beijing will take a pass.
We may be tiring o
f it, but
the Unipolar Era is
alive and well

Hegemony High


US primacy not at risk in Asia

current shift in grand strategy solves

, Co
Founder Center for a New American Security,
and Davidson
, Professor Public
Policy George Mason,


Former US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and Janine

US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, July/August, “Obama’s New Global Posture” Foreign
Affairs, Vol 91 Issue 4, EbscoHost)


AN OPTIMAL U.S. military

posture must reflect the reality that resources will be limited in the coming
years and that the United States simply cannot be present everywhere. With that in mind,
the Obama
administration's defense posture realignment will customize deployments based
on the
exigencies of each region and U.S. priorities.

The most significant shift will be toward the Asia
Pacific region
. President Barack
has made clear that the United States is "a Pacific nation" and that it will "play a larger
and long
term role i
n shaping this region and its future." His emphasis is reflected in the
Defense Department's January 2012 "strategic guidance" document, which states that
"U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc
extending fr
om the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and
South Asia."

Accordingly, as U.S. responsibilities in Afghanistan wind down,
the country's attention and
, both diplomatic and military
, will begin to concentrate more on the

. The American
presence in Japan and South Korea will remain a cornerstone

of this
even as the United States builds up its relationships with other Asian nations,
especially those in and around Southeast Asia
. Already, last Novem
Obama and
Australian Prime Minister

Gillard announced plans for enhanced U.S.
military cooperation
, including sending up to 2,500 U.S. marines to Australia for joint training and
exercises, increasing visits by U.S. aircraft to northe
rn Australian airfields, and conducting more calls by
U.S. ships to various Australian ports.

The United States is also planning to deploy two new Littoral Combat Ships,

small vessels
designed to operate close to shore,
from Singapore and is exploring enha
nced military
cooperation with the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam
. The details are still under
discussion, but this cooperation will likely include more joint exercises, troop rotations, and ship visits.
Throughout the region, new bilateral and multila
teral training programs, especially
those geared toward humanitarian relief, disaster preparedness, interoperability, and
capacity building, will help the region better counter transnational threats, prevent
conflict, and respond to crises.

In the Indian O
cean region, through which 70 percent of the world's petroleum products
and 25 percent of global commerce sail, the United States is also deepening its
partnerships. The Indian military now conducts more exercises with the U.S. military
than with any other
. The United States has also enhanced its security cooperation with
India by selling New Delhi advanced military systems
, such as c
130, p
81, and c
17 aircraft.

Finally, Obama has made clear that
after the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan

in 2014,
he United States does not intend to keep any permanent U.S. bases there. However, the strategic
partnership agreement that Washington and Kabul concluded in May laid the groundwork for a long
security relationship between the two countries. Making goo
d on that commitment will almost certainly
involve deploying a smaller number of U.S. forces to Afghanistan on a rotational basis. Those
troops will
support joint counterterrorism efforts and continue to help build the capacity of the
Afghan National Secur
ity Forces
. Meanwhile, the United States will no longer depend as heavily on
the Northern Distribution Network, which runs across the Baltic states and through Central Asia and
which NATO set up to keep its troops in Afghanistan supplied. Even so, the Unit
ed States should seek to
maintain cooperative relationships with as many of the network's states as possible, given the strategic
flexibility these relationships provide in a region that lies at the crossroads between Europe and Asia.

A2: Defense Cuts

nse cuts won’t happen

political bargaining

, Defense Fellow at Cato,
and Logan
, Director of Foreign Policy at Cato,


PhD Candidate PolSci at MIT, and Justin; Spring, “Why the U.S. Military Budget is ‘Foolish and
Sustainable’” Orbis)

, however,
is unlikely to occur. Neither the White House nor either party’s
Congressional leadership favors it. Democrats
, however,
understand the prospect of
sequestration is a hostage they can trade to Republicans in another budget deal.
Democratic leaders

including the President

say that they will not spare the Pentagon from
sequestration without Republican compromise on other items
, like the expiration of some of the Bush
tax cuts at the end of 2012. A deal of that type might include

additional defense cuts made under normal budget rules rather than
sequestration. But
if Republicans take back the White House and Senate

next fall,
their first act
might be to prevent sequestration by cutting other spending.




US hegemony sustainable

economic and military primacy and
international partnerships are key

, US Ambassador to the UK,
’12 (Louis, “America: Still the Indispensable Power?”
Chatham House,

Because an argument is being made by some academics, commentators and journalists that America is
now in permanent decline. The argument goes that a gradual but irreversible erosion of economic
strength, the so
called ‘rise of the rest’, and the effects of

two gruelling wars is stripping the United States
of its power, influence and authority. Now, there’s no doubt

as President Obama acknowledged in his
speech to Parliament last year

that the international order is being reshaped and that as we adapt to

we face undeniable and significant challenges.

we have overcome similar circumstances before. In the 1950s and 60s the fear was
we were falling behind the Soviet Union in technology and ambition. The 1970s brought
recession and unemployment to Am
erica; combined with a loss of faith in our system
after Vietnam and
Watergate. At the same time,
Japan’s economy was taking off. Then in the
1980s and 90s the tiger economies of East Asia produced an economic miracle of rapid
growth unparalleled in modern


Each time America’s standing was questioned. Each time America rose to the particular
challenges it faced. Time and again the doom mongers and the defeatists were proven

I am confident that they will be again.
There are many reasons f
or my conclusion but
three factors stand out.

First, the strength of our economy.

Second, our military prowess.

Third, the power and scope of our international partnerships.

Let me start with the strength and resilience of the United States economy.

Despite being damaged by the most severe recession in more than 70 years, America is

by far

the world’s largest economy. Today the United States is responsible for
one quarter of all global economic output, just as we have been for more than four

decades. Our economy is growing

with the IMF, Federal Reserve and others projecting
growth of somewhere between two and three per cent this year.

And the
trend lines of the important economic factors continue to be strong.



t 8.2%


from a peak of 10% in October 2010.
More than four
million private sector jobs have been created in the past two years. There is a renewed
consumer confidence


essential to a selfsustaining recovery

here people are
no longer paying
off th
eir credit cards but

out spending again.

The Troubled Asset Relief Program

known as TARP

has ensured that our banks are stable and well
capitalized. TARP authorized the Treasury to use up to $700 billion to stabilize banks and other financial
tions. Ultimately, only $410 billion was disbursed

including $245 billion to recapitalize the
banks. The Treasury is now confident that overall TARP will cost less than $50 billion

in fact, the
financial assistance we provided banks will actually resul
t in taxpayer gains of approximately $20 billion.

The stronger position of banks is helping to support broader economic recovery, including a 30% increase
in private investment in equipment and software. Lending to companies is also rising by over 10% a y
And America is still the No. 1 choice for foreign investment. US exports increased almost 16% last year to
$2.1 trillion. That is well on track to achieving America’s ambitious goal of doubling exports by 2015
under the National Export Initiative.


is making a strong comeback

for the first time since the 1990s.
United States has added nearly half a million manufacturing jobs since the beginning of
. The revival is evidenced by General Electric bringing back manufacturi
ng operations from China
and opening new plants in America. The French company Michelin is investing $750 million in a new
plant and factory expansion in South Carolina.

And there is no better example of the recovery in American manufacturing than the Un
ited States
automobile industry. In 2008, 400,000 jobs across the car
making industry were lost. Two of the big
three manufacturers were on the brink of administration. Today,
GM is the No. 1 car
maker in the
world, Chrysler is growing faster in America th
an any other car company, and Ford is
posting record profits.

So while always guarding against complacency, the American economy is on the right path to a return to
full health. But
one of our greatest and most enduring strengths comes from the
ls of our economic approach. Our philosophy is built on the whole
belief in free trade. While other nations

including some of the fast
growing emerging economies

still trade behind barriers, the United States continues to embrace market
rinciples. Free trade means every country, every business, and even every individual,
has a chance to compete.

That in turn creates the very jobs and wealth that lift people and communities out of

both at home and abroad. America has firmly reje
cted protectionist policies; reaffirming our
commitment to open markets with a number of new international free trade agreements.

We are also open to immigration. Our ethnically diverse society and a culture of
opportunity continues to draw talent from ar
ound the world
. The latest OECD records show
more than 1.1 million foreigners came to live permanently in America in 2009. A
survey by Gallup
published in April once again
put the United States as the most desirable
destination for immigrants
. Another

distinct advantage America enjoys is the entrepreneurial spirit
embedded in our DNA. Equally, our faith in free enterprise and freedom of thought and speech helps
stimulate creativity and innovation. Today our companies

many of them small start

e at the
forefront of the highgrowth, R&D
based industries of the future.

It is also worth noting that
America is blessed with an abundance of natural resources
. From
the most arable land of any country on Earth to a diverse range of energy sources that w
ill leave us
increasingly energy independent.
Current crude oil production is the highest since 2003, we
have been the world’s largest producer of natural gas since 2009, we have vast shale oil
deposits, and use of renewables such as wind and solar has dou
bled since 2008.

All these underlying strengths make me confident that the United States will continue to be a vibrant and
vital global economic power.

And a strong economy, of course, underwrites our second enduring strength: the capability and reach of

our military. Clearly, we are in a period of transition; turning the page on a decade of war and at the same
time dealing with our budget deficit. But
despite what some might say, America is not
dismantling its defences.

The truth is that
in the wake of

and our response to it,
our defence budget grew at an
extraordinary pace.
In 2001

the year of the attacks

annual defense spending was $319 billion. By
2011 it had more than doubled to $691 billion a year. So
we are taking the difficult step of
ucing our planned defence spending

by around $45 billion a year over a period of 10 years.

this adjustment is in no way going to undermine America as the foremost military
power on earth. Our defense budget was

and still is

larger than roughly the

next 10
countries combined.

The new approach combines the need for deficit reduction with a recognition of the
changing nature of the security threats we face.

Today our policy encompasses a more agile,
flexible, rapidly deployable and technologically ad
vanced military

complemented with strong
international alliances and multilateral cooperation.

Which brings me to America’s third core strength, which is the power of our partnerships.
are essential in the 21st century. Today’s challenges a
re too many, too immense and too
complex for one country to go it alone. This administration is intent on expanding and
intensifying US engagement with other nations and with international institutions
. As a
the United States now has a range of for
midable alliances on every continent. We
don’t see ourselves as a super
power believing unilateral action can solve everything.

A more direct, confrontational approach advocated by some in previous decades is clearly no longer

nor, I should
add, would it be effective. The complexity of today's challenges demand a
different style of American leadership. That's why today we see ourselves as a super
partner applying
Secretary Clinton’s focus on ‘smart power’.

In Libya, for example, we used an e
ffective range of tools

including diplomatic, economic, military, and

in the multilateral alliance against Colonel Gaddafi. And we will continue to play a central
role within

the United Nations and NATO

and also inside the G8, G20, the W
orld Bank, and the IMF.

At the same time,
we are forging new relationships across Asia
Pacific, which is fast
becoming a strategic and economic center of gravity. This is what the Pacific pivot is all
about. As a truly global power, we have widespread, en
during interests in the region

and they demand our widespread, enduring presence.

But turning our face towards Asia
Pacific does not mean turning our back on Europe.
We are
constantly reinforcing ties with our oldest and strongest allies, including our
relationship with the United Kingdom
. Building and maintaining strong, mutually beneficial
partnerships, however, does not come from government alone. Successful and enduring alliances are not
simply born from the President signing a treaty, a trad
e agreement or military pact. They are entrenched
and sustained by a range of additional assets that are hard to quantify but nonetheless highly significant:
our values, our customs and culture, our institutions and organizations. In effect, what the Unite
d States
represents to the world.

Take the timeless appeal of the values we embrace. Values of freedom, democracy,
human rights, tolerance, opportunity and the rule of law.

These are the values we
promote on the international stage. And one way others learn what we stand for, and
who we are, and what aspirations we share comes from the power of our example.

America’s standing and influence is not only built on economic and
military authority.
Consider how the US was one of the first countries to send a message to the corporate
world on transparency and bribery. We passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
because it was the right thing to do

even though it possibly put Amer
ican companies at
a disadvantage.

America was also among the first to take humanitarian action following the devastating
earthquake and tsunami in Japan last year. We sent relief supplies, elite search and
rescue teams, and disaster response experts

le the American Red Cross provided
shelter for some of those made homeless.

The exceptional work of American NGOs and foundations around the world also
provides US leadership on a number of global causes
. In 2011 alone, American individuals,

and foundations donated almost $300 billion to charities. But it is not just the immense
resources our NGOs bring to their efforts, it is also the boldness of their vision. The Carter Center

organization founded by former President Jimmy Carter

s close to eradicating Guinea worm disease. It
is also promoting democracy through monitoring elections across Africa, Latin America, and Asia. And
look at Bill and Melinda Gates. How easy it would have been for them to slip into comfortable early
nt, using their wealth to hide from the world’s troubles. Instead, they were determined to use
their personal fortune to help confront and overcome some of the world’s toughest health problems. This
enlightened approach to public service and social respons
ibility is an explicit demonstration of America’s
‘hidden’ role as a global leader.

Another source of international influence comes from our educational institutions. The
excellence of our universities helps us to cultivate some of the world’s best and br
. Indeed, America remains the No. 1 destination for foreign students

attracted by a system that
gives them the opportunity to pursue and achieve their ambitions. According to the QS World University
Rankings, 11 of the top 15 universities in

the world are located in the United States.

Perhaps that is why
the US can also claim more Nobel Prizes than any other country
. This
widespread appeal of America is part of what makes us strong because it means our alliances are built on
conviction not c
onvenience. We do not stand alone in the world. We face our challenges in partnership
with others. And yes, of course, America has enormous challenges. So nothing I have said this evening is
intended to sound either boastful or complacent. We recognize tha
t we constantly have to work, and that
there is still a lot to do to maintain our leadership in a turbulent world undergoing significant

But I do believe strongly that our continued leadership is more important than ever. And America is no
perfect, we know that. Unemployment is still too high; the need for deficit reduction is essential and must
be addressed; there remain issues around equality in our society; and aggressive partisanship is causing
dysfunction in our government and cannot
be ignored. In these and many other areas, we know our
country needs to do more: to heal wounds, take courageous decisions, and adapt to new circumstances.

the lesson from history is that America has always shown the capacity to overcome
its difficu
lties. In the past decade, we’ve endured the deadliest terrorist attacks in
modern history; two conflicts that have lasted longer than both world wars; and a global
financial crisis on scale unprecedented in a generation.

Through it all, America has retai
ned its global leadership.

And, as I have outlined this evening,
the sources of our influence are many and they are durable.

Our economic strengths are unequaled. Our military power unrivaled. And our
international partnerships unsurpassed. I believe tha
t our weaknesses pale in
comparison to our resilience and our strengths. This is why I can say with confidence
that ultimately America will remain the indispen
sable global power.

Hegemony Sustainable


US not declining

maintaining relative lead

, Professor International Politics Tufts, 1

(Daniel, “Predictions about the death of
American hegemony may have been greatly exaggerated” Foreign Policy,

America is doomed, right?

To be honest,
this sounds like a lot of pious baloney
. As Michael Beckley points out
in a new article in International Security, "
The United States is not in decline; in fact, it i
s now wealthier,
more innovative, and more militarily powerful compared to China than it was in 1991
." The
whole article is worth a read, and a good cautionary tale on the dangers of overestimating the ease of national catch
The widespread
n that China is catching up to the United States stems from

a number of analytical flaws, the
most common of which is
the tendency to draw conclusions about the U.S.
China power balance from
data that compare China only to its former self.

For example, man
y studies note that the growth rates of China’s per capita
income, value added in hightechnology industries, and military spending exceed those of the United States and then conclude t
hat China is catching up.
This focus
on growth rates, however, obscures
China’s decline relative to the United States in all of
these categories
. China’s growth rates are high because its starting point was low. China is rising, but it is not catching up. What about th
e future? One could
point to the last few months of modestl
y encouraging economic data, but that's ephemeral. Rather,
there are three macrotrends that are
worth observing

now before (I suspect) they come up in the State of the Union: 1)
The United States is successfully
. As the McKinsey Global Institu
te notes,
the United States is actually doing a relatively good job
of slimming down total debt


i.e., consumer, investor and public debt combined. Sure, public debt has exploded, but as MGI points out, that really
is the proper way of doing things after

a financial bubble: The deleveraging processes in Sweden and Finland in the 1990s offer relevant lessons today. Both endured
bubbles and collapses, followed by recession, debt reduction, and eventually a return to robust economic growth. Their expe
riences and other historical examples show two
distinct phases of deleveraging. In the first phase, lasting several years, households, corporations, and financial instituti
ons reduce debt significantly. While this happens,
economic growth is negative or mi
nimal and government debt rises. In the second phase of deleveraging, GDP growth rebounds and then government debt is gradual
ly reduced
over many years.... As of January 2012,
the United States is most closely following the Nordic path towards
. Debt in the financial sector has fallen back to levels last seen in 2000,
before the credit bubble, and the ratio of corporate debt relative to GDP has also fallen.
US households have made more progress in debt reduction than other countries
, and may hav
roughly two more years before returning to sustainable levels of debt. Indeed, the deleveraging is impressive enough for even

Paul Krugman to start sounding optimistic: the
economy is depressed, in large part, because of the housing bust, which immediate
ly suggests the possibility of a virtuous circle: an improving economy leads to a surge in home
purchases, which leads to more construction, which strengthens the economy further, and so on. And
if you squint hard at recent data, it
looks as if something like that may be starting: home sales are up, unemployment claims
are down, and builders’ confidence is rising.
the chances for a virtuous circle have
been rising, because we’ve made
significant progress on the debt front
. 2) Manufacturing is on the mend.
Another positive trend, contra the Harvard Business School and the GOP presidential candidates, is in manufacturing. Some ana
lysts have already predicted a revival in that
sector, and

now the data appears to be backing up that prediction. The Financial Times' Ed Crooks notes: Plenty of economists and busines
s leaders believe that
manufacturing is entering an upturn that is not just a bounce
back after the recession,
but a sign of a
term structural improvement
. Manufacturing employment has grown faster in the US since the
recession than in any other leading developed economy, according to official figures. Productivity growth, subdued wages, the

steady decline in the dollar sin
ce 2002 and rapid
pay inflation in emerging economies have combined to make the US a more attractive location. “Over the past decade,
the US has had some huge
gains in productivity, and we have seen unit labour costs actually falling
,” says Chad Moutray, c
economist at the National Association of Manufacturers. “A lot of our members tell us that it sometimes is cheaper to produce

in the US, especially because labour costs are
lower.” Now, whether this boom in manufacturing will lead to a corresponding b
oom in manufacturing employment is much more debatable. Still, as The Atlantic's Adam
Davidson concludes: "the still
unfolding story of manufacturing’s transformation is, in many respects, that of our economic age. It’s a story with much good

news for the
as a whole. But it’s also one that is decidedly less inclusive than the story of the 20th century." 3) A predicted decline in

energy insecurity. British Petroleum has issued their
Energy Outlook for 2030. The Guardian's Richard Wachman provides a us
eful summary:
Growth in shale oil and gas supplies will
make the US virtually self
sufficient in energy by 2030
, according to a BP report published on Wednesday.
In a
development with enormous geopolitical implications, the country's dependence on oil
rts from potentially volatile countries in the Middle East and elsewhere would
, BP said, although Britain and western Europe would still need Gulf supplies.
BP's latest energy outlook forecasts a
growth in unconventional energy sources, "includin
g US shale oil and gas, Canadian oil
sands and Brazilian deepwater, plus a gradual decline in demand
, that would see [North America] become
almost totally energy self
sufficient" in two decades. BP's chief executive, Bob Dudley, said: "Our report challenge
s some long
held beliefs. Significant changes in US supply
demand prospects, for example, highlight the likelihood that
import dependence in what is today's largest energy
importer will decline substantially."
The report said the volume of oil imports
in the US would fall below 1990s levels, largely due to rising
domestic shale oil production and ethanol replacing crude. The US would also become a net exporter of natural gas. Note that
this will take a while, and doesn't mean that the
U.S. will be energ
y independent. Still, it's quite a trend. Or, rather, trends.
Since the Second World War, the pattern in the
global political economy has been for the United States to adjust to systemic shocks
better than any potential challenger country
. A lot of very sm
art people have predicted that this time was different

the United
States wouldn't be able to do it again. These trends suggest that maybe, just maybe, that might be wrong. Am I missing anyt

Hegemony Sustainable


Hegemony structurally


, Fellow International Security Program at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs,


Professor PolSci Tufts, Winter, “China’s Century? Why America’s
Edge Will Endure” International Security, Vol 36 No
3, ProjectMuse)

Hegemony is indeed expensive and provocative, but these declinist arguments tell only part of the story.
The United States is both “system
maker and privilege

it pays a large share of system
maintenance costs but takes
a disproportio
nate share of the benefits
.36 The basic claim of the alternative perspective is that
these benefits
outweigh the costs.
Most obvious,
the United States, as hegemon, possesses an array of tools
with which to reward and punish. It can provide, restrict, or d
eny access to the U.S.
market, technology, foreign aid, support for membership in international organizations,
bribes, and White House visits
. These tit
tat bargains with individual states, however, are not as consequential as the United States’ power
over aspects of the international system itself. In the alternative perspective,
hegemony is not just preponderant power, it is
“structural power.”
It is the power to set agendas, to shape the normative frameworks
within which states relate to one anothe
r, and to change the range of choices open to
others without putting pressure directly on them
. It is, at once, less visible and more profound than brute force. Seen in this
light, the United States is neither benevolent nor feeble, but coercive and capabl
e, and the goods it produces “are less collective goods than private ones, accruing primarily to the
hegemon and thus helping maintain its hegemony.”38
Military superiority
, for example,
allows the United States to
employ “force without war,” pressuring ot
her countries into making concessions by
shifting military units around or putting them on alert
It also allows

[End Page 48]
the United
States to run a protection racket, garnering influence through the provision of security
. As
Joseph Nye explains, “E
ven if the direct use of force were banned among a group of countries, military force would still play an important political

role. For example, the
American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as
oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be
used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but presen
t in the back of statesmen’s minds.”40 To be sure,

costs of maintaining U.S. military superiority are substantial. By historical
standards, however, they are exceptionally small
.41 Past hegemons succumbed to imperial overstretch after fighting multifront
wars against major powers and spending more than 10

percent (and often 100 or 200 percent) of their GDPs on defense.42
The United States
, by contrast,
spends 4 percent of its GDP on defense and concentrates its enmity on rogue nations
and failed states
. Past bids for global mastery were strangled before he
gemony could be fully consolidated.
The United States
, on the other
has the advantage of being an extant hegemon

it did not overturn an existing
international order
; rather, the existing order collapsed around it. As a result, its dominant position i
s entrenched to the point that “any effort to compete
directly with the United States is futile, so no one tries.”43 The dollar’s global role may handicap American exports, but it

also comes with perks including seigniorage,44
reduced exchange rate risks f
or U.S. firms involved in international commerce, competitive advantages for American banks in dollarized financial markets,
and the ability to
delay and deflect current account adjustments onto other countries.45 More important,
foreign governments that h
old dollar
reserves depend on U.S. prosperity for their continued economic growth and are thus
,” unable to disentangle their interests from those of the United States.46 Rather than [End Page 49] seeking to undermine th
e American economy, they
nvest in its continued expansion.47 Finally,
given its position at the top of the world trade regime, the United
States can distort international markets in its favor
.48 Declinists expect the hegemon to use its power magnanimously.
According to the alterna
tive perspective, however,
American foreign economic policy involves the routine use of
diplomatic leverage at the highest levels to create opportunities for U.S. firms
.49 U.S. trade
officials, “acting as self
appointed enforcers of the free trade regime,
asserted the right with their own national law to single out and punish countries they judged to be unfair
, therefore,
may not be a neutral process that diffuses wealth evenly
throughout the international system, but a political p
rocess shaped by the United States
in ways that serve its interests.

A2: Hegemony Unsustainable


China rise literature is statistically flawed

only snapshots partial statistics

, Fellow International Security Program at Harvard’s Belfer Cen
ter for Science and
International Affairs,


Professor PolSci Tufts, Winter, “China’s Century? Why America’s
Edge Will Endure” International Security, Vol 36 No 3, ProjectMuse)

With few exceptions, however,
existing studies on the decline of th
e United States and the rise of China
suffer from

at least one of the following
.5 First,
most studies do not look at a comprehensive
set of indicators
. Instead
they paint impressionistic pictures of the balance of power,
presenting tidbits of
information on a handful of metrics.

In general,
this approach biases

Page 42]
results in favor of the declinist perspective because most standard indicators of
national power

for example, gross domestic product (GDP), population, and energy consumpti

conflate size with power and
thereby overstate the capabilities of large but underdeveloped countries
. For example, in a recent study
Arvind Subramanian contends that “China’s dominance is a sure thing” based on “an index of dominance combining just thr
ee factors: a country’s GDP, its trade (measured as
the sum of its exports and imports of goods), and the extent to which it is a net creditor to the world.”6
The United States and China
, however,
are each declining by some measures while rising in terms o
f others
. To distinguish between ascendance and
decline writ large, therefore, requires analyzing many indicators and determining how much each one matters in relation to ot
hers. Second,
many studies are
static, presenting single
year snapshots of U.S. and

Chinese power.
This flaw tends to bias results in favor of
the alternative perspective because the United States retains a significant lead in most categories. The key question, howeve
r, is not whether the United States is more powerful
than China at pres
ent, but whether it will remain so in the future.
Without a dynamic analysis, it is impossible

to answer this
This study addresses these shortcomings by comparing the United States and
China across a large set of economic, technological, and mili
tary indicators over the past
twenty years
. The results are mixed, but
the bulk of the evidence supports the alternative perspective.

Over the last two decades,
globalization and U.S. hegemonic burdens have expanded significantly, yet
the United States has

not declined;

in fact
it is now wealthier, more innovative, and more
militarily powerful compared to China than it was in 1991.
China has narrowed the gap in terms of GDP and now
exports a greater volume of high
technology products and employs more scient
ists than any country in the world. However,
GDP correlates poorly
with national power
; more than 90 percent of China’s high
tech exports are produced by foreign firms and consist of low
tech components; and
China’s quantitative advantage in scientists has

not yet translated into qualitative
advantages in innovation
. The United States suffers from a huge debt problem that its political system appears ill
suited to solve.
, however,
faces its own fiscal mess, which may be more intractable than America’s
The widespread
misperception that China is catching up to the United States stems from a number of
analytical flaws, the most common of which is

[End Page 43]
the tendency to draw conclusions
about the U.S.
China power balance from data that compare Chin
a only to its former
. For example, many studies note that the growth rates of China’s per capita income, value added in high
technology industries, and military spending exceed those of the
United States and then conclude that China is catching up.
is focus on growth rates
, however,
obscures China’s decline
relative to the United States in all of these categories. China’s growth rates are high
because its starting point was low. China is rising, but it is not catching up

China GDP figures irrelevan
t and not predictive

, Fellow International Security Program at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs,


Professor PolSci Tufts, Winter, “China’s Century? Why America’s
Edge Will Endure” International Security, Vo
l 36 No 3, ProjectMuse)

The case for the decline of the United States and the rise of China rests heavily on a
single statistic: GDP
. Over the last twenty years, China’s GDP has risen relative to the United States’ in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP)
, though it has
declined in real terms.84 Regardless of which measure is used, however, most projections have China overtaking the United Sta
tes as the world’s largest economy before 2050,
and some as early as 2015.85
Economic size
, however,
does not neces
sarily make China a contender for
superpower status
. After all,
China was the largest economy in the world throughout most of
its “century of humiliation,” when it was ripped apart by Western powers

and Japan.
United Kingdom
, on the other hand, ruled a

quarter of the globe for more than a century, but
was never, even at its peak, the
largest economy in the world
. Britain’s GDP was far smaller than China’s and India’s for all of the eighteenth century and much of the nineteenth
century.86 Britain, howeve
r, was able to establish imperial control over India and to defeat China militarily, imposing unequal treaties on Beijing, ac
quiring Hong Kong and
various other concessions, and establishing a sphere of influence in East Asia. This
dominance stemmed not fr
om the absolute
size of Britain’s economy, but from its superior level of economic development,
measured in terms of per capita income
, which was the highest in the world and several times higher than China’s and India’s at the
time.87 This is not to say t
hat size is irrelevant. Luxembourg’s per capita income is almost double that of the United States, but its tiny population pr
ecludes it from raising a
meaningful army, let alone entering the ranks of the great powers. [End Page 58] It is, however, importan
t to recognize that
GDP is not synonymous
with national power
, and that
countries with larger economies do not necessarily have more
resources at their disposal. Half a billion peasants will produce a large volume of output,
but most of it will be immediat
ely consumed, leaving little left over for national
. As Klaus Knorr argued,
what matters for national power is not wealth, but “surplus
.”88 It is therefore significant that the average Chinese citizen is more than $17,000 poorer relative to

the average American than he was in 1991 (see figure 1).
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2010. PPP stands for purchasing power parity. O
n the other hand, the United States has
accumulated great wealth in part
by borrowing from abroad at an unprecedented rate. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the United States’ public de
bt will remain
greater than 60 percent of GDP through 2020.89 In the coming years, U.S. policymakers will be forced to either decre
ase public spending or allow interest costs on the national
debt to rise ruinously. Either option will retard economic growth. Managing such high levels of debt will be especially diffi
cult if the [End Page 59] dollar loses its position as the
l reserve currency, an outcome that some experts think is likely.90
At first glance, China’s fiscal future appears
much brighter than the United States’
. The Chinese economy grew 8 percent annually throughout the global financial crisis, and its
reported d
GDP ratio is only 19 percent.91
China’s true level of public debt
, however,
is likely much higher than
reported because a great deal of state spending is funneled through investment entities
connected to local governments. Estimates that take this s
pending into account put
China’s debt
GDP ratio between 75 and 150 percent
.92 The Chinese government projects annual growth rates of 7
percent between now and 2030. Some prominent investors and economists, however, believe
Chinese growth will plunge to
2 to 5
percent within the next decade following the collapse of a “debt
fueled bubble
.”93 These
predictions are speculative and may turn out to be overly pessimistic.94 What is more certain, however, is that
several factors that allowed for
rapid Chinese g

(e.g., a surplus of cheap labor and capital, expanding export markets abroad, and sufficient water supplies)
.95 Chief among these factors is China’s “demographic dividend.”96 In the 1950s and [End Page 60] 1960s, the Chinese governme
nt encouraged
Chinese women to bear multiple children to boost the working
age population. In the 1970s, however, the Chinese government reversed course and instituted the one
policy. As a result,
China will soon confront the most severe aging proces
s in human history.
Within twenty years, China will have 300 million pensioners, causing the ratio of
workers per retiree to plummet from 8 to 1 today to 2 to 1 by 2040
.97 The fiscal cost of this swing in
dependency ratios may exceed 80 to 100 percent of C
hina’s GDP.98 SOURCE: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population Database (New York:
United Nations, 2010).
The United States, by contrast, “can be said to be a young and even a
developing country
.”99 Its working age populatio
n will grow by 17 percent over the next forty years while that of all the other major powers (except India) will
decline (see figure 2).100 Moreover, its pension system is better funded, its public welfare commitments more modest, and its

citizens more pro
ductive (in [End Page 61] terms
of hours worked and years employed) than any other major power.101 “
Global aging
,” Mark Haas writes, “
is therefore not only likely to
extend U.S. hegemony . . . but deepen it as . . . other states are likely to fall even far
.”102 Declinists claim that a rising GDP helps China attract foreign investment and compel foreign firms to transfer advanced

technology to Chinese
enterprises.103 The fundamental assumption behind this claim is that a nation’s GDP reflects the
size of its domestic market. Market size, however, is a measure of consumption
whereas GDP is a measure of production. China’s citizens produce many goods, but they consume relatively few. The Chinese mar
ket is much larger than it used to be, but it has
runk relative to the U.S. market over the last two decades: China now imports less compared to the United States than it did
in 1991.104 More important, China’s bargaining
power vis
vis foreign firms seems to be waning.105 Wholly foreign
owned enterprise
s now account for 70 percent of foreign direct investment (FDI) flowing into China,
whereas joint ventures between foreign and Chinese firms have steadily declined (see figure 3). Such rampant foreign ownershi
p never occurred in past cases of successful
chnological development (Japan and Korea grew with almost zero FDI or foreign ownership) and with good reason: wholly foreign
owned enterprises, unlike joint ventures,
are generally under no obligation to transfer technology to local partners and may crowd

domestic firms out of the market.106 In sum,
the United States is
now wealthier compared to China than it was in 1991. This prediction runs counter to
declinism and provides suggestive support

[End Page 62]
for the alternative perspective
. The trends
discussed above may change, and historians may one day look back on the recent financial crisis as the beginning of a massive

transfer of wealth and power from the United
States to China. Such an outcome will depend on, among other things, the relative rat
es of innovation in each country.

Rumors of a credible Chinese threat have been greatly exaggerated

Nye ’12
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., co
founder of IR neoliberalism, University Distinguished Service Professor
at Harvard and former Dean of the Kennedy School of
Government, “The Twenty
First Century Will Not
Be a ‘‘Post
American’’ World,” International Studies Quarterly (2012) 56, 215

An area where I agree with Layne is the shift of wealth from West to East. In The Future of Power, I identify that transition

s one of
the two great power shifts of this century (the other is the power diffusion from states to nonstate actors, about which Layn
e is
silent). In inter
state politics, the most important factor will be the continuing ‘‘return of Asia.’’ In 1800, Asia
had more than half of
the world population and the world’s product. By 1900, after the industrial revolution in Europe and America, Asia’s share sh
rank to
fifth of the world product. By 2040, Asia will be well on its way back to its historical share.
he ‘‘rise’’ in the power
of China and India
may create instability, but it
is a problem with precedents, and we can learn
from history about how our strategies can affect the outcome. It is a mistake, however,
to exaggerate Chinese power.

For more than a d
ecade, many have viewed China as the most likely contender to
balance American power, or surpass it. Some draw analogies to the challenge imperial Germany posed to Britain at the beginnin
g of
the last century, though Germany surpassed Britain in 1900, and
China has a long way to go to equal the power resources of the
United States.
Even when the overall Chinese GDP passes that of the United States, the two
economies will be equivalent in size, but not equal in composition. China would still
have a vast, und
erdeveloped countryside, and it will begin to face demographic
problems from the delayed effects of its one
couple policy.
As the Chinese say,
fear the country will grow old before it grows rich. Per capita income provides a measure
of the s
ophistication of an economy. China will probably not equal the United States in
per capita income until sometime near the middle of the century
. In other words, China’s
impressive growth

combined with

size of
population will likely lead it to
pass the
American economy in total size, but that is not the same as equality.
projections can be misleading, and growth rates generally slow as economies reach
higher levels of development.
China’s authoritarian political system has thus
far shown an impressive power
conversion capability, but whether China can maintain that capability over the longer term is a mystery both to outsiders and

Chinese leaders. Unlike India, which was born with a democratic constitution,
China has not yet f
ound a way to
solve the problem of demands for political participation

(if not democracy)
that tend to
accompany rising per capita income. Whether China can develop a formula that can
manage an expanding urban middle class, regional inequality, and resentm
ent among
ethnic minorities remains to be seen.

A2: Hegemony Unsustainable


Globalization won’t kill hegemony

relative gain for the US

, Fellow International Security Program at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and


Professor PolSci Tufts, Winter, “China’s Century? Why America’s
Edge Will Endure” International Security, Vol 36 No 3, ProjectMuse)

There is much to these arguments, but once again the declinist case tells only part of the story.
balization has increased developing
countries’ access to advanced technology, but it has also spawned a new mode of

globally networked production

that may undercut their long
technological development
. In the past, industries were mostly se
contained within countries, allowing rising states (e.g., the United States,
Germany, Japan, and South Korea) to use targeted investment and trade barriers to cultivate internationally competitive indus
tries.61 Today, however, such protective barriers
ay no longer be available because “the world’s wealthiest countries

though hardly paragons of free trade

do not tolerate the sorts of protectionism they once did.”62 In other
words, “[T]he conventional technological upgrading ladders have been kicked away
in the [World Trade Organization] era.”63
The international trade
regime affords poor countries some leeway to protect their infant industries, but these

[End Page 52]
countries generally lack the legal capacity necessary to take advantage of such
Lower trade barriers, coupled with advances in technology

(particularly digitization),
allow lead firms to “slice up the value

to produce a good in a number of stages in a number of locations, adding a little bit of
value at each stage.”65 Acco
rding to the alternative perspective,
the result is a global division of labor in which firms in
developed states specialize in

research and development (
), branding, and marketing while outsourcing manufacturing and basic
engineering to developing coun
By farming out production activities to the developing world, U.S.
companies reap “dynamic self
reinforcing competitive advantages,” tapping pools of
cheap labor and investing the savings in technological modernization and rejuvenation
They hav
e become “global flagships,” deriving power from their control over proprietary resources and their capacity to coordinate tr
ansactions among the various nodes of the
production system.68
By controlling integral technologies and standards, lead firms can d
tier partners and constrain their development.
Latecomers face pernicious competition not only from powerful
incumbents but also from hordes of low
cost competitors from elsewhere in the developing world. The globalization of production mak
es cheap, high
quality manufacturing a
widely available commodity. And because technology diffuses rapidly across borders, shop
floor innovations quickly spread from one manufacturer [End Page 53] to another. As
competition rises, profit margins and time h
orizons shrink. In response, fledgling firms eschew long
term investments in R&D and instead focus on lowering costs in existing
activities, “mastering open processes instead of developing proprietary ones.”69 In theory, globalization should help develop
g countries obtain and absorb advanced
technology. In practice, however, this may not occur because some of the knowledge and infrastructure necessary to absorb cer
tain technologies cannot be specified in a
blueprint or contained within a machine. Instead
they exist in peoples’ minds and can be obtained only through “hands
on” experience.70 The World Bank recently calculated
80 percent of the wealth of the United States is made up of intangible assets, most
notably, its system of property rights, its e
fficient judicial system, and the skills,
knowledge, and trust embedded within its society
.71 If this is the case, then
a huge chunk of what
separates the United States from China is not for sale and cannot be copied.
Economies and
militaries used to consi
st primarily of physical goods (e.g., conveyor belts and tanks), but today they are composed of systems that link physical go
ods to networks, research
clusters, and command centers.72 Developing countries may be able to purchase or steal certain aspects of

these systems from abroad, but many lack the supporting
infrastructure, or “absorptive capacity,” necessary to integrate them into functioning wholes.73 For example, in the 1960s, C
ummins Engine Company, a U.S. technological
leader, formed joint ventures
with a Japanese company and an Indian company to [End Page 54] produce the same truck engine. The Japanese plant quickly reac
hed U.S.
quality and cost levels while the Indian plant turned out second
rate engines at three to four times the cost. The reason,

according to Jack Baranson, was the “high degree of
technical skill . . . required to convert techniques and produce new technical drawings and manufacturing specifications.”74
This case illustrates how an intangible factor such as
skill can lead to signi
ficant productivity differences even when two countries have access to identical hardware.
Compared to developing
countries such as China, the United States is primed for technological absorption. Its
property rights, social networks, capital markets, flex
ible labor laws, and legions of
multinational companies not only help it innovate, but also absorb innovations created
Declinists liken the U.S. economic system to a leaky bucket oozing
innovations out into the international system. But

in the

alternative perspective,
the United States is
more like a sponge, steadily increasing its mass by soaking up ideas, technology, and
people from the rest of the world
. If this is the case, then
the spread of technology around the globe
may paradoxically fa
vor a concentration of technological and military capabilities in the
United States.

A2: Unsustainable


No imperial overstretch

our budget is slimming and our economy is
maintaining relative efficiency

Nye ’12
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., co
founder of
IR neoliberalism, University Distinguished Service Professor
at Harvard and former Dean of the Kennedy School of Government, “The Twenty
First Century Will Not
Be a ‘‘Post
American’’ World,” International Studies Quarterly (2012) 56, 215

It is currentl
y fashionable to compare American ‘‘hegemonic decline’’ to that of Britain or imperial Rome. It would be ahistorical to
believe that the United States will have a preponderant share of power resources forever. However,
the word ‘‘decline’’
mixes up two dif
ferent dimensions: absolute decline in the sense of decay, and relative
decline in which the power resources of other states grow greater or are used more
effectively. Rome, an agrarian society with little economic productivity and much
internecine warfare
, succumbed not to the rise of another empire but to absolute decay,
while Britain declined relative to the rise of new powers

such as Germany and the United States. And the
‘‘declinists’’ of the 1980s whose theories Layne tries to rescue developed a theor
y of ‘‘
imperial overstretch’’

in which
defense expenditures constantly increase as a share of GDP until the ‘‘hegemon’’ collapses. This theory helps
explain the
collapse of the Soviet Union
where defense expenditures eventually exceeded 20% of GDP,
but in
the United
States, despite two ill
advised wars in the past decade, defense expenditure at 6% has
decreased from its Cold War levels of 10%.
The analogy with British decline is misleading. Britain had naval
supremacy and an empire on which the sun never se
t, but
in 1914, Britain ranked only fourth among

great powers in its share of military personnel, fourth in GDP, and third in military

With the rise of nationalism, protecting the empire became more of a burden than an asset. For all the loos
e talk of
American empire,
the United States is less tethered and has more degrees of freedom than
Britain had.

And while Britain faced rising neighbors in Germany and Russia,
America benefits from two
oceans and weaker neighbors.

Actually our economy is s
till awesome

Nye ’12
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., co
founder of IR neoliberalism, University Distinguished Service Professor
at Harvard and former Dean of the Kennedy School of Government, “The Twenty
First Century Will Not
Be a ‘‘Post
American’’ World,” Internatio
nal Studies Quarterly (2012) 56, 215

Layne sees the current financial situation of the United States as proof of decline

even though

downgrading of
America’s credit rating

by Standard and Poors
led to an increase rather than a decrease in
holders’ desire to purchase US treasury bonds
. Similarly, Layne refers to ‘‘China’s vote of no
confidence in the dollar’s future,’’ but there is a gap between Chinese declaratory and practical policy. Despite its various

China continues to ho
ld dollars and is a long way from internationalization of
the renminbi.

The United States has very real problems and certainly needs to deal with its debt and deficit problems, but
the American economy remains highly productive. America remains first in to
tal R&D
expenditures, first in university rankings, first in Nobel prizes, first on indices of
entrepreneurship, and according to the World Economic Forum, the fifth most
competitive economy in the world

(China ranks 26th). Moreover,
the U
ins at the
forefront of such cutting
edge technologies as bio
tech and nano
. This is hardly a
picture of absolute economic decline such as in ancient Rome. Some observers worry that America will become sclerotic like Br
at the peak of its p
ower a century ago. But American culture is far more entrepreneurial and decentralized than was that of Britain
where the sons of industrial entrepreneurs sought aristocratic titles and honors in London. And despite recurrent historical
bouts of
mmigration helps keep America flexible. In 2005, foreign
born immigrants had
participated in one of every four technology start
ups in the previous decade
. As Lee Kwan
Yew once told me,
China can draw on a talent pool of 1.3 billion people, while the Unite
States can not only draw on a pool of 7 billion people, but can also recombine them in a
diverse culture that enhances creativity in a way that ethnic Han nationalism cannot.

Economics are irrelevant to unipolar stability theory

Wohlforth ’12

William C.
Wohlforth, Professor of Government at Dartmouth College and Chair of
the Department of Government, “How Not to Evaluate Theories,” International Studies Quarterly (2012)
56, 219

Unless I missed something, Layne’s theory is about how unipolarity generat
es systemic forces that work for a rapid return of bi

multipolarity. Much of Layne’s essay, by contrast, is about economics, primarily the shift in global GDP shares. As I noted e
Layne is certainly correct that the financial crisis and ‘‘great
recession’’ accelerated
China’s relative economic rise. But he provides no argument or evidence to show that
the unipolar distribution of capabilities stimulated, prompted, influenced, or affected
this change in any way.

As William Thompson (2006:17) obser
Layne never explains ‘‘why uneven
growth should be viewed as a function of unbalanced power.’’ The causes of economic
growth are exogenous to the theories under discussion, so fast or slower
economic growth of China, the United States, o
r any other country has no bearing on the
veracity of those theories.

Even if we were to accept Layne’s claim that a new polar structure has emerged, it would have
little to do with arguments he advanced about unipolarity. Indeed,
Layne provides no argumen
t or evidence
that clearly links the financial collapse, great recession, and consequent ballooning of
the US budget deficit to the international system at all

(at least, as scholars of international security
construe it). I am not aware of any study that
shows a connection between any US security commitment and the causes of the
economic downturn.
The downturn might affect the United States’ willingness to sustain
defense spending at 4

5% of GDP and may even prompt Washington to reevaluate some
of its secu
rity commitments

(though Layne probably exaggerates the magnitude),
but that does not mean
that defense spending or security commitments caused the downturn in the first place
Exogenously generated economic changes do not validate the balance
ofpower real
ists’ arguments.

Answers To

A2: Econ Turns Heg

Increased debt won’t hurt military primacy

, Senior Fellow New America Foundation,
’12 (Michael, “This Week In Threat Mongering

The Debt Version” The Century Foundation, http://tcf.org/blogs/botc/201

The fact is,
if last year’s debt limit debacle hasn’t already convinced other nations to be
skeptical of America’s future
, then I think
we’re probably in the clear.

Of course, the debt limit debate is
structive in this regard. Even though both parties agreed to a mandated reduction of the defense budget, which would basicall
return the Pentagon budget to FY 2007 levels (or what some might call, non
crazy levels of spending), the ink was barely dry on t
agreement before both parties began falling over themselves to restore the cuts. The House of Representatives even went so fa
r as to
take a sledgehammer, earlier this year, to key social safety net programs in order to prevent the Pentagon from taking a

Secretary of Defense Panetta practically ran around Washington with his hair on fire decrying the impact of sequestration cut

O’Hanlon and Lieberthal’s

predictions of doom are fanciful at best and are based on the
notion that the world is a dangerous place when in fact it’s never been safer
. But even if they
are right that their calamitous series of events could occur,
there are about $690 billion reason
s to believe
that the sort of defense cuts that would lead to this series of events will never happen

especially when the country can rely on esteemed national security experts to convince
Americans that if it were to occur the world would descend into a d
ystopian state.

But that
isn’t even the worst part of the debt