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UNIVERSITE DE GENEVE

THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM
AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS
UPON SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

Thèse présentée à la Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales de
l’Université de Genève

par

Robin Hagelberg

Pour l’obtention du grade de
Docteur ès sciences économiques et sociales
Mention: Science politique

Membres du jury de thèse:
Mme Alice LANDAU, chargée de cours, Université de Genève
M. Jan-Erik LANE, professeur, Université de Genève, directeur de thèse
M. René SCHWOK, maître d’enseignement et de recherche, Université de
Genève, président du jury
M. Fred TANNER, directeur, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)

Thèse n°605
Genève, 2006
 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS








LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

p.04







INTRODUCTION

p.07







THEORETICAL APPROACH
p.17







PART I: THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM
 p.28





1) THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM p.31



a.TheEvolutionoftheEuropeanSecuritySystemuntilthe
EndoftheColdWar
p.31



b.TheEuropeanSecuritySysteminthepost"ColdWarEra p.48





2) THE PARAMETERS OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM p.58



a.TheConceptofSecurity p.59



b.TheChallengestotheStabilityofEurope p.66





3) THE PRINCIPAL INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS p.74



a. The Security Institutions within the Framework of the
EuropeanUnion
p.76

§1.TheCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy/
TheEuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy
p.76

§2.TheWesternEuropeanUnion p.94



b.TheOtherSecurityInstitutions p.101

§1.TheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization p.102

§2.TheOrganizationforSecurityandCooperationin
Europe
p.115



 2

c.TheInstitutionalQuestion p.121

§1.TheComplexEuropeanSecurityArchitecture p.122

§2.ConceptualandStrategicDistinctions p.127







PART II: THE INTEGRATION OF CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE INTO THE WESTERN
INSTITUTIONS

p.134





1) THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION AND EXPANDED NORTH
ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
p.137



a.TheProcessofEnlargementoftheEuropeanUnion p.137



b.TheDynamicsoftheTwoEnlargements p.150





2) THE POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES
TOWARDS THE ENLARGEMENTS
p.164



a.TheIncentivesoftheUnitedKingdom p.165



b.TheAttitudeofFrance p.170



c.ThePositionofGermany p.179





3) THE TURKISH QUESTION p.187



a.TheGeostrategicPositionofTurkey p.188



b.TheTurkishWillingnesstoJointheEuropeanUnion p.199







PART III: THE ZONES OF INFLUENCE IN THE UNIFYING
EUROPE

p.207





1) THE POSITION OF THE DIFFERENT EUROPEAN STATES
TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
p.212



a.TheIncentivesofthe“Atlanticist”UnitedKingdom p.213



b.TheMotivationsofthe“Europeanist”France p.219



c.TheGermanPosition p.228

 3




2) THE GEOPOLITICAL AREAS OF THE TWO KEY EUROPEAN
GEOSTRATEGIC PLAYERS
p.236



a.Germany’sGeopoliticalArea p.237



b.France’sGeopoliticalArea p.252





3) EUROPE’S CORE p.264



a.TheFranco"GermanTandem p.265



b.EnlargingEurope’sCoreandtheRussianComponent p.276



c.TheEuropeanUnionasaGenuine“Non"State”Great
Power
p.289







CONCLUSION

p.302







ENDNOTES
p.324







ANNEXES
p.370







BIBLIOGRAPHY
p.381




 4
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

 
 
ACCHAN AlliedCommandChannel
ACP
Africa"Caribbean"Pacific
AKP
AdaletVeKalkinmaPartisi[JusticeandDevelopmentParty]
ASEAN AssociationofSoutheastAsianNations
ASEM
Asia"EuropeMeeting[ASEM]
B.T.O.
BrusselsTreatyOrganization
CAP
CommonAgriculturalPolicy
CDU
ChristlichDemokratischeUnionDeutschlands
CEE
CentralandEasternEurope
CEECs
CentralandEasternEuropeanCountries
CFE
ConventionalArmedForcesinEurope
CFSP
CommonForeignandSecurityPolicy
CINCSOUTH

Commander"in"ChiefAlliedForcesSouthEurope
CIS
CommonwealthofIndependentStates
CJTF
CombinedJointTaskForces
COMECON
CouncilforMutualEconomicAssistance
CSCE
ConferenceonSecurityandCooperationinEurope
CST
CollectiveSecurityTreaty
CSTO
CollectiveSecurityTreatyOrganization
CSU
Christlich"SozialeUnion
EADS
EuropeanAeronauticDefenceandSpaceCompany
EAPC
Euro"AtlanticPartnershipCouncil
EC
EuropeanCommunity
EDA
EuropeanDefenceAgency
EEA EuropeanEconomicArea
EEC EuropeanEconomicCommunity
ECSC EuropeanCoalandSteelCommunity
EFTA EuropeanFreeTradeAssociation
EPC EuropeanPolicyCooperation
EMU EconomicandMonetaryUnion
ENP EuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy
ESDI EuropeanSecurityandDefenceIdentity
ESDP EuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy
EU EuropeanUnion
EurAsEC EurasianEconomicCommunity
Euratom EuropeanAtomicEnergyCommunity
EUMC EUMilitaryCommittee
 5
EUMS EUMilitaryStaff
FDI ForeignDirectInvestment
FDP FreieDemokratischePartei
FOC FullOperationalCapability
FPÖ FreiheitlicheParteiÖsterreichs
FRG FederalRepublicofGermany
FYROM FormerYugoslavRepublicofMacedonia
GATT GeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade
GNI GrossNationalIncome
GDP GrossDomesticProduct
GDR GermanDemocraticRepublic
GNP GrossNationalProduct
ICTY InternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia
IEC InitialOperationCapability
IGC IntergovernmentalConference
IFOR ImplementationForce
IMF InternationalMonetaryFund
KFOR KosovoForce
MAD MutualAssuredDestruction
NAC NorthAtlanticCouncil
NACC NorthAtlanticCooperationCouncil
NATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization
NMD NationalMissileDefense
NRF NATOResponseForce
NSDAP NationalsozialistischeDeutscheArbeiterpartei
OCCAR OrganisationConjointedeCoopérationpourl’Armement
(OrganizationofCooperationinArmaments)
OECD OrganizationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment
OSCE OrganizationforSecurityandCooperationinEurope
PfP
PartnershipforPeace
PHARE PolandandHungary:AssistancetotheRestructuringofthe
Economy
PSC PoliticalandSecurityCommittee
PSOE PartidoSocialistaObreroEspañol
RRF RapidReactionForce
SACEUR SupremeAlliedCommanderEurope
SACLANT SupremeAlliedCommanderAtlantic
SDI StrategicDefenseInitiative
SEA SingleEuropeanAct
SFOR StabilisationForce
SHAPE SupremeHeadquartersAlliedPowersEurope
 6
SPD SozialdemokratischeParteiDeutschlands
TEU TreatyonEuropeanUnion
TRNC TurkishRepublicofNorthernCyprus
UN UnitedNations
UNESCO UnitedNationsEducational,ScientificandCultural
Organization
USA UnitedStatesofAmerica
USSR
UnionofSovietSocialistRepublics
VAT
ValueAddedTax
WEAG WesternEuropeanArmamentsGroup
WEAO WesternEuropeanArmamentsOrganization
WEU
WesternEuropeanUnion
WTO WorldTradeOrganization



 7

INTRODUCTION

 8
In the wake of the fundamental geopolitical change caused by the fall of
theBerlinWall,numerousinterrogationsquestioningtheshapeofthepostCold"
War Europeansecuritycomplexhaveemerged.Thewaningofthebipolarworld
orderledthewayforalotofuncertaintiesconcerningtheroleandinterestsofthe
actors of the European security system. Both the states and international
institutions endeavoured to adapt to the new geopolitical context. Some
institutions tried to find a new legitimation, some other to grasp the change for
further developments. As for the states, they keep on defending their own
interests.Someareseekingtokeeptheirinfluence,othertofindnewpossibilities.
Yet, a series of questions remain: How are these diverse actors, whether it be
states or international institutions, defining their preferences in the evolving
European geopolitical context? What is the role of the major European states in
the European security architecture? What is theroleofRussiaandoftheUnited
States, generally considered as the genuine victor of the Cold War and as the
unique superpower in the post"Cold War era? How are the European states
weighting up the options so as to have a more secure Europe in which their
national interests are acknowledged? In this context, which role can be assigned
to the common European Security and Defence Policy [ESDP] developed inside
theEuropeanUnion[EU]?
GiventheachievementoftheEconomicandMonetaryUnion[EMU],the
fascinating topic in Europe in the next decades concerns certainly the European
integration in the areas of security and defence. While aiming at tackling the
above"mentioned interrogations, this thesis has as a purpose to provide a better
understanding of how national security concerns affect the formation of spheres
of influence (or geopolitical areas)
1
 in the optic of an enlarged European Union
(or unified Europe)
2
. The hypothesis we are willing to confirm is the following
one: in the unifying post"Cold War Europe, security and defence concerns
continue to induce the states, especially the great powers, to form spheres of
influence. Notwithstanding and to some extent even via international
organizations,thestatesareaiming–byseekingtodefendtheirnationalinterest–
to assert their respective geopolitical area. In this context, the likely formation
insidetheEUofagenuinecapacityinthedefenceandsecurityfieldlendsfurther
weight to the assumption of an EU acting as an authentic player with its own
 9
sphereofinfluence.Therefore,theroleandimplicationoftheEuropeanUnionas
apotential“non"state”greatpowerwillalsobeaddressed.

Thethesiswillattempttoconfirmitshypothesisbybasingitsanalysison
the defensive variant of neo"realism. By doing so, the paper will focus on
traditional neo"realist assumptions, notably on its emphasis on state as the key
actor, while also dealing with the possibilities of cooperation. The theoretical
approachwillbyandlargebeaddressedinthefollowingpartandonlyslightlyat
thispoint.
On the one hand, the thesis’ hypothesis is opposing the traditional
hypothesis, asserting that the EU member states do not have any sphere of
influencesincetheEUhasabsorbedthemintoitsownsphereofinfluence.Onthe
otherhand,thehypothesisofthethesisisalsocontradictingtraditionalrealistand
neo"realist’s assumptions, which seem to be unable to account for cooperation
betweentheEUmemberstatesandtheimpactoftheEUinstitutionsuponthem.
This explains why the use of neo"realism to understand the current security
architecture in Europe is largely rejected. The aim of the thesis is precisely to
apply neo"realism, in taking its defensive variant, to try to comprehend that
spheres of influence exist for both the states in Europe – most particularly the
three big EU member states, which are France, Germany and the United
Kingdom, but also Russia and Turkey – and at an EU level. By backing its
analysis on the defensive variant of neo"realism, the thesis seeks notably to
corroborate the assertion that the major EU member states, while pushing for
moreintegrationwithintheEU,areatthesametimemaintainingtheirsphereof
influence. To that end, these states tend to use the EU and other international
institutions as a means to increase their influence. But, on the other hand, given
the fact that EU’s great powers are gradually underpinning EU’s status as an
international actor in its own right, the thesis will analyse under which
circumstances the European Union can effectively be considered a genuine
internationalactorhavingitsownsphereofinfluence.

 10
Letusnowaddresssomemethodologicalissues.Asthethesiswillanalyse
theEuropeansecuritysystemanditsrepercussionsuponspheresofinfluence,one
shouldbeginbydefiningthekeyconceptsinvolved.

Thethesisentailstwoambiguitiesasregardsthepoliticalobjectexamined.
WhenspeakingabouttheEuropeansecuritysystem,onequestionswhatobjectis
really meant to be analysed. Europe is a complex political object. So, which
Europedowemean?Inotherwords,whichEuropeisreferredtowhenonespeaks
aboutthe“Europeansecuritysystem”?
The first distinction to be made concerns the different appreciations of
Europe. Geographically and seen as a continent, Europe’s generally accepted
eastern limits are the Urals and the Bosporus. Yet, Europe is in fact at least as
much a political and cultural concept as a geographical one. So, for a better
understanding,wewilldistinguishfour“Europes”insecurityterms,asidentified
bytheDanishresearcherOleWæver.ThefirstoneistheEuropeoftheEuropean
Union,thesecondoneisthenon"superpowerEuropespreadingfromPortugalto
EstoniaorRomania,thethirdoneisthe“geographical”Europereachingfromthe
Atlantic to the Ural Mountains – also sometimes called the Gaullist Europe or
Gorbachev’s Common European House – and finally the fourth one, the most
inclusive,istheOSCEEuropestretchingfromVancouvertoVladivostok.Besides
thosefourEurope,onecanalsoaddtheAtlanticistEurope,regroupingtheNATO
countries.(Mortimer,1992:5"6;BoothandWheeler,1992:4"5;Buzan,Kelstrup
andLemaitre,1990:45"49)
The second distinction to be made relates to the European Union and its
memberstates.Itissometimesnotveryobviousifthepoliticalobjectconsidered
is the EU in its own right or only some (or even one) of its member states. For
instance, in the case of the Franco"German tandem, when France and Germany
decidesomething,thereisoftensomeconfusionastoknowifitencompassesthe
wholeEUoronlythetwocountries
 11
Besides,oneshouldspecifythatintheEU’sEurope,differentsub"groups
ofstatesformingsomeentities,whichareinawayoranothermoreintegratedin
termsofsecurity,canalsobeidentify.
To sum up, one distinguishes a double ambiguity when it comes to the
political object examined. The first one takes into account the different kinds of
Europe, while the second one refers to the ambiguity between the European
Unionanditsmemberstates.
Initially, the thesis will focus more particularly on the states of the old
continent, with an emphasis put on the three major EU member states (namely
France, Germany and the United Kingdom), and their respective spheres of
influence. One should bear in mind that the thesis will obviously predominantly
refertothesestatesasmemberstatesoftheEU.Inthatoptic,thedevelopmentof
theEUintegrationprocessisofgreatimportance.Oneshouldstress,ontheother
hand, that the behaviour, interests and preferences of these states will also be
analysed within the broader European order. When addressing the EU’s external
identity and the question of an EU acting as an authentic player with its own
sphere of influence, one logically focuses principally on the EU and the role
played by its EU member states; but on placing the analysis also in the broader
European security system. So, in its analysis, the thesis will also question to
which extent one can speak, in the case of the EU, of a kind of multilevel
governance, where power and influence are shared among different levels of
decision"making;eachlevelhavingitsownsphereofinfluence.

Furthermore,ithastobementionedthatthispaperwillbeconsideredina
multidimensional way, which means that the subject of the thesis will not be
analysedunderasingleaspect,butmanyaspectswillbetakenintoconsideration,
such as the security, political, historical, economic and cultural aspects. The
emphasis will nonetheless be put on the security and political aspects. In this
respect,itseemsappropriatetodefinesomeconcepts,suchas“hardpower”,“soft
power”, “civilian power” and “military power”. Hard power is a concept which
referstonationalpowerthatcomesfrommilitaryandeconomicmeans.Itisused
in contrast to the concept of soft power, which refers to power that comes from
 12
diplomacy,cultureandhistory.Inthissense,economicpowerisassimilatedtothe
concept of hard power, since economic means can be used to influence and
coerce.Asforthedifferencebetweencivilianandmilitarypower,mostobservers
seem to agree that civilian means non"military, thus including economic,
diplomaticandculturalpolicyinstruments,whilemilitarypowerinvolvestheuse
of armed forces. (K. Smith, 2004: 1) In order to avoid imprecision, the thesis
maintains a meticulous distinction, as does it Karen E. Smith, «between civilian
power strictly speaking, and anything that involves the use of the military.
[Accordingly,forinstance,]peacekeepersmayormaynotbearmed,buttheyare
still troops who are trained also to kill.» (K. Smith, 2004: 1"2) Although neo"
realismtendstofocusonhighpoliticsandhardsecurity(Andreatta,2005:20,23"
24), the thesis regards the security, political, historical, economic and cultural
aspectsasinterconnected.Alltheseaspectsareentailedinthegeopoliticalinterest
ofthedifferentactorswiththesecurityaspectbeinghoweverthemostimportant
intheformulationofthatinterest.Thethesiswillthustakeintoaccountallthese
aspects, with the priority logically being given to the security and political
aspects.
Asfarastheempiricalapproachofthethesisisconcerned,itwillconsist
of a contemporary debate, as opposed to a historical or futuristic debate.
Accordingly,thethesiswillbebasedonthecurrentinternationalsituation(i.e.in
termsofthecurrentpowerstruggle)betweenstatesandinternationalinstitutions.

As for the literature used in the thesis, a broad number of data and
documents have been utilized. Very many documents describing the last
developments of the European security architecture exist. As far as primary
sources – including official documents – are concerned, many of them emanate
directlyfromthedifferentsecurityinstitutions,beitthedifferentEUinstitutions,
NATO or the OSCE. Most of these data are even directly available over the
Internet. Besides the sources, the thesis based its research on many secondary
works.Thepaperalsoreliedgreatlyonbooksaswellasonmanyarticlesfocusing
on recent security issues and which could servetoconfirmthehypothesisofmy
thesis. As far as the theoretical sources are concerned, the thesis backed its
analysis on the works of neo"realists, most particularly of defensive neo"realists,
 13
such as Charles Glaser, Robert Jervis (and occasionally) Kenneth Waltz.
Concerning the EU and other international organizations, preferences was given
toprimarysources,butconcerningthepolicyandinterestsofthedifferentnation
states, the thesis relied primarily on works and articles written by different
authors.Moregenerally,articlesandworksofanalystshavebroadlybeenused.A
particular focus has certainly been given to documents of analysts who are
generally recognized as having a realist or neo"realist view of international
relations. Amongst them, one can notably point out Zbigniew Brzezinski
3
, with
his 1997 The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic
Imperativesandhis2004TheChoice:GlobalDominationorGlobalLeadership,
or Robert Kagan
4
. Furthermore, a paramount book on geopolitics, written by
Aymeric Chauprade and reedited in 2003, Géopolitique, constantes et
changements dans l’histoire, was a great help to understand the geopolitic
characteristicsofinternationalrelationsandhasthuslargelybeenused,especially
in the third part of the thesis. Concerning more particularly the EU’s status in
international relations, the thesis has largely based its research on works of
renowned specialists. Several books and articles of specialists – such as Filippo
Andreatta, André Dumoulin, Geoffrey Edwards, Nicole Gnesotto, Christopher
Hill, Jolyon Howórth, Antonio Missiroli, Elfriede Regelsberger, Karen E. Smith
andMichaelE.Smith–haveindeedbroadlybeenused.Besides,onehastonote
that the research of some details of historical events have essentially been based
onencyclopaedias.
Having presented the hypothesis as well as some methodological issues,
wewillnowdescribehowthetopicofthethesiswillbedealtwith.Indoingso,
wewilladdressthescopeandlimitsofthethesis.Inordertobeabletoconfirm
the hypothesis brought up, we will firstly consider the European security
architecture, entailingthedebateabouttherelationsbetweenthediversesecurity
institutions on the old continent. In analysing the contacts in Europe between
these various institutions – most notably the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
[NATO] and the security foundations of the European Union (as the Common
Foreign and Security Policy [CFSP], the European Security and Defence Policy
[ESDP]andtheWesternEuropeanUnion[WEU]),butalsotheOrganizationfor
Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] –, we expect to obtain the first
 14
elementspermittingustoconfirmourhypothesis.Then,wewillmorespecifically
focus on the crucial issue of the dynamics of the changing geopolitical face of
Europeandtheevolvingtransatlanticrelations,followingtheendoftheColdWar
andtheconnectedeastwardsenlargementsofbothNATOandtheEU.Thisbrings
us to consider the positions and motivations of the European states towards the
integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the Western institutions. It also
leadsustoanalysemorebroadlythedynamicsstemmingfromthesechangesand
generatingevolvinggeopoliticalandsecurityinterestsinEuropeforthestatesand
institutions. Challenging, understandably, the geopolitical realities of the former
Eastern countries, but also of the countries in the former West (especially with
regardtoGermanyandFranceandtoalesserextenttotheUnitedKingdom)and
of countries getting a renewed geostrategic importance, as Turkey and Ukraine,
theanalysisofthepost"ColdWargeopoliticaldynamicswillequipuswithawell"
roundedoutlookthatwillpermitustoconfirmourhypothesis,assertingthatinthe
unifyingpost"ColdWarEuropesecurityanddefenceconcernscontinuetoinduce
the states, especially the great powers, to form their own geopolitical areas (or
spheres of influence). From that angle, the way the different European states
envisage the European security architecture as well as the different geopolitical
areas will be analysed, with particular consideration being given to the three
principal actors within the EU, that are, especially France and Germany but also
to a lesser extent the United Kingdom. Deeming the unlikely importance and
characteristics of their geopolitical areas as well as analysing their interests and
preferences,wewilltakeintoconsiderationthedynamicsoftheirinteractions,so
as to apprehend the potential coalitions emerging or likely to appear between
states in Europe. In that context, the role and function of other key countries
–besidesthethreeabove"mentioned–willalsohavetobeconsidered;onethinks
especiallyaboutRussia,butalsoaboutstatesofgeopoliticalgreatimportancelike
TurkeyandUkraine.Obviously,theroleandpurposeoftheUnitedStates–often
regardedasthehegemonintheinternationalsystem–havealsotobetakeninto
account, although it is geographically an extra"European state. Simultaneously
through the analysis of these questions, a major issue that the EU encounters in
thefieldsofdefenceandsecuritywillbetackled.Itisthequestionoftheapproach
oftheUnioninordertomaximiseitsinterestsasawholeandofitssinglemember
stateswhiletakingintoaccounttheUSleadership,thatistosaythedifficultyof
 15
maximising the European interests knowing that a security framework already
exists within the context of the transatlantic relations and NATO. Rather than
making a normative analysis with afocusonthedesirabilitytohaveaEuropean
Union politically and militarily freed from NATO and the USA, the paper will
make an analysis based on assumptions of defensive neo"realism, with the
emphasislaidonthehindrancesandpossibilitiestohavesuchanEU.

The important role of the United States in the European security
architecturewillbeaddressedthroughoutthethesis.Yet,thisissueaswellasthe
question of the alleged US hegemony will not be tackled as issues on their own
and will only be addressed in relation to the subject of the thesis, because a
thoroughandextensiveanalysisoftheseissuesmightwellgobeyondthebounds
ofthispaper.
5


Let us now address the structure of the thesis. Thus, before tackling the
heart of the thesis, this paper begins with an examination of the theoretical
approachandremainingmethodologicalissues.Subsequently,itconcentratesona
study of the European security complex, illustrating the evolution as well as the
parametersoftheEuropeansecuritysystem,attemptingtodefinethemeaningof
the concept of security and noting the challenges to stability in Europe. It then
turns to the security institutions as actors, beginning with an examination of the
security institutions lying within the framework of the European Union, before
analysing those lying outside it. Turning next to the institutional question, it
analyses the permanently evolving European security architecture, noting the
institutionalcomplexityofthesystem.Thisanalysiswillconcludethefirstpartof
the paper. The first part having set the scene, the second part examines the
geopolitical changes of the post"Berlin Wall Europe, focusing especially on the
integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the Western alliances. It begins
thus with a detailed discussion about the eastern enlargement of the Western
alliances – especially the EU and NATO – and its consequences on a security
level.ItthenconsiderstheattitudeoftheEuropeanUnionmemberstatestowards
these enlargements, before addressing in that context the sensitive Turkish
question. In its third part, the paper attempts to apprehend the existence of
differentgeopoliticalareasinthisunifyingpost"ColdWarEurope.Therefore,the
 16
thirdpartfirstanalysesthedifferenceofpositionsofthediverseEuropeanStates
– with special attention given to Germany, France and the United Kingdom –
towards the European security architecture, before considering the geopolitical
areasofthetwokeyEuropeangeostrategicplayers,GermanyandFrance.Then,it
focuses on the significance of the Franco"German engine, its potential extension
tootherstatesandtheroleofRussiawhichhasitsownsphereofinfluencebased
onitsdoctrineofthe“nearabroad”.Finally,thispaperends–beforeconcluding–
withananalysisoftheEUasapotentiallygreatpowerinitsownright.

 17

THEORETICAL APPROACH


 18
Atthispoint,wehavetoaddressthetheoreticalapproachthatwouldguide
us through the analysis of the European security system and of the existing and
evolving geopolitical areas on the old continent. One should note that the
literatureonEuropeansecurityconcentratesforthemostpartontheEU,beiton
itsevolutionasauniquetypeofbodyactingontheinternationalarenaoronthe
roleitplaysinthebroaderEuropeanorder.(HillandSmith,2005:4"5)Although
there has been a sustained and substantial growth of attention in the 1990s and
2000s to the increasing influence the EU has on security issues, most of the
literature on EU security remains purely descriptive, focusing particularly on the
evolutionoftheEUinstitutions,onthechangesrealisedbytheEUtreatiesandon
the transatlantic relationship. (Hill and Smith, 2005: 4"5; Carlsnaes, Sjursen and
White, 2004) Much of it is of normative nature, since it concentrates on the
desirabilityornottohavetheEuropeanUniondevelopingasecurityanddefence
element. As for this paper, it is fairly descriptive, but also has a theoretical
dimension. It addresses the aforementioned topic by primarily relying on realist
approaches, as the issues raised above will principally be examined from a
defensiveneo"realistangle.Oneshouldalreadyspecifythatsinceoneobjectiveof
the thesis is to not be a pure theoretical paper, the discussed theories will
essentially be used as a means helping us to answer the questions raised and to
corroborate the hypothesis put forward. Furthermore, one should add that the
paperdoesnotseektobenormative.

One could broach the topic of the European security system and its
influence upon geopolitical areas in Europe with several approaches. The
theoretical literature on the European system is rather scarce and it focuses
generally–asnotedabove–onthesecuritysystemoftheEU.Andmostofthat
theoretical literature on EU security stems from the liberal school of thought.
Liberalism and its variants are generally deemed as generating most of the
insightswhenitcomestotheEU’sexternalrelations.(HillandSmith,2005:388"
393)Ananalysisbackedonneo"liberaltheorieswouldhaveledustofocusonthe
promotion of Western democratic values, security guarantees and capitalism as
wellascooperationbetweenstatessupportednotablybyinternationalinstitutions.
An analysis through a merely neo"liberal prism would thus have induced us to
concentrate on the role of institutions as well as on complex interdependence
 19
betweenaseriesofactors,includingnotonlystates,butalsootherkindsofactors
suchasinternationalinstitutionsordomesticplayers.Indoingso,wewouldhave
examinedtheoutcomeofsuchcooperationuponthegeopoliticalareasinEurope,
with a predisposition to consider Europe as a unique geopolitical, economic and
jurisdictional area, where transnational interdependence, regimes
6
 and common
values would eventually guarantee its security, welfare becoming the principal
concernofthestates.Consciousoftheimportanceofcooperationbetweenstates
andinternationalinstitutions,thepaperoccasionallyapproachessomeneo"liberal
7

assumptions. As it analyses deeply the diverse international organizations, the
thesis agrees in part with the assumption of institutional liberalists – a strand of
neo"liberalism
8
 – that international institutions, whether they be in the form of
international organizations or of mere international regimes
9
, can promote
rapprochement and cooperation between states. Institutional liberals argue that a
high level of institutionalisation considerably reduces the destabilising effects of
the anarchy that neo"realists – such as John Mearsheimer – identify in a
multipolarworldorder.Providingaflowofinformationandforafornegotiations
between states, institutions compensate for the lack of trust between states, thus
fostering cooperation between states for their mutual advantage. This in turn
provides continuity and stability. In addition, institutions are deemed by
institutional liberals to act as buffers helping to absorb shocks caused by
fundamentalinternationalchanges,asforinstancethosecausedbythechangesto
thepoliticalworldorderinthepost"ColdWarera.(JacksonandSørensen,1999:
119"122)Theinternationalinstitutionsarehoweverconsideredinthethesisasnot
truly independent from the states, especially the strong ones, which they serve
ratherashandmaidens;thisassumptionbringsusclosetotheneo"realists.

Theneo"realistsareindeedcriticaloftheimportantroleliberalsattachto
international institutions, because they believe that even though states cooperate
through those institutions, they still do it solely on the basis of self"interest.
According to neo"realists, there are however some possibilities for states to
cooperate.Theaimofthepaperistofigureoutcurrentandfurtherdevelopments
intheEuropeansecuritysystembyrelyingessentiallyonneo"realistassumptions.
Willing to understand the post"Cold war developments by backing our analysis
with neo"realist assumptions, preferences in the thesis will thus be given to the
 20
principal assumptions of neo"realism. Hence, we will examine the key
assumptions of neo"realism and then focus on the two variants (offensive vs.
defensive) of neo"realism in order to observe the differences of opinion within
neo"realism regarding in particular the prospect of cooperation between states
(mostnotablywithintheEU).
Theneo"realistassumptionsuponwhichthethesisbasesitsdevelopments
are the following. The international system is considered to be a system withno
overarching authority, i.e. an international anarchy. This means that a self"help
system exists, within which states have to rely upon their own means to protect
their interests. (Jackson and Sørensen, 1999: 52, 128"129) Rather than being led
by ethics, states defend their interests, with security and power being their key
objectives. (Schwok, 2005: 75) States focus on security and power, because the
realisationoftheirinterests,aimsandvaluesdependsonsecurityandpowertoget
other actors to bend to the state’s will. While traditional realists and offensive
neo"realistsputtheemphasisonpower,defensiveneo"realists(aswillbeanalysed
slightly further ahead) identify the security and survival of the state, and not
powerperse,astheprevailingaimofstateaction.(Kolodziej,2005:137)Nation"
statesarethepre"eminentactors,thebasicunitsoftheworldsystem.(Brzezinski,
1997: 37) Realists and neo"realists identify the state as the key actor in
international relations for several reasons. Not only did it become over several
centuries the principal unit of political organization (prevailing over all other
formsofpoliticalorganization,beitcity"states,empiresorfeudalprincipalities),
but the state also enjoys a monopoly of legitimate violence and has been
recognizedbyinternationallawashavingthelegalandmoralauthoritytoperform
itsinternalandexternalsecurityfunctions.Moreover,theirmutualrecognitionof
sovereigntyoverterritoryandpopulationemphasizestheroleofthestatesasthe
fundamental actor in international relations. (Kolodziej, 2005: 128)
Correspondingly,thepaperprimarilyanalysesthestates,withafocusonthegreat
powers.Neo"realistsconsideragreatpowerasonewhoserelationsdeterminethe
most important outcomes of international politics. (Jackson and Sørensen, 1999:
88, 104) The other actors are principally the international organizations
(supranational and intergovernmental), which only some defensive neo"realists
grant certain significance. In line with neo"realist assumptions, the states will be
 21
considered as unitary entities, without thoroughly taking into account the
interplayofthepoliticalforces(parties,publicopinion...)northeeconomicones
(lobbies, economic actors…).
10
Evolvinginananarchicinternationalsystem,the
states are further considered as being rational actors with consistent and ordered
preferences calculating «the costs and benefits of all alternative policies in order
tomaximizetheirutilityinlightofboththosepreferencesandoftheirperceptions
of the nature of reality.» (Keohane, 1986: 11) Another key assumption of neo"
realism is the focus of the states on relative gains, that is, the worry and
apprehensionofastatethatotherstatesgainmorefromcooperationthanitdoes.
(JacksonandSørensen,1999:130"131;DavidetRoche,2005:90"92;Kolodziej,
2005:127"139)
AnalysinginitsfirstpartthesecuritycomplexinEuropeandfocusingon
theinstitutionalactors,thepaperconcentratesonthecooperationbetweenstates,
whichhasnotablyledtointernationalorganizationssuchastheOrganizationfor
Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization [NATO] and recently to the promising development of a security
and defence policy inside the EU. Undoubtedly, globalisation and the increasing
importance in number and quality of institutional regimes seem to somehow
challenge neo"realist assumptions. The multipolar world order of the post"Cold
War era is considered by offensive neo"realists such as John Mearsheimer to be
lessstableandlesspeaceful,asthepost"ColdWarwarsintheformerYugoslavia
and in the former Soviet Union demonstrate. Yet, it appears as though neo"
realism’s theory about bipolarism versus multipolarism seems unable to
comprehend some post"Cold War developments as the success of the European
Union, particular its Franco"German core and its recent evolution in the field of
securityanddefence.(JacksonandSørensen,1999:91"92)

Accordingtotraditionalrealistsandneo"realists,cooperationisnotausual
occurrence,thoughitdoeshappenundercertaincircumstances.So,theyconcede
that states can attempt to increase power on their own efforts but also through
alliances. Also do they deem cooperation between opponents most probable if
their vital interests and very survival are at risk unless cooperation limits their
automatic recourse to force to resolve their differences. (Kolodziej, 2005: 145)
 22
Yet,thoserealistandneo"realistassertionsseemtoinsufficientlyexplainontheir
own the continued existence – and even success – of numerous post"Cold War
alliances,especiallyifonethinksattheincreasingintegrationoftheEUsincethe
collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting end of the bipolar world.
Christopher Hill and Michael E. Smith consider the realism and neo"realism
approaches to be the least promising ones when it comes to study the EU’s
external behaviour. Because of their emphasis on the unitary nature of the state
andoninternationalanarchy,theseapproachesareregardedbythetwoauthorsas
inappropriatefortheanalysisoftheEU,whichisseenasnotbeingaunitarystate
and transcending anarchy. (Hill and Smith, 2005: 389) Christopher Hill and
Michael E. Smith particularly consider neo"realism as inappropriate in this
endeavour,becauseofitshighlysystemicperspectiveandstressonthebalanceof
power.(HillandSmith,2005:390)

As a result, neo"realism nowadays seems to be a neglected paradigm in
international security studies. As a matter of fact, although being one of the
dominantparadigmsinthisfieldofstudies,theuseofneo"realismtounderstand
the current security architecture in Europe is largely rejected because of the
widespread belief that it is unable to account for cooperation between the EU
member states and the impact of the EU institutions upon them. Nevertheless,
thereismoretoneo"realismthantheassumptionofJohnMearsheimer.

There is in particular the attempt of Joseph M. Grieco to explain the
deepening of European integration since the 1980s with its “amended neo"
realism”.AccordingtoJosephM.Grieco,therelaunchingofEuropeanintegration
during the 1980s is notably explained by the willingness of the European
Community to balance against the emerging economic threat from the United
States and Japan, while the insistence upon economic and monetary union by
France and Italy in the 1990s appears as bandwagoning with a potential
hegemonicGermany.Inthisview,Europeanintegrationthroughoutthe1990sand
2000s may to a great extent be the result of other member states (especially the
weakerbutstillinfluentialpartners)«toconstrainGermany,especiallyafterithas
emergedpotentiallystrongerafterunification.»(Andreatta,2005:27)Inthisway,
the weaker but still influential partners will seek to ensure that the rules
 23
constitutingacollaborativearrangement«willprovidesufficientopportunitiesfor
them to voice their concerns and interests and thereby prevent or at least
ameliorate their domination by stronger partners.» (Grieco, January 1995: 34)
(See also Andreatta, 2005: 27; Schwok, 2005: 77; Pollack, 2000: 2"4) More
recently,anotherscholar,MichaelMosserhasbuiltonJosephM.Grieco’swork.
Focusing on the Benelux countries’ influence on the EU institutions
11
, he
examinedtheways«inwhichsmallandweakstates“engineerinfluence”through
international institutions.»(Pollack,2000:3)TheworkofJosephM.Griecoand
Michael Mosser drawourattentiononthewaysmallandweakstatesparticipate
in the creation and modification of international institutions «so as to provide
themselves with opportunities for voice while at the same time binding large
statesintoinstitutionalrulesandnormsthatlimittheirabilitytoexploitmaterial
power resources.» (Pollack, 2000: 3) However, one should note that some
theorists do not regard Joseph M, Grieco’s (and Michael Mosser’s) approach as
deserving the designation of a “realist theory”. They consider their work to be
ratherconsistentwithneo"liberalinstitutionalismorliberalintergovernmentalism.
(Schwok,2005:77;LegroandMoravcsik,Fall1999:41"43;Pollack,2000:3"4)

But, more generally, one has to distinguish, within the neo"realisttheory,
two variants or strands: the offensive neo"realists on the one hand and the
defensive neo"realists on the other hand. (Gibbs, September 2000: 10"12) The
latter,whoseetheworldinalesscompetitiveandlesspessimisticlightthanthe
former,areabletoaccountforcooperationbetweentheEUmemberstatesandthe
impactoftheEUinstitutionsuponthem.
The “older” and somehow “purer” variant is the so"called offensive neo"
realism, with John Mearsheimer as its principal advocate. Offensive neo"realists
seetheinternationalsystemasaninternationalanarchy,wheresecurityisscarce,
thus making international competition intense, conflict recurrent and war likely.
Becausetheincreaseofpowerreducesthelikelihoodofbeingovercomebyother
states, power is the most important factor in international relations, thus often
compelling states to adopt offensive strategies in their search for security.
Consequently, offensive neo"realists are very pessimistic about cooperation
between states. They do not exclude cooperationstraightaway,but–becauseof
 24
thelackofconfidenceinaself"helpinternationalsystem–theyregarditaslikely
to be temporary. According to offensive neo"realists, cooperation is linked and
restrictedbyconsiderationaboutrelativegainsandbyconcernsaboutcheating.In
an anarchic system without ultimate authority, there will always be a possibility
ofcheating.Thereisnodoubtthatthesetwofactorsrendercooperationdifficult.
The leading offensive neo"realist, John Mearsheimer, reasserted in 1995 (in his
article The False Promise of International Institutions) that institutions not only
matter very little, but also have close to no influence on state behaviour, since
theymerelyreflectstatecalculationsofself"interest.(Mearsheimer,Winter1994"
1995: 13) In the spectrum of thinking about the role of state cooperation and
institutions,oneconsequentlycanplaceoffensiveneo"realismattheoppositeend
of the one occupied by institutional liberalism, while defensive neo"realism is
placedsomewhereinbetween.

Amongst defensive neo"realist theorists, one finds Stephen Walt, Charles
Glaser, Robert Jervis and occasionally Kenneth Waltz (who exposes
characteristics of both variants of neo"realism). Defensive neo"realists suppose
that states can learn to cooperate as an outcome, paradoxically, of their self"
regarding pursuits. Contrary to offensive neo"realists, defensive neo"realists
emphasize the state’s search for security rather than concentrate on the state’s
search for power. Security is the highest goal – and number one preference – of
states.Defensiveneo"realistsdonotperceivetherelationshipbetweenpowerand
security as automatic as do the offensive neo"realists. Focusing on defensive
strategies, they argue that two potential competitors would be happy with the
statusquoofmutualsecurity.Cooperationisthuslikelytooccur.Competitionis
notaninevitableconsequenceofneo"realism’sbasicassumptions;securitybeing
thehighestgoalofstatesandcooperationoftenthebestwaytoachievesecurity,
one can even directly deduct cooperation from neo"realist assumptions. (Glaser,
Winter 1994"1995: 51) Certainly, conflict is not completely absent, since some
statescontinuesometimestoactaggressively.Yet,cooperationispossiblewhere
powers facing each other in a security dilemma are status quo oriented powers.
Whereas cooperation is not possible when a revisionist state is included (in this
case only temporary and “insincere” cooperation as depicted by offensive neo"
realists would be possible), several conditions enhance the likelihood of
 25
cooperation between status quo oriented powers. Those conditions are the
followings: the transparency is high; the gains from cheating and the costs from
beingcheatedarelow;mutualcooperationismorebeneficialthandefection;and
astrategyofreciprocityisadoptedbyeachside.(Jervis,Summer1999:52)Under
such circumstances, the actors clearly and increasingly realise that their mutual
gains maximize their individual gains through cooperation. There is however
divergence within the defensive neo"realist component about the impact of
institutions.WhileRobertJervisarguesthatinstitutionscanplayasignificantrole
by affecting actor’s preferences, others like Charles Glaser consider the
international institutions – fairly like John Mearsheimer does – to act essentially
dependentuponstatepreferences.(Glaser,Winter1994"1995:84)Yet,defensive
neo"realists generally agree that even though institutions are the outcomes of
member states’ interests, they also provide an important forum for extensive
cooperation
12
. Thus, unlike John Mearsheimer, defensive neo"realists broadly
regard institutions as significant, though generally dependent upon states’
preferences.(Kolodziej,2005:144"150)

In line with the defensive neo"realists, the thesis takes into consideration
thepossibilitiesforstatestocooperateandfocusoninternationalinstitutions,but
withtheassumptionthattheseareevolvingaccordingtotheinterestsofthestates.
Consistent with neo"realist assumptions, the cooperating states are considered to
remain self"interested and to keep an eye on relative gains. (Jackson and
Sørensen, 1999: 52, 128"129) The basic neo"realist assumptions will become
moreapparentinthesecondandthirdpartsofthethesis,whentheemphasiswill
belaidontheinterestsoftheEuropeanstates,especiallythegreatpowers,andthe
existence of geopolitical areas in post"Cold War Europe. Yet, one will keep in
mindthecharacteristicsofthedefensivevariantofneo"realism,especiallywhenit
comestotheanalysisofcooperation,whetheritbebetweenFranceandGermany
oratthelargerEUlevel.Inputtingtheemphasisontheassumptionsofdefensive
neo"realism, we hope to be able to bypass traditional neo"realism’s failure to
explain the EU’s place in the world and the post"Cold war successes of EU’s
CFSP/ESDP.
 26
Similar criticism is addressed to defensive neo"realism as that which is
directed to Joseph M. Grieco’s and Michael Mosser’s work. Some theorists
criticizethatdefensiveneo"realismcomessoclosetoneo"liberalinstitutionalism
that one should rather speak about a form of neo"liberal institutionalism taking
some neo"realist paradigms. Despite these criticisms, this thesis will keep this
designation and accordingly back its analysis with the above"mentioned
assumptionsofdefensiveneo"realism.
One has to add that, when addressing in its first part the concept of
security and the challenges to the stability in Europe, the paper relies largely on
another approach, that is, the English School of International Relations
13
; an
approach which distinguishesarationalisttradition(Grotiantradition)besidethe
realist tradition (Hobbesian tradition)
14
 on the one hand, and the revolutionary
tradition(Kantiantradition)
15
ontheotherhand.TheInternationalSocietytheory
is an approach of a world of sovereign states where many features are present.
First,powerandnationalinterestsmatter,asstateshaveanationalresponsibility
to their own nation and to its citizens. Second, common norms and institutions
matter also, as the states have an international responsibility to respect and
complywithinternationalrulesandprocedures,thusalsorespectingtherightsof
the other states. Third, the states have a humanitarian responsibility to defend
humanrightsallovertheworld,asworldpoliticsisaworldofstatesbutalsoof
individuals.Therefore,theInternationalSocietyapproachexploitsclassicalrealist
and liberal elements, combining and expanding them so as to provide an
alternative to both
16
. (Jackson and Sørensen, 1999: 55"56, 158"165; Williams,
Wright and Evans, 1995: 260"273) Accordingly, one would certainly place the
International Society approach not far away from the defensive neo"realist
thinking.
The decision to back the exposition of the thesis mainly with the neo"
realist approach with particular attention given to its defensive variant, while
confronting it to other theories when appropriated, is rather a personal choice.
Yet, the choice of the neo"realist theoretical approach seems relevant and
appropriate for several reasons. First, the thesis’ accent on spheres of influence,
laying emphasis on the particular interests of the states, pushes us somehow
 27
naturallytorelyonneo"realistassumptions.Second,sincemostofthetheoretical
literatureonEUsecurityhassofarneglectedtheneo"realistschoolofthought,the
use of neo"realismtoanalysenotonlythepotentialgeopoliticalareasinEurope,
but also the degree and possible evolution of EU cooperation in the fields of
securityanddefence,isanopportunitytocontributetotherevivalofneo"realism
asameanstostudypost"ColdWarsecurityissuesinEurope.Ourambitionisto
use neo"realism assumptions in this thesis, although some scholars put forward
that the sui generis nature of the EU is a reason to deem the use of traditional
theories as obsolete when considering issues involving a closer analysis of the
development of the EU. Third, defensive neo"realism seems to be the most
appropriate theoretical approach to analyse the fundamental interests and
preferences of the states in Europe, while simultaneously taking into
consideration state cooperation within the diverse security institutions, most
notablytheCFSP/ESDPbutalsoNATOandtheOSCE.
 28

PART I:
THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM

 29
The last years the European security system (or complex) has undergone
manychanges.WiththeendoftheColdWar,theinternationalworldorder–with
Europe at its heart – faced a complete new geopolitic situation. Especially the
European security complex had to adapt itself to this new situation, in which
globalisationplaysaneverincreasingroleandwhichbringswithitnewkindsof
threats–amongwhichonefindstheinternationalterrorism–causednotonlyby
thetraditionalactors,butalsobynewkindsofones.

The European security complex is different from other power complexes
inthatitsmaindynamicisintegration,whichinfluencesallotherissues,notably
the way the actors are adapting and transforming the European security system.
OneoftheprincipalsecurityissuesofEuropeistotransformamultipolarEurope
intoamorehomogenousunit.

This has in particular been the EU’s main security task. One of the
outcomes of European integration is indeed to spread conciliation between
Europe’s regional actors. The EU functions in that sense as a security system,
definedasafirmlyconnectedsecuritycommunity,withinternalbutalsoexternal
security functions. Therefore, the EU, with its efforts to push forward the
integrationprocess,hastobeconsideredasaveryimportantdesecuritizingactor
in a European security complex, still rather heterogeneous and where diffuse
threatsotherthanthemilitaryonehaveincreasedinimportance.

Apart from the EU, and although it is the most important actor
contributing to transform Europe into a more homogenous unit, other security
institutionsarealsoplayingaroleinEurope’sevolvingsecuritycomplexintrying
torender–inawayoranother–Europemorehomogeneousintermsofsecurity.
AsEuropeansecurityisnowincreasinglysoughtthroughmultilateralinstitutions,
one can observe an increasing institutionalisation of relations between European
states.(Sjursen,2004:16"18)
Thepurposeofthispartistodefinethecharacteristicsandsetupthemain
features of the European security system. In doing so, the discussion inthisfirst
part of the paper addresses two important elements of current international
 30
concern,namelytheevolutionoftheEuropeansecuritysysteminconnectionwith
the different actors playing a role in it and how these actors cope to provide an
institutionalisationofsecurity,giventhenewgeopoliticalchallengesandthenew
securityagenda.
Thispartfocusesthusontheevolution,theparametersandthemainactors
of the security complex in Europe. Therefore, this part analyses at first the
evolution of the European security system to date. Then, it considers its
parameters; in doing so, it will highlight the main challenges the European
security system is facing and focus on the controversial concept of security with
theaimofunderstandingtheideabehindthisconceptanditslatestdevelopments.
Afterthat,thispartexaminesthemaininstitutionalactorsofthesecuritycomplex
inEurope,beginningwiththesecurityinstitutionslyingwithintheframeworkof
theEuropeanUnion,beforeanalysingthoselyingoutsideit.Finally,theanalysis
ofthecontinuallyevolvingEuropeansecurityarchitecturewillconcludethisfirst
part.

This part sets the scene for a discussion about the integration of Central
andEasternEuropeintotheWesternalliancesaswellasthestructureofzonesof
influence in that unifying Europe – which are the central themes of respectively
thesecondandfinalpart.
 31
1) THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM


TheEuropeansecuritydevelopmenthasoccupiedacentralpositioninthe
history of the international system for a very long time. Up until the end of the
Second World War, the close interrelation of amities, enmities and balance of
powerhaddefinedtheEuropeansecuritysystem.Duringtheseventeenthcentury
already, these interactions had worked out in a single security framework. (Bull
andWatson,1984:64)Certainly,diversesub"structuresexistedwithinit,suchas
theonesexistingamongtheNordicstatesoramidtheBalkanstates.Nevertheless,
the European system was united asawhole,whichmeansthatthedifferentsub"
systemsandthesecurityofthesinglecountrieswerebuiltinabroaderEuropean
pattern. With the process of colonisation this system controlled eventually even
theentireinternationalsecuritysystem.
Hereupon, we should examine the shifts and changes of the European
security system throughout its history. The latter will relate particularly to
Europe’shistoriccentralityintheglobalsystem.
Thus,thischaptersetsouttheevolutionoftheEuropeansecuritysystem,
tobeginwiththeperiodgoinguntiltheendoftheColdWarbeforeconcentrating
on the post"Cold War era with an analysis of the development of the European
securitysystemsincethecollapseofSovietcommunism.

a. The Evolution of the European Security System until the End of the
Cold War

Fromaboutthesixteenthcenturyon,theinternationalsystemwasinmany
respects defined by the European system which had vigorous internal dynamics.
The creation and development of the sovereign state
17
 in Europe contributed
radicallyinshapinganewinternationalstructureoutofwhathadpreviouslybeen
acollectionofrelativelyinsulatedhumancentres.Duringthatperioduntiltheend
of the Second World War, a specific characteristic of the European security
system was the existence of many great powers in such a limited geographical
 32
area. At different moments in time, never fewer than five varying great powers
shared this status. France, Britain, Germany or Russia certainly enjoyed this
status, but for some time also Austria"Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and
Sweden,nottobementionSpainItalyandPortugal.

Atthattime,territorywascloselyassociatedwithpower
18
.Asamatterof
fact,inordertocontrolterritory,amyriadofwarstookplaceinEurope.Yet,the
balance ofpowerwasthenormalsituationwithinthesystem:noonepowerwas
dominantenoughtosubjugatealltheothers.Howeversomeattemptsweremade
to put an end to this situation of balance of power. The making and resisting of
these attempts has indeed a long and central role in European security. The
Ottomans made such an attempt in the fifteenth to seventeenth century. They
camefromoutsideEurope.Theyweretheonlyoneswhohavetriedtodominate
Europe from outside the system in the modern period
19
. As the ones who will
follow, they failed in their efforts. Two other attempts to dominate Europe were
made later respectively by France with Napoleon in the lead and by Germany
with Adolf Hitler. They were the two attempts – trying to achieve the stunning
success accomplished by the Roman Empire to unify Europe
20
– which werethe
mostcompleted.Indeed,revolutionaryandNapoleonicFranceaswellasHitler’s
ThirdReichlateralmostsucceededinunifyingthecontinentundertheirrulesand
supremacy,buteventuallyfailed.
Besides, one has to add that «the intense military and economic
competitionoflifeintheEuropeananarchyproducedasetofgreatpowerswhose
surplusenergiesandexpandingcapabilitiesenabledthemtopursuetheirrivalries
notonlywithinEurope,butincreasinglyonaglobalscale.»(Buzan,Kelstrupand
Lemaitre, 1990: 32) The outward thrust of the European powers took some
pressureoffthelocalsecuritysystem.InexpandingoutsideEurope,theEuropean
statesavoidedtothreatendirectlythecoreinterestsoftheirneighbours.Thus,the
great European states increasingly continued in expanding their influence and
power, initially in Europe and then outsidetheoldcontinent
21
.But,ontheother
hand, such outward expansion also increased the power of the successful
imperialists, thus threatening the European security system with its balance of
power. Hence, to maintain this structure, the European powers had to quickly
 33
adapt to the increasing power of their rivals. The conflicts going along with the
periodicattemptsfordominancewerepartsoftheprocessbywhichtheEuropean
powersbecamesodisproportionatelypowerfulinrelationtotherestoftheworld.

Nevertheless, these conflicts had also an unpleasant side, not only for
Europe but for the whole world. In the end, it was the various attempts for
dominance–thelastbeingthoseofGermanyinthetwentiethcentury–whichled
to the annihilation of both Europe’s global ascendancy and the autonomous
character of Europe’s security system. Indeed, the threat triggered by the rise of
Germany in the context of the industrial revolution during the middle of the
nineteenthcenturycreatedarealdangerthatoneEuropeanstatecouldputanend
to the European balance ofpower.Inthefirstyearsofthetwentiethcentury,the
Europeansecuritysystembasedonthebalanceofpowerwasinrealjeopardyfirst
and foremost because of the German rise in power. Yet, besides the German
problem, anotherthreatloomedatthesametime.ApotentialRussianattemptto
overthrow Europe’s security system existed really. The fear that Russia could
become by far the biggest power on the continent, if it industrializes efficiently,
remained present at that time. Thus, the German problem, with the Russian
problem looming in his back and «preparations for what was tobethelastgreat
military contest for control of Europe (…) already well under way
22
» (Buzan,
Kelstrup and Lemaitre, 1990: 33) shed serious doubts on the viability of the
Europeansecuritycomplex.
Aswealreadynoticed,Germany’sattempttodominateEuropecamevery
close to success, especially during the Second World War. In both wars the
interventionofanon"Europeanstatewasdecisive,namelytheinterventionofthe
United States. In the First World War, this intervention seemed to maintain the
predominantroleofEuropeintheinternationalsystem,particularlysobecauseof
thesuccessiverefugeintoisolationismbytheUnitedStates.Onecansaythatafter
the First World War and despite the danger Europe’s security system faced, the
international system remained in many respects defined by the European one.
WiththegreatEuropeanstateshavingexpandedtheirinfluenceandpowerinand
outside Europe, they had managed to control most of the planet. Besides the
European powers, only two non"European powers were able to grow into the
 34
statusofagreatpower:theUnitedStatesofAmerica,whichisindeedaderivative
of European colonisation, and Japan, which imitated quickly and efficiently
enough the imperialism of the European powers to not be immersed by it.
Nevertheless,theillusionthatEuropestillhadthecentralroleintheinternational
system after the First World War was shattered by the Second World War. The
US intervention in the latest World War indicated the rise of non"European
powers into world roles and the ending of Europe’s global primacy. Moreover,
Europelostthecontrolandautonomyoveritsownsecurityrelations.Asamatter
offact,onecanassertthat«inreality,therescueoftheoldworldbythenewwas
boththeheraldof,andthevehiclefor,Europe’stransitionfrombeingadominant
to a subordinate security complex.» (Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre, 1990: 34)
Thetwoworldwarsmarkedthusnotonlythecollapseoftheoldbalanceofpower
system, but put first and foremost an end to the long period of convergence
betweentheEuropeanandtheinternationalsecuritysystem.

So,thecollapseofmanygreatpowerswasaconsequenceofthetwoworld
wars. The Western European powers and Japan broke down indeed as great
powers.Sincethegreatpowerswhichcollapsedincludedallofthemajorholders
of overseas empires, the post"war period led logically to decolonisation; all the
more that the two superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union –, that
emerged out of the world wars, were both anti"colonial, though for different
ideological motives. But both thought that the withdrawal of European powers
wouldcreateopportunitiesforthem.Underthesecircumstances,itisnosurprise
thattheprocessofdecolonisationbeganalmostimmediatelyafterthewarandwas
forthemajorpartcompletedwithintwodecades.
ThecollapseofWesternEuropeanandJapanesepowerhadanothereffect.
ItfosteredgreatlytheelevationoftheSovietUnioninthesuperpowerstatusatthe
end of the war. The fact that the Soviet Union was surrounded with power
vacuums where before there had been major centres of power explains it for a
good part
23
. Indeed, Europe’s continental heartland was particularly weakened:
the power of Germany had been decisively devastated; France, the other main
continental great power, was strongly enfeebled; Great Britain, albeit victorious,
wasalsobadlyweakened;andtheoldregimesinCentralandEasternEuropehad
 35
collapsed. As a result of war and of this power vacuum, the Soviet power arose
considerablyintermsofmilitaryandpoliticalpower.MostofEasternEuropewas
under the possession of the Soviet Union. One can thus notice that the security
problemposedbyGermanywasthussimplyreplacedbyanotheroneposedbythe
SovietUnion.
But the rise of Soviet power resulted in taking the Soviet Union out of
Europe and to putting it on to the international arena as a superpower. Even if
therehavealwaysbedoubtsabouttoconsiderRussiawhetherasapartofEurope
orasaseparateentity,onecanundoubtedlyassertthatRussiawasdefactopartof
Europeaslongasthelatterdominatedtheworldpowerstructure.ButasEurope
slipped into subordination, the Soviet Union became a genuine world power for
whichEuropewasonlya–yetveryimportant–frontier.LiketheUnitedStatesof
America,theUnionofSovietSocialistRepublics[USSR]becamethusanextra"
Europeansuperpower.
The rise of the extra"European powers certainly hindered – and it will
surelyhinderforever–EuropegoingbacktotheEuropeansecuritycomplexasit
existed before 1945. Indeed, the main condition to obtain this system that thrust
Europe into global dominance – which is the huge disproportion in power at its
benefit–isnolongerpresent.

All these events demonstrate – as we already emphasized – that the
dynamics of European security no longer ran independently and no longer
dominatedtheinternationalsecuritysystemasawhole.Europewasstillcentralin
thequestionofglobalsecurity,butinadifferentway.Indeed,whileitwascentral
as the centre of world power before, now it was central only as the principal
objectoflargerrivalries.Hence,«withoverlayfrom1945to1989,theEuropean
security complex virtually ceased to exist as an entity defined by its own
interactions. It became instead the nut in the nutcracker of a global rivalry
dominatedbytwosuperpowers.»(Buzan,KelstrupandLemaitre,1990:31)

Thepost"warsecuritysystemwasthusbasedonanewsetofpoliticaland
economic relationships and involved not only different protagonists, but also
 36
differentinstitutionalarrangements.Therefore,astheEast"Westconflictunfolded
and as the new European security system took shape, the principal protagonists
hadtodevelopnew‘rulesofthegame’.
The broad outlines of post"war Europe was wrought at the wartime
summit meetings between the ‘Big three’ at Teheran (held in November 1943),
Yalta (held in February 1945) and Potsdam (held in July"August 1945). Yet,
contrary to the myth, the Yalta Conference was not a meeting in which they
dividedEuropeamongstthemselves
24
.Thepartitionaroseratherfromthemilitary
dispositionofthevictor’sforcesattheendofthewar.(Mihalka,Autumn2001:2"
3)
Asaresult,thenewbipolarpowerstructureunfoldedquickly.Ontheone
side, there was the United States. Having ended its isolationism, it played a
decisive role in shaping the key institutions of the Western world, including the
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], the IMF [International Monetary
Fund],theWorldBankandtheGATT[GeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade].
The Americans were keen to establish an open economic system. Although
initially expressing large sympathy towards anti"colonial movements in the
overseas empires and – as we already mentioned – seeking an end to European
colonialism,theUnitedStatesofAmerica[USA]believedinthesametimeinthe
worldwide applicability of their values. Thus, the Americans tended to «believe
thataninternationalsystemfoundedonWilsonianprinciplesandincorporatingan
openeconomyandtheinternationalruleoflawwouldbegoodforAmerica,and
atthesametime,goodfortheworld.ManyAmericansthereforebelievedthat,in
contrasttothehegemoniesofthepast,thatoftheUSAwouldbeintheinterests
of all peoples and nations, in that it would produce a peaceful and prosperous
world,foundedonfreetrade,openmarketsandpoliticaldemocracy.(…)Whenin
the late 1940s the Americans began to perceive a growing Soviet threat to the
European equilibrium, however, they quietly dropped the anti"colonial elements
of their policy, and rallied to the defence of what they chose to describe as the
‘free world’» (Hyde"Price, 1991: 26) The American policy"makers saw the
communistsystemindeedasachallengetopeace,stabilityandprosperity.

 37
On the other side, there was the Soviet Union. Its security interests in
Central and Eastern Europe – as seen by Stalin – directed the Soviet policy
towards post"war Europe. One has to notice that thanks tothethrustandvictory
oftheRedArmyattheendofthewar,theSovietpowerexpandedhenceforthinto
CentralandEasternEurope,aregionpreviouslydominatedbyGermaninfluence.
Inordertoensurethathiscountrywouldneveragainhavetofacethehorrorsofa
war triggered by the West, Stalin worked to obtain a drastic decay and
containment of German power as well as a collective security arrangement in
EuropeinwhichtheUnionofSovietSocialistRepublicswouldplayaninfluence
role. Stalin was also eager to establish a kind of hegemony and control over
CentralandEasternEurope,soasnotonlytomonitortheforcesofdissensionin
these countries which had so often threatened Soviet’s (and before Russian’s)
securityinterests,butparticularlytohaveaprotectivebulwarkagainsttheWest.
25


Like the Soviet Union, the USA considered that the Second World War
provedtheneedforthemforaforwarddefencepolicy.Hence,theUnitedStates
did not take long to establish its own glacis in Western Europe, in merging the
NATOcommitmentintoitsownsecuritydesireforaforwarddefence.

Onehastoadd,that,despitethefactthatthetwosuperpowersbothplayed
a dominant role in the post"war era, some other key countries, especially France
andtheUnitedKingdomwerealsoactiveinformingthenewsecuritysystem.As
far as France is concerned, the French under De Gaulle pursued their own
interests, in focusing in particular on the issue of the future role of Germany.
TheirprogrammeforthefutureofGermanydivergedonseveralpointsfromthat
of the Anglo"Saxonpowers.AsfortheUnitedKingdom,theBritishmadeevery
endeavourtosecureanAmericancommitmenttoEuropeinordertocounterwhat
London perceived as a growing threat to the European balance of power.
(Wheeler,Winter1985"1986:71"86)
Yet, a series of events established then the main edge of confrontation
downthemiddleoftheoldcontinent.TheTrumanDoctrineinMarch1947
26
was
followed by the Marshall Aid in 1947. Then the Berlin blockade occurred and
lastedalmostayear,fromJune1948toMay1949.Thisepisode
27
–triggeredby
 38
Stalin’sclumsyattempttoforcetheAlliedpowersintoabandoningtheirplansto
establish a separate West German State – had as a result to accelerate the
integration of German power into the West European and Atlantic Alliance
structures.Besides,thiswasanoverwhelmingpriorityofWesternpolicy–andit
became even more after the Berlin Blockade. Moreover, the founding of the
COMECON [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] in 1949 on the oneside
and of NATO the same year on the other drew the confrontation further and
deeper. The establishment of two separate German states – in May (for the
Federal Republic of Germany [FRG]) and October 1949 (for the German
Democratic Republic [GDR]) – completed the initial period of the superpower
bloc"building. Europe was thus definitely cut in two by the Iron Curtain, both
rival superpower blocs at one side of it.
28
 By the end of the decade the key
structures of the post"war bipolar European security system had been laid.
Furthermore, the communist victory in China in 1949, the successful Soviet
explosionofanatomicbomb
29
andtheKoreanWarin1950"1953allcontributed
to reinforce the East"West confrontation. A dramatic arms race which followed
brought the miniaturization of the Cold War, as both sides prepared for
conventionalandevennuclearwar.
In spite of the slackening in the East"West relations that took place after
1953 – following the death of Stalin, the Korean armistice and the ending of
McCarthyism in the USA –, the Federal Republic of Germany was admitted to
NATOin1955
30
andconsequentlyrearmed,towhichthesocialistblocresponded
increatingtheWarsawPactinMay1955.Nevertheless,inthisrelativelyrelaxed
period, the two superpowers could settle some issues at the summit of Geneva
held in July 1955: the signing of the Austrian State Treaty – which created a
neutral and independent state – and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from
occupiedFinnishterritory.
Also,theSuezCrisisin1956–wheretheUnitedStatesclearlyhumiliated
France and the United Kingdom – demonstrated evidently the limits of
independent European power in international affairs. Furthermore, the failure of
the European Defence Community [EDC]
31
 gave evidence two years earlier that
security–andespeciallydefence–wouldcertainlynotbeconsideredwithinany
 39
independent European framework for the duration of the Cold War. The signing
of the Treaty of Rome – which established the European Economic Community
[EEC]–,in1957,provedhoweverthattheprocessofWestEuropeanintegration
could and would develop under the protective shield of NATO and the nuclear
guaranteeoftheUSA.
The period of the late 1950s and early 1960s was, therefore, a period of
transition in the European security system. The Cold War lost some of its bitter
intensity. The security relationships and alliance structures that were to
distinguish the European security system were in place by 1955, thus giving the
post"war order on the European continent a growing sense of stability and
predictability.(Hyde"Price,1991:32;BowkerandWilliams,1988:17)

Nonetheless, two events in the late 1950s and early 1960s – which
constituted a turning point in the development of the East"West relationship –
were to have a profound impact on the European security system. These two
events weretheBerlincrises–whichledtotheerection,on13August1961,of
theBerlinWallinAugust1961–andtheCubanMissileCrisisinOctober1962.
The building of the Anti"fascist Defence Wall – as it was called by the East"
Germanpolicymakers–contributedinawaytotheformationofanewapproach
to the East"West relations on both sides of the Wall. In West Germany itself it
illustrated the limitsofKonradAdenauer’spolicyofstrengthandfosteredatthe
sametimethedevelopmentofanewapproachtothecommunistworld.Thelatter
eventuallyledtotherejectionoftheHallsteindoctrineandtheadoptionofWilly
Brandt
32
’s Ostpolitik
33
. The Berlin Wall itself" despite the fact that it gave a
physical evidence of the division of Europe – symbolized the failure of the
communistsystemintheEast.AsfortheCubanMissileCrisis,itcontributesalso
to the new approach to East"West relations. The Soviet"American confrontation
overplannedSovietMissiledeploymentsinCuba–themostdangerouscrisisthe
world has ever seen, according to the then US Secretary of State Dean Rusk
34
"
revealed to the world the implication of the existential threat caused by nuclear
weapons. It indeed demonstrated the danger the nuclear age was posing for
internationalsecurity,particularlyinEurope.Asaresult,anewclimatecameout
oftheresolutionoftheUS"SovietconfrontationattheBayofPigs.«Henceforth,
 40
inEuropemoremeasuredreactionstocrisiswereevidentanditseemedclearthat
both security systems were developing codes of behaviour and reaction to
minimisefrictionandtodefusedangeroussituations.»(RichardVine(ed.),1987:
17) The new climate included several treaties between the two superpowers,
notably the ‘hot"line’ agreement of 1963. The ‘Cold Peace’ – as some analysts
described this fairly peaceful period starting in the early 1960s – brought a
somewhat stable security system and eventually led to the search for a long"
lastingdétentebetweenthetwosuperpowerblocs.

Hence, by and large, the bipolar system was based at that time on two
stable military, political and even economic alliances facing each other with an
intenseideologicalrivalry.Betweentheblocsdominatedbythetwosuperpowers,
there was just enough space for the neutral and non"aligned states. The nuclear
deterrence definitely added force to the whole system. Besides the European
integration which moved forward fairly swiftly, France and Germany signed in
1963 the Elysée Treaty, detailing a regularly get"together, thus denoting the new
spirit of trust and friendship between these two long"standing enemies. (Hyde"
Price,1991:34)

«OnthebasisoftherelativestabilityandgrowingconfidenceinEastand
West, there was a new willingness to achieve some sort of rapprochement and
understanding between the two alliance structures in Europe. From 1966 the
Americans reversed their view that German reunification must be the point of
departure for the resolution of the East"West conflict and began arguing that