Egypt IMET Neg - adi2011

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Dec 14, 2013 (4 years and 17 days ago)

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ADI

2011


1

Frappier Russell


IMET Neg


Egypt IMET Neg


Egypt IMET Neg
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Error! Bookmark not defined.


***Neg


IMET Inherency

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..................

2

IMET funding high now (1/8)

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2

IMET funding high now (2/8)

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3

IMET funding high now (3/8)

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4

IMET funding high now (4/8)

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5

IMET funding high now (5/8)

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6

IMET funding high now (6/8)

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7

IMET funding high now (7/8)

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..............

8

IMET funding high now (8/8)

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9


***Neg


CMR

Advantage

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................

10

Egypt CMR Prevents Regional CMR

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10

CMR Bad (1/2)

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................................
..

10

C
MR Bad (2/2)

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..

13

*Solvency Take
-
outs

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..........................

14

CMR doesn’t solve terrorism (1/3)

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....

14

CMR doesn’t solve terrorism (2/3)

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....

15

CMR doesn’t solve terrorism (3/3)

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....

16

CMR increasing/high now (1/2)

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........

17

CMR increasing/high now (2/2)

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........

18

U.S. influence high now

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.....................

19

CMR can’t solve


Con
flict too great

................................

20

CMR stopped by military (1/5)

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..........

21

CMR stopped by military (2/5)

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..........

23

CMR stopped by military (3/5)

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..........

24

CMR stopped by military (4/5)

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..........

25

CMR stopped by military (5/5)

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26


***Neg


Stability Advantage

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...........

27

Regional Stability Increasing/Stable Now

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27

Pla
n Hurts Stability

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............................

27

Democracy Will Succeed Now (1/3)

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.

28

Democracy Will Succeed Now (2/3)

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.

30

Democracy Will Succeed Now (3/3)

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.

31

Plan Causes Democracy to Fail

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.........

32

Egypt Democracy Bad

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32

NATO

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................

33

Solvency Take
-
outs

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34


***Neg


IMET Solvency

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.................

35

Military focus guts solvency

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35

Egypt Reject Aid/Aid Fails

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...............

36

IMET can’t solve
-

timefram
e

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...........

37

Econ decline tanks solvency

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..............

39

Egyptian military kills transition (1/4)

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40

Egyptian military kills transition (2/4)

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41

Egyptian military kills transition (3/4)

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42

Egyptian military kills trans
ition (4/4)

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43


***Links to DAs

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44

Spending

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44

Politics

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45


***EU CP

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46

EU CP


Shell

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...

46

EU CP


Solvency

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47


***NED CP

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.......

48

NED CP


Shell (1/2)

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........................

48

NED CP


Shell (2/2)

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........................

49

NED CP


Solvency

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50


***Topicality

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....

51

Topicality 1/6

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51

Topicality 2/6

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52

Topicality 3/6

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53

Topicality 4/6

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....

54

Topicality 5/6

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....

55



ADI

2011


2

Frappier Russell


IMET Neg


***Neg


IMET Inherency

IMET
funding high

now

(
1
/
8
)

Egypt IMET funding won’t be cut


AFP 11

(“Foreign Aid Cuts would be ‘Detrimental’: Clinton,” February 15, 2011,
http://tribune.com.pk/story/
119202/foreign
-
aid
-
cuts
-
would
-
be
-
detrimental
-
clinton/) KJS

Clinton said she had told House Speaker John Boehner the
cuts would cause the

State Department and
US

Agency for International Development (USAID)
to scale back their

critical
roles in Iraq, Pakist
an and
Afghanistan.

The secretary of state also cited political upheaval in Egypt, the linchpin of US
peacemaking in the Middle East, as a key reason for keeping a strong diplomatic presence to help
defuse crises.

“Massive” cuts proposed by Republicans in
the House of Representatives will be detrimental
to America’s national security,” Clinton told reporters after talks with Boehner, the most powerful
Republican. “We need the resources to do the job, otherwise we will pay a higher price later in crises that

are
allowed to simmer and boil over into conflicts.” She said the State Department and USAID are “on the
frontlines” of US national security challenges and promotes American jobs as well. If the cuts go forward,
the US diplomatic apparatus would have to “
significantly” scale back its work in hotspots like Iraq,
Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as “critical” health, food security, climate change, border security and
trade promotion efforts abroad, Clinton noted. She proposed reaching “reasonable bipartisan

consensus” to
resolve the standoff. “We cannot recede from our presence anywhere in the world,” Clinton argued. The
State Department meanwhile released a copy of a letter Clinton sent to Hal Rodgers, chairman of the House
Appropriations Committee, in whic
h she said the proposed cuts would be “devastating” to national security.
The committee’s proposed 2011 spending levels for the State Department and USAID will result in a 16
percent drop from 2010 funding and would cut humanitarian assistance programs by
41 percent from last
year, according to Clinton. While her greatest concern was for the 2011 continuing resolution to keep her
agency running, the State Department rolled out a proposed 2012 budget of $47 billion, which it said was just
one percent more th
an comparable 2010 levels. The core foreign assistance budget is $32.9 billion, including
$3.3 billion in economic assistance to Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. It also includes nearly $1 billion in
economic and development assistance to “help strengthen a
nd stabilize fragile states, including support to
Yemen, Haiti, Liberia and Bangladesh and Sudan,” the State Department said. Supporting “key allies and
partners critical to our national security,”
the budget

also
includes

$3.1 billion in military assistan
ce to
Israel, and
$1.3 billion in military assistance for Egypt. Those funds maintain “traditional levels of
funding as we support the Egyptian people in their moment of transition,”

it added. Among the
proposals is eliminating foreign military financing t
o Chile, Haiti, Malta, East Timor and Tonga, for savings
of about $5 million, State Department officials told reporters. Nine countries will no longer receive assistance
for joining the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, where fo
reign military
officers train at US institutions. Those countries include Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait, Iceland, Madagascar,
Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and the United Arab Emirates, with savings of under $1 million.


IMET is currently funded in Egyp
t


IISS 11

(International Defence and Military Program, “Egypt and the US: Military Ties that Bind?, March 3, 2011,
http://www.iiss.org/whats
-
new/iiss
-
voices/?blogpost=127
) KJS

In 2010
, the US allocated $1.3bn in foreign military financing to Egypt


only Israel received more


and earmarked $1.4m for it through the International Military Education and Training programme
.
This may give Washington some leverage over the Egyptian governme
nt



although how much is open
to question. However, the relationship could obviously also prove problematic for the US should its
equipment be used against civilians.


ADI

2011


3

Frappier Russell


IMET Neg



IMET funding high now (
2
/
8
)

IMET’s expansion is solving now


AFNS 11
(“Education pro
gram promotes relationships, partnerships,”
The Disarm Journal,
July 5, 2011,
http://www.disamjournal.org/news/education
-
program
-
promotes
-
relationship
s
-
partnerships
-
177
) KJS

Today IMET's focus has extended increasingly to the Middle East and northern Africa
. Judkins called
this outreach a way
to address vulnerabilities to terrorism and other regional threats
. "The emphasis is
on the Middle East and Afr
ica because we know that terrorism will grow, and we know that vulnerable
countries are the most targeted," she said. In addition,
IMET is expanding its scope to provide more
noncommissioned officer education and training
, particularly for countries workin
g to build professional
NCO corps.
Mobile IMET education teams also have begun deploying to other countries to provide
training tailored to their specific needs. The impact can be significant, because a single team can
train 50 to 100 students at a time
, J
udkins said. Last year, mobile training teams provided about half of
all IMET training. Landay called IMET an important program that's almost universally recognized for its
contribution to U.S. national defense. "It's a superb program," he said. "Anybody y
ou talk to is a fan of the
IMET program."


IMET already effective


Moss 11

(Lorianne Woodrow

need qualification, “America’s Role During the Arab Spring, American Action
Forum February 28, 2011,
http://americanactionforum.org/content/americas
-
role
-
during
-
arab
-
spring
) KJS

Some of our strongest relationships in the region are military
-
to
-
military
, and some of our best
-
spent
aid dollars are on programs to improve military p
rofessionalism.
The U.S.
-
Egyptian military relationship
was, and

remains
, one of

our closest. Even as the police forces allegedly attacked protesters, the
Egyptian military conducted itself with great professionalism and restraint. The fact that a
temporar
y government takeover by the military leadership is being celebrated by so many in the
democracy movement speaks volumes of the esteem in which the Egyptian Armed Forces are held
.


IMET is just a drop in the bucket in a system that already works

4 reasons


Bruneau, Peggar, and Wright 8

(Researchers at the Center for Civil
-
Military Relations, “IMET Assessment
Project,” pg 28, 2008) KJS

First, IMET is only one tool among many used by the U.S. in its efforts to promote American values
and policies
, build part
nerships, influence foreign nations, and foster international cooperation.
IMET is
but one component of military assistance

provided by the U.S. to allied and friendly nations.
Military
assistance is itself but one element of U.S. foreign assistance and fo
reign assistance is just one tool
employed by the U.S. in its engagement efforts
throughout the globe. Accordingly, nations which receive
IMET funding are also likely to receive other sources of U.S. aid in the form of grants or loans.
Second,
many nations

which promote education and training through the IMET program also purchase
similar (or the same) courses using their own national funds
. They may also send attendees to these
courses using U.S. loaned funds through the Foreign Military Financing program.

The IMET program
budget is in many cases a tiny sliver of the much larger Foreign Military Sales or Foreign Military
Financing budgets, and accordingly is likely to finance sending a relatively small number of participants to
U.S. courses.
Third, the IMET

program does not exist in a vacuum. Many other nations
, including
Australia, Great Britain, India, France, Spain, Canada, China, Russia, Taiwan, and numerous others
have
similar military engagement programs
. These nations may offer education and training
to foreign
militaries on a grant, loan, reduced funding or reciprocal basis.
It is not uncommon for foreign military
officers, particularly those in the middle or latter part of their careers, to have pursued education
and training in more than one nation.

Fourth, in addition to its diplomatic efforts, the U.S. has ties to
countries throughout the world on a number of different levels. Nations interact with the U.S. in the
political sphere, militarily, through trade and economic relations, through academic,

scientific and
technical exchanges, and in many other arenas. IMET is just one tiny component of the massive and
complex interactions that occur between states on a regular basis.

ADI

2011


4

Frappier Russell


IMET Neg



IMET funding high now (
3
/
8
)

The US trains Egyptians under IMET now


Scie
nce Monitor 11
(Feb 3, “
America's best agents in Cairo: US
-
trained Egyptian officers;

Pentagon training of foreign military officers in the US may be the best investment in democracy. Thousands of
Egyptian officers have been exposed to US democratic value
s, Will those officers now stick with Mubarak?”, lexis)
MV

America's best hope for democracy

in Egypt and the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak may not be the
protesters in the streets. It
could be mid
-
level officers in Egypt's Army. Thousands of them have

received
official training and education in the United States, where they were exposed to the values of a
democratic societ
y, such as human rights and civilian rule over the military. As events unfold in Cairo, the
Army may yet turn the tide. Much depends

on how the rank and file see their role. The Army has already
stated it will not shoot the pro
-
democracy protesters. It even describes their demands as "legitimate." And yet
soldiers stood by this week when pro
-
Mubarak groups attacked the demonstrators in

Cairo. Many eyes are on
Lt. Gen. Sami Anan, the Egyptian Army's chief of staff, to see if he now feels pressure from the officer ranks
or common soldiers to turn against Mr. Mubarak. While he received training in Russia and France, he has
had regular cont
act with the Pentagon
. Egypt and the US have had close military ties since the 1979
Israeli
-
Egyptian peace treaty

-

but especially
because the US provides $1.3 billion in military aid to
Egypt, or about a third of its military budget
. In addition,
hundreds

of Pentagon officials operate in the
country
. But
Egypt

is one of many friendly but authoritarian
-
run countries
that sends officers to the US for

various types of
education
, usually at institutions such as the Army War College or the National Defense
Univ
ersity. The

officers come

under

a little
-
known program called International Military Education and
Training (
IMET
). Their informal contacts with Americans, it is hoped, will instill democratic values that
might be useful later during a confrontation in the
ir home country.


Egypt receives millions from the Pentagon for equipment and IMET


Sharp 11

(Specialist in Middle East Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, Jeremy M., June 17
th
,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf)

Egypt
also
receive
s

Excess Defense Articles
(EDA) worth

hundreds of millions of dollars annually
from the Pentagon
.
15
Egyptian officers participate in the

International Military and

Training
(IMET)
program ($1.4 million requested for FY2011) in order to facilitate U.S.
-
Egyp
tian military cooperation
over the long term.
IMET assistance makes Egypt eligible to purchase training at a reduced rate.
Bright Star is a multinational training exercise co
-
hosted by the United States and Egypt that helps
foster the interoperability of U
.S. and Egyptian forces and provides specialized training
opportunities for U.S. Central Command Forces (CENTCOM) in the Middle East. Eagle Salute is a
U.S.
-
Egyptian joint maritime training exercise conducted annually in the Red Sea.


Egypt already receive
s massive amounts of assistance from the US military


Sharp 11

(Jeremy M., Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, June 17
th
, “Egypt in Transition”
Congressional Research Service

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf) JJN

Egypt also receives Excess
Defense Articles

(EDA)
worth hundreds of millions of dollars annually from
the Pentagon.
15

Egyptian officers participate in the

International Military and Education Training (
IMET
)
program
16 ($1.4 million requested for FY2011)
in order to facilitate U.S.
-
E
gyptian military cooperation over
the long term. IMET assistance makes Egypt eligible to purchase training at a reduced rate. Bright
Star is a multinational training exercise co
-
hosted by the United States and Egypt that helps foster the
interoperability o
f U.S. and Egyptian forces and provides specialized training opportunities for U.S.
Central Command Forces

(CENTCOM)
in the Middle East. Eagle Salute is a U.S.
-
Egyptian joint
maritime training exercise conducted annually in the Red Sea.


ADI

2011


5

Frappier Russell


IMET Neg



IMET funding hig
h now (
4
/
8
)

IMET trains key decision making personnel

now


Armed Forces News Service 11

(7/5, “Education program promotes relationships, partnerships,”
http://www.disamjournal.org/news/education
-
program
-
promotes
-
relationships
-
partnerships
-
177) MV

They're a

testament to the popularity of the
I
nternational
M
ilitary
E
ducation and
T
raining program,
something officials say
provides a huge bang for the buck as it fosters

relationships and
military
-
to
-
military partnerships around the globe.



IMET is a State Depart
ment security assistance program,
managed by the Defense Department's Defense Security Cooperation Agency, to provide professional
military training and education to U.S. allies, Kay Judkins, DSCA's program policy manager, told American
Forces Press Servic
e.



Last year, IMET provided training to more than 7,000 students

from 130
countries.



"
That is building a lot of influence
," Judkins said. "And that is really what this program is all
about: influencing minds and hearts. It's about cooperation, forming rela
tionships and building partnership
capacity."



Because most students who receive the

highly coveted
IMET training slots are rising stars

within their respective militaries or governments, Judkins said
the impact of the program runs far deeper
than the numb
ers might indicate.


With an annual budget of about $110 million, IMET provides a great
return on investment, she said.
Nations that can afford it pay their students' education costs, and the U.S.
picks up the tab for those that can't
. For some of these na
tions, IMET represents their only source of
professional military education.



This education has a more lasting impact than any
weapons system or
military hardware

ever could, Judkins said.



"You could give a military a helicopter, but how much is that
hel
icopter going to make an influence on that country?" she said. "That helicopter will come and go. But
education and training could influence someone who becomes the next president of that country... and
remembers his relationships with the United States an
d with other countries
."



䅭o湧 the

thousands of
IMET alumni
around the world
are

Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and
Jordanian King
Abdullah

II bin al
-
Hussein.



Funding for IMET has increased, promoting regional stability and democracy


Johnson and Payne 10

(Andy
Johnson, Director, National Security Program at Third Way, former Staff
Director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Scott Payne, Senior Policy Advisor, National Security
Program at Third Way,
www.thirdway.org/publications/317
, July 27) MV

It i
s the State Department, not the Pentagon, which Congress has tapped to coordinate the main foreign
military training programs, viewing them as another element of foreign assistance.
The

International Military
Education and Training
(IMET) program’s objecti
ves are to further regional stability through better
military
-
to
-
military relations that culminate in increased understanding and cooperation
; to train
foreign militaries to support combined operations with U.S. forces;
and to train foreign militaries in
d
emocratic and human rights values to instill in their own government
.
The D
epartment
o
f
D
efense
performs the training under the State
-
funded IMET program

and trains roughly 7,000 foreign students
annually both inside and outside the US.1 The IMET program i
s diffuse, with training funds spread among
143 countries, and it has grown modestly in recent years.
Funding for the program went from $86 million
in 2006 to a request for $110 million in 2011, an average increase of 5% per year
, excluding Iraq and
Afgha
nistan.2 While there has been somewhat greater emphasis on targeting counterterrorism training, six
vital countries in the fight against al Qaeda (Algeria, Kuwait, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen)
together received only $8.9 million of IMET fund
ing in 2010.3


ADI

2011


6

Frappier Russell


IMET Neg



IMET funding high now (
5
/
8
)

The U.S. military already provides assistance to Egypt


including training


Darling 11

(Daniel, international military markets analyst with Forecast International Inc, Feb 4, “How Much
Influence Does $1.3 Billi
on Buy the U.S. With Egypt’s Military?”
http://thefastertimes.com/defensespending/2011/02/04/how
-
much
-
influence
-
does
-
1
-
3
-
billion
-
buy
-
the
-
u
-
s
-
with
-
egypts
-
military/) JJN

Washington’s contention is that such funding is crucial to maintaining a close military
relationship
with Egypt
, promoting interoperability between forces should future joint operations be required,

ensuring
U.S. military access to the Suez Canal

and over
-
flight routes needed to support American forces operating in
the region, and as a reward

to Egypt for continuing to uphold its peace agreement with Israel.
Another
unspoken factor is the benefit to the U.S. defense industry that comes from taxpayer
-
subsidized
Egyptian orders of American military hardware. In addition, the Pentagon also provid
es Egypt with
grants under the

International Military Education and Training (
IMET
)
program that sponsors the
training of Egyptian military students in the U.S. Some 4,200+ Egyptian students have been trained
under IMET
and the U.S. military considers the
program invaluable to creating closer ties between the two
sides.


Egypt is already receiving tons of U.S. aid


Sharp 11

(Jeremy M., Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, June 17th, “Egypt in Transition” Congressional
Research Service

http://www.fas.org/sg
p/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf) JJN

Between February and May 2011,
U.S. policy toward post
-
revolutionary Egypt was primarily concerned with
developing contacts with new political forces and working with the SCAF to ensure that the transition
struck a balance be
tween the need for the military to quickly relinquish power while at the same time
provide adequate time for

secular
reformers

and young revolutionaries
to formally organize themselves
politically in time for elections. The Administration also announced th
at

between $150 million and

$165
million

in existing Economic Support Funds (ESF)
would be reprogrammed to support
, among other things, economic
recovery and
democracy promotion to support nascent political parties and new elections. In addition, the
U.S.
Export
-
Import Bank has approved $80 million in insurance cover to support letters of credit
issued by Egyptian financial institutions. The Administration also has instructed

the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (
OPIC
)
to provide financial support to

encourage private sector investment in Egypt.


America is training Egypt’s top officers now


Thompson 11

(Mark, Writer for TIME magazine, “Sharing Democracy with the Egyptian military,”
http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2011/02/01/sharing
-
democracy
-
with
-
the
-
egyptian
-
military/
) CLS

Bahgat says the
Egyptian students

he has taught need what the U.S. military offers. "They
are exposed to
American culture a
nd values
," Bahgat says.
It changes their outlook
. "I don't want to say they're
brainwashed, but
almost all the information and education they receive in Egypt is government
-
controlled
,"
says the 1977 poli
-
sci graduate of Cairo University, who went on to g
et a master's degree in Middle Eastern studies from
the American University in Cairo in 1985 (and a Ph.D. in political science from Florida State University in 1991). "I'm alway
s surprised
at how strongly they believe that Egypt won the wars with Israel,"
he notes. "If you have a high school degree in the U.S., you know
that's not true, but its what they teach them in Egypt."
NDU students from Egypt and other countries spend up to a
year taking classes, and watching Congress in action

(or in inaction)
and s
ocializing with their U.S. and
international colleagues. The students selected for such programs are the country's top officers, usually
with the rank of colonel
, fairly
high up in the chain of command. Their U.S. experience is highly
regarded back home, a
nd can turbo
-
charge their career track. "Many of them become ambassadors
and generals
--

very important positions," Bahgat says
. "It's a small percentage, but
these are the people
who will be making the decisions and have the power."

Scales estimates such
exchange programs send
up to 20 foreign officers annually to several U.S. military schools to attend classes with their U.S.
counterparts and soak up the cultural norms of the U.S. military. "Over the years it has eroded away
the autocratic stranglehold th
at the Soviets had on Egyptian military
," Scales says. "
The long shadow
of the international fellows program is being felt in this revolution
."

ADI

2011


7

Frappier Russell


IMET Neg



IMET funding high now (
6
/
8
)

Massive IMET assistance now


MEPI 11

(The Middle East Partnership Initiative, “Fled
gling Democracies Have Full Support of U.S.”
http://mepi.state.gov/mh7111a.html) JS

IMET is

also frequently
used to bring Mobile Education Teams

(METs) or Mobile Military Training
Teams (MTTs)
to foreign countries to train larger numbers of students at one

time
. While one of the
goals of the IMET program is to familiarize foreign officers with U.S. values, customs and culture, some
countries prefer to use their IMET budgets to fund METs or MTTs instead. The MET can be a cost
-
effective
way to train many stud
ents at once. For example,
the country may be able to train more than 50 students
at once, the cost of bringing three or four instructors to their country
, rather than paying to cover the
tuition, travel and per diem expenses for all 50 students to travel
to the U.S. which would be considerably
more expensive. Then too, some countries require that their officers doing courses abroad receive per diem
equal to diplomatic personnel. These expenses can be very high indeed. In addition,
MEPI is providing
$6,50
0,000 in direct support to Egyptian civil society organizations. A number of new MEPI grants
are underway to expand citizen participation in public life, assist local grantees build networks that
strengthen their organizational skills, and support other t
ransition
-
related projects by Egyptian and
U.S. organizations, focusing on civil society, women, and youth.

In Egypt, women have marched,
blogged, and put their lives on the line. But they have seen their participation limited in this transition
period
. One Egyptian woman recently remarked, “The men were keen for me to be there when we were
demanding Mubarak should go. But now that he has gone, they want me to go home.”
MEPI is providing
assistance directly to women through new partnerships that help
breakdown longstanding professional
barriers that keep them from fully participating in the future of their country
.

For example, using MEPI
funds, the Arab Center for the Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession is teaching women to advocate

for their rights to
serve as prosecutors by giving them to skills to lobby judges and officials to change the law. A vibrant civil society is
a fundamental
element of a successful democracy. To help create an environment for civil society organizations

(CSOs) to thrive in Egypt, the
International Center for Not
-
for
-
Profit Law (ICNL) and MEPI are partnering with Egyptian CSOs to advocate for legal reform to enable
them to operate in a “safe legal space.” Through workshops and seminars, ICNL also strength
ens CSO participation in policy making
and implementation and is working with stakeholders to develop recommendations about and advocate for a new NGO law in Egypt.


US training extensive


Deen 11
(Thalif, writer for Global Realm, “Egypt’s US armed militar
y in transitory commanding role,”
http://theglobalrealm.com/2011/02/11/egypts
-
us
-
armed
-
military
-
in
-
transitory
-
commanding
-
role/
) CLS

When

embattled
Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak

reluctantly
called it quits

after more than two weeks
of mass demonstrations against his 30
-
year
-
old authoritarian regime,
he temporarily turned over the
country to an institution trained, armed and nurtured by the United S
tates: the 350,000
-

strong
military
.
“Mubarak was essentially a military man sustained by the military,” says an Arab diplomat, “So it’s not surprising he
expects the armed forces to take a commanding role.” Egypt’s formidable ground forces also include an

additional 300,000
-
strong
security force, including the National Guard, Frontier Corps, Coast Guard and the paramilitary units of the Ministry of Inter
ior, plus an
estimated 320,000 in army reserves.
The hefty 35 billion dollars in gratis military aid to
Egypt over the last 32
years


under the

U.S. Foreign Military Financing (
FMF
)
and

International Military Education and
Training (
IMET
)
programmes



was lavishly bestowed on the armed forces
which sustained and protected the
Mubarak regime since October 19
81. The State Department describes FMF, currently at 1.3 billion dollars annually, as “the backbone”
of Egypt’s military procurement budget. According to the latest 2011 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operation
s
released by the State Depart
ment, U.S. aid to Egypt includes funding for international narcotics control and law enforcement; non
-

proliferation, anti
-
terrorism and de
-
mining; combating weapons of mass destruction; counter
-
terrorism and security sector reforms.
Over the past decade,
about 85 percent of the arms in Egypt’s military arsenal originated in the United
States,

says Dan Darling, Europe and Middle East Military Markets Analyst at Forecast International, a U.S. based defence market
research firm. The U.S. assistance, however,
came with a condition attached to it, ensuring that virtually all of those funds be ploughed
back into the U.S. economy, according to the State Department. The funds could be utilised only to purchase U.S. equipment, t
hereby
indirectly subsidising the U.S.

defence industry, one of the most powerful political lobbies in the United States.
The U.S. aid
agreement
, both
with Egypt

and Israel,
was an integral part of the

historic
1979 peace treaty following
the 1978 U.S.
-
brokered Camp David peace accords
.
While
the Egyptians were hamstrung, the Israelis were not. After
strong lobbying by the Israeli government, the United States granted an exception to the Jewish state: it could use a sizeabl
e part of the
U.S. funds to buy equipment made in Israel. For Egypt it w
as a “one
-
way street”, Pieter Wezeman, senior researcher in the Arms
Transfers Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), told IPS.

ADI

2011


8

Frappier Russell


IMET Neg



IMET funding high now (
7
/
8
)

Current IMET causes stability now


Miles 11

(Donna, American Fo
rces Press Service, “Education program promotes relationships, partnerships”,

http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123262516, 7/5/2011) JS

With an annual budget of about $110 million, IMET provides a great return on investment, she said. Nations
that can a
fford it pay their students' education costs, and the U.S. picks up the tab for those that can't.
For
some

of these
nations, IMET represents their only source of

professional
military education
.
This
education has a more lasting impact than any weapons sy
stem

or military hardware
ever could
, Judkins
said. "You could give a military a helicopter, but how much is that helicopter going to make an influence on
that country?" she said. "That helicopter will come and go. But
education and training could influe
nce
someone who becomes the next president of that country... and remembers his relationships with the
United States
and with other countries." Among the thousands of IMET alumni around the world are
Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jorda
nian King Abdullah II bin al
-
Hussein.
Yudhoyono attended the Army's Airborne and Ranger schools, as well as the Infantry Officer Advanced
Course at Fort Benning, Ga., and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth,
Kan. Abdullah a
ttended the Defense Resource Management Course at the Naval Postgraduate School in
Monterey, Calif. Other IMET graduates have gone on to become leaders in their armed forces. "
IMET is an
investment
," Judkins said. "It's not one of those things where you
can always see the rewards after the very
first course." Sometimes the payoff takes time, as students who first participate in IMET as young
lieutenants return for more advanced courses as they rise through the ranks to become military and
government lea
ders in their home countries. "We have an investment
that

takes years to develop and mold,
but generally

pays off in dividends
," Judkins said. Those dividends demonstrate themselves in ways big and
small.
Judkins pointed to the responsible way the Egypti
an military
--

a longtime participant in the
IMET program
--

has responded to protest movements there, as one indicator
. Another dividend can be
seen in Afghanistan and previously in Iraq, where many nations that benefited through IMET sent troops to
supp
ort international coalitions working together in support of operatios Enduring Freedom and Iraqi
Freedom. On a smaller scale, Judkins recalled a recent incident in which a Guatemalan military helicopter
inadvertently ventured across the Mexican border and

crashed there. What could have turned into an
international incident didn't, thanks to understanding generated through IMET. "When it was all said and
done, it turned out that the (Guatemalan) helicopter pilot and one of the (Mexican) officers on the gro
und
knew each other because they had attended training together through IMET," Judkins said. "And because
they knew each other, they understood that it wasn't intentional. It dissolved a big issue that could have
become deadly in some instances."
IMET stu
dents

who attend classes side
-
by
-
side with their U.S.
counterparts
get exposure to

the U.S. professional military establishment, from military procedures to
how
the armed forces operate under civilian control
.
This
, Judkins explained,
forms the foundation
for
strong military
-
to
-
military relations, increased understanding and closer defense cooperation that
enhance regional stability
.
But IMET education extends beyond the classroom as students get exposure to the American way of
life and ideals: democratic
values, respect, individual and human rights, and belief in the rule of law, among them, Judkins said. "It's
one thing to say, 'Here's what we do in the United States,'" said Navy Vice Adm. William E. Landay III, the DSCA director. "I
t's another
thing to
say, 'Come to a war college for a year and sit through that and talk to people and go out in town and understand our values a
nd
how we apply them
--

from our democratic principles to our civilian control of the military."


USFG already funds IMET and simil
ar organizations



Sharp 11

(Jeremy Sharp, Writing for CRS, Specialist on Middle Eastern Affairs, June 17, 2011.
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/167872.pdf
)

Egypt also recei
ves Excess Defense Articles (EDA) worth hundreds of millions of dollars annually from the Pentagon.15
Egyptian officers participate in the International Military and Education Training (IMET) program16
($1.4 million requested for FY2011) in order to facili
tate U.S.
-
Egyptian military cooperation over the
long term. IMET assistance makes Egypt eligible to purchase training at a reduced rate. Bright Star is
a multinational training exercise co
-
hosted by the United States and Egypt that helps foster the
interop
erability of U.S. and Egyptian forces and provides specialized training opportunities for U.S.

Central Command
Forces

(CENTCOM) in the Middle East. Eagle Salute is a U.S.
-
Egyptian joint maritime training
exercise conducted annually in the Red Sea.

ADI

2011


9

Frappier Russell


IMET Neg



IMET fu
nding high now (
8
/
8
)

Egyptian army trustable now


30 years of American training


Bannerman 11
(Graeme, writer for United States Institute of Peace, former US Senate Foreign Relations
Committee staff member, professor at Georgetown University, and founder
of Bannerman consulting
firm, “All Eyes On the Egyptian Military,”
http://www.usip.org/publications/all
-
eyes
-
on
-
the
-
egyptian
-
military
) CLS

30 years of military cooperation b
etween Egypt and the United States

in some ways
has transformed
the Egyptian military
.
30 years ago the officer corps was trained and educated in the Soviet bloc
.
Americans were viewed with suspicion, and as subverting Egyptian national interests. Being as
sociated with
Americans could be harmful to one’s career.
Today, thousands of military officers have trained with
Americans. They undergo the same human rights training as does the American military. They
understand us
--

and many have close personal friend
s in the American military.

American officers and
troops are no longer seen as threatening.
Differences of policy are recognized, but these are issues to be
discussed and not barriers to cooperation.



America already provides many varieties of military ai
d to Egypt


Curry 11

(Tom, national affairs writer, 2/11, “New challenges for U.S.
-
Egyptian military ties,”
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/cleanprint/CleanPrintProxy.aspx?unique=1311824591185) JJN

For a relationship that might appear right now


to provide the Un
ited States with only limited


influence,
the American investment in Egypt


has cost billions of dollars and taken many


forms. Last year
, for example,
the
Obama

administration
awarded a $213 million

contract to Lockheed Martin for production of


20 new F
-
16s for Egypt
, which already owns


240 of the planes. “
This is a

great day for

Lockheed Martin and a
testament to the


enduring partnership and commitment we


have made to the government of Egypt
,” said


Lockheed Vice
President John Larson.
Other recent De
fense Department investments


range from $210 million for
refurbishment


and upgrading of four U.S.
-
made frigates in


the Egyptian Navy to $145 million for anti
-
ship


missiles

made by Boeing.

Egyptian officers train at American military


staff colleges und
er the
International Military


and Education Training program, funded at


about $1.4 million a year.




ADI

2011


10

Frappier Russell


IMET Neg




***
Neg


CMR Advantage

Egypt CMR Prevents Regional CMR

Selective aid causes backlash


turns case


Sky 11

(Ema Sky, Arab Spring…American Fall?” Harva
rd University Institute of Politics. Summer 2011.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb137/is_2_33/ai_n57856889/?tag=mantle_skin;content
)


So far,
the Obama Administration has responded reactively

to the situation in the Middle East as it unfolds,
sending different signals to those countries where the United States has significant national interests

(
for instance, Bahrain where the US fifth fleet is
stationed) than from those where US interests are more limited.
The trouble with
this approach is that people in the region are quick to point out the inconsistencies and double
standards in how the United States responds.

They accuse the United States of
being slow to support
the people of

Tunisia
and Egypt, and of being non
-
supportive of the people of

Yemen
.
They criticize the United
States for not pushing
Saudi Arabia

to reform. They ask why the United States intervenes in Libya but not
Bahrain
,
fueling
greater sectarian suspicions and giving credence to accusations that the United States is anti
-
Shi'a.
Such sectarian concerns may increase the connection between Arab Shi'a and Iran as they invariably
look for moral and actual support in the face of what t
hey perceive as discrimination by US
-
backed
Shia rulers.


ADI

2011


11

Frappier Russell


IMET Neg



CMR

Bad

(1/
2
)

Civil
-
military conflict is good


ensures effective mission planning


Murdie 10

(Amanda, phD, dept of polisci @ KSU, “The Bad, the Good, and the Ugly: The
Curvilinear Effects of Civi
l
-
Military Conflict on International Crisis Outcome,” p5,
http://polisci.osu.edu/conferences/vim/VIMMurdiedocument.pdf
) JJN

First,
civil
-
military friction is needed to ensure tha
t the military has leeway over their domain of war
fighting. Without friction, it is too easy for bureaucratic mission creep to result in a situation of
subjective control and, thus, civilians making decisions outside of their realm of expertise.
22 Subject
ive
control of military forces by

Russia president Boris
Yeltsin is one explanation
, for example,
for that military's
ineffectiveness in the First Chechnya conflict in 1994 and 1995.

During this time, both Desch and Herspring contend
the Yeltsin had the m
ilitary under “subjective control mechanisms."23 According to Herspring, Yeltsin had overstepped his bounds in
the war planning, instigating maneuvers that he army did not have the training or equipment to carry out successfully. Perhap
s
increased friction

from the military to civilians would have improved the war planning that occurred
in the lead up to the conflict.

However, Yeltsin had effectively silenced all critiques from officers during this time period, even
starting criminal proceedings against di
scontents. In the new quantitative data I use in this paper, I also see dynamic with respect to
Russia. There is a dramatic decrease in the overall conflictual intensity of civil
-
military friction in the time period immediately prior to
the First Chechnya

conflict. In fact, there are twelve times as many cooperative events between military officers and civilians as there
are conflictual (friction) events in 1993.
This could indicate that any civil
-
military friction was not allowed by
civilian leaders, lead
ing to mission creep that harmed war fighting by limiting the input and expertise
of military officers on the conduct of the war.



Military pushback increases innovation and initiative, which is key to crisis management


Murdie 10

(Amanda, phD, dept of
polisci @ KSU, “The Bad, the Good, and the Ugly: The
Curvilinear Effects of Civil
-
Military Conflict on International Crisis Outcome,” p 6
-
7,
http://polisci.osu.edu/conferences/vim/
VIMMurdiedocument.pdf
) JJN

In addition,
civil
-
military friction can serve as an indicator of military initiative. Initiative is a process
of fighting efficiently and utilizing military expertise to insure that the fighting plans provide a
strategic advant
age. Having a military that is able to update battle plans and take initiative on the
field has long been thought of as essential in military effectiveness and victory.

According to the
democratic peace literature, soldiers in democratic countries are mor
e likely to take initiative on the
battlefield, forcing their opponents to follow their battle plan and, in the long run, contributing to successful
bargaining outcomes.25 Though democracies typically have soldiers with more initiative, the larger
litera
ture views military initiative as a crucial component for military effectiveness across regime types. As
such,
indicators of military initiative should make victory more for any state in crisis.

There is no reason
to expect that initiative by soldiers on
the battlefield would not be observed off the battlefield as well. It
seems likely that mil
itary initiative could result in disagreements with civilian leaders as to battlefield
and training decisions.
In other words, in taking the initiative,
officers are

going to have to present ideas
to civilian leaders which could run counter to the civilian's preexisting desires and plans. When they
are able to do that, overall military effectiveness will be improved.

As such, in addition to the large
advantage that de
mocracies have in crisis bargaining, it follows that civil
-
military friction, as an indicator of
military initiative, will contribute to military effectiveness and crisis bargaining success. This
conceptualization of mid
-
level civil
-
military conflict is fu
ndamentally different than Feaver's principal
-
agent
account in many regards. Yet, unlike Feaver, the military may not be “shirking” when they voice opinions in
an insolent manner. Instead,
the military, by stressing their divergent preferences

and advice,
may be
involved in a process of conflictual relations with the civilian leadership that will result in a more
preferred outcome for all parties. As such, some civil
-
military conflict may lead to innovation, as it did
in the case of Russian military use of
fuel oil explosives in 1999

in Dagestan.28 The military had
continually pressed for the use of these explosives from Yeltsin; if they had not "shirked" and just fought the
war as they had had been requested to do, the military would not have been as effe
ctive on the ground. Later,
Putin recognized the validity of their request and gave them permission to use the explosives.29 Feaver's
conceptualization of "shirking" does not appear to allow for any achievement of the principal's goals; it is
mainly vie
wed as a negative for overall military operations. Instead, as presented here,
some push
-
back
ADI

2011


12

Frappier Russell


IMET Neg


from

the agents,
military officers
,

to

their principals,
the civilian

leadership,
can

be indicative of military
initiative and, as such,
contribute to overall cr
isis success.

ADI

2011


13

Frappier Russell


IMET Neg


CMR Bad (2/
2
)

Full civilian control over the military decreases states’ abilities to resolve conflicts


Murdie 10

(Amanda, phD, dept of polisci @ KSU, “The Bad, the Good, and the Ugly: The Curvilinear Effects of
Civil
-
Military Conflict on In
ternational Crisis Outcome,” p 7
-
8,
http://polisci.osu.edu/conferences/vim/VIMMurdiedocument.pdf
) JJN

Within the crisis bargaining model, information is a necessary component for
successful bargaining short of war and a key component to
outcome success once war has begun.30
The military, as the
key guardians and

experts of the force structure,
maintains a more updated view of military capabilities than the civilian leadership. By p
roviding this
information to civilian leaders, the civilian leadership is better able to bargain successfully short of war
and will be more choosy in the crises it is in
, all l
eading to

a better likelihood of crisis bargaining
victory.
In
providing this in
formation to the civilian leadership, however, friction is likely.
The civilian leadership may have
preexisting beliefs about the strength of a certain strategy or force structure. They even can have
certain preexisting beliefs about how issues can be sol
ved without involving military force
, as Clinton did
prior to the Haiti invasion of 1994.31
When the military provides advice to the contrary of a civilian
leadership’s pre
-
existing beliefs, it is likely that that this will be a somewhat conflictual ev
ent.
However,
it is also likely that the overall result will be much improved.

For example, Brooks 's account of the differences between Egypt's
abysmal performance in the 1967 Arab
-
Israeli war and the 1973 Arab
-
Israeli war is highly dependent on the i
ncreased information
Sadat had in 1973 from his military leaders.32 As Brooks points out, “Sada had unfettered access to multiple sources of in
formation."
33 This information from military officers, however, was definitely not free of conflict. The m
ilitary frequently had somewhat serious
friction with Sadat in the pre
-
war planning phase of 1972. This was especially true when military officers had to provide Sadat with
information he did not expect or like. Despite this friction, information from the
military as to capabilities is necessary for civilian
leaders to recognize their bargaining situation short of war or to bargain successfully during a conflict situation. As such,

when the
military is able to provide this information, victory in a crisis i
s more likely. When subjective control
mechanisms do not allow this information to be conveyed to the leadership or when the military is too
“civilianized” to want to provide conflictual information to the leadership, it is more likely that the
civilian le
adership will be disadvantaged in crisis bargaining situations.


Civil military conflict is key to deterring conflict


Murdie 10

(Amanda, phD, dept of polisci @ KSU, “The Bad, the Good, and the Ugly: The Curvilinear Effects of
Civil
-
Military Conflict on

International Crisis Outcome,” p 7
-
8,
http://polisci.osu.edu/conferences/vim/VIMMurdiedocument.pdf
) JJN

Finally,
civil
-
military friction can serve as a signal to adversaries that

the military is mobilizing

or, at the
very least, discussing battle plans. Quite basically,
it can provide necessary information concerning the use of
objective civilian control within the state. This information is necessary to reinforce the credibility
of a
threat of force during crisis bargaining.
35 When bargaining, there are incentives for states to “bluff,” indicating that they
have more resolve or better capabilities than they actually do. Therefore,
states seek ways to provide information to
sign
al their resolve and capabilities in order to show the credibility of their threat, improving their
bargaining outcome. Consistent with the crisis bargaining model, this information can lead to
capitulation by the other side as it updates its beliefs conc
erning likely outcomes of conflict and
reevaluates possible bargains on the table.



There’s little impact to CMR, and too much military complacency weakens crisis
bargaining


Murdie 10

(Amanda, phD, dept of polisci @ KSU, “The Bad, the Good, and the Ugly
: The Curvilinear Effects of
Civil
-
Military Conflict on International Crisis Outcome,” p 7
-
8,
http://polisci.osu.edu/conferences/vim/VIMMurdiedocument.pdf
) JJN

Do civil
-
military r
elations impact crisis outcome? The results shown here indicate that
civil
-
military conflict has a non
-
monotonic relationship with crisis success. Like Goldilocks and porridge, conflict can be either “too
hot” or “too cold.”

However, mid
-
level civil
-
milita
ry friction does appear to improve the likelihood of crisis bargaining success.
This project thus serves as a reminder of the importance of both halves of Feaver's “problematique”: the military has to be b
oth under the
control of the civilian leadership bu
t still emboldened in its mission directive. Unlike Feaver but very similar to Huntington, I argue that
a military too complacent to the civilian leadership limits military effectiveness by diminishing
military fighting and limiting the information both

the civilian leadership and the adversary has in a
crisis bargaining situation.
ADI

2011


14

Frappier Russell


IMET Neg



*Solvency Take
-
outs

CMR doesn’t solve terrorism

(1/3)

CMR doesn’t prevent terror


Western militaries not equipped to teach


Lyon 4
(Rod, PhD, School of International Studie
s, Queensland University, Civil
-
Military Relations in an
Age of Terror,
http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/2290/lyon.pdf
, 2004) CLS

So what did September 11 create? It galvani
sed civilian leadership throughout the Western world, and
engaged them in the security predicaments of a new age. Civilians, in short, came back to the idea that
strategic studies was a discipline worthy of intellectual endeavour. Moreover,
September 11 si
gnaled a
refocusing of Western military capabilities towards the threat posed by that most worrying of non
-
state actors, the transnational terrorist group
. An important element of that refocusing was a greater
degree of liberation from the restrictive mand
ates typical of UN
-
authorised missions.
On its face,
September 11 seems to have signaled an important watershed in security
.
But
, at least so far,
it has done
rather less to change the central terms of

the third
civil
-
military age than we might imagine
. 8
Since
September 11 2001,
Western militaries

have undoubtedly returned to the use of force, and indeed to the use
of force in manners


if not quantities


suggestive of the robust military engagements of the first age of
civil
-
military relations. But those


uses of force’ have at times stretched our understanding of what it
means to use military force at all. Military capacities to ‘manage’ small
-
group terrorist violence have
been the source of considerable dispute. Western militaries had never been built t
o ‘manage violence’
on that scale
, but to address the threat of inter
-
state war, ‘trinitarian war’ as some have called it.
Western
military capacities can be brought to bear on a non
-
state actor. But those militaries were not designed
to address the peculi
arities of the transnational terrorist challenge, which have both an internal and an
external dimension
.


No solvency


CMR not stable against terrorism


Lyon 4
(Rod, PhD, School of International Studies, Queensland University, Civil
-
Military Relations in

an
Age of Terror,
http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/2290/lyon.pdf
, 2004) CLS

Academic theorists have speculated for some time that the shape of the security environment coul
d
have a profound effect upon the nature of civil
-
military relations
.
The best model in that regard is the one provided
by Michael Desch, in his excellent book, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment. The thrust of D
esch’s
work

was an attempt to show that
civil
-
military relations were closely related to the idiosyncrasies of the
security environment within which they were nurtured. That environment shaped the levels of
engagement of civil and military leaders, and their relative

perceptions of priorities, focus, and the
need for cooperative endeavor. When external security threats were high and internal security threats
low
, argued Desch,
civil
-
military relations encountered their most favourable environment. Where the
opposite c
ondition held


external security threats were low and internal security threats high


conditions for smooth civil
-
military relations were at their least favourable
.
In the intermediate environments


where threats from both sources were high, or threats
from both were low


conditions for sound civil
-
military relations were mixed and
uncertain.
Desch has shown us that security environments do shape civil
-
military relations. He has not
shown us, in particular, how the War on Terror will shape them
. In some

important 9 respects
, the age
of terror takes us outside the neat categories of the Desch model. Terrorism obliges us to confront a
threat that has both internal and external dimensions, and is indeed transnational in its reach and
character
.
In Desch’s m
odel, external and internal threats are different threats, but in the War on Terror they might well be the same
threat. That offers some prospect for diminishing the tension between internal and external policy choices that the Desch mod
el would
predict. B
ut
there’s a worrying element to that interconnectivity of internal and external threat profiles,
because it suggests that neither dimension of the threat, external or internal, can be addressed singly
.
In
the almost three years since September 2001, Weste
rn policy
-
makers have taken to heart the new threats to homeland security, and
money and resources have flowed to law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies and defence forces in an attempt to offset

those
threats. In terms of the particular threat en
vironments outlined above, the current age is perhaps most like one of Desch’s intermediate
conditions. But
analysts might well argue about whether the external and internal threats were either both
high or both low, and insofar as either applies
, we shoul
d accept that
we are facing an environment in
which civil
-
military relations will probably not run as smoothly as they did during the Cold War. In an
ADI

2011


15

Frappier Russell


IMET Neg


environment where threats are not easily distinguishable and separable
, indeed where external and
internal

threats mesh and intertwine,
the prospects are high for a loss of focus, and for contention over
the priorities of security policy and for where force might appropriately be brought to bear.


CMR doesn’t solve terrorism (2/3)

Teaching fails


American CMR

breaks down with terrorism


Lyon 4
(Rod, PhD, School of International Studies, Queensland University, Civil
-
Military Relations in an
Age of Terror,
http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/e
xhibits/2290/lyon.pdf
, 2004) CLS

Counter
-
terrorism is
, in fact,
a multi
-
faceted thing: it draws upon resources, capabilities and skills
spread across the military, the law enforcement agencies, and the economic, the social and the political
worlds.

Force,

or at least force in the sense that Western militaries have classically understood that term, is not used as easily as we
would like, and constrained by a series of practical and political difficulties. Countering terrorists requires us to wage wa
r a part
icular
way, by manhunts as much as by classic operational campaigns. Indeed, using military power against terrorism requires us to b
e acutely
sensitive to the limitations of such use, when Western militaries have traditionally felt most comfortable waging
relatively unlimited
wars (Hoyt 2004: 166).

Why is this relevant? Because recent research shows that


at least in the United
States


non
-
veteran civilians differ from veteran civilians and military elites in important ways in
their views on the use of fo
rce
. The work of Peter
Feaver and

Christopher
Gelpi points to differing views
on the utility of force, when resort to force is appropriate and how force should be used

(Feaver and
Gelpi 2004). How and where do those groups vary? From the research,
non
-
vete
ran civilians are more
ready to resort to the use of force than are veterans and military elites: and this split is the basis of
what is called the ‘chicken
-
hawk’ phenomenon in the United States
.
Secondly, non
-
veteran civilians are more
likely than veteran
s or military officers to use force in smaller, graduated packages. The second group tends to favour more decisive use
of force once a decision to resort to force has been taken. And thirdly, non
-
veteran civilians are more likely than military elites and
v
eterans to deploy military forces under ambiguous mandates and restrictive conditions. Militaries tend to favour mandates tha
t do not
tie their hands.

In brief

then,
veterans and military elites are not drawn naturally towards a dynamic of
proactivism in s
trategic policy, nor towards ‘graduated’ war, nor to ambiguity and complexity in
military tasking
.


Western CMR doesn’t translate


Latin America proves


Lyon 4
(Rod, PhD, School of International Studies, Queensland University, Civil
-
Military Relations in
an
Age of Terror,
http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/2290/lyon.pdf
, 2004) CLS

Western militaries are subject to civilian oversight and a restricted area of professionalism: ex
pertise,
social responsibility and corporateness are each defined in a manner that makes sense to the role of
militaries in Western societies
. In those societies,
Western militaries are externally oriented and play
almost no domestic role in social and pol
itical activities. They are ‘professional’

in the sense identified
by Samuel Huntington. Claude Welch and Rebecca Schiff are amongst those academics who have argued
that the Huntington version of civil
-
military relations is, in fact, quintessentially Weste
rn.
By contrast,
students of civil
-
military relations in the

developing
world start from an assumption that militaries are
central to the political life of those societies. In such circumstances, militaries are national institutions
surrounded by few compe
titors and weak civilian partners. Their central role springs from both the
military’s own organisational cohesion and the relative weakness of civilian ‘power centres’ within the
society
.
This is a point that Huntington endorses in his work, Political Ord
er in Changing Societies. There he observed that militaries
that over
-
reach themselves are seldom impelled to do so by factors internal to the military institution itself. Rather, their overreach
ing is
the product of civilian failure: the weakness of civil
ian institutions and the thinness of mechanisms available to civilian leaders to redress
their problems in some other form: ‘the most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but polit
ical, and
reflect not the social and organ
isational characteristics of the military establishment, but the political and institutional structure of the
society’ (Huntington 1968: 194)
Militaries which take up the mantle of political and social responsibilities
differ in important ways from their t
raditional Western counterparts. Alfred Stepan did
the bulk of his
civil
-
military research on Latin America, and

he
argued

over 30 years ago
that regional militaries there
were driven by pressures of internal security towards role expansion. What counted a
s professionalism
in Western militaries
, argued Stepan,
was inappropriate for Latin American militaries. There,
militaries were pulled by the comparative weakness of civilian institutions towards an expansion of
their roles
; towards what Stepan termed ‘new

professionalism’, in which they would be obliged to take on
more of the skills of the administrator, the politician and the economist (Stepan 1973)


ADI

2011


16

Frappier Russell


IMET Neg



CMR doesn’t solve terrorism (3/3)

American CMR dysfunctional


ensures teaching fails


Hoffman 7
(Frank,

Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “Derilection of Duty Redux?”
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200711.hoffman.derelictionofdutyredux.html
) CLS

It is cle
ar by now that the protracted war in Iraq uncovered fissures and dysfunctional elements
involved in American civil
-
military relations
. Indeed,
there has been a dangerous undertow in civil
-
military discourse for some time
. Before the war,
Dr. Richard Kohn o
f UNC

Chapel Hill
concluded that
relations were “extraordinarily poor” and that a tear in the national fabric existed
.[1] One could argue
that the fabric is now completely rent, but we can hope it is not beyond repair. The war has exacerbated the
situation

appreciably, enough to suggest that a sequel to Colonel H.R. McMaster’s classic book Dereliction
of Duty is in order.
The nation’s leadership, civilian and military, need to come to grips with the
emerging “stab in the back” thesis in the armed services a
nd better define the social compact and code
of conduct that governs the overall relationship between the masters of policy and the dedicated
servants we ask to carry it out
. Our collective failure to address the torn fabric and weave a stronger and
more e
nduring relationship will only allow a sore to fester and ultimately undermine the nation’s security.



ADI

2011


17

Frappier Russell


IMET Neg



CMR
i
ncreasing
/high

n
ow

(1/2)

The U.S. and Egypt already have a close military relationship


Egypt shares U.S. views
on CMR


Economist 11
(Feb 24 “M
ilitary
-
to
-
military relationships: The ties that bind
-

America’s
armed forces may sometimes succeed where its diplomats cannot,”
http://www.economist.com/node/18227542
) JJN


The cornerstone of America
’s “mil
-
mil” relationship with Egypt is the $1.3 billion in annual foreign
military financing

that it has handed over since 1979 as “untouchable compensation” for Egypt’s peace with Israel.
Over 30
years the Egyptian armed forces have replaced Soviet
-
era w
eapons with top
-
notch American kit
, such as
F
-
16 fighters and M1 tanks. How much influence this buys the Americans is debatable: they tread a fine line between giving advi
ce and
appearing to dictate. But the example of Iran, which saw its advanced American

weapons rapidly fall into disrepair after the fall of the
Shah, is a warning of what could happen to Egypt if ties with America go irretrievably wrong. The links are personal too.
While
demonstrations in Egypt escalated there was frequent contact between

the secretary of defence, Robert
Gates
,
and his Egyptian counterpart
, Field
-
Marshal Muhammad Tantawi.
The chairman of the joint chiefs of staff
,
Admiral Mike Mullen,
was also talking to the Egyptian army chief
, Lieutenant General Sami Enan, who
had been at

the Pentagon only in late January for discussions about combined training.

Mr Gates and Admiral Mullen were
urging their Egyptian chums to do exactly what they so far have done

gently shove Mr Mubarak to the exit, restore calm and preside
over an orderly
transition while reiterating support for peace with Israel. Major General Robert
Scales, a retired commandant
of the US Army War College, argues that the passage of large numbers of the best and brightest
Egyptian officers through American war colleges has

suffused the army with American values. He

recently
said: “They learn our way of war…but they also learn our philosophies of civil
-
military
relations.”


Egypt’s new constitution will solve CMR


Hendawi and El Deeb 11

(
Hazma and Sarah, AP journalists, 7/21
, “Egypt refuses international election
monitors,” http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2015665376_apmlegypt.html
)

JJN

A key member of a panel drafting guidelines for Egypt's next constitution said

Wednesday
that most of
the group's 50 members

object to giving the military a future role in politics.

Legal expert Tahany el
-
Gibali said
the binding principles will have enough guarantees to protect the rights of all Egyptians while also safeguarding the civilia
n character of
the state. Another lega
l expert and panel member, Mohammed Nour Farahat, said
the panel would submit the draft to the
military, but that it would be up to the generals sitting on the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to
decide what to do with the document
-

adopt it without ch
ange, amend it, issue it by decree or put it up for a referendum.
They said the draft is likely to be ready in a matter of days and that
it would represent a compromise that bridges the
gap between Islamists and the rest of the country's political forces o
ver the selection of those to be
mandated to draft the constitution and the nature of the charter wanted by most Egyptians.


ADI

2011


18

Frappier Russell


IMET Neg



CMR increasing/high now (2/2)

Egyptian CMR high now


Thompson 11
(Mark, Writer for TIME magazine, “Sharing Democracy with the Egy
ptian military,”
http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2011/02/01/sharing
-
democracy
-
with
-
the
-
egyptian
-
military/
) CLS

"
Egypt, more so than anyone else in th
e region, is dependent on U.S. support," says

Stephen Biddle,
a
military expert with the Council on Foreign Relations. "And one of the things the U.S. insists on when
we give that support is that we try to socialize aid
-
receiving militaries in American sty
le civil
-
military
relations
." In a U.S. context,
that means the military is professional and restrained
--

and stays out of
politics
,
Biddle says. "They're in a very ambiguous situation
--

they haven't called for Mubarak's ouster, but they haven't fired on

the
protesters," he says. "The key question is how much has this American socialization taken?" Daniel Brumberg of the U.S. Insti
tute of
Peace says the Egyptian military won't be able to sit on the sidelines forever
. "
The Egyptian military may find itself

compelled to play an arbitrating role in a new democracy,"

he says. "That's a much more complicated
role, and in a sense it has become politicized in a way it wasn't before
--

and it's not going to be able to shirk
that off." That flips the normal underst
anding of a
military's proper mission on its head. "We think when
transitioning to a democracy that the military is going
to be more sidelined, but it could be for the next
few months, or even years, that
the military will find its role enhanced
," Brumberg

says. "They probably
didn't intend for that to happen when they threw their weight behind the protesters, but they're going to have
to live with it." Zinni says there are "red lines" the Egyptian army won't allow to be crossed
--

if the Muslim
Brotherhood

or some other element tries to hijack the uprising, for example
--

the army could find itself in a
fight.The relationship between the U.S. and Egyptian militaries is so close there were some two dozen senior
Egyptian military officers at the Pentagon last

week on an annual week
-
long visit as demonstrators took to
the streets back home (they cut their stay short). "It would be hard to have ignored the fact that this was going
on," Marine Gen. James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said Jan. 28
. "We didn't say anything
to them about how they should handle it, and they didn't tell us how they were going to handle it."
The
Egyptian military's 468,000 troops makes it the world's 10th largest and

a
--

perhaps
the
--

key pillar of
Egyptian society
. T
here is no need for it to be so big, especially since Egypt signed a peace deal with Israel,
its most likely foe. But it is a route into the middle class for many, and often provides lucrative post
-
military
jobs for ex
-
officers in Egypt's military
-
industri
al complex or other governmental offices. While its enlisted
ranks are filled with conscripts
--

all able Egyptian males must serve
--

its officer caste is an elite and
powerful force that plays a major role in the nation's economic and political health
. I
t carried out the
1952 coup that toppled the monarchy, and all four presidents since have come from its ranks. Unlike the
police forces, which are reviled by many Egyptians,
the army is seen as a stable and professional force.
Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairma
n of the Joint Chiefs, said

Jan. 31 he liked what he saw as he paid close
attention to the actions of Cairo's armed forces. "
So far, the Egyptian military have handled themselves
exceptionally well
," he said in a Pentagon pod cast. "
You can see that just f
rom the pictures that have
been displayed, in terms of how they have been accepted by their people
." He added that he expects little
to change despite the turmoil. "We've had a very strong relationship with the Egyptian military for decades,"
he said. "I c
ertainly look to that to continue."



ADI

2011


19

Frappier Russell


IMET Neg



U.S. influence high now


Americans already have a great deal of influence over high level Egyptians


Curry 11

(Tom, national affairs writer, 2/11, “New challenges for U.S.
-
Egyptian military ties,”
http://www.msnbc.ms
n.com/cleanprint/CleanPrintProxy.aspx?unique=1311824591185) JJN

In the past, the U.S.
-
Egyptian relationship was


based largely on a decades
-
long familiarity



American
officials became accustomed to


repeated dealings with one president and his


military
complex.

Gates
underscored the personal nature of the


alliance during a 2009 visit to Cairo, saying, “I


first met President
Mubarak nearly 20 years


ago,”


when Gates was director of Central


Intelligence


“and over the years
multiple


American preside
nts and administrations have


benefited from his wise counsel.“Our own military has
benefited from the


interaction with the Egyptian armed forces,


one of the most professional and capable in


the
region," he added.
That connectivity runs through the top
ranks


of U.S. and Egyptian military officers,
who “are


interwoven in their personal connections


through the training that they’ve done and


through
their common strategic vision for the


Middle East
,” said Brownlee.



It’s quite a close relationship, wi
th
influence that can go in both directions
," he said. "We talk about leverage. Leverage is mutual. I think


one of
the reasons why the U.S. has


difficulties, not just right now, but over the


past decade, getting more political
reform


through (in Egypt)

is because any discussion of


political change in Egypt is circumscribed by


what the
Pentagon and American intelligence


agencies need from the Egyptian government.”


ADI

2011


20

Frappier Russell


IMET Neg



CMR

can’t solve


Conflict too great

No Solvency

conflicts in Middle East are too gr
eat to overcome, so plan fails.


Hanson 7
(Victor Davis, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, “Armies for Democracy,”
The American
Spectator,
July/August 2007, p. 35) MNC

The contemporary enigma in the Middle East
, however,
revolves around the question
of what degree, if
any, globalization

the intrusion into traditional tribal life by television, DVDs, the Internet, and
cellphones, along with the large numbers of contemporary democracies in the world at large

has collapsed
the window of preparation neces
sary for reform
. And while
Islam
, for example,
seems
not

incompatible

with democracy
per se
in countries like India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Turkey (where over half the world's
Muslims live),
the Arab Islamic world may prove to be a different story altoge
ther
.
There the obstacles
to democracy and Western ideals of liberty and equality seem more profound than elsewhere
. These
include a deeply entrenched tribal culture, endemic anger at modernity combined with a desire for the fruits
of modernity, feelings o
f pan
-
Arabic chauvinism nursed on transnational solidarity, scapegoating of
foreigners and foreign influences, intense feelings of grievance over a purportedly grand past juxtaposed to a
miserable present, and dislocations brought about by the huge wealth
of exporting a third of the world's daily
petroleum consumption.
All have combined to produce the anti
-