Rhetoric, Cybernetics, and the Work of the Body in Burke's ... - e1020

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Nov 30, 2013 (3 years and 8 months ago)

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Rhetoric,
Cyber
netics,
and
the
W
ork
of
the
Body
in
Burk
e’
s
Body
of
W
ork
This
article
e
xamines
the
de
velopment
of
K
enneth
Burk
e’
s
early
rhetorical
the
-
ory
in
r
elation
to
the
coterminous
cybernetic
r
esear
c
h
to
whic
h
Burk
e
was
often
r
esponding
.
I
a
r
gue
that
r
ecuper
ating
Burk
e’
s
early
attempts
to
construct
a
rhe
-
torical
subject
embr
acing
nonr
epr
esentational
vector
s
i
s
salutary
for
intervening
in
ongoing
debates
o
ver
subjectivity
and
af
fective
e
xperience
in
contempor
ary
critical,
rhetorical,
and
cultur
al
theory
.
Indeed,
always
beneath
the
dance
of
wor
ds
ther
e
will
be
the
dance
of
bodies,
the
mimetic
symbol-system
that
all
these
animals
will
come
close
to
having
in
common,
though
their
sedentary
ways
of
living
will
cause
them
to
for
g
e
t
it,
lik
e
per
sons
still
quite
young
,
come
in
time
to
for
g
e
t
the
langua
g
e
of
their
c
hildhood,
the
langua
g
e
most
pr
ofoundly
per
suasive
of
all.
But
talk
of
the
dance
,
and
its
body-langua
g
e
,
brings
us
to
e
xactly
the
ne
xt
step
in
our
unfolding
[. . .]

K
enneth
Burk
e,
The
Rhetoric
of
Religion
Thr
ee
F
olds:
Rhetoric
and
Origami
A
participant
identif
ied
as
“K
enneth
Burk
e”
has
been
making
the
rounds
in
chatrooms
and
electronic
message
boards
recently
,
announcing
itself
with
a
morbid
in
v
ocation
of
one
of
Burk
e’
s
central
concepts:
“Hello
I
a
m
K
enneth
Burk
e;
e
v
en
though
I
h
a
v
e
been
dead
for
a
f
e
w
years,
I
w
ould
lik
e
t
o
enter
this
con
v
ersation.

1
This
eerie
salutation
from
the
digital
be
yond
is
not
an
instance
of
online
haunting,
b
u
t
the
“K
enneth
Burk
e
chatbot”—a
program
with
enough
language-recognition
coding
and
stored
Burk
e
quotations
to
con
v
erse
in
a
combination
of
case-specif
ic
response
and
Burk
eisms.
Although
Burk
ebot’
s
salutation
lends
a
certain
literality
(ho
we
v
e
r
sinister)
to
the
“ne
v
e
r
-ending
con
v
ersation,

Burk
e’
s
digital
reincarnation
as
symbol-
Rhetoric Re
vie
w
, V
ol. 25, No. 3,
275–96
Cop
yright © 2006, La
wrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
275
J
EFF
P
R
UCHNIC
P
ennsylvania State Univer
sity
using
code-script
simultaneously
undermines
one
of
his
more
protracted
inter
-
ests—a
career
-long
battle
ag
ainst
the
becoming-machine
of
humans
(and
vice-v
ersa),
which
he
sa
w
occurring
in
re
gisters
both
literal
(for
e
xample,
the
increasingly
uncreati
v
e
and
mechanistic
nature
of
human
labor)
and
theoretical
(through
the
emer
ging
control
science
of
c
ybernetics,
the
interdisciplinary
inquiry
into
“control
and
communication
in
the
animal
and
the
machine”).
Burk
e’
s
struggle
ag
ainst
the
machine
be
gins
in
his
earlier
w
orks
and
becomes
increasingly
proleptic
throughout
his
career
in
contention
with
material
adv
ances
in
technology
and
speculati
v
e
adv
ances
in
c
ybernetic
theorizing.
Human
e
xceptionality
in
Burk
e’
s
thinking
continually
narro
ws
in
the
age
of
intelligent
machines,
requiring
defenses
that
shift
from
questions
of
epistemol
-
ogy
to
ones
of
response:
As
re
g
ards
our
basic
Dramatistic
distinction,
“Things
mo
v
e
,
persons
act,

the
person
who
designs
a
computing
de
vice
w
ould
be
acting
,
whereas
the
de
vice
w
ould
be
b
u
t
going
through
whate
v
e
r
sheer
mo-
tions
its
design
mak
es
possible.
These
motions
could
also
be
so
uti-
lized
as
to
function
lik
e
a
v
oice
in
a
dialogue.
F
o
r
instance,
when
you
weigh
something,
it
is
as
though
you
ask
ed
the
scales,
“Ho
w
much
does
this
weigh?”
and
the
y
“answered,

though
the
y
w
ould
ha
v
e
gi
v
e
n
the
same
“answer”
if
something
of
the
same
weight
had
happened
to
f
all
upon
the
scales,
and
no
one
happened
to
be
“ask-
ing”
an
y
question
at
all.
The
f
act
that
a
machine
can
be
made
to
function
lik
e
a
participant
in
a
human
dialogue
does
not
require
us
to
treat
the
tw
o
kinds
of
beha
vior
as
identical.
(“Mind”
64)
Burk
ebot’
s
mastery
of
symbolicity
mocks
this
initial
distinction
(and
through
Burk
e’
s
o
wn
w
ords,
no
less).
Unlik
e
Burk
e’
s
h
ypothetical
scale,
it
dif
ferentiates
between
“intentional”
and
“accidental”
stimuli
and
the
question
of
whether
we
should
“treat”
its
dialogue
lik
e
that
of
a
human
participant
becomes
a
non
sequi
-
tur
insof
ar
as
this
dif
ference
reaches
high
le
v
els
of
indiscernability
in
an
elec
-
tronic
format.
Similarly
,
the
relati
v
e
autonomy
of
Burk
ebot
troubles
the
clean
distinction
of
the
agenc
y
o
f
the
operator
v
ersus
the
machine.
Programmer
,
program,
and
source
mer
ge
as
Burk
e
becomes
sampled
and
Burk
ebot
attains
the
agenc
y
o
f
the
DJ—sampling
Burk
e
into
its
emissions
dra
wn
from
and
reinserted
inside
symbolic
en
vironments.
Burk
e
made
allo
w
ances
for
such
adv
ances,
admitting
that
c
ybernetic
inno
-
v
ations
might
e
v
entually
require
a
complete
rethinking
of
Dramatism;
and
although
in
opposition
to
both
Darwin
and
c
ybernetics,
Burk
e
will
ar
gue
that
the
dif
ference
among
humans,
animals,
and
machines
is
one
of
kind
and
not
de
gree
(“Order”
171),
the
biological
and
the
mechanical
are
f
igured
into
a
spectrum
of
276
Rhetoric Re
vie
w
qualitati
v
e
dif
ference:
“Man
dif
fers
qualitati
v
ely
from
other
animals
since
the
y
are
too
poor
in
symbolicity
,
just
as
man
dif
fers
qualitati
v
ely
from
his
machines,
since
these
man-made
caricatures
of
man
are
too
poor
in
animality”
(“Mind”
64).
Burk
e’
s
(and
c
ybernetics’)
three
subjects
become
less
static
beings
than
the
loci
of
capacities
dif
fering
in
their
potentiality
,
v
ectors,
and
application.
The
implications
of
this
position—the
qualitati
v
e
location
of
the
human
between
and
betwixt
the
animal
and
the
machine—are
fore
grounded
in
an
appendix
to
Burk
e’
s
“Def
inition
of
Man”:
The
idealizing
of
man
as
a
species
of
machine
has
ag
ain
g
ained
con
-
siderable
popularity
,
o
wing
to
the
great
adv
ances
in
automation
and
“sophisticated”
computers.
But
such
things
are
ob
viously
inadequate
as
models,
since,
not
being
biological
or
g
anisms,
machines
lack
the
capacity
for
pleasure
and
pain
(to
say
nothing
of
such
subtler
af
fec
-
ti
v
e
states
as
malice,
en
vy
,
amusement,
condescension,
friendliness,
sentimentality
,
embarrassment,
etc.,
ad
nauseum
).
(23)
Here
Burk
e
disco
v
ers
human
dif
ference
be
yond
the
realm
of
symbolicity
and
signif
ication;
the
af
fecti
v
e
states
and
capacities
he
introduces
simultaneously
hail
capacities
not
only
distinct
from
machinic
intelligence
(“this
does
not
compute”)
b
u
t
outside
of
(or
at
least
prior
to)
human
rationality
,
referentiality
,
and
agenc
y
.
The
other
half
of
this
c
ycle
closes
in
“Mind,
Body
,
and
the
Uncon-
scious,

where
Burk
e
writes
that
“a
conditioned
animal

pro
vides
a
better
model
than
the
computer
for
“reducti
v
e
interpretations”
of
the
human,
b
u
t
that
this
ani-
malistic
parallel
f
ails
as
well
due
to
weaknesses
in
“the
w
ays
of
smiling
and
laughing”
(64).
As
per
the
epigraph
abo
v
e
,
beneath
the
dance
of
w
ords
continu
-
ally
returns
the
dance
of
bodies;
human
dif
ference
emer
ges
in
or
g
anic
ruptures
such
as
laughter
,
which
Ber
gson
reminds
us
is
not
a
p
i
v
otal
capacity
separating
humans
and
machines
b
u
t
the
appropriate
response
to
the
denigration
of
this
sep
-
aration—“
Something
mec
hanical
encrusted
on
the
living

(39).
Be
yond
the
ma
-
chine,
laughter
simultaneously
trumps
the
reduction
of
humans
animalistically—
animals
ne
v
e
r
get
the
jok
e—and
tak
es
us
be
yond
human
cognition
(“What’
s
so
funn
y?”)
to
af
fecti
v
e
response.
This
attention
to
aspects
of
human
embodiment
and
their
af
fecti
v
e
and
asignifying
corollaries
runs
consistently
through
Burk
e’
s
corpus,
playing
a
cen
-
tral
role
from
his
earliest
writings
to
later
essays
written
in
the
1960s
through
1980s.
It
is
therefore
odd
that
Burk
e’
s
career
-long
interest
in
the
body
as
topos
has
produced
a
less
than
vital
response
from
critics;
to
summarize
broadly
,
consensus
vie
ws
on
the
body
in
Burk
e’
s
thought
position
it
as
a
dangerous
essentialism
(for
e
xample,
Condit),
a
misstep
on
the
w
a
y
t
o
more
sophisticated
treatments
of
rhetoric
and
subjecti
vity
(W
ess),
or
a
l
e
v
er
in
interpreting
or
Rhetoric, Cybernetics, and the W
ork of the Body in Burk
e’
s Body of W
ork
277
qualifying
his
other
concepts
(Crable,
“Ideology”;
Fletcher;
Y
oshioka).
These
bodies
are
perv
erse,
adolescent,
supplementary
,
and
apologetic—the
y
concei
v
e
the
w
ork
of
the
body
as
an
appendix
to,
rather
than
a
vital
part
of,
Burk
e’
s
body
of
rhetorical
w
ork.
My
task,
then,
will
be
to
assay
these
mo
v
ements
in
Burk
e’
s
thought,
eng
agements
that
flo
w
between
the
seemingly
oppositional
ecologies
of
rhetoric
and
ph
ysiology
and
consistently
put
Burk
e
i
n
contact
with
the
coterminous
de
v
elopment
of
c
ybernetics,
the
interdisciplinary
scientif
ic
mo
v
ement
introduced
to
the
general
public
in
1948
by
Norbert
W
iener
and
his
colleagues,
and
subse
-
quently
the
midwife
of
such
domains
as
artif
icial
intelligence,
comple
xity
theory
,
and
transgenics.
Burk
e
i
s
a
particularly
salutary
f
igure
for
the
producti
v
e
encounter
of
rhetoric
and
c
ybernetics
for
reasons
in
addition
to
the
parallel
de
v
elopment
of
his
theorizing
and
that
of
f
irst-w
a
v
e
c
yberneticists;
be
yond
the
disciplines’
mutual
interest
in
technologies
(both
mechanical
and
discursi
v
e
)
o
f
“control”
and
“communication,

Burk
e’
s
early
w
ork
on
rhetoric
and
aesthetic
theory
fore
grounds
the
more
sophisticated
intersections
I
will
detail
in
the
remainder
of
this
essay
,
eng
agements
perhaps
best
characterized
by
instances
of
another
recurring
trope
in
Burk
e’
s
w
orks—foldings
and
unfoldings:
(1)
a
folding
of
modernist
and
postmodernist
thought
de
v
eloping
in
the
w
a
k
e
of
informatic
models
of
human
consciousness
that
Ev
e
K
osofsk
y
Sedgwick
and
Adam
Frank
ha
v
e
termed
“the
c
ybernetic
fold”;
(2)
a
folding
of
“form”
or
structure
that
Burk
e
locates
in
not
only
aesthetic
and
rhetorical
tropes
b
u
t
also
the
ph
ysiologi-
cal
responses
and
rh
ythms
of
the
human
body;
and
(3)
a
folding
of
thought
and
agenc
y
emer
ging
from
asceticism,
rein
v
ented
in
the
writings
of
Nietzsche
and
Ber
gson,
and
inte
gral
to
the
processes
of
self-transformation
proposed
by
both
Burk
e
and
c
yberneticists.
The
f
irst
fold
be
gins
after
beha
viorism
and
some
where
between
dialectic
and
inf
inity
.
Though
Burk
e
w
as
consistent
and
incessant
about
his
disaf
fection
for
the
emer
ging
f
ield
of
c
ybernetics,
he
shared
man
y
o
f
the
same
concerns
and
points
of
departure
with
this
interdisciplinary
inquiry:
an
attempt
to
mo
v
e
be
yond
the
stimulus/response
pairing
of
beha
viorism
without
recourse
to
depth
psychology
,
2
a
resultant
concentration
on
internal
rather
than
e
xternal
mecha
-
nisms
of
persuasion
and
control,
and
an
intense
focus
on
af
f
inities
and
di
v
e
r
-
gences
between
human
and
machinic
cognition
and
symbolicity
.
Writing
in
ref
-
erence
to
American
c
yberneticist
Sylv
an
S.
T
omkins,
Sedgwick
and
Frank
detail
the
results
of
such
a

c
ybernetic
fold”:
Modes
of
theorizing
inspired
by
“the
moment
when
scientists’
understanding
of
the
brain
and
other
life
processes
is
mark
ed
by
the
concept,
the
possibility
,
the
imminence
,
o
f
p
o
werful
computers”
and
based
on
a
model
constituted
by
components
greater
than
tw
o
b
ut
less
than
inf
inity
(
inf
inity>n>2
)
(105).
This
model,
today
most
commonly
associated
with
278
Rhetoric Re
vie
w
structuralism,
is
fundamentally
pragmatic
in
its
aim,
guaranteeing
that
an
y
theo
-
retical
taxonomy
cannot
be
reduced
to
a
vulg
ar
dialectic
(an
“either/or”)
b
u
t
i
s
also
delimited
into
f
inite
and
identif
iable
cate
gories.
Although
the
production
of
further
cate
gories
is
possible,
the
inf
inity>n>2
calculus
demands
that
a
theorist
w
ork
immanently
within
an
established
system
(though
a
w
are
of
its
limitations)
to
w
ard
a
g
i
v
en
aim.
F
o
r
Sedgwick
and
Frank,
this
di
vision
of
totality
into
f
inite
components,
a
hallmark
of
structuralist
thought,
disappears
in
critical
theory’
s
“sleek
trajectory
into
poststructuralism”
through
the
latter’
s
emphasis
on
social
and
discursi
v
e
construction,
denigration
of
the
biological,
and
reliance
on
irre
-
ducible
multiplicities
(105).
One
of
T
omkins’
most
f
amous
applications
of
the
inf
inity>n>2
formula
is
helpful
here
in
fore
grounding
both
Burk
e’
s
eng
agement
with
this
mode
of
c
yber
-
netic
theorizing
and
its
implications
for
his
re
v
aluation
of
rhetoric:
W
e
ha
v
e
assumed
that
the
major
moti
v
e
s
consist
of
eight
primary
af
-
fects:
interest,
enjo
yment,
surprise,
distress,
fear
,
shame,
contempt,
and
anger
[. . .].
These
f
acial
af
fecti
v
e
responses
we
assume
are
con-
trolled
by
innate
af
fect
programs
which
are
inherited
as
a
sub-corti-
cal
structure
[. . .].
These
innate
responses
are
later
transformed
in
v
arious
w
ays
through
learning,
b
u
t
there
is
al
w
ays
a
continuing
openness
to
acti
v
ation
of
the
innate
pattern
of
response.
(“What”
261,
219)
Burk
e
referred
to
the
f
irst
assumption
here
(the
parsing
of
moti
v
e
into
eight
pri-
mary
af
fects)
as
an
act
of
“scope
and
reduction,

a
strate
gy
he
introduces
in
di
-
rect
opposition
to
beha
viorism
(
Gr
ammar
59).
Burk
e’
s
w
ork
is
replete
with
such
constructions,
the
logic
of
scope
and
reduction
under
girding
not
only
the
f
i
v
e
(or
six)
components
of
Dramatism
b
u
t
also
four
“Master
T
ropes,

eight
v
arieties
of
the
unconscious,
f
i
v
e
le
v
els
of
linguistic
signif
ication,
four
primary
mechanisms
of
historical
change,
and
so
forth.
The
k
e
y
upshot
of
such
a
formation
is
not
its
epistemic
v
alue
(as
Burk
e
consistently
reminds
us)
b
u
t
its
pragmatic
potential.
Structurally
,
i
t
f
acilitates
not
so
much
epistemological
resolution
(“so
that’
s
what
it
is!”)
and
the
end
of
in
v
estig
ation
b
u
t
a
dynamic
potentiality
for
functional
application
(“so
that’
s
what
it
does . . .

)
and
the
be
ginning
of
practice.
In
other
w
ords,
the
point
of
such
an
operation
is
not
the
e
xposure
of
a
certain
mechanism
b
u
t
the
potential
that
this
mechanism
might
be
manipulated
through
practice.
3
T
omkins’
statement
is
additionally
helpful
in
articulating
tw
o
folds
also
im
-
plicated
in
both
c
ybernetics
and
the
eng
agement
Burk
e
stages
between
rhetoric
and
the
body
,
b
ut
it
is
outside
of
Sedgwick
and
Frank’
s
formulation.
T
omkins’
second
assumption
approaches
structure
on
another
le
v
el—subcortical
struc
-
Rhetoric, Cybernetics, and the W
ork of the Body in Burk
e’
s Body of W
ork
279
ture—b
u
t
t
o
this
we
might
add
man
y
other
biological
systems
and
netw
orks
implicated
in
a
similar
w
a
y
b
y
both
c
ybernetic
research
and
Burk
e’
s
interaction
with
this
emer
ging
f
ield:
neural
nets,
protoplasm,
psychogenic
and
somatic
response.
These
phenomena
not
only
maintain
the
totality
being
di
vided
through
c
ybernetic
folding—the
“permanence”
of
Burk
e’
s
P
ermanence
and
Chang
e

b
u
t
locate
originary
(though,
as
we
shall
see,
highly
dif
ferentiable)
capacities
for
response.
In
Counter
-Statement
Burk
e
f
inds
these
capacities
rhetorically
through
the
persistence
and
rob
ustness
of
symbolic
tropes
and
arrangements,
and
aesthet
-
ically
through
the
artist’
s
manipulation
of
“blood,
brains,
heart,
and
bo
wels”
by
inducing
af
fecti
v
e
responses
in
an
audience
(36).
T
omkins’
third
and
f
inal
assumption—the
potential
of
tr
ansforming
these
af
fecti
v
e
responses—both
reaf
f
irms
the
permanence
of
these
programs
and
introduces
the
possibility
of
their
alteration.
Here
“program”
mo
v
e
s
from
noun
to
v
erb,
as
the
possibility
for
dif
ference
that
al
w
ays
haunts
repetition
is
mobi
-
lized,
and
the
body
becomes
not
so
much
an
inscribed
site
of
actualization
b
u
t
a
location
for
e
xperimentation
and
transformation.
Though
contemporary
read-
ings
of
c
ybernetics
often
focus
e
xclusi
v
ely
on
the
mo
v
ement’
s
impulse
to
w
ard
disembodiment
and
the
creation
of
artif
icial
intelligence,
the
mo
v
ement
w
a
s
additionally
(if
not
equally)
committed
to
ho
w
c
ybernetic
research
might
aid
in
transforming
human
perception
and
response.
Not
surprisingly—as
a
concomi-
tant
to
the
earlier
folds
mentioned
abo
v
e
and
as
a
general
production
of
the
impulse
to
diagnose
the
af
f
inities
and
di
v
e
r
gences
between
the
human,
the
animal,
and
the
machine—this
impulse
also
tra
v
erses
Burk
e’
s
project
in
re
v
aluating
rhetoric,
threading
throughout
his
corpus
b
u
t
f
inding
its
most
e
xplicit
formulation
in
his
“Metabiological”
concept
of
human
communication
and
“Perspecti
v
e
by
Incongruity
,

Burk
e’
s
Nietzschean/Ber
gsonian
method
of
breaking
af
fecti
v
e
habitation.
The
follo
wing
tak
es
up
this
tripartite
(
inf
inity>n>2
)
logic
of
structure
(form),
af
fect,
and
transformation
in
reference
to
Burk
e’
s
Counter
-Statement
and
P
ermanence
and
Chang
e
.
This
itinerary
will
ultimately
fold
rhetoric
into
the
biological
and
mechanical
(and
vice
v
ersa)
through
these
three
smaller
folds
intersecting
c
ybernetics
and
Burk
e’
s
early
writings;
though
more
immedi
-
ately
recognizable
to
the
former
than
the
latter
,
folding
becomes
the
practice
of
both
the
orig
ami
master
and
the
rhetorician.
Once
Mor
e
with
F
eeling
:
Repetition,
Affect,
and
Psychology
of
F
orm
Speaking
nearly
a
half-century
after
the
book’
s
publication,
Burk
e
empha
-
sizes
the
relati
v
e
originality
of
his
project
in
Counter
-Statement
:

I
started
from
280
Rhetoric Re
vie
w
poetry
and
drama
whereas
most
of
such
speculation
starts
from
questions
of
truth
and
f
alsity
,
problems
of
kno
wledge.
I
started
out
with
other
w
ords
for
beauty”
(“Counter
-Gridlock”
374).
In
other
wor
ds
,
Burk
e
responds
to
a
w
orld
gone
suddenly
informatic—netw
ork
ed
and
link
ed
by
mass
communication
and
rapidly
proliferating
media
technologies—by
dislocating
kno
wledge;
rather
than
entering
epistemological
territory
,
Burk
e
shifts
focus
to
aesthetics
and,
rhetoric
and
their
corollaries
of
structure,
form,
and
feeling.
As
Burk
e
e
xplains
in
his
response
to
Gran
ville
Hicks’
critique
of
Counter
-Statement
,
the
imbrication
of
rhetoric
and
aesthetics
of
fered
in
the
essays
“Psychology
and
F
orm”
and
“The
Poetic
Process”
is
focused
on
the
ef
fects
of
language
and
art
and
the
responses
the
y
elicit
rather
than
judgment
of
these
ef
fects
or
prescriptions
for
the
“proper”
uses
of
art.
Burk
e
i
s
initially
concerned
not
with
what
ef
fects
should
be
pr
oduced
,b
u
t
how
ef
fects
ar
e
p
r
oduced
.I
n
discussing
the
processes
of
w
alking,
one
must
a
v
oid
an
y
judgment
as
to
whether
a
man
should
w
alk
north
or
south.
A
moral
imperati
v
e
is
not
proper
to
a
rhetoric,
an
y
more
than
the
study
of
the
mechanics
of
a
motor
equips
us
to
decide
whether
motors
should
be
used
for
w
arf
are
or
trade.
(101)
Pushing
be
yond
the
normati
v
e
models
of
both
Marxism
and
Psychoanalysis,
Burk
e
gets
thoroughly
ph
ysical.
Art
becomes
“a
coerci
v
e
force
in
itself”
(“Counterblasts”),
unsubsumable
to
both
superstructure
and
sublimation.
As
such,
the
crucial
site
of
persuasion
emer
ges
neither
as
the
unconscious
nor
f
alse
consciousness
b
u
t
the
corporeal.
Burk
e
b
e
gins
by
essaying
the
constituti
v
e
elements
of
communication.
He
distinguishes
tw
o
forces
operating
in
an
y
g
i
v
en
communicati
v
e
representation:
a
“psychology
of
information”
manifested
in
the
content
of
communication
and
focused
on
the
transmission
of
signif
ication
from
its
producer
and
a
“psy
-
chology
of
form”
contained
in
the
e
xpressi
v
e
structure
of
communication
and
actualized
through
the
ef
fect
it
produces
on
the
recei
v
e
r
.
Ecologically
,
the
tw
o
psychologies
are
eng
aged
in
a
zero-sum
g
ame:
“The
h
ypertroph
y
o
f
the
psychology
of
information
is
accompanied
by
the
corresponding
atroph
y
o
f
the
psychology
of
form”
(33).
Discretely
,
h
o
w
e
v
er
,
the
tw
o
e
xist
dif
ferentially
in
an
y
g
i
v
en
representation.
Referencing
a
satirical
conflation
of
Cézanne’
s
painting
of
trees
with
a
forestry
b
ulletin,
Burk
e
asks:
“Y
et
are
not
Cézanne’
s
landscapes
themselv
es
tainted
with
the
psychology
of
information?
Has
he
not,
by
perception,
pointed
out
ho
w
one
object
lies
ag
ainst
another
,
indicated
what
tak
es
place
between
tw
o
colors?”
The
vie
wer
cannot
help
b
u
t
recei
v
e
content
from
the
painting;
its
image
automatically
hails
spatial
and
temporal
resolu
-
Rhetoric, Cybernetics, and the W
ork of the Body in Burk
e’
s Body of W
ork
281
tion,
the
reception
of
some
cogniti
v
e
signif
ication
e
v
en
if
it
is
only
the
kno
wl
-
edge
of
“ho
w
one
object
lies
ag
ainst
one
another
.

Y
e
t
the
real
force
of
the
im
-
age
resides
not
just
automatically
b
u
t
autonomically
in
the
af
fecti
v
e
,
embodied
response
it
pro
v
o
k
e
s
separate
from
its
content
or
ostensible
subject,
“what
goes
on
in
the
e
y
e
rather
than
on
the
tree”
(32).
Brian
Massumi
is
helpful
here
in
unpacking
both
the
ef
fects
of
such
a
response
and
the
relation
between
content
and
form
emphasized
by
Burk
e:
[. . . I]t
may
be
noted
that
the
primac
y
o
f
the
af
fecti
v
e
is
mark
ed
by
a
g
a
p
between
content
and
ef
fect
:
i
t
w
ould
appear
that
the
strength
or
duration
of
an
image’
s
ef
fect
is
not
logically
connected
to
the
con
-
tent
in
an
y
straightforw
ard
w
a
y
.
This
is
not
to
say
that
there
is
no
connection
and
no
logic.
What
is
meant
here
by
the
content
of
the
image
is
its
inde
xing
to
con
v
entional
meanings
in
an
intersubjecti
v
e
conte
xt,
its
sociolinguistic
qualif
ication.
This
inde
xing
f
i
x
e
s
the
determinate
qualities
of
the
image;
the
strength
or
duration
of
the
image’
s
ef
fect
could
be
called
its
intensity
.
What
comes
out
here
is
that
there
is
no
correspondence
or
conformity
between
qualities
and
intensity
.
I
f
there
is
a
relation,
it
is
of
another
nature.
(24)
F
o
r
Massumi
this
mechanism
of
af
fect
is
ne
glected
by
what
he
refers
to
as
“dominant”
strains
of
social-constructi
vism
that
ar
gue
“e
v
erything,
including
na-
ture,
is
constructed
in
discourse”
(38).
Recognizing
af
fecti
v
e
forces
and
relation-
ships
then
becomes
vital
to
a
necessary
and
“serious
re
w
orking”
of
the
concepts
of
nature
and
culture,
one
that
might
e
xpress
“the
irreducible
alterity
of
the
non
-
human
in
and
through
its
acti
v
e
connection
to
the
human
and
vice-v
ersa”
(39).
Burk
e
eng
ages
this
latter
objecti
v
e
in
P
ermanence
and
Chang
e
(a
point
I
will
return
to
later
in
this
essay),
b
u
t
a
s
early
as
his
writings
in
Counter
-State
-
ment
,
a
f
fecti
v
e
technologies
were
vital
in
articulating
a
n
e
w
theorization
of
the
relationship
between
rhetoric
and
the
body
.
Burk
e
locates
these
af
fects
in
not
only
the
visual
b
u
t
also
the
v
erbal,
citing
aphorism—which
“satisf
ies
without
be
-
ing
functionally
related
to
the
conte
xt”
(34)—as
an
e
xample
amongst
a
multi
-
tude
of
rhetorical
tropes
recuperated
or
in
v
ented
through
his
Le
xicon
Rhetoricae.
The
crucial
element
of
Burk
e’
s
distinction
between
information
is
the
af
fective
intensity
of
communication
that
operates
before
the
le
v
e
l
o
f
signif
ication—that
which
is
produced
by
an
image
or
articulation
b
u
t
that
remains
fundamentally
unrepresented
and
unarticulated.
As
Burk
e
details,
this
intensity
is
written
im
-
mediately
on
the
body
b
u
t
cannot
be
written
do
wn
immediately
by
the
body:
“T
o
arouse
the
human
potentiality
to
be
aroused
by
the
crescendo,
I
must
produce
some
particular
story
embodying
the
crescendo
[. . .].
Here
I
h
a
v
e
replaced
the
282
Rhetoric Re
vie
w
concept
by
a
w
ork
of
art
illustrating
it”
(46).
Af
fect
remains
distinct
from
both
signif
ication
and
irreducible
to
emotion—a
latecomer
that
can
only
respond
to,
rather
than
mediate,
af
fect:
“[T]he
emotions
cannot
enjo
y
these
forms
[. . .]
(nat
-
urally
,
since
the
y
are
merely
the
conditions
of
emotional
r
esponse
)
e
xcept
in
their
concreteness,
in
the
quasi-vitiating
material
incorporation,
in
their
specif
i
-
cation
or
indi
viduation”
(46–47).
I
a
m
interested
in
Burk
e’
s
early
theorization
of
af
fect
for
tw
o
primary
rea
-
sons.
First,
it
occupies
a
conceptual
plane
ne
gotiated
outside
of
both
informatic
reductionism
and
the
kind
of
o
v
erreaching
social-constructi
vism
that
Massumi
so
compellingly
critiques.
Burk
e’
s
concentration
on
af
fect
w
ould
(as
noted
abo
v
e
)
continually
reappear
as
a
principle
of
dif
ferentiation
between
humans
and
“intelligent”
machines.
The
disjunction
of
“information”
and
“form”
fore
-
grounds
the
importance
of
the
latter
in
human
ph
ysiology
and
human
interac
-
tion
o
v
e
r
and
ag
ainst
the
former
term,
one
popular
in
emer
ging
c
ybernetic
w
ork
of
Burk
e’
s
time.
T
a
k
e
,
for
e
xample,
the
follo
wing
passage
from
Norbert
W
iener’
s
The
Human
Use
of
Human
Beings
:
[. . . T]he
man
y
automata
of
the
present
age
are
coupled
to
the
out-
side
w
orld
both
for
the
reception
of
impressions
and
for
the
perfor-
mance
of
actions.
The
y
contain
sense
or
g
ans,
ef
fectors,
and
the
equi
v
alent
of
a
nerv
ous
system
to
inte
grate
the
transfer
of
informa-
tion
for
the
one
to
the
other
.
The
y
lend
themselv
es
v
ery
well
to
de-
scription
in
ph
ysiological
terms.
It
is
scarcely
a
miracle
that
the
y
can
be
subsumed
under
one
theory
with
the
mechanisms
of
ph
ysiology
.
(43)
Burk
e’
s
distinction
between
“information”
and
“form”
w
ould
recognize
the
pragmatic
use
of
this
conflation
of
the
biological
and
mechanical
b
u
t
fore
ground
the
ph
ysiological
processes
he
will
associate
with
af
fecti
v
e
relations
as
unique
to
human
beings.
Ho
we
v
e
r
,
Burk
e’
s
concentration
on
human
ph
ysiology
in
this
process
(as
I
will
detail
in
the
ne
xt
section)
additionally
attends
to
f
actors
of
human
corporeality
and
their
relation
with
nonhuman
phenomena
in
a
manner
that
resists
recourse
to
social-construction.
Moreo
v
e
r
,
his
treatment
of
af
fect
emphasizes
the
mutual
reductionism
the
y
perform
in
dif
ferent
re
gisters:
Just
as
a
vulg
ar
social
constructi
vism
w
ould
reduce
the
nonhuman
to
a
cultural
or
discur
-
si
v
e
construction
of
the
human,
a
vulg
ar
c
ybernetic
w
ould
reduce
the
ph
ysiologi
-
cal
operations
of
the
human
body
to
informatics.
The
k
e
y
dif
ference
in
these
operations
emer
ges
in
the
former’
s
impulse
to
the
critical
deconstruction
of
phenomena
under
re
vie
w
contra
the
latter’
s
emphasis
on
the
material
construc
-
tion
of
pragmatic
technologies
based
on
this
principle
of
conflation.
Rhetoric, Cybernetics, and the W
ork of the Body in Burk
e’
s Body of W
ork
283
Secondly
,
and
in
a
similar
v
ein,
Burk
e’
s
early
treatment
of
af
fect
is
salutary
for
reconsidering
contemporary
critical
w
ork
on
af
fect
and
embodiment
in
both
the
discipline
of
rhetoric
and
composition—where
af
fect
has
both
been
h
ypostasized
as
a
systematic
structure
of
influence
a
v
ailable
to
be
decoded
and
resisted
(thus
occup
ying
a
role
similar
to
that
which
“strong”
conceptions
of
ideology
used
to
play
in
critical
theory)
4
and
the
asignifying
and
“nonrational”
has
been
in
v
o
k
e
d
generically
to
critique
logocentric
or
consensus-based
schools
of
rhetoric
5
—as
well
as
humanist
approaches
to
c
ybernetics,
where
embodiment
and
af
fecti
v
e
processes
ha
v
e
been
pitted
ag
ainst
popular
conceptions
of
artif
icial
intelligence
or
informatic
subjecti
vities.
6
Burk
e’
s
relati
v
ely
no
v
e
l
and
nuanced
eng
agement
with
af
fecti
v
e
phenom
-
ena
arises
from
a
close
attention
to
the
underlying
structures
and
conditioning
f
actors
of
these
forces.
Though
follo
wing
humanist
approaches
to
c
ybernetic
theories
that
uphold
af
fecti
v
e
phenomena
as
processes
that
(currently)
cannot
be
captured
by
high-technological
simulations
of
human
consciousness
or
in-
telligence
(e
v
e
n
a
s
the
resources
we
use
to
quantify
these
phenomena—PET
scans,
infrared
oculograph
y
,
f
acial
electromyograph
y
,
and
so
forth—are
in-
creasingly
of
this
nature),
Burk
e
additionally
attends
to
the
f
act
that
the
v
ectors
of
these
forces
contain
a
consistenc
y
that
is
oddly
mechanical
in
nature.
In
this
sense
the
pragmatic
potential
for
manipulating
af
fecti
v
e
forces
is
fore
grounded
o
v
e
r
its
use
as
an
“outside”
to
either
traditional
rhetoric
or
early
c
ybernetic
conceptions
of
informatics,
and
Burk
e
appropriates
k
e
y
v
ectors
from
both
dis-
ciplines
in
his
endea
v
o
r
.
Principal
to
this
conception
is
Burk
e’
s
a
r
gument
that
af
fecti
v
e
forms
de
v
elop
and
sustain
through
an
imbrication
of
ph
ysiology
and
repetition,
a
sequence
he
will
associate
with
the
rhetorical
technology
of
the
trope:
forms
of
language
and
e
xpression
unif
ied
by
their
structure
rather
than
their
content
and
that
share
structural
af
f
inities
with
biological
and
nonhuman
processes.
Repetition
maintains
the
ubiquity
of
these
forms,
a
point
Burk
e
mak
es
in
detailing
the
“contrib
ution”
of
the
psychology
of
form
as
distinguished
from
the
psychology
of
information:
“T
ruth
in
art
is
not
the
disco
v
ery
of
f
acts,
not
an
addition
to
human
kno
wledge
in
the
scientif
ic
sense
of
the
w
ord.
It
is,
rather
,
the
e
x
ercise
of
human
propriety
,
the
formulation
of
symbols
which
rigidify
our
sense
of
poise
and
rh
ythm”
(42).
Music—compositions
that
maintain
their
inte
grity
solely
through
the
production
of
form
and
repetition—pro
vide
the
ultimate
e
xample
of
the
force
w
orking
through
form:
“The
reason
music
can
stand
repetition
so
much
more
than
correspondingly
good
prose
is
that
music,
of
all
the
arts,
is
by
its
nature
least
suited
to
the
psychology
of
information,
and
has
remained
closer
to
the
psychology
of
form”
(34).
F
orm
cannot
atroph
y
here,
and
the
asignifying,
repetiti
v
e
quality
of
music
entirely
occludes
intrusion
by
the
284
Rhetoric Re
vie
w
psychology
of
information.
Ne
v
ertheless,
these
forms
themselv
es
manifest
a
consistenc
y
that
making
them
a
v
ailable
for
use
and
manipulation.
Through
his
f
irst
sustained
encounter
with
rhetoric
and
the
body
in
Coun
-
ter
-Statement
,
Burk
e’
s
double
gesture
introduces
the
af
fecti
v
e
,
asignifying
components
of
rhetoric
as
well
as
the
rhetoricized
f
aculties
of
the
body:
the
capacity
to
detect
and
respond
to
forms
that
emer
ge
from
the
natural
processes
of
the
body
and
are
maintained
by
repetition.
Y
e
t
repetition,
by
nature
of
its
continual
iteration,
in
vites
the
possibility
for
dif
ference.
In
f
act,
as
Burk
e
notes,
“restatements
with
a
dif
ference”
are
not
just
a
possible
mutation
of
form
b
u
t
constitute
one
of
the
more
reliable
and
consistent
e
xisting
forms.
I
tak
e
u
p
the
potential
this
formulation
carries
for
transforming
thought
and
perception
later
in
this
essay;
for
no
w
I
w
ant
only
to
note
that
Burk
e’
s
emphasis
on
the
“condi
-
tioning”
that
instantiates
af
fect
lea
v
e
s
open
the
possibility
for
further
“re
-
conditioning.

Rhetorical
Bodies:
Metabiology
So
what
of
this
body
then?
In
K
enneth
Burk
e
and
the
Dr
ama
of
Human
Relations
,
W
illiam
Rueck
ert
titles
his
chapter
on
Counter
-Statement
“Both/And.

F
or
Rueck
ert,
Burk
e’
s
theory
of
form
creates
a
“mer
ge”
between
“essences”
and
“structures”
best
described
by
this
term
often
associated
with
poststructuralist
thinking,
a
relation
later
replaced
by
Burk
e
with
the
superior
formulation
of
dramatism.
In
his
recent
“Symbolizing
Motion:
Burk
e’
s
Dialectic
and
Rhetoric
of
the
Body
,

Bryan
Crable—dra
wing
on
the
same
“progress
narra-
ti
v
e

o
f
Burk
e’
s
writings
that
informs
Rueck
ert’
s
analysis—concei
v
e
s
Burk
e’
s
theorizing
of
embodiment
in
P
ermanence
and
Chang
e

s
Metabiology
as
a
misstep
to
be
corrected
by
an
“either/or”—the
dramatistic
dialectic
of
the
action/motion
pairing.
Such
a
polarity
pro
vides
for
Crable
a
tool
for
distinguish
-
ing
ho
w
symbolic
action,
in
the
form
of
social
construction,
is
routinely
passed
of
f
a
s
nonsymbolic
motion—the
“natural”
(134).
Ho
we
v
e
r
,
Burk
e’
s
eng
agement
with
corporeality
in
P
ermanence
and
Chang
e
might
pose
questions
more
vital
to
contemporary
rhetoric,
ethics,
and
subjecti
vity
than
either
dialectic
or
social-construction.
Metabiology
auscultates
a
relation
that
is
neither
the
“poststructuralist”
“both/and”
nor
the
dialectical
“ei
-
ther/or
.

The
c
ybernetic
logic
of
inf
inity>n>2
mo
v
e
s
from
form
to
body
(the
only
w
a
y
form
e
v
er
mo
v
es)
in
the
interstice
between
Counter
-Statement
and
P
ermanence
and
Chang
e
;
the
presumably
strictly
autopoetic
structures
of
body
and
culture
are
radically
link
ed
in
this
mo
v
ement,
one
we
might
term
after
Deleuze
and
Guattari
a
logic
of
“either
,
o
r
,
or”
(12).
F
o
r
Deleuze
and
Guattari,
this
formation
hails
not
dialectic
or
endless
con
v
e
r
gence
b
u
t
a
dynamic
set
of
Rhetoric, Cybernetics, and the W
ork of the Body in Burk
e’
s Body of W
ork
285
linkages
and
disjunctions.
Through
metabiology
this
af
f
iliation
follo
ws
the
logic
of
what
scientists
such
as
Eric
D.
Schnieder
ha
v
e
ar
gued
is
the
or
g
anizing
v
ector
of
both
the
“symbolic
action”
of
or
g
anisms
and
the
“nonsymbolic
motion”
or
tornadoes
and
global
weather
patterns—the
gradient.
The
relation
between
the
body
and
the
symbolic
(or
culture
or
the
socius
or
rhetoric)
emer
ges
not
as
opposition
or
subsumption
b
u
t

a
dif
ference
across
a
distance”
(Mar
gulis
and
Sag
an
45).
If
the
folding
of
form
that
marks
Burk
e’
s
project
in
Counter
-Statement
wa
s
a
reaction
to
an
informatically
netw
ork
ed
w
orld
dri
v
e
n
b
y
a
contemporary
“cult
of
e
xcessi
v
e
technological
‘progress’”
(“Biology”
17),
then
metabiology
assays
the
possibility
of
a
dif
ferent,
more
or
g
anic
and
ancient
topological
connecti
vity:
“[T]he
entire
attempt
to
distinguish
between
or
g
anism
and
en
vironment
is
suspect”
(
P
ermanence
232).
Joining
early
c
ybernetic
scholarship
ar
guing
for
the
necessity
of
vie
wing
human
actions
and
thought
processes
as
netw
ork
ed
within
lar
ger
ecological
systems,
Burk
e’
s
metabiological
perspecti
v
e
augments
f
irst
the
or
g
anic
and
then
rhetorical
ecologies
deplo
yed
in
this
equation,
linkages
that
were
rapidly
being
cro
wded
out
by
a
concentration
on
the
material
and
theoreti-
cal
human/machine
fusions
of
artif
icial
intelligence
and
automata.
Concei
ving
the
w
orld
as
a
meshw
ork
of
bacteria
and
gene
in
addition
to
(and
before)
one
of
wires
and
circuits—an
anticipation
of
what
we
w
ould
no
w
call
the
Gaia
h
ypoth-
esis:
earth
as
“c
ybernetic
system”
(Lo
v
elock
131)—Burk
e
e
xtrapolates
tw
o
con-
sequences
from
this
conclusion.
First,
the
body
becomes
more
ratio
than
closed
system,
and
di
visions
become
the
production
of
language
and
terminology
rather
than
structure:
“Is
oxygen
en
vironmental
or
internal?
Are
the
microscopic
crea-
tures
in
our
blood
stream
separate
from
us
or
a
part
of
us?
The
y
are
members
of
a
‘ci
vic
corporation’
which
we
call
the
or
g
anism”
(232).
F
o
r
Burk
e
the
en
viron
-
ment
cannot
be
the
“distinctly
prior
f
actor”
in
an
y
analysis
of
human
acti
vity
and
beha
vior
(233).
Although
we
can
discern
“e
v
ents
manifesting
suf
f
icient
indi
vid
-
uality
from
our
point
of
vie
w
t
o
b
e
classed
as
separate
or
g
anisms,

the
“uni
v
ersal
te
xture”
of
e
xperience
is
composed
of
a
dynamic
interaction
between
the
sentient,
nonsentient,
or
g
anic
and
inor
g
anic
components
of
the
en
vironment.
Second,
Burk
e
emphasizes
the

participant
aspect”
of
these
actions
and
e
xchanges
rather
than
their

competitive
aspect”
(266).
The
neo-Darwinian
emphasis
on
agonistic
becoming
as
the
primal
relation
among
and
between
spe
-
cies
and
their
en
vironments
is
replaced
by
an
unfolding
structure
of
cooperation,
communication,
and
homeostasis:
“Life,
acti
vity
,
cooperation,
communica
-
tion—the
y
are
identical”
(236).
Thus
“f
itness”
of
species
and
ecological
change
emer
ge
not
from
a
capacity
to
endure
or
o
v
ertak
e
b
ut
to
producti
v
ely
r
espond
.
The
k
e
y
upshots
of
this
formulation
are
its
resistance
to
a
rigid
separation
be
-
tween
participants
in
an
ecology
and
its
refusal
to
subsume
the
biological
into
a
286
Rhetoric Re
vie
w
subject
to
be
either
cogniti
v
ely
interpreted
or
dismissed
as
a
social
construction.
The
biological
and
the
af
fecti
v
e
emer
ge
as
phenomena
to
be
interacted
with,
and
the
relation
between
the
ph
ysical
and
the
symbolic
becomes
much
more
comple
x
than
simple
cognition.
Indeed,
although
Burk
e
i
s
willing
to
tak
e
this
ecstatic
ph
ysicality
f
a
r
enough
to
disperse
the
co
gito
by
insisting
we
follo
w
Ber
gson
in
thinking
of
the
“mind-body”
as
a
mer
ge
rather
than
separate
entities
(94;
Crusius
97),
the
(ap
-
parently)
e
xo-biological
communicati
v
e
structures
of
symbolic
culture
pro
v
e
a
thornier
issue.
As
a
microcosm
of
this
process,
Burk
e
dra
ws
on
the
de
v
eloping
f
ield
of
endocrinology
and
the
e
xample
of
psychogenic
illness
to
diagnose
the
connection
between
enculturation
and
ph
ysiologic
response
that
is
at
play
,
for
instance,
in
the
cocktail
of
dopamine
and
(sub)socialization
that
gi
v
e
s
meaning
to
a
term
such
as
drug
cultur
e
.
Writing
in
the
afterw
ord
to
P
ermanence
and
Chang
e
,
Burk
e
retrospects
on
the
metabiological
body-culture
relationship
under
girding
such
a
process:
The
principle
of
indi
viduation
(which
is
grounded
in
the
centrality
of
the
nerv
ous
system)
features
a
dualistic
distinction
between
“primal,
immediate”
sensations
that
we
e
xperience
in
the
realm
of
nonsymbolic
motion
and
the
v
ast
“mediated”
kno
wledge
of
“reality”
acquired
by
the
learning
of
symbol-systems
(resources
in
the
realm
of
symbolic
action
that
gi
v
e
us
access
to
wholly
public
modes
of
in-
terpretation,
orientation,
and
corresponding
cultural
relationships).
(313)
In
P
ermanence
and
Chang
e
,
Burk
e
has
a
multiplicity
of
names
for
such
“modes
of
interpretation,
orientation
and
corresponding
cultural
relationships”
in
both
their
positi
v
e
and
ne
g
ati
v
e
actualizations:
trained
incapacities,
pieties,
occupational
psychoses,
and
so
forth—“comple
x
interpreti
v
e
netw
orks”
de
v
e
l
-
oped
through
habituation.
Cogniti
v
e
psychologist
Merlin
Donald
is
helpful
in
unpacking
the
v
arying
connections
between
the
symbolic
and
ph
ysiological,
the
impulse
behind
Burk
e’
s
project
to
determine
human
“symbolic
beha
vior
as
grounded
in
biologi
-
cal
conditions”
(275).
Donald
describes
the
unique
symbol-using
capacity
of
humans
as
both
a
radical
openness
and
dependence:
The
human
brain
is
the
only
brain
in
the
biosphere
whose
potential
cannot
be
realized
on
its
o
wn.
It
needs
to
become
part
of
a
netw
ork
before
its
design
features
can
be
e
xpressed
[. . .].
The
result
is
that
we
are
plugged-in,
as
no
other
species
before
us.
W
e
depend
hea
vily
Rhetoric, Cybernetics, and the W
ork of the Body in Burk
e’
s Body of W
ork
287
on
culture
for
our
de
v
elopment
as
conscious
beings.
And
by
e
xploit
-
ing
this
connection
to
the
full,
we
ha
v
e
outdistanced
our
mammalian
ancestors.
(324)
But
this
capacity
comes
with
a
cost;
the
“h
ybrid
brain”
of
humans
mak
es
the
in
-
di
vidual
“distinct”
b
u
t
n
e
v
er
“fully
autonomous”
from
the
symbolic
structures
of
their
culture
(326).
The
f
act
that
the
“modes
of
interpretation”
installed
by
the
symbolic
technologies
of
culture
form
through
repetition
and
practice
rather
than
conscious
acceptance
suggests
that
the
y
similarly
cannot
be
remo
v
e
d
b
y
a
simple
process
of
e
xposure
or
rejection.
Rationally
,
there
w
ould
seem
to
be
no
changing
these
structures.
Writing
in
the
afterw
ord
to
P
ermanence
and
Chang
e
,
Burk
e
approaches
such
an
obstacle
in
fore
grounding
the
primary
component
of
Metabiology
that
he
still
f
inds
appealing:

Abo
v
e
all
I
w
ould
cling
to
the
notion
that
the
concept
of
a
biological
‘method’
suggests
a
useful
w
a
y
o
f
a
v
oiding
the
o
v
ersimplif
ied
reduction
to
a
blunt
choice
between
‘rational’
and
‘irrational’”
(297).
I
tak
e
u
p
Burk
e’
s
refusal
to
reduce
situations
to
this
binary
in
the
follo
wing
section,
an
impulse
that
f
inds
its
most
producti
v
e
manifestation
in
his
Perspecti
v
e
by
Incon-
gruity—a
singularizing
technology
for
altering
structures
of
interpretation
by
w
orking
by
the
same
logic
that
creates
and
sustains
these
structures.
A
Closer
Look:
P
erspecti
v
e
by
Incongruity
As
indicated
earlier
,
concentrating
on
Burk
e’
s
treatment
of
the
body
and
its
relation
to
af
fect
and
the
symbolic
through
Metabiology
re
v
eals
a
crucial
period
in
his
eng
agement
with
these
topics,
a
moment
when
Burk
e
paused
from
cataloguing
the
de
v
elopment
and
circulation
of
orientations
and
“sponta
-
neously
opted
for
the
principle
of
tr
ansformation

(308).
Early
in
P
ermanence
and
Chang
e
,
Burk
e
writes
that
“shifts
in
interpretation
mak
e
for
totally
dif
fer
-
ent
pictures
of
reality
,
since
the
y
focus
the
attention
upon
dif
ferent
orders
of
relationship.

Although,
as
Burk
e
documents
relentlessly
,
w
e
“learn
to
single
out
certain
relationships
in
accordance
with
the
particular
linguistic
te
xture
in
which
we
are
born,

there
is
still
the
potential
to
“manipulate
this
linguistic
te
xture
to
formulate
still
other
relationships”
(36).
This
possibility
for
manipu
-
lation
is
mobilized
in
Perspecti
v
e
by
Incongruity
,
a
concept
Burk
e
d
e
v
elops
in
reference
to
tw
o
theorists
who
also
performed
signif
icant
critiques
of
the
di
vi
-
sion
between
rationality
and
irrationality
and
share
his
vie
ws
concerning
the
dif
ferential
relationship
between
af
fect
and
content:
Ber
gson
and
Nietzsche.
F
o
r
Burk
e
i
t
i
s
Nietzsche,
who
“kne
w
that
probably
e
v
ery
linkage
w
a
s
open
to
destruction
by
perspecti
v
e
s
o
f
a
planned
incongruity”
and
who
pro
-
vides
the
most
vital
contrib
ution
to
the
process
of
“e
xperimentally
wrenching
288
Rhetoric Re
vie
w
apart
all
those
molecular
combinations
of
adjecti
v
e
and
noun,
substanti
v
e
and
v
erb,
which
still
remain
with
us”
(91,
119).
In
her
analysis
of
Burk
e’
s
debt
to
Nietzsche,
Debra
Ha
whee
emphasizes
ho
w
the
latter’
s
“perspecti
v
alism”
(and
in
its
adaptation
by
Burk
e
into
Perspecti
v
e
by
Incongruity)
w
orks
by
a
logic
of
multiplication
(the
quantitati
v
e
accumulation
and
application
of
dif
ferent
per
-
specti
v
es)
and
a
concomitant
critique
of
totalizing
systems
of
kno
wledge.
Al
-
though
this
is
undoubtedly
true—Nietzsche
and
Burk
e
both
state
as
much,
and
it
f
its
with
Burk
e’
s
later
comments
in
Attitudes
T
owar
ds
History
on
the
ef
fects
of
the
de
vice—I
w
ould
lik
e
t
o
fore
ground
here
the
connections
between
Burk
e’
s
concept
and
emer
ging
c
ybernetic
conceptions
of
subjecti
vity
as
well
as
a
concomitant
aspect
of
Perspecti
v
e
that
is
more
closely
tied
to
Burk
e’
s
read
-
ing
of
Ber
gson
rather
than
Nietzsche:
the
logic
of
re
v
ersal
and
in
v
ersion
by
which
it
operates.
As
detailed
abo
v
e
,
although
Burk
e
dismissed
the
rigid
equi
v
alences
between
humans
and
machines
articulated
in
popular
debates
o
v
e
r
c
ybernetics,
eng
aging
this
problematic
w
a
s
salutary
for
his
theorization
of
human
af
fect
and
agenc
y
and
the
impact
of
rhetorical
technologies
in
producing
and
manipulating
these
structures—conceptions
that
troubled
traditionally
humanist
conceptions
of
sub-
jecti
vity
and
self-so
v
ereignty
e
v
en
as
it
resisted
reducti
v
ely
informatic
depictions
of
the
same.
On
this
score,
and
generally
in
re
g
ards
to
structural
af
f
inities
be-
tween
c
ybernetics
and
rhetoric,
it
is
helpful
to
remember
the
pro
v
enance
of
the
neologism
cybernetics
as
it
w
a
s
coined
by
Norbert
W
iener
.
W
iener
selected
the
title
for
the
emer
ging
interdisciplinary
mo
v
ement
from
the
Gor
gias
,
cybernetics
being
his
approximation
of
the
Greek
term
for
steer
sman
or
navigation
.I
n t
h
e
dialogue
Socrates
compares
this
function
to
rhetoric,
separating
them
both
from
the
pri
vile
ged
domain
of
philosoph
y
i
n
a
n
incidence
that
fore
grounds
for
sec
-
ond-order
c
yberneticist
Satosi
W
atanabe
that
W
iener’
s
appropriation
w
a
s
pre
-
scient
for
the
discipline’
s
subsequent
eng
agement
with
scientif
ic
epistemology:
[. . . I]t
is
highly
signif
icant
that
in
his
mind
Plato
someho
w
associ
-
ated
rhetorics
and
c
ybernetics.
W
e
should
notice
that
these
tw
o
arts
ha
v
e
indeed
something
in
common:
The
y
both
represent
fle
xible
and
adapti
v
e
methods
aiming
at
utilizing,
influencing,
controlling,
and
o
v
ercoming
the
outside
w
orld,
mental
or
ph
ysical,
in
order
to
achie
v
e
one’
s
o
wn
goal.
The
y
are
entirely
dif
ferent
from
primarily
disinterested
sciences
such
as
geometry
or
astronomy
or
from
straight
technology
such
as
bridge-b
uilding
or
oil
pressing.
(152)
Ho
we
v
e
r
,
this
methodology
required
a
comple
x
vie
w
o
f
human
agenc
y
.
Al
-
though
W
atanabe
fore
grounds
the
self-directed
nature
of
c
ybernetic
w
ork,
the
discipline
w
a
s
equally
premised
on
a
nuanced
conception
of
the
imbrication
of
Rhetoric, Cybernetics, and the W
ork of the Body in Burk
e’
s Body of W
ork
289
the
indi
vidual
and
her
en
vironment,
one
that
dre
w
o
n
informatics
and
automata
theory
to
detail
the
impact
of
ecology
and
interaction
on
human
kno
wledge
production
and
human
perspecti
v
e
.
Such
a
conception
w
a
s
a
t
the
forefront
of
often-ne
glected
c
ybernetic
w
ork
in
the
human
sciences,
articulated,
for
e
xample,
by
anthropologist
and
c
yberneticist
Gre
gory
Bateson
in
his
essay
“Cybernetics
of
‘Self,
’”
a
consideration
of
the
coincidence
between
“the
theology
of
Alcoholics
Anon
ymous”
and
the
“epistemology
of
c
ybernetics”
(309):
Cybernetics
[. . . recognizes]
that
the
“self”
as
ordinarily
understood
is
only
a
small
part
of
a
much
lar
ger
trial-and-error
system
which
does
all
the
thinking,
acting,
and
deciding.
This
system
includes
all
the
informational
pathw
ays
which
are
rele
v
ant
at
an
y
g
i
v
en
moment
to
an
y
g
i
v
en
decision.
The
“self”
is
a
f
alse
reif
ication
of
an
improp
-
erly
delimited
part
of
this
much
lar
ger
f
ield
of
interlocking
pro
-
cesses.
Cybernetics
also
recognizes
that
tw
o
o
r
more
persons—an
y
group
of
persons—may
together
form
such
a
thinking-and-acting
system.
(331–32)
Burk
e’
s
Perspecti
v
e
by
Incongruity
w
ould
dra
w
v
ectors
from
the
seemingly
oppositional
dynamic
of
self-direction
and
interdependence,
conceptual
tools
circulating
in
early
c
ybernetic
theorizing
and
still
v
ery
much
at
play
in
trail-
ing-edge
artif
icial
intelligence
programs
based
on
response
mechanisms—such
as
Burk
ebot’
s
—by
positioning
w
ould-be
practitioners
of
Perspecti
v
e
as
both
subjects
and
objects
in
its
process.
In
encouraging
readers
to
“deliberately
culti
v
ate
the
use
of
contradictory
concepts,

Burk
e
positions
them
as
f
irst
self-
directed
decision-making
subjects
and
then
responsi
v
e
and
responsible
objects
inside
a
greater
af
fecti
v
e
and
conceptual
netw
ork
(94).
This
planned
encounter
with
the
seemingly
illogical
w
ould
aim
at
disrupting
established
conceptual
habituations
and
chronic
modes
of
response
by
both
dra
wing
on
and
challenging
the
aspects
of
human
kno
wledge
production
and
cognition
that
form
our
deepest
af
f
inities
with
both
nonhuman
animal
cognition
and
mechanical
“intelligences.

As
such,
it
constitutes
a
rhetorically
based
practicum
in
encountering
and
culti
-
v
ating
alterity—training
in
ho
w
t
o
concei
v
e
and
think
dif
ferently
.
Ber
gson’
s
writings
on
metaphor
and
perception
w
ould
pro
vide
for
Burk
e
the
core
of
the
ne
w
“approach
to
reality”
actualized
in
Perspecti
v
e
by
Incongruity
and
the
comple
x
consideration
of
human
agenc
y
under
girding
it
(95).
F
o
r
Burk
e,
Ber
gson’
s
application
of
metaphor
pro
vides
a
w
ay
of
disjoining
and
conjoining
substances
by
w
orking
on
a
l
e
v
el
other
than
rationality:
“Indeed,
the
metaphor
al
w
ays
has
about
it
precisely
this
re
v
ealing
of
hitherto
unsuspected
connecti
v
e
s
[. . .].
It
appeals
by
e
x
emplifying
relationships
between
objects
which
our
cus
-
290
Rhetoric Re
vie
w
tomarily
rational
v
ocab
ulary
has
ignored”
(90).
Ber
gson
pro
vides
perhaps
his
most
concise
treatment
of
this
process
in
Laughter:
An
Essay
on
the
Meaning
of
the
Comic
,
a
w
ork
focusing
on
that
rather
irrational
response,
which,
as
detailed
at
the
be
ginning
of
this
essay
,
Burk
e
s
a
w
as
constituti
v
e
of
human
dif
ference
and
potentiality
.
F
or
Ber
gson
the
“incongruous”
marks
not
solely
a
critique
of
ratio
-
nality
and
a
disruption
of
habituated
linkages,
b
u
t
a
n
ability
of
the
human
mind
to
be
af
fected
by
a
logic
other
than
that
of
rationality:
Such
a
proposition
as
the
follo
wing:
“My
usual
dress
forms
part
of
my
body”
is
absurd
in
the
e
yes
of
reason.
Y
e
t
imagination
looks
upon
it
as
true.

A
red
nose
is
a
painted
nose,


A
n
e
gro
is
a
white
man
in
disguise,

are
also
absurd
to
the
reason
which
rationalises;
b
u
t
the
y
are
gospel
truths
to
pure
imagination.
So
there
is
a
logic
of
the
imagination
which
is
not
the
logic
of
reason,
one
which
at
times
is
e
v
en
opposed
to
the
latter
,—with
which,
ho
we
v
e
r
,
philosoph
y
must
reck
on,
not
only
in
the
study
of
the
comic,
b
u
t
i
n
e
v
ery
other
in
v
estig
ation
of
the
same
kind.
(42)
The
human
capacities
to
percei
v
e
and
respond
to
the
incongruous
pro
vided
not
only
the
structure
of
comedy
b
u
t
also
a
vital
port
of
entry
into
in
v
estig
ating
ho
w
perception
and
thought
in
general
are
disciplined
into
a
c
ycle
of
rationalization,
critique,
and
judgment.
Interv
ention
into
this
process
requires
a
“special
ef
fort”
to
forestall
lockstep
judgment
by
culti
v
ating
habits
of
the
imagination
rather
than
reason:
In
order
to
reconstruct
this
hidden
logic,
a
special
kind
of
ef
fort
is
needed,
by
which
the
outer
crust
of
carefully
stratif
ied
judgments
and
f
irmly
established
ideas
will
be
lifted,
and
we
shall
behold
in
the
depths
of
our
mind,
lik
e
a
sheet
of
subterranean
w
ater
,
the
flo
w
o
f
a
n
unbrok
en
stream
of
images
which
pass
from
one
into
another
.
This
interpenetration
of
images
does
not
come
about
by
chance.
It
obe
ys
la
ws,
or
rather
habits,
which
hold
the
same
relation
to
imagination
that
logic
does
to
thought.
(42–43)
Burk
e’
s
Perspecti
v
e
by
Incongruity
is
essentially
a
technology
for
retrain
-
ing
human
response,
dra
wing
on
the
capacity
to
respond
to
(in)congruity
that
Ber
gson
elaborates
abo
v
e
.
I
t
w
orks
by
nature
of
both
meanings
of
tr
ope
:
tr
ope
as
designation
for
static
structures
of
form
and
language
counted
on
for
pro
-
ducing
a
consistent
response,
and
the
tr
ope
of
“troping,

a
n
action
that
intro
-
duces
juxtaposition
into
this
f
irst
mechanism
of
conditioned
response,
thereby
Rhetoric, Cybernetics, and the W
ork of the Body in Burk
e’
s Body of W
ork
291
producing
a
dif
ferential
relation
between
the
original
structure
and
its
percep
-
tion.
As
Nietzsche
reminds
us,
all
perspecti
v
e
s
are
only
perspecti
v
es,
and
as
Burk
e
reminds
us,
all
perspecti
v
e
s
are
in
a
sense
already
“perspecti
v
e
s
b
y
i
n
-
congruity”:
metaphorical
constructions
linking
di
v
e
r
gent
phenomena.
Ho
we
v
e
r
,
Burk
e’
s
methodology
of
planned
incongruity
w
orks
by
the
acceleration
and
de
-
celeration
of
these
already-ubiquitous
processes.
On
the
one
hand,
we
ha
v
e
a
speeding
up
of
perspecti
v
alism;
Burk
e
echoes
Nietzsche
in
calling
for
the
quantitati
v
e
multiplication
of
perspecti
v
e
s
and
the
concomitant
de
v
aluation
of
an
y
one
single
“correct”
perspecti
v
e
.
O
n
the
other
hand,
we
ha
v
e
a
decelera
-
tion
of
the
habituated
reaction
to
perspecti
v
es:
a
replacement
of
the
lockstep
impulse
to
judgment
with
hesitation.
Burk
e
hails
a
qualitati
v
e
(in
addition
to
quantitati
v
e
)
operation
on
perspecti
v
e
;
the
comple
xity
of
incongruity
creates
a
space
for
response
rather
than
judgment
or
rationalization.
In
this
sense,
then,
Burk
e
gets
us
much
closer
to
the
forces
shaping
struc
-
tures
of
thinking
than
an
y
deliberation
on
the
process
could
achie
v
e
.
The
real-
ization
that
orientation
and
conditioning
shapes
perspecti
v
e
on
a
l
e
v
el
beneath
rationality—perhaps
the
most
consistent
topic
in
Burk
e’
s
corpus—e
v
entually
led
Burk
e
a
w
a
y
from
the
“deb
unking”
of
such
structures
to
the
pursuit
of
the
most
benef
icial
one
(a
project
that
ends
whether
by
choice
or
chance
with
logology).
Among
the
v
arious
perspecti
v
e
s
Burk
e
culti
v
ated
in
his
writings,
ho
we
v
e
r
,
Metabiology
emer
ges
as
singular
in
one
crucial
aspect:
It
marks
a
point
in
Burk
e’
s
trajectory
where
his
attempt
to
pro
vide
the
most
appropriate
interpreti
v
e
frame
leads
us
instead
to
the
creation
of
tools
for
culti
v
ating
singu-
lar
and
dif
ferentiating
shifts
in
interpretation.
Conclusion:
On
Seeing
Differ
ently
Abo
v
e
I’
v
e
attempted
to
map
out
sites
in
Burk
e’
s
early
w
ork
where
ne
w
w
ays
of
thinking
about
the
human
body
and
the
correlations
between
the
sym
-
bolic
capacities
of
humans,
animals,
and
machinery
prompted
rein
v
estig
ations
of
the
connections
between
the
body
and
rhetoric.
In
most
cases
this
relation
has
fore
grounded
ho
w
corporeality
af
fects
rhetoric,
b
u
t
Burk
e
describes
in
the
afterw
ord
to
Attitudes
T
owar
ds
History
a
v
ery
personal
e
v
ent
during
the
construction
of
the
Perspecti
v
e
by
Incongruity
section
of
P
ermanence
and
Chang
e
where
rethinking
rhetoric
af
fected
his
body
:
And
precisely
then,
at
a
time
when
I
w
as
focusing
on
the
concept
of
“double
vision”
and
as
I
b
e
g
an
seeing
the
design
of
my
whole
pro
-
ject
changing,
the
twist
of
vision
became
actual.
On
the
road
to
go
shopping,
I
s
a
w
tw
o
cars
coming
whereas
I
kne
w
i
t
w
as
only
one,
292
Rhetoric Re
vie
w
looking
double.
I
could
see
close
up
without
the
doubling,
b
u
t
the
f
arther
of
f
things
were,
the
wider
apart
the
tw
o
images
became.
What
w
a
s
this?
Cancer
of
the
brain,
perhaps
[. . .].
Y
e
t
s
o
f
ar
,
n
o
diagnosis;
nothing
b
u
t
plans
for
further
and
costlier
e
xaminations.
(399)
T
rue
to
his
consistent
emphasis
on
the
af
fects
of
psychogenic
illness,
Burk
e
performs
a
self-diagnosis
linking
his
ph
ysical
ailment
to
his
mental
state
and
prescribes
a
self-e
xperiment
in
response:
I
h
a
v
e
had
se
v
eral
occasions
to
learn
that,
if
we
get
in
v
olv
ed
enough
in
the
using
of
w
ords,
the
w
ords
in
turn
be
gin
using
us.
“Inspiration”
is
an
honorif
ic
w
ord
(thus
dangerously
decepti
v
e
)
for
a
process
of
self-h
ypnosis
that
can
result
from
o
v
e
r
-susceptibility
to
whate
v
e
r
terms
one
happens
to
be
engrossed
with.
So
I
diagnosed
the
situation
thus:
When
speculating
on
the
resources
of
the
term
“double
vision”
at
the
same
time
that
I
w
as
shifting
my
perspecti
v
e
on
my
o
w
n
books
on
perspecti
v
e
,
I
be
g
a
n
seeing
double.
So
I
w
ork
ed
tentati
v
ely
on
the
assumption
that
I
w
as
subjecting
myself
to
the
magic
of
some
ob
vious
“let
there
be”
equations.
I
clearly
“solv
ed”
the
dizzying
for-
mal
problem
thus
brought
to
the
fore
when
the
Nietzschean
theme
of
“transv
aluation”
in
the
middle
section
of
P&C
introduced
what
T
rot-
sk
yites
might
call
a
v
ariation
on
the
theme
of
perpetual
re
v
olution.
My
reco
v
ery
follo
wed
forthwith—and
you
can’
t
imagine
what
a
truly
sybaritic
delight
it
w
as,
to
look
do
wn
the
road
and
see
just
one
car
coming.
(399)
Burk
e’
s
“double-vision”
marks
human
susceptibility
to
persuasion
and
connec
-
tion,
a
capacity
his
early
w
orks
detail
as
operating
through
the
body
rather
than
through
rational
cognition
(a
process
“doubly”
emphasized
by
Burk
e’
s
p
h
ysical
symptoms).
Perspecti
v
e
by
Incongruity
emer
ges
as
the
“perpetual
re
v
olution”
ag
ainst
the
ne
g
ati
v
e
ef
fects
of
this
condition,
a
sustained
retraining
of
response
that
manipulates
rather
than
blocks
human
capacities
to
be
af
fected.
Burk
e’
s
early
writings,
which
I
h
a
v
e
tried
to
illustrate
as
dynamic
attempts
to
fuse
rhetoric
and
the
corporeal
and
recognize
the
importance
of
af
fect
and
the
nonrational,
occup
y
a
tentati
v
e
place
in
his
canon.
Rueck
ert
speaks
for
man
y
(though
perhaps
more
e
xplicitly
than
any
)
when
referring
to
these
w
orks
as
a
“stylistic
and
terminological
underbrush”
and
“an
irritation,
a
distraction,
the
rank
gro
wth
of
a
fecund
mind”
(5).
When
these
writings
are
not
summarily
dismissed,
the
y
typically
(as
for
Rueck
ert)
function
lar
gely
as
anticipation
for
Rhetoric, Cybernetics, and the W
ork of the Body in Burk
e’
s Body of W
ork
293
Burk
e’
s
later
w
orks,
adolescent
v
ersions
of
his
more
domesticated
concepts
such
as
dramatism
and
more
generically
f
amiliar
methodologies
such
as
dialec
-
tic.
The
recuperation
of
Burk
e
a
s
a
proto-poststructuralist
by
man
y
critics
(the
w
orks
of
W
ess,
Bieseck
er
,
and
Crusius
being
perhaps
the
more
prominent)
has
also
contrib
uted
to
an
emphasis
on
the
later
w
orks
and
the
(perhaps
paradoxi
-
cal)
canonization
of
Burk
e
a
s
both
our
preeminent
rhetorical
humanist
and
most
important
postmodern
rhetorician.
Ho
we
v
e
r
,
I
w
ould
lik
e
t
o
end
here
by
suggesting
that
Burk
e’
s
early
writ
-
ings
might
pro
vide
more
po
werful
(and
more
timely)
tools
than
either
human
-
ist
rationality
,
dialectic,
or
social-constructi
vism
and
that
he
concomitantly
pro
-
vides
a
n
e
w
telos
for
contemporary
rhetoric.
Ha
ving
essayed
the
po
wer
of
form
and
habituated
structure
to
shape
perception
through
the
rhetoric
and
aes
-
thetics
of
Counter
-Statement
and
the
metabiological
frame
of
P
ermanence
and
Chang
e
,
Burk
e
i
n
vites
us
to
get
in
v
olv
ed
in
these
processes
themselv
es
rather
then
their
critique.
W
orking
immanently
through
rather
than
outside
of
these
productions,
Burk
e
prescribes
the
redirection
rather
than
elimination
of
already
e
xisting
(and
una
v
oidable)
structures
of
influence.
Such
a
process
instantiates
not
so
much
a
resistance
to
the
force
behind
orientation
b
u
t
a
surf
ing
of
these
forces
g
ained
through
an
eng
agement
with
their
ef
fects
rather
than
their
mean-
ing:
Rhetoric
emer
ges
not
only
as
a
technology
for
persuading
others
b
u
t
also
as
a
technology
of
the
self
used
by
rhetors
to
discipline
and
transform
their
o
w
n
habits
of
response.
Picture
Burk
e
looking
do
wn
the
highw
ay
and
delight-
ing
in
his
perception
of
only
one
car:
a
m
o
v
ement
from
multiplying
perspec-
ti
v
e
s
t
o
manipulating
perspecti
v
e
,
from
seeing
doubly
to
seeing
dif
ferently
.
Notes
1
Man
y
thanks
to
Rhetoric
Re
vie
w
peer
re
vie
wers
Da
vid
Blak
esle
y
and
W
illiam
Co
vino
for
v
aluable
and
supporti
v
e
comments
on
the
draft
of
this
manuscript.
I
also
thank
Jack
Selzer
and
the
members
of
his
2003
K
enneth
Burk
e
seminar
at
Penn
State
for
their
insightful
readings
of
early
drafts.
2
F
o
r
a
n
account
of
f
irst-w
a
v
e
c
yberneticists’
response
and
resistance
to
beha
viorism,
see
Heims
(particularly
1–13;
201–47).
3
Burk
e
comments
on
both
of
these
impulses
in
“Counter
-Gridlock”:
“That’
s
where
the
deconstructionist
guys
are
cutting
in,
on
that
sort
of
thing.
I
w
ant
to
stay
halfw
ay
there.
Destro
y
it,
yes,
if
you
will.
But
f
irst
let
us
see
it
as
ha
ving
the
form
it
does,
with
its
particular
kind
of
be
ginning,
middle,
and
end”
(22).
4
See
L
ynn
W
orsham’
s
“Coming
to
T
erms:
Theory
,
Writing,
and
Politics”
and
“Going
Postal:
Pedagogic
V
iolence
and
the
Schooling
of
Emotion”
for
nuanced
accounts
of
this
conception.
5
See
Ballif
(153–94),
Da
vis
(21–115),
and
V
itanza
for
e
xamples
of
this
critical
mo
v
e
.
6
See,
for
instance,
Hayles’
influential
How
W
e
Became
P
osthuman
(244–46)
for
a
critique
of
artif
icial
intelligence
theories
that
minimize
the
importance
of
emotion
and
W
ilson
(103–32)
for
an
e
xamination
of
reducti
v
e
interpretations
of
embodiment
within
the
same.
294
Rhetoric Re
vie
w
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orks
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