models of democracy

dinnerworkableUrban and Civil

Nov 16, 2013 (3 years and 9 months ago)

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A longitudinal perspective on

models of
democracy




1

2

3

Do
models

of democracy change?



What is change?
(from
osmosis to oxymoron)



First
-
order change
:


adjusting to the preferences of citizens



Second
-
order change
:


new «color», style of leadership, or
political equilibrium



Third
-
order

change
:


transformation in the institutional pattern of democracy

and in its embedded political principles and logic of

interaction



4

5

Different

research

designs
:




In the research question (trees or forest?)



In the selection of cases (stable set or changing geometry?)




In the
measurement

strategy

(
central

tendency
,
dispersion
,
distribution
,
modelling

the
effect

of time)


6

Which

model?




Several concepts


(Consensus/Westminster model; Proportional/Majoritarian vision;

Unitary/adversarial democracy; Centripetal/
decentralised

governance;

Centralist/polycentric…)



Two “approaches”:

Consensus/Westminster (Lijphart)

Veto points/players (
Immergut
,
Tsebelis
)




Reasons
:


Well

established

approaches


Cross
-
country time
-
series

datasets


Check

of
robustness

using

different

data and
techniques


7

Three
options

Option A. Winning models (three sub
-
options)


1.



2.



3.



Option B. Increased heterogeneity





Option C. Null Hypothesis




8

Good

reasons



Models of democracy are stable by definition (they wouldn’t be
«
models
»
)



Institutional configuration tend to resist change (
«
institutions are sticky,
the costs of change are high, and the advantages are not guaranteed
»
)



Lock
-
in effects, increasing returns, path dependencies promote institutional
friction in spite of societal change


Historical inefficiency of institutions.



The genetic heritage of a model strongly determines its future (
eg

freezing of
party system


cleavages


divided society


cause of
consensualism
)



Globalization can either be considered as a driver of change or as a cause of
retrenchment



Europeanization

(or
regional

integration
)
as

homogeneizing

the
polities



The
experience

of
modernity


fluid
»
institutional

patterns
?)



Institutions

are
not

often

the «
bread

and
butter

»

of
political

competition
,
but




9

Descriptives



34 democracies in the 1945
-
2010 period



Update Lijphart first
-
dimension

(
electoral

system
, party
system
,
type

of
government
, executive
-
legislative
relationship
,
interest

groups
)

in
order

to
have

three

comparable

measures

of
majoritarianism

for
three

periods
: 1945
-
1971; 1971
-
1996; 1996
-
2010




1945
-
1971

1971
-
1996

1996
-
2010

Mean

0.0155

0.0393

-
0.0516

Min

-
1.2406

-
1.3575

-
1.3042

Max

1.1117

1.3853

1.3942

Standard deviation

0.7725

0.8135

0.8140

N

27

34

34

Tab. 1
The index of
majoritarianism

in the three periods

10

Fig. 3

The index of majoritarianism for country and period (1945
-
2010)

11


Replicate the
same

analysis

with the
same

34
democracies

in the
same

1945
-
2010
period

using

the
Political

constraint

index

(
based

on
vps
, and
controlling

for the
role

of
the
chied

executive, for the
potential

opposition

control of the legislature, for the
type

of
government
, for the
number

and position of parties in and
outside

the
executive
coalition
)



1945
-
1971

1971
-
1996

1996
-
2010

Mean

0.4414

0.4342

0.4486

Min

0.1204

0.1105

0.0917

Max

0.6633

0.7081

0.7181

Standard deviation

0.1035

0.1131

0.1263

N

572

845

408

Tab. 2
The
Polcon

index in the three periods

12

Modeling

time 1



94 observations for 34 democracies in the 3 periods during
1945
-
2010
[
Xtreg

with
fe

and re, with
robust

s.e.)]



Tab. 3
Random and Fixed effects

of Time
in the Majoritarian dataset


Random effects
𝛽




Fixed effects
𝛽




Est

(Robust
SE)

P> |z|


Est

(
Robust
SE)

P> |t|

Fixed part

𝛽
0

[_cons]


.126


.140


0.
368



.116


.
068


0.097

𝛽
1

[period]

-
.055

.033

0.
091


-
.056

.033

0.097


Random part


𝜓



.769






.774
*




𝜃

.226




.226
*





Not parameter estimates but standard deviations of estimates
𝜁

,

𝜖





Tab.
4

Random and Fixed effects
of Time
in

the Polcon dataset


Random effects
𝛽




Fixed effects
𝛽




Est

(Robust
SE)

P> |z|


Est

(
Robust
SE)

P> |t|

Fixed part

𝛽
0

[_cons]


.
400


.
020


0.0
00



.
402


.0
17


0.000

𝛽
1

[period]

.0
16

.0
08

0.
044


.0
17

.0
08

0.0
41


Random part


𝜓



.
089






.
097*




𝜃

.
050




.
050*





Not parameter estimates but standard deviations of estimates
𝜁

,

𝜖



13

Modeling

time 2



1765 yearly observations for 34 democracies during 1945
-
2010
[
Xtpcse
,
psar
(1)]
























































































r
h
o
s

=


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.
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6
3
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a
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:


p
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(
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a
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)







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a
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:




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3
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:



c
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=






1
7
6
5
P
r
a
i
s
-
W
i
n
s
t
e
n

r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
,

c
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r
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a
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p
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c
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s
t
a
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a
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d

e
r
r
o
r
s

(
P
C
S
E
s
)
14

«Eppur si muove…»



Very

(
very
) slow,
but

systematic

change

towards

consensualism

or
towards

an
increase

in the
vp

configuration

of
democracies



It

is

just a
point

of
departure

(
not

many

empirical

analyses

of the
issue
)



What

about

the
dynamics

of
change
?
(
Historical

institutionalist

talked

about

different

types

of
accumulation

of small
changes

with
transformative

power
)




The
assumption

of
linearity
?
(
it’s

not

only

a
question

of
fit
,
but

of a
different

idea of
how

underlying

factors

push

for
change
)



Interactions
?
(
different

types

of
democracy

may

have

different

type

or pace of
change
)









Causes
!