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Plan Text

Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its
development and deployment of the Joint Milli
-
Arcsecond Pathfinder Survey satellite
constellation beyond the Earth’s mesosphere.

Contention 1 is inherency


No funding for JMAPS program in the status quo

Computational Physics Inc 2012
-

research and development (R&D) company
http://www.careerstrategies.cpi.com/projects/jmaps.html
hnass
er


The Joint

Milli
-
Arcsecond Pathfinder Survey (
JMAPS) was an all
-
sky
, bright
-
star
astrometric and photometric
cataloging mission of the

Department of the Navy
(
DoN
)

that was jointly undertaken by the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) and the
United Stat
es Naval Observatory (USNO).
The program was

executed from 2009 until

December
2011 when it was
discontinued due to

budget cutbacks
within the DoN
.

Some instrument development work is still on
-
going
.
The

primary
goal
of the mission
was to

update and
modernize the

current
bright star catalogs

in order
to meet

future
national security space needs

and requirements
of the

Department of Defense
(DoD),

NASA, and other
developers of satellites for purposes of attitude

determination.

The
JMAPS

mission
was des
igned to
provide

a

highly
accurate

(1 milli
-
arcsecond)
catalog of astrometric

and photometric
parameters

such as stellar
position, brightness and color covering the entire sky,
with sensitivity sufficient to provide suitable guide stars required
by any sub
sequent mission.

This was to be accomplished using a dedicated astrometric telescope flown on a small satellite (micro
-
satellite) in a sun synchronous terminator orbit that was scheduled to be launched in 2015.
Over the course of the three
-
year
primary mis
sion the
JMAPS

instrument
was going to image the

complete
sky

multiple times
to high
precision
.
The resulting

image
data would

have been processed

on the ground using algorithms
developed by the
USNO to
provide

highly

accurate stellar position
, proper moti
on, parallax
and photometric data
. Following
the measurement phase of the JMAPS mission,
those data would have been used
to generate the final Bright Star
Catalog
.

The update would have improved the position accuracy of known bright stars for the 2015 epoch to the level of 1 milli
-
arcsecond (5
nano
-
radians) for stars up to absolute magnitude 12.


SSA data is insufficient in the status quo
-

systems can detect objects

but not catalogue
them

Gaume et al 6
-

“Joint Milli
-
Arcsecond Pathfinder Survey (J
-
MAPS) Mission: The Application of High Metric Accuracy Astrometry to
Space Situational Awareness” Dr. Ralph Gaume, Mr. Bryan Dorland, Dr. David Monet, Dr. Kenneth Johnston U
nited States Naval Observatory
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi
-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA498094

01 APR 2006

hnasser


Two

critical
aspects of the

Space Situational Awareness
(SSA) problem are detection and orbit generation

for
R
esident
S
pace
O
bject
s
. The two problems ha
ve two different instrumentation solutions.
Existing

and

planne
d

ground and
space
-
based optical
systems are optimized for detection
,

with the result that
their ability to measure the
position and velocity
of RSOs

of interest
is compromised
.
In this section

we discuss the potential benefit of supplementing
the existing SSA architecture with one or more assets dedicated to high metric accuracy orbital determination with near
-
real time capability.
Space Situational Awareness
(
SSA
)

the ability to understand whe
re space assets are and what they are doing

is founded on two
capabilities: detection and determination
of the position

and velocity
of RSOs of interest
. First,
the RSO
must be detected against the space background
. Once detected
,

the
RSO’s
position and velocity need to be
determined
and

an
orbit calculated
.
An
RSO with a solved orbit can be periodically revisited and its orbit updated.
For

potentially
hostile RSOs
, maneuvers can be detected and
threat potential can be assessed if the

RSO’s
p
osition and velocity is observed with

sufficient
accuracy.

For high value systems, “keep out” regions around the asset can
be monitored,
and satellite operators can be notified when

potentially
hostile RSOs

are maneuvering onto
dangerous trajectories

with
respect to high value systems.
For

both

offensive

and

defensive

purposes,

the

more

accurate

the

position

and

velocity

measurements

(and hence, the orbit
),
the

better

the

SSA
.
Current and
planned ground and space
-
based SSA systems require many observations
to determine RSO position

and
velocity with high accuracy.
This is because these assets are optimized for solving the detection problem
,

and
detection and tracking are two different measurement tasks. The detection of RSOs against the space background requ
ires maximizing PD
(probability of detection) while simultaneously minimizing the FAR (False Alarm Rate). For typical space systems, this is acc
omplished by sizing
the optics and pixel dimensions such that the Airy disk for a point source is contained with
in a single pixel. Furthermore, the pixel instantaneous
field of view (IFOV, or the angle subtended by a single pixel on the sky) is chosen to be large enough to eliminate smearing
due to differential
motion between the RSO and the background.
High accurac
y orbit determination requires precise position
measurement

of the RSO against a high accuracy background reference grid
. High precision position measurement
requires first determining the centroid of the RSO’s point source function (PSF); this relative po
sition is then referenced to the relative positions
of multiple reference stars measured in same image.
The high precision relative position of the RSO can then be
converted to a high accuracy absolute position

if the reference star positions are known with high accuracy. High precision
centroid determination requires proper sampling of the RSO and reference star PSFs rather than the significant level of under
sampling desirable
for detection.
Undersampling intro
duces significant systematic errors that severely limit the centroiding
precision

possible.

Furthermore, while elimination of streaks by employing large IFOVs is clearly desirable for maximizing S/N, it
significantly limits the amount of position and veloc
ity information present in the scene. The detection and position measurements tasks are
thus at cross
-
purposes, and an instrument optimized for the former will be sub
-
optimal for the latter (see Figure 4). Figure 4. Simulated
observation of a constellation

of geosatellites as observed by (left) a typical (detection
-
optimized) space
-
based sensor, and (right) an
astrometric (high metric accuracyoptimized) space
-
based sensor.
Future SSA needs will move into the regime of rapid,
highly precise orbit determinati
on. To support rapid threat analysis for satellites maneuvering in the
vicinity of high value asset
s
, and enable satellite operators the opportunity to take effective defensive counterspace actions when
required,
highly precise
orbit determination will nec
essarily be required in near
-
real time
.
This motivates
the SSA need for precise

(~1 mas)
background star catalogs, and high metric accuracy astrometric space
surveillance

sensors
. In the next section we discuss USNO’s proposed Joint Milli
-
Arcsecond Pathfin
der Survey
(
J
-
MAPS) satellite

designed
to perform

very high accuracy measurements

of star position,

and J
-
MAPS’
ability to conduct an
on
-
orbit advanced concept demonstration of high metric accuracy SSA observation
s, with
the

potential

for

improving

orbit

d
etermination

accuracy

by

one

or

more

orders

of

magnitude
, and
generatin
g high
-
accuracy orbit
solutions

much
more quickly than

other
current and envisioned SSA systems.





Contention 2 is hegemony

There’s no space deterrence strategy in the status quo
-

in
creases vulnerability

Keuter et al 8/3/11

-

Jeff Kueter President, The George C. Marshall Institute *AND Dr. Robert Butterworth, Marshall Institute’s
Board of DirectorsAND

Peter Marquez, Fellow at the George C. Marshall Institute. *AND Dr. John B. Sheldon, Marshall Institute Fellow. AND Eric
R. Sterner, Fellow at the George C. Marshall Institute

(“Returning to Fundamentals: Deterrence and U.S. National Security in the 21st
Century” The George C. Marshall Institute
http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=980&print=1

The U.S. has

several

key
components
in place
to form

the foundation of
a

credible
deterrent
c
apability against hostile
actors.
But
there remain several areas that
need to be de
;t
veloped

before

the U.S. can claim a true deterrent capability.
The U.S. will need to address these

capability
shortfalls before
publicly
unveiling a deterrence

and/or compellence
strategy
.
Deploying an incomplete

deterrence
strategy encoura
ges

hostile acts

and forces the U
.S. to
accept actions

or conditions
that are against its

national and
foreign policy objectives
. Therefore,
announcing a
deterrent capability before such a capability actually exists will lead to a regressive cycle

in which

U.S.
credibility is continually reduced

and
the

deterrent

value

goes

below

zero

and

actually

becomes

an

encouragement
.
Even if the U.S.

develops those capabilities it is unlikely that a

committed
aggressor will be
deterred because of the critical role sat
ellites perform for the U.S
. and its allies. Additionally,
aggression in
space favors the initiator
. So any deterrence capacity will begin with two major strikes against them.
Therefore the best
possible option is to deny the adversary any benefit they
seek to gain from an attack
. The new National Space
Policy, building upon the policies of previous administrations, provides the foundational guidance for developing these missi
ng capabilities,
materiel and non
-
materiel, and integrating them into a larger
suite of U.S. capabilities. 33 Policy makers need to remember that deterrence is a
gamble and
when it comes to deterring

hostile acts
against our space systems

the U.
S. currently
has very
bad hand

and a lot of chips on the table
. Deterrence should not be v
iewed as a replacement for defense or a less expensive way
to protect our satellites.
The U.S. should focus

its nearterm efforts
on cultivating defensive capabilities

and
developing

and exercising
response plans
.

If the U.S. can build this

broad suite of
t
ools
then deterrence

may
take care of itself
.


There will be an attack on U.S. Assets

First


Chinese Doctrine

Houpt 10/31/11

(Danny Houpt recently earned an M.A. in Security Studies from Georgetown University where he completed his
thesis, “Does China hav
e a Comprehensive, Coordinated, and Consistent Space Policy? Implications for U.S. Policymakers.” “A new policy
typology to better understand the goals of China’s space program” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1958/2,)

Given the dual
-
use nature of mo
st space technology,
it is no surprise that China’s military uses of space are advancing
commensurately

with its civilian and commercial programs. First of all,
China

is

widely
known to have an array of
intelligence satellites

for space reconnaissance and
surveillance
. The Ziyuan Earth observation satellite is known to be
one of these, but China has also fielded the Fanhui Shi Weixing, or Retrievable Satellite, which drops canisters of film from

space.15 China’s
ongoing microsatellite program has sparked so
me of the most concern abroad. Aside from intelligence satellites,
microsatellites have

many potential
offensive uses

such as maneuvering in range of an adversary’s satellite and either
latching on

a “parasitic microsat”

to disrupt proper functions, or mer
ely exploding within range of a
target satellite to destroy it.
Furthermore,
the ability to deploy a constellation

of microsatellites
on short

notice
, a capability China may already possess with its Kaituozhe launch vehicle,
denies the deterrence factor

th
at could

otherwise
prevent offensive attacks

on an adversary’s space assets for fear of retaliation
.
China’s rocket
technology also has

proven
offensive military use

in space:

the ability to shoot down enemy assets in space through direct
ascent attacks. China demonstrated such ability in 2007, which has been the impetus for much of the recent speculation about
China’s military
space aspirations.
Despite political blowback from

this test

(it resulted in a 20 percent increase in the total amount of trackable
space debris in low Earth orbit),
China may still be pursuing ASAT technologies
.
16
In

January
2010 China
conducted a

successful
test of its

ground
-
based

midcourse
missile int
erception technology
. This test used
technology similar to its 2007 ASAT test and, as exemplified by the US Navy
-
led Operation Burnt Frost that intercepted the satellite USA 193,
missile defense technology can serve ASAT ends. In addition to these hard
-
kil
l capabilities,
China has the capability to use soft
-
kill

measures
to neutralize

adversary’s
space assets
.
China is

known to have

the means to jam

satellite
communication and
GPS receiv
ers

and is developing directed energy ASATs, including high
-
powered mic
rowave and particle beam
weapons.
17 The

US Department of Defense
(DoD),

in their annual report to Congress on China’s military modernization, also
notes
that China is developing ground
-
based laser ASATs
, the beginnings of which may have already been demons
trated. In 2006
the director of the National Reconnaissance Office, Donald Kerr, substantiated reports that
China used

a

ground
-
based
laser to
dazzle a US spy satellite

over its territory.

Although this laser could not do any long
-
term damage,
similar tech
niques

and capabilities

used to track and dazzle this satellite
could be coupled with

more
powerful ground
-
based

lasers to
destroy space assets
. Some reports actually indicate
China has already tested

and deployed a ground
-
based ASAT
laser that
can target
assets in LEO
.18 Despite the array of activity the PLA conducts in and through space, they seem to lack a specific doctrine
for the employment of their space capabilities and have not made public any substantial plans for military uses of space. In
lieu of

a formal
declaration on space, there is a growing literature from within the PLA ranks that may be forming the basis for what later be
comes stated

or
unstated

PLA space doctrine
. These authors generally
hold the

same ass
umptions

about space, including the

inevitability that space will be a domain of war

in the future
.19
Many

also
acknowledge that

establishing
space dominance will

be crucial

to fully

exploiting wartime necessities

such as control of airspace and secure
command and control.20

Three internal Chinese sources are largely cited as being the defining PLA space doctrine writings:
Space War by
Colonel Li
Daguang
; On Space Operations by Colonel Jia Junming; and
J
oint Space War Campaigns by
Colonel Yuan Zelu
.21
Colonel
Li highlights

man
y
specific recommendations to develop

the PLA’s
space fighting

capabilities
,
including fielding offensive capabilities
capable of “destroying or temporarily incapacitating all enemy space
vehicles

that fly in space above our sovereign territory.” Other rec
ommendations include focusing development on land
-
based anti
-
satellite
weapons and anti
-
satellite satellites as well as “assassin’s mace” space weapons that could deal a crippling blow to an enemy.
Particularly
important

to foreign perceptions of China
,
t
h
ese
writings

also
call for China to combine

military and
civilian technology

and integrate peacetime and wartime facilities.

Other authors

on the subject
promote such actions as: fielding sea
-
launched anti
-
satellite weapons
,
attacking GPS with high energy
laser weapons
, fielding stealthy space satellites and weapons,
and seeking the ability
to attack terrestrial targets from space
. Kevin Pollpeter, summing up the view of most Chinese authors writing on the subject,
writes, “
The development of
space technolo
gy will inevitably lead to the militarization of space

and space
militarization will lead to confrontation in space. As the struggle over air and
space control is becoming the new focal point

of
wa
r, space will become the main battlefield of future wars.”2
2 Pollpeter also notes that
throughout his extensive review of
Chinese

space
writing
s,
there

were

no

rebuttals

to

the

view

that

China

will

inevitability

develo
p

and

use

counterspace

weapons.

These views also seem to be held by some in the upper echelons of

the PLA. In November 2009,
PLA

Air Force

(PLAAF)
commander
Xu Qiliang
stated

in an interview
with the PLA Daily newspaper, an official government publication,
that
the militarization
of space is a “historical inevitability

and called on the PLAAF to develop offensive and defensive capabilities in space.23 Xu is not
only the head of the PLAAF, but as of 2007 was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (CCCP) and a member o
f the
Central Military Commission (CM
C)

two primary policy decision making bodies in China. The Foreign Ministry tried to backtrack on Xu’s
comments days later by reiterating that China has “all along upheld the peaceful use of outer space,” and would not be part o
f a space arms
race.24 Howev
er,
Xu did not personally retract his statements
and, given his elite government position,
this interview
could

actually
be exemplary of ho
w

some of
China’s top official’s views space
.

Indeed, there is some indication the
CCCP acknowledges the need to prep
are for the weaponization of space. In December 2010,
the official publication of the CCCP
,
the Qiushi Journal, on its website released an article that
spoke to China’s perspectives on space war
:
China's missiles
can directly attack

the military
satellites
, which

usually
orbit at an altitude less than 10,000
kilometers
...
Chin
a

should make efforts to develop space weapons

as soon as possible, as
this is the most
effective military means of attacking

the U.S
. If we can eventually fire missiles from a satellit
e,
the U.S. will find that it
has nowhere to hide
; it will find itself entirely exposed to the attack radius of Chinese weaponry…Vigorously strengthening the building
of our space military forces should be not only the focus of our national defense, but al
so the most powerful weapon to deter U.S. military
blackmail.25 After the article was translated into English, the original Chinese version was altered to state that the views
were those of the
authors only. In a society well versed in controlling media an
d hiding military intentions, it is interesting the Chinese government is allowing
these and other perspectives to be published containing such inflammatory language on space warfare.
This suggests that

perhaps
the views are not condemned

or are being floa
ted as trial balloons to gauge foreign response.

Second


Chinese Miscalculation

MacDonald, 11
-

Senior Director, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Program, U.S. Institute of Peace (Bruce, CQ
Congressional Testimony, “MILITARY AND CIVIL SPACE PROGRAMS IN C
HINA”, 5/11, lexis)

These factors are reasons why
China
is
probably
not looking for war

with the United States
,
though they

also
could inadvertently
become factors in China's
stumb
ling

into

a
conflict

they would ordinarily not want,
through
miscalculation

or distraction
.
One characteristic

of too
many wars

in the last century
is that they are the result
of

miscalculation

that ignites

the tinder of
fundamental geopolitical tensions.

Averting
major power
conflict
requires

skillful management of tensions

by s
enior leaders of the major powers.
China has become much more
internationally sophisticated
, though with important exceptions
, in its dealings with the rest of the world

than has
been true in the past, and this is reflected in its civilian
leadership.
Unfo
rtunately, the PLA's

senior officer corps
trails its
civilian counterparts in this respect
.
They have

much
less interaction
with foreign
official
and travel
abroad

much
less frequently

than their U.S. counterparts
. This means that
the PLA overall views wor
ld events
from a less knowledgeable and sophisticated perspective
, a danger in this increasingly complex world,
and could
explain
, for example,
the
political "tonedeafness"
of the PLA

in the manner they conducted their 2007 ASAT test. This PLA
problem becomes more serious when one realizes that
the PLA is

organizationally
separate from

the rest
of
the Chinese
government, and

reports
only to the C
entral
M
ilitary
C
ommissio
n, currently ch
aired by President Hu Jintao.
President Hu,

and his likely successors
, have no significant military background
,
and
the majority of
the

CMC's
members are top PLA officers
,
suggesting that c
ivilian

oversight

of major military decisions and consideration of
their
larger implications
are not as carefully reviewed as in the U.S. government
. Normally this would not be too great a
concern, but
in a crisis this could be dangerous
.
Add to this the fact that
China has no equivalent

of our
National Security Council
,
a critically important body
for coordinating our security decisionmaking
, and one comes
away concerned about the relative insularity of the PLA in

the Chinese power structure. In a crisis,
the PLA probably cannot be
counted on to show as sophisticated a se
nse of judgment

as one would hope any country's military leaders, even an
enemy's, to show. All these problems and many more pose potential threats to internal political stability and Communist Party

control,
providing ample opportunity for crisis and conf
lict in the years ahead. Overview of The Strategic Landscape of Space Space assets, and the
communications and cyber links that enable them to function, are the means by which essential national security information i
s either
generated, transmitted, or bot
h. This information is the lifeblood of U.S. conventional military superiority and plays a key role in U.S. strategic
nuclear posture as well. As such, these
space

related
assets represent

extraordinarily
appealing targets

in any
future conflict
, and
their

relative
vulnerability can provide

dangerously
attractive incentives in a crisis to
preempt
, escalating to
war
.

Resisting this temptation to attack may be morally virtuous but could be
strategically unwise
: going first in a space conflict with a nearpeer

space adversary appears to offer many advantages, while absorbing
such a strike, with all its attendant destruction of military capabilities, and then responding to the attack against an oppo
nent fully expecting
such a response, appears to be militarily a
nd strategically quite undesirable. As technology advances, the ways of interfering with, disrupting, or
destroying information streams in space or supporting space systems will likely increase, as will U.S. and others' dependence

upon such
systems.
Provid
ing defensive options for U.S. space assets should be pursued where appropriate
, but most
space observers believe that offense has the advantage in space over defense, as General Cartwright observed last May. Cartwr
ight also noted
that
the challenging issu
es that space poses has made the Space Posture Review "the most difficult of all
the defense reviews"

the Obama Administration has undertaken.
The overall U.S. goal in space should be to shape
the space domain to the advantage of the United States and its
allies
, and to do so in ways that are stabilizing and
enhance U.S. and allied security. The United States has an overriding interest in maintaining the safety, survival, and funct
ion of its space assets
so that the profound military, civilian, and commerci
al benefits they enable can continue to be available to the United States and its allies. This
need not mean that China and others must perforce be disadvantaged by such an arrangement
-

there should be ample opportunity for many
countries to benefit and p
rosper from a properly crafted system of space management.
There is an inherent risk of strategic
instability

when

relatively
modest defense efforts create

disproportionate danger to an adversary
, as
with space offense
. And there is a serious risk of crisi
s instability in space when "going first" pays off
-

destroying an adversary's satellites
before he destroys yours.
We don't know what would happen in a crisis, but
the potential for space instability
seems high and likely to grow.


Third, Rogue state atta
ck

Lynn 11
-

William J. Lynn III , U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, (2011): A Military Strategy for the New Space Environment, The
Washington Quarterly, 34:3, 7
-
16 To link to this article:
http
://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2011.586933

hnasser

During the Cold War, space largely remained the private preserve of the United States and the Soviet Union, with space assets

as tools of
superpower control. Missile warning and imagery satellites enabled

us to detect missile launches and to verify the arms control arrangements
meant to lessen the risk of conflict. During this period, each nation developed hit
-
to
-
kill, anti
-
satellite weapons that had the potential to
generate large clouds of space debris.
Since the space domain was inextricably linked with our understanding of nuclear escalation, the
employment of such weapons was believed to serve as the harbinger of a nuclear first
-
strike.
Although in the past information
derived from space capabilities w
ent almost exclusively to national decisionmakers,
today we rely on
space for

almost
everything we do
.
Space systems ar
e
critical to operations on the ground
, at sea, and in
the air
, whether enforcing a no
-
fly zone over Libya or countering insurgents in Af
ghanistan.
With such

widespread
reliance
comes

potential
vulnerability
.

A greater number of
potential
adversaries
now
employ

a

wider
spectrum of
weapons

capable of countering

U.S. space
capabilitie
s. As a result,
physically shooting down a satellite is no
longer the most likely threat to our military systems.

Electronically
jamming

GPS and communications
signals

are

among a range of

relatively
low
-
cost

options
for states

seeking counterspace weapons
.
The threshold

for using these weapons
has been

lowered
,
w
ith a number
of nations employing them for political purposes in peacetime or during crises. For example,
Iran

has recently
jammed the

BBC’s
Persian television service

in an effort
to limit information

about regional unrest
. Furthermore,
counterspace
weapo
ns

are no longer the weapon of last resort in a geo
-
strategic conflict.

Instead,
they
are

becoming
tools that advanced

nations and
sub
-
regional powers

alike are incorporating
into conventional

military
doctrine
.

Even non
-
state actors have found utility in
employing jammers and manipulating communications satellites. For instance,
the
Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka have been accused of hijacking transponders on

commercial communications
satellites
to broadcast propaganda
,
demonstrating a sophisticated understandi
ng of space technology
.
Irregular
warfare has come to space.

To respond to the proliferation of counterspace weapons, the U
nited
S
tates
is employing

new
ways to
prevent and deter aggression

against U.S. and allied space systems.
In the contested

space

envi
ronmen
t

of today,
we
can no longer rely

solely
on the threat of retaliation

to protect space systems from attack.
We must expand our
traditional concepts of deterrence
. Accordingly, the National Security Space Strategy outlines the multilayered approach we

will
take to deter aggression. This approach includes several important initiatives. First,
we are assessing diplomatic initiatives

such as
the EU Code of Conduct
to promote international norms of responsible behavior
.
These initiatives

define how
responsible space
-
faring nations are expected to conduct themselves

and should over time discourage destabilizing
acts that threaten the overall stability of the space domain.
Nations willfully acting contrary to such norms can expect to
be isolated as rog
ue actors
. Second,
we can utilize alliances in space to serve the same deterrent function
as basing troops in allied countries
. They can ensure an attack on one is an attack on all. As with terrestrial defense alliances,
partnerships in

space also
can add
resilience

and capabilities
, without relinquishing the strategic advantage our systems
provide. At their fullest, these partnerships could consist of completely interoperable systems in which costs, benefits, and

risks are shared
among trusted participants
. For instance, Australia recently became a full partner in the Wideband Global Satellite Communications System
(WGS), which directly supports warfighters. The cost
-
savings from our partnership with Australia allowed the Pentagon to procure an additional
s
atellite for the WGS constellation.
By sharing the benefits and risks of developing this system, we enhanced our
operational capability and raised the cost of aggression against it
. Increasingly, we will want to operate in coalitions in
space, just as we d
o in other domains. To achieve this, the department will examine all mission areas to identify where shared interests open
the door to greater levels of cooperation.
One way to foster

greater
cooperation is to transform the

J
oint
Sp
ace
O
perations
C
enter
, w
hich provides command and control for our space forces, into a Combined Space Operations Center run in concert
with international partners. Such an arrangement will allow our partners to work side
-
by
-
side with U.S. commanders,
improving our
situational awa
reness

while integrating a multilateral approach to day
-
to
-
day operations
.
Networking
our space operations center with those of our allies offers a further way to expand collaboration
. But even
as we increasingly work in partnerships,
we will maintain some

U.S.
-
only capabilities for our most sensitive national
security missions.

Third,
we need to make our space systems more resilient
, and our combat power less reliant on their full functioning. This
will help deny adversaries the benefit from an attack in s
pace. Just as in the cyber domain,
denying the

benefit of attack

in space
can join retaliatory deterrence
as a disincentive to adversaries
.

To maintain our combat power, we are learning how to
operate in a degraded information environment.
Training exercis
es where we disrupt space
-
based capabilities help
our forces become proficient at operating with interference
. To improve resiliency, we are developing technology to help
us mitigate the loss or degradation of on
-
orbit systems
.
For instance, we now have gr
ound, air, and naval
-
based platforms which can
increasingly augment or replace space assets. The U.S. military is one of the few militaries today with the capability to ope
rate in all domains on
a global basis, and this ability provides a strategic advanta
ge when space capabilities come under threat.

Responsive space capabilities which rapidly launch replacements can also play an important role in reconstituting functionali
ty either during or
after an attack. And broader partnerships with commercial firms w
hich enable national security payloads to ride on commercial satellites will
further improve our resiliency. Hosting military payloads on commercial spacecraft, as we are already doing with a missile wa
rning sensor, is
not only cost
-
effective, it also enab
les a more diverse, robust, and distributed set of space systems.

Finally,
the U
nited
S
tates
views

free
access to space as

a vital
national interest
. Consistent with our inherent right of
self
-
defense
, we will respond accordingly to attacks on it
, at a tim
e and place of our choosing
1
and not necessarily in space.
Ultimately,
deterrence must impact the decision
-
making of

particular
countries

and leaders in specific
scenarios
.
A multilayered approach

to deterrence
offers the greatest likelihood of encouraging
restraint, and
thereby
protecting our vital space capabilities

from attack
.


That destroys hege
-

the military needs space

Marshall, 8

-

NASA Ames Research Center (Will, Astropolitics
, 6:154

199, “REDUCING THE VULNERABILITY OF SPACE ASSETS: A
MULTITIERED MICROSATELLITE CONSTELLATION ARCHITECTURE,” Ebsco Political Science)

Space assets are

one of
the
most critical
‘‘Achilles’ heels’’ of the

current
military

capability

of the United
Stat
es (U.S.). This is for two reasons: (1)
the U.S. military
space systems

in particular reconnaissance, navigation, signals
intelligence, early warning, and communications systems

are critical to

modern military
warfare and intelligence
; and (2)
space
system
s

are inherently
vulnerable to attack
.

This

combination is understood at the highest levels and was espoused in
the ‘‘Rumsfeld Space Commission’’ with talk of a ‘‘Space Pearl Harbor.’’1 Whether one agrees with the tone,
this is a genuine security
problem f
or the U.S. in need of a near
-
term solution.

While there have been numerous papers, and much media and
academic attention, in the space security discussion focused on promoting or criticizing space
-
based weapons,2 there have been far fewer
papers and studi
es offering constructive ways forward that deal with these genuine security concerns in a broader sense.3 The central
motivation for this paper is to put forward one key element

the satellite architecture

in an effort to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. sp
ace
assets. It is hoped that this idea, together with others like it, should stimulate and contribute to a debate on more constru
ctive ways forward
for how to achieve space security in the post
-
Cold war world. Importance of Space Assets
For better or worse
, it is clear that
the
U.S. military is

to some significant extent
dependent on its key
satellites
,

which number about 86

105 operational
satellites at present.
These

s
atellites
constitute
a

significant part of
the eyes, ears, and central nervous system
of

the

modern
military
.
4 A practical

example
that helps to illustrate this
is the

case of the
U.S.
-
led invasion of Iraq

in
2003. First,
the decision to go was based

in part
on satellite imagery and signals intelligence

from satellites
;
whether or not it was
interpreted or used correctly is a separate issue. Second,
the planning

and operation were facilitated by
satellite imager
y. Third,
many

planes, ships, tanks, and
units’ positions were

known through

Global Positioning
System
(GPS) satellites
, and even most
munitions were guided by
GPS
.

Fourth, the operation was commanded from the U.S. in
large part through the use of communications satellites.
Perhaps
more important
ly

than any of the functions in the Iraq example,
early warning

(EW)
satellite
s are the

U.S.’s and Russia’s
first warning o
f
nuclear missile attack
.

As Gray
classified,
space assets have moved from being ‘‘useful and important’’
to

an

‘‘indispensable

adjunct’’

in
the military

over the last decade.5 Space assets are definitely used a

great deal by the U.S. military, but that does not mean necessarily as
strong a dependence as Gray implies.
T
he loss of

U.S. space
assets could
range in its effect

Reducing the Vulnerability of
Space Assets 155
anywhere from a loss to

the U.S. military in

practical operations, to
be
ing

catastrophic to
U.S. security
.

The former would entail a reduction in operational effectiveness or speed, but fundamentally supposes that back
-
up systems
and=or redundancy allow a near continuation of military capability.
Th
e latter scenario would entail an effective
disablement of the U.S. military capability from normal operations
. In reality, the significance lies between these
boundaries, but this is a topic that could benefit from further research.


Solves great power wa
r and nuclear escalation

Kagan 12



Senior Fellow @ the Brookings Institution, Robert,
The importance of U.S. military might
shouldn’t be underestimated
, Washington Post, 2
-
2,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the
-
importance
-
of
-
us
-
military
-
might
-
shouldnt
-
be
-
underestimated/2012/02/02/gIQAX5pVlQ_story.html

These are sensible arguments. Power takes many forms, and it’s smart to make use of all of them. But there is a
danger in

taking this wisdom too far and forgetting just how important U.S. military power has been in building and
sustaining
the present
liberal
international
order
. That order has
rested
significantly
on the U.S.
ability
to provide security in
parts of the worl
d, such as
Europe and Asia, that had
known
endless
cycles of war
fare
before the
arrival of the
U
nited
S
tates. The world’s free
-
trade
, free
-
market
economy has
depended on America’s ability to keep
trade
routes open
, even during times of
conflict. And the re
markably wide
spread of democracy
around the world
owes
something
to
America’s ability to
provide support to democratic forces under siege and to
protect
peoples
from
dictators such as

Moammar
Gaddafi
and

Slobodan
Milosevic
. Some find it absurd that the Un
ited States
should have a larger military than the next 10 nations combined.

But that gap in military power has probably been
the greatest factor in upholding an international system that, in historical terms, is unique


and uniquely beneficial
to America
ns. Nor should we forget that this power is part of what makes America attractive to many other nations.
The world has not always loved America. During the era of Vietnam and Watergate and the ugly last stand of
segregationists, America was often hated. B
ut nations that relied on the United States for security from threatening
neighbors tended to overlook the country’s flaws. In the 1960s, millions of young Europeans took to the streets to
protest American “imperialism,” while their governments worked to e
nsure that the alliance with the United States
held firm. Soft power, meanwhile, has its limits. No U.S. president has enjoyed more international popularity than
Woodrow Wilson did when he traveled to Paris to negotiate the treaty ending World War I. He w
as a hero to the
world, but he found his ability to shape the peace, and to establish the new League of Nations, severely limited, in
no small part by his countrymen’s refusal to commit U.S. military power to the defense of the peace. John F.
Kennedy, anot
her globally admired president, found his popularity of no use in his confrontations with Nikita
Khrushchev, who, by Kennedy’s own admission, “beat the hell out of me” and who may have been convinced by his
perception of Kennedy’s weakness that the United
States would tolerate his placing Soviet missiles in Cuba. The
international system is not static. It responds quickly to fluctuations in power.
If the U
nited
S
tates were to
cut
too deeply into
its

ability to project
military
power, other nations
could be
counted on to respond
accordingly. Those nations whose power rises in relative terms
would display expanding ambitions
commensurate with their new clout in the international system. They would, as in the past,
demand
particular
spheres of influence
. Those
whose power declined in relative terms, like the United
States, would have little choice but to cede some influence in those areas. Thus
China would lay
claim to
its sphere of influence in
Asia, Russia
in
eastern Europe and
the
Caucasus
. And, as in the
pas
t,
these
burgeoning

great
-
power claims would
overlap and
conflict
: India and China claim the
same sphere in the Indian Ocean; Russia and Europe have overlapping spheres in the region
between the Black Sea and the Baltic.
Without the U
nited
S
tates
to suppress
and contain these
conflicting ambitions, there would
have to
be
complex adjustments to establish a new balance.
Some of these adjustments could be made through diplomacy, as they were sometimes in the past.
Other adjustments might be made throu
gh
war
or the threat of war, as also happened in the past.

The biggest illusion is to imagine that as American power declines, the world stays the same.
What has been true
since the time of Rome remains true today:
There can be no world order without powe
r to preserve it, to
shape its norms, uphold its institutions, defend the sinews of its economic system and keep the
peace.

Military power can be abused, wielded unwisely and ineffectively. It can be deployed to answer problems
that it cannot answer or tha
t have no answer. But it is also essential. No nation or group of nations that renounced
power could expect to maintain any kind of world order.
If the United States begins to look like a less
reliable defender

of the present order, that order will begin t
o unravel. People might indeed find
Americans very attractive in this weaker state, but i
f the United States cannot help them when
and
where
they need help the most, they will make other arrangements.


Your turns are non
-
unique


we prevent U.S. lashout

G
oldstein ‘7

(Avery, Professor of Global Politics and International Relations @ University of Pennsylvania, “Power transitions,
institutions, and China's rise in East Asia: Theoretical expectations and evidence,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 30,

Iss
ue 4 & 5 August)

Two closely related, though distinct, theoretical arguments focus explicitly on the consequences for international politics o
f a shift in power
between a dominant state and a rising power. In War and Change in World Politics, Robert Gilpin suggested that
p
eace prevails
when a dominant state’s capabilities enable it to ‘govern’

an international order that it has shaped. Over time,
however,
as

economic and technological diffusion proceeds during eras of peace and development,
other states are
empowered
. Moreo
ver, the burdens of international governance drain and distract the reigning hegemon,
and
challengers

eventually
emerge

who seek to rewrite the rules of governance. As the power advantage of the erstwhile hegemon ebbs,
it may
become desperate
enough
to
resort to

the ultima ratio of international politics,
force
, to forestall the
increasingly urgent demands
of a rising challenger
. Or as the power of the challenger rises, it may be tempted to press
its case with threats to use force. It is
the

rise and
fal
l
of

the
great powers

that

creates

the circumstances under which major
wars, what Gilpin labels ‘
hegemonic wars’
,

break out.13 Gilpin’s argument logically encourages pessimism about the implications of
a rising China. It leads to the expectation that inter
national trade, investment, and technology transfer will result in a steady diffusion of
American economic power, benefiting the rapidly developing states of the world, including China. As the US simultaneously scu
rries to put
out the many brushfires that
threaten its far
-
flung global interests (i.e., the classic problem of overextension), it will be unable to devote
sufficient resources to maintain or restore its former advantage over emerging competitors like China.
While the erosion of the
once clear Ame
rican advantage plays itself out,
the US will find it
ever
more difficult to preserve

the
order

in Asia that it created during its era of preponderance. The expectation is an increase in the likelihood for the use of forc
e


either
by a Chinese challenger
able to field a stronger military in support of its demands for greater influence over international arrangements in
Asia, or by a besieged American hegemon desperate to head off further decline. Among the trends that alarm those who would lo
ok at Asia
thr
ough the lens of Gilpin’s theory are
China’s expanding share of

world trade and
wealth

(much of it resulting from the gains
made possible by the international economic order a dominant US established); its
acquisition of technology in key sectors
that have

both civilian and
military applications

(e.g., information, communications, and electronics linked with the ‘revolution
in military affairs’);
and

an
expanding military burden for the US

(as it copes with the challenges of its global war on
terrorism and
especially its struggle in Iraq) that limits the resources it can devote to preserving its interests in East Asia.14 Although

similar
to Gilpin’s work insofar as it emphasizes the importance of shifts in the capabilities of a dominant state and a rising ch
allenger, the power
-
transition theory A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler present in The War Ledger focuses more closely on the allegedly dangerou
s
phenomenon of ‘crossover’


the point at which a dissatisfied challenger is about to overtake the established
leading state.15 In such cases,
when the power gap narrows
, the dominant state becomes increasingly desperate to forestall
, and
the challenger becomes increasingly determined to realize the transition to a new international order
whose contours it will def
ine.
Though suggesting why a rising China may ultimately present grave dangers for international
peace when its capabilities make it a peer competitor of America, Organski and Kugler’s power
-
transition theory is less clear about the
dangers while a potenti
al challenger still lags far behind and faces a difficult struggle to catch up. This clarification is important in thinking
about the theory’s relevance to interpreting China’s rise because
a broad consensus prevails

among analysts
that Chinese
military ca
pabilities are at a minimum two decades from putting it in a league with the US

in Asia.16 Their
theory
, then,
points with alarm to trends in China’s growing
wealth and
power relative to the U
nited
S
tates, but especially looks ahead to what it sees as the period of maximum danger


that time when a dissatisfied China could be in a
position to overtake the US on dimensions believed crucial for assessing power. Reports beginning in the mid
-
1990s that of
fered
extrapolations suggesting China’s growth would give it the world’s largest gross domestic product (GDP aggregate, not per cap
ita)
sometime in the first few decades of the twentieth century fed these sorts of concerns about a potentially dangerous cha
llenge to
American leadership in Asia.17
The huge gap between Chinese and American military capabilities
(especially in
terms of technological sophistication)
has

so far
discouraged prediction of comparably disquieting trends on this
dimension, but inkling
s of similar concerns may be reflected in occasionally alarmist reports about
purchases of

advanced
Russian air and naval equipment, as well as concern that Chinese espionage may
have undermined the American advantage

in nuclear and missile technology, and

speculation about the potential military
purposes of China’s manned space program.18 Moreover,
because
a dominant state may react
to the prospect of a
crossover
and believe
that
it is wiser to embrace the logic of preventive war and act early to delay a
t
ransition while the task is more manageable
, Organski and Kugler’s powertransition theory also provides grounds for
concern about the period prior to the possible crossover.19


SSA solves attributive deterrence

Craig 10
-

Col Craig A. Smith, USAF Staff Judg
e Advocate, Air Force Space Command Peterson AFB, Colorado “Legal Considerations of
International Space Operation” February 2010 Volume 6, Number 2 High Frontier
hnasser


Event Identification
-

The Importance of Attribution Potential legal remedies and ot
her state response options are theoretical without the
capability to identify the cause of a space event (interference with, degradation, or destruction of a space object).
How important is the
capability to attribute an event to someone or something?

[Spa
ce situational awareness]
SSA is crucial to
accurate

determination o
f the
space system failure
,

whether from

environmental

effects,
unintentional

interference,
or

an
adversary attack
,
allowing decision makers

to determine the
appropriate response

[emphasis added]. 12
Before we can talk about providing space protection,

we need to understand

what is
going on

up there
.
We need to have the tools

in place
to establish what is being launched
, what the capabilities
are,
the intent
,
and ultimately attrib
ution
.
Once we have attribution,

we can determine the options
the US
government has to deter
,
dissuade or stop someone if they have started doing these types of thing
s. As a
result of the Chinese antisatellite testing, and since we were able to attribute (
the launch) to them, China is receiving diplomatic pressure from
around the world. “
There are tools available outside the military, such as diplomatic pressure, that are
available for our country to use; but
without

attribution, you can’t use a single one

of them
” [emphasis
added]. 13 How challenging is the environment? Space traffic growth is both a challenge and a concern. In 1980 only 10 countr
ies were
operating satellites in space. Today, nine International Space41 High Frontier countries operate spacep
orts, more than 50 countries own or
have partial ownership in satellites and citizens of 39 nations have traveled in space. In 1980 we were tracking approximatel
y 4,700 objects in
space; 280 of those objects were active payloads/spacecraft, while another 2
,600 were debris. Today we are tracking approximately 19,000
objects, 1,300 active payloads, and 7,500 pieces of debris. In 29 years, space traffic has quadrupled. 14 The US will have no

meaningful
response to an event if it cannot identify who caused it.
SSA is

a much broader subject than the issue of
attribution,

which we may
consider to be a product of effective SSA.
A general appreciation of SSA is important
, though, and Air Force doctrine is the best
place to start: “
SSA is
the result of

sufficient
kno
wledge about space
-
related conditions, constraints,
capabilities, and activities

both
current and planned

in, from, toward, or through space.” 15


Attribution is key for a successful deterrence strategy

Keuter et al 8/3/11

-

Jeff Kueter President, The Geo
rge C. Marshall Institute *AND Dr. Robert Butterworth, Marshall Institute’s
Board of DirectorsAND Peter Marquez, Fellow at the George C. Marshall Institute. *AND Dr. John B. Sheldon, Marshall Institute

Fellow. AND Eric
R. Sterner, Fellow at the George C. M
arshall Institute

(“Returning to Fundamentals: Deterrence and U.S. National Security in the 21st Century” The George C. Marshall Institute
http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=980&print=1

There are two elements of deterrence that are common
to dealing bo
th the global powers and the regionalists:
attribution and signaling
.
T
he U.S. must have the ability to know it is being attacked

in space
and
attribute those attacks to a specific acto
r
. Current

U.S
.
situational awareness

capacity
is poor
.

To make matters
more difficult
the operating environment of
space requires an attribution capability

that is

not only
precise
but

also
timely

an attack on a satellite could literally come at the speed of light.
The combatant commander and
policy
makers mu
st have precise attribution

information quickly
to respond to an

attack
.

Unfortunately, despite
considerable financial and intellectual investment by intelligence agencies
there exists no

perfect and instantaneous
intelligence collection capability
. 29 The
re has been a long
-
enduring discussion about the placement of warning sensors on our
satellites. Such
sensors
would definitely be helpful but they cannot disc
ern whether an attack took place, who
perpetrated an attack, and most importantly to policy makers
, why an attack occurred.


Contention 3 is Debris


Scenario 1 is Russian Miscalculation

Russian satellites are vulnerable to debris
-

cause accidental launch

Sat News 4/4
-
12
Satnews Daily April 04, 2012, Robert Bridge, http://www.satnews.com/cgi
-
bin/story
.cgi?number=886826536

The great frontier of
space is
increasingly
cluttered

with debris
, and
a
Russian engineer warns that

damage

to a satellite

from some hypothetical collision
may be misconstrued as a

deliberate
act of sabotage
.
Researchers examine piece

of space junk that came down in Cape Town on April 27, 2000 (AFP Photo) With the global village increasingly
dependent on satellites and other space
-
based equipment, Academician Yury Zaitsev of
the Russian Academy of Engineering
Sciences believes that
acc
idental damage to a
n American or Russian
satellite
by

runaway space garbage
may be seen as a deliberate attack from a foreign entity
,

which
may be the spark to

ignite a conflict
. "The
American, Russian and other defense agencies have already been suffering serious losses, caused by the collision of satellite
s with space
garbage,” Zaitsev said. “
Space garbage hitting

and disabling
a military satellite may

be seen as an attack
,
whi
ch
could provoke retaliation

with all of the ensuing consequences
.” As more nations send their own satellites into outer
space,
the risk of space collisions has increased dramatically over the last decade
.
US space engineers
seem to agree

with their Russia
n counterparts
concerning the risk
of potential
space collisions

involving
debris
. Last year, the US
-
based National Research Council reported that the amount of
space
debris “has reached a tipping
point
, with
enough

currently in orbit
to collide

continuall
y
and create
even
more

debris
, raising the risk of
spacecraft failures.”
However,
the issues raised

by Zaitsev
over the

possibility of a conflict

arising as the result
of some “accidental” space collision
deserve consideration
. As a means for reducing such

risks, Zaitsev has proposed
various suggestions, including burning or dumping the fuel leftover in booster rockets and in payload modules. On March 11, 2
000, a Chinese
carrier rocket exploded in orbit and created a huge debris cloud. The Russian engineer
also suggests de
-
orbiting defunct satellites or transfer
them to a circling space junkyard, which Zaitsev says would exist in a harmless “disposal orbit.” Finally, Zaitsev believes i
t is necessary to “ban
the deliberate destruction of spacecraft, which is
frequently done when the service life of a military satellite expires, and to prohibit tests of
kinetic weapons." In conclusion, some space
-
junk trivia: In January 1997, Lottie Williams was taking a late
-
night walk with friends in Oklahoma
when the group s
aw a streak of light in the sky. Williams then felt something graze her shoulder. It turned out to be part of a US Delta II r
ocket
launched in 1996


the only space junk known to have hit someone


Extinction


Bostrom 2
-

Nick, Recipient of the Gannon Award
, Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies 2002 "Existential Risks: Analyzing Human
Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards," 38, www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html.


A

much
greater existential risk

emerged with the build
-
up of

nuclear
arsenals

in the US and the USSR.

An
all
-
out

nuclear
war

was a possibility

with both a substantial probability and
with consequences that

might have
been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal
. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with
th
e
information available at the time that a nuclear
Armageddon would occur

and that it
might annihilate
our species

or
permanently destroy human civilization
.
Russia and the US retain large

nuclear
arsena
ls

that
could be used

in a future confrontation,
eith
er accidentally or deliberately
.
There is also a risk
that
other
states

may

one day
build up

large
nuclear arsenal
s. Note however that
a smaller
nuclear exchange
, between India and
Pakistan for instance,
is not an existential risk
, since it would not destr
oy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently.



And there’s a nuclear strategic crisis now

RT 4/2
-

Russia Today, Robert Bridge, “US deals Russia the 'anti
-
American' card Get short URL email to a friend print version Published: 02
April, 2012, 13:23
http://rt.com/politics/columns/bridge
-
too/us
-
russia
-
missile
-
bridge/

One of the more distressing aspects

of international relations today
is the breakdown in

Russia
-
US relations
,
due
i
n large part
to

America’s
determination to build a
missile defense

system

on Russia’s doorstep. Washington, professing
a need to protect Europe from some rogue nation, has decided to alienate Russia over these plans.
Moscow has

repeatedly
warned
the U
nited
S
tates
and its NATO allies that the construction of a missile defense sy
stem in Europe


without Russian
participation


would undermine

Russia’s nuclear deterrence
. Washington’s insistence on pursuing missile defense without
Russia’s
cooperation
, however,
has implications that go far deeper than

simply the future of
the so
-
ca
lled reset

(
which
appears

now
to have been a smokescreen
on the part of the Obama administration that serves
to camouflage America’s
real geopolitical desig
ns).

Indeed,
without some sort of bilateral agreement on this system
,
the world may
soon be entering



if it has not already entered


another arms

race.

But not only is
Washington

refusing to budge on the
issue, it
has even
refused to offer

Moscow

legally binding
assurances that

the missile shield will not be
used



in some hypothetical

future scenario

(another Bush in the White House?)


against Russian military assets
.

Why do US officials refuse to take a simple stroll down to the notary office to assuage Russia's fears? Meanwhile, according
to recent reports,
the missile defense system will not be limited to Europe, but will fan out across parts of Asia and the Persian

Gulf.
More than one
Russian military official has discussed the possibility of Russia being “surrounded” by an iron wall of
radar and missiles

in some indeterminate future.


That increases the probability of the impact

Lewis 4

-

a postdoctoral fellow in
the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program

(Jeffrey, “What if Space Were Weaponized? Possible Consequences for Crisis Scenarios, Center for Defense Information Washingt
on, D.C. July
2004 http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf
)

News reports suggest that
an edgy Russia may have move
d
tactical nuclear weapons

into the
enclave.
54
If the Lithuanian government were to close access to Kaliningrad in a fit of pique,
this would
trigger a major crisis

between NATO and Russia
.
Under these
circumstances,

the loss of a
n

early
-
warning

satellite would

be

extremely
suspicious
.
It

is any military’s nature during a crisis to

interpret
events in their worst
-
case

light
.
For example, consider the coincidences that occurred in early September 1956, du
ring the
extraordinarily tense period in international relations marked by the Suez Crisis and Hungarian uprising.55 On one evening th
e White House
received messages indicating: 1. the Turkish Air Force had gone on alert in response to unidentified aircraf
t penetrating its airspace; 2. one
hundred Soviet MiG
-
15s were flying over Syria; 3. a British Canberra bomber had been shot down over Syria, most likely by a MiG; and 4. The
Russian fleet was moving through the Dardanelles. Gen. Andrew Goodpaster was rep
orted to have worried that the confluence of events
“might trigger off … the NATO operations plan” that called for a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. Yet, all of these report
s were false. The
“jets” over Turkey were a flock of swans; the Soviet MiGs ove
r Syria were a smaller, routine escort returning the president from a state visit to
Moscow; the bomber crashed due to mechanical difficulties; and the Soviet fleet was beginning long
-
scheduled exercises. In an important
sense, these were not “coincidences
” but rather different manifestations of a common failure


human error resulting from extreme tension of
an international crisis. As one author noted,

The detection and misinterpretation of these events, against the
context of world tensions from Hungary

and Suez, was the first major example of how the size and
complexity of worldwide electronic warning systems could, at certain critical times, create
momentum of its own
.” Perhaps most worrisome,
the U
nited
S
tates
might be

blithely
unaware o
f
the degree
to

which the
Russians were concerned

about its actions
and inadvertently escalate a crisis
. During the early
1980s, the Soviet Union suffered a major “war scare” during which time its leadership concluded that bilateral relations were

rapidly declining.
Th
is war scare was driven in part by the rhetoric of the Reagan administration, fortified by the selective reading of intellige
nce. During this
period, NATO conducted a major command post exercise, Able Archer, that caused some elements of the Soviet militar
y to raise their alert
status. American officials were stunned to learn, after the fact, that the Kremlin had been acutely nervous about an American

first strike during
this period.56 All of these incidents have a common theme


that confidence is often t
he difference between war and peace
.
In times of
crisis, false
alarms

can
have

a
momentum

of their own
.

As in the second scenario in this monograph
,
the lesson is
that commanders rely on the steady flow of reliable information
.
When that information flow i
s
disrupted


whether by a deliberate attack or an accident



confidence collapses and the result is
panic and escalation
.
Introducing ASAT weapons into this mix is all the more dangerous, because such weapons target the elements of
the command system that

keep leaders aware, informed and in control. As a result,

the mere presence of

such

weapons is
corrosive

to

the
confidence that allows

national
nuclear forces

to operate safely.


Scenario 2
-

ISS


Debris will hit the ISS without the plan

U.S. News and Wo
rld Report 3/26
-

JASON KOEBLER “International Space Station Nearly Struck by Space Junk” March 26,
2012
http://www.usnews.com/news/articl
es/2012/03/26/international
-
space
-
station
-
nearly
-
struck
-
by
-
space
-
junk

hnasser

Sometime Friday afternoon, the
six people

including two Americans

aboard
the I
nternational
S
pace

S
t
ation
got a warning
:
Head into the nearest Russian Soyuz spacecraft and wait for further instructions,
because a chunk of a disabled Russian rocket
was hurtling towards them at speeds of over 17,000 miles per hour
.
The threat of

man
-
made space
debris is

increasingly becoming

a problem for astronauts

and the nearly 700 satellites orbiting earth
. NASA
estimates there are about 19,000 man
-
made objects orbiting earth

at orbital speeds,
even a tiny particle

can destroy

satellites
or cause serious damage to
the space station
. [See
Spectacular Snapshots of Space] Early Saturday morning, the six astronauts
got the all
-
clear

the errant piece of space garbage passed about 7 miles from the station, according to Kelly Humphries, a NASA spokesman.
It
was the third time in the past 11 years

that astronauts have had to take shelter from space debris
.
Last
June, a piece of space junk came about 1,000 feet from striking the station.

The problem
, experts say,
is that
there's no good way to remove debris from orbit,

and
any collision
, such as one

between a $55 million American satellite
and an inactive Russian satellite in 2009,
can create thousands of new pieces of lethal debris.

"There's no solution

just
don't generate new debris," General William Shelton, head of the Air Force Space Command, to
ld reporters last week.
"If you look at the
problem of trying to clean up debris, the physics just don't close. With what we know about propulsion,
there's no way to get there
." [Solar Flares Likely Knocked Military Satellites Offline] Switzerland has anno
unced plans to try to bring
inactive satellites back to earth, but NASA is skeptical that they'll be successful. "There are a number of people studying t
he problem,"
Humphries says. "
But there does not appear to be a realistic solution
." Shelton says
the

p
ieces

of

debris

that

are

too

small

to

track

are

often

the

most

dangerous
. "If you can't sense it, you can't avoid it," he said. "
If you think about
something relatively small in mass,
at orbital

velocity, that is lethal

to a fragile spacecraft
." [Military's Secret
'Space Plane' Mission Extended Indefinitely]
What the U.S. Strategic Command can do
, however,
is get better at
detecting space junk
.
Stratcom

informed

NASA

of

the

imminent

threat

to

the

I
nternational

S
pace

S
tation

too

late

to

perform

a
n

evasive

maneuver.

Humphries says
NASA needs about a 72
-
hour warning

to have enough
time for astronauts onboard to initiate an evasive maneuver

otherwise, they head onto the docked Russian Soyuz spacecraft. "
The Soyuz
remains in orbit on the space statio
n

it's used as their normal return vehicle, but it's available as a life
boat as needed
," he says. The United States and other countries have discussed trying to create a space "Code of Conduct" to prevent
countries from creating new debris.
In 2007, China

destroyed an out
-
of
-
commission satellite

in order to test an anti
-
satellite weapon,
creating at least 2,000 trackable pieces of debris

and tens of thousands of smaller particles
. Those
pieces will continue to orbit earth for decades
,
before finally fallin
g back to earth. With the pieces circling 600 miles above
earth, they can remain in orbit for more than 100 years, according to NASA.

SSA solves ISS collision

Johnson & Hudson, ‘8



Lt Kevin Johnson and John G Hudson, Ph. D. NOTE


Johnson and Hudson = pr
oject supervisors @ Global
Innovation and Strategy Center (GISC) Internship program. This program assembles combined teams of graduate and undergraduate

students
with the goal of providing a multidisciplinary, unclassified, non
-
military perspective on impo
rtant Department of Defense issues. “Global
Innovation and Strategy Center,” http://www.slideshare.net/stephaniclark/giscinternpaperspacedebriselimination.

According to forecasts published by the BBC, space industry profits will exceed $250 billion by the
year 2010.46 Technologies such as
telecommunications, global positioning systems, broadband, and remote sensing are being further developed for use in space
.
Of utmost
priority
,

however
, is
the need for

heightened
sp
ace
s
ituational
a
wareness

and space debris elimination measures.
Without

space
debris

elimination

measures,
the possibility of a crescendo
, known as the “Kessler Effect
,”
occurring at current debris levels
remains high
.
In this scenario,
large and small debris

continually
collide
and fragment until the atmosphere

at LEO becomes
unusable
. Space
-
faring nations would lose the
ability for

space
exploration and technology

such as

the I
nternational Space Station
(ISS)

and Hubble
Space Telescope might be compromised. In fact,
the

NASA spa
ce
shuttle could

also
be rendered
inoperable
.


ISS key to commercial spaceflight

Hauser and John, 9

[Marty. VP, Washington Operations, Research and Analysis. Mariel. Research analyst at the Space Foundation,
Space Foundation, 2009, “The International Spac
e Station: Decision 2015" http://www.spacefoundation.org/docs/ISS_Decision_2015.pdf]

An

interesting
benefit

that also
results
from the ISS
program
is a boost to

the
commercial space

sector
.
Research
done on the ISS

concerning space systems and human
safety

will benefit
any
future space travel

companie
s in addition to government spaceflight programs.
As we learn
more

about
how to protect humans in

space

and how to make systems that are more reliable for space travel
, the
commercial space

sector
is becoming

increasingly
robust
.

To date,
seven “private spaceflight participants” have visited the ISS.
While small in scope, this effort has
demonstrated that there is interest, even at very high prices, for commercial human spaceflight.
Several companies are using
this
information to better understand the market for commercial space trave
l; one startup company, Virgin Galactic, has
already begun taking deposits and waitlisting passengers for its upcoming suborbital spaceflight operation.The International
Space Stati
on:
Decision 2015


SpaCe fouNDatioN 12 The ISS is also acting as a catalyst for commercial development in another way.
The Commercial
Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Program seeks to stimulate commercial space

transportation services
companies
by c
reating a market for supply flights to the

ISS. 45 This has been likened to the government purchasing air
-
mail
services during the early days of aviation to promote the growth of the airline industry.
The COTS program may result in less
expensive and less
risky launch options for future NASA payloads,

as well as for other customers. Companies involved
in NASA’s COTS effort may eventually provide commercial options for human space transportation, allowing NASA to focus on its

goal of
cutting
-
edge development

and exploration rather than routine transportation.
The ISS
is essential to this effort

since
it
is the
destination for which these
vehicles have
been designed
.

However, COTS vehicles are unlikely to be ready before 2010,
and if the U.S. breaks away from
the program in 2015 these technologies may not reach their full potential. The effect on COTS
-
D, the program
aimed at supporting commercially
-
developed space systems to transport humans to the ISS, may be even more pronounced, as these
technologies are not

scheduled to be ready until after the cargo vehicles have been developed and tested. Even the infrastructure of the station
is being opened to the commercial industry on some fronts. NASA has signed a servicebased contract with one company to provid
e wate
r
production services aboard the ISS. NASA does not need to purchase any hardware, just the water. The company will provide the

equipment,
and if the system does not work, NASA will not pay for it. The contractor is responsible for all system development a
nd performance. This is a
fundamental change in the way NASA works with private companies and demonstrates the willingness of industry to invest in spa
ce systems. 46
The
designation of the ISS

as a National Laboratory also
opens
new possibilities
for

the
p
articipation of
commercial industry

in the experiments and operation of the ISS
. As with other forms of government research,
the
longer the ISS is available

as a research facility,
the more likely

companies are to engage in

research
leading to
break
-
throug
h findings and innovations
.


Only commercial space can prevent extinction.

Collins & Autino 10



Professor of Life & Environmental Science @ Azabu University & Systems Engineer @ Andromeda Inc., Italy
[Patrick Collins (Expert in the economics of energy su
pply from space) & Adriano Autino, “What the growth of a space tourism industry could
contribute to employment, economic growth, environmental protection, education, culture and world peace,” Acta Astronautica 6
6 (2010)
1553

1562]


7.2. High return in safe
ty from extra
-
terrestrial settlement

Investment in low
-
cost orbital access and other space infrastructure will facilitate the establishment of settlements on the Moon, Mars,
asteroids and in man
-
made space structures. In the first phase, development of new
regulatory infrastructure in various Earth orbits,
including property/usufruct rights, real estate, mortgage financing and insurance, traffic management, pilotage, policing and o
ther services
will enable the population living in Earth orbits to grow very lar
ge. Such activities aimed at making near
-
Earth space habitable are the logical
extension of humans’ historical spread over the surface of the Earth. As trade spreads through near
-
Earth space, settlements are likely to
follow, of which the inhabitants will
add to the wealth of different cultures which humans have created in the many different environments
in which they live.

Success

of such extra
-
terrestrial settlements
will have

the additional
benefit

of reducing the danger
of
human extinction due to

planet
-
wide or
cosmic accidents

[27].
These horrors include both man
-
made
disasters such as

nuclear war, plagues

or
growing pollution, and natural disasters such as super
-
volcanoes or asteroid impact.
It is hard to think of any objective that is more imp
ortant than preserving peace. Weapons developed in recent decades are so destructive,
and have such horrific, long
-
term side
-
effects that their use should be discouraged as strongly as possible by the international community.
Hence
,
reducing the incentive t
o use these weapons by rapidly developing the ability to use space
-
based resources on a large scale is surely equally important [11,16]. The achievement of this depends
on low space travel costs

which, at the present time, appear to be achievable only thro
ugh the development of a vigorous space
tourism industry.

8. Summary

As discussed above, if space travel services had started during the 1950s, the space industry would be enormously more develo
ped than it is
today. Hence the

failure to develop

passenger
s
pace travel has seriously
distorted

the path taken by
humans’ technological and
economic development

since WW2, away from the path which would have been followed if
capitalism and democracy operated as intended. Technological know
-
how which could have been

used to supply services which are known
to be very popular with a large proportion of the population has not been used for that purpose, while
waste and suffering due to
the unemployment and environmental damage caused by the resulting lack

of new industr
ial opportunities
have increased.

In response, policies should be implemented urgently to correct this error, and to catch up with the possibilities for indust
rial and economic
growth that have been ignored for so long. This policy renewal is urgent becaus
e of the growing dangers of unemployment, economic
stagnation, environmental pollution, educational and cultural decline, resource wars and loss of civil liberties which face c
ivilisation today. In
order to achieve the necessary progress there is a particu
lar need for collaboration between those working in the two fields of civil aviation
and civil space. Although the word ‘‘aerospace’’ is widely used, it is largely a misnomer since these two fields are in practi
ce quite separate.
True ‘‘aerospace’’ collabora
tion to realise passenger space travel will develop the wonderful profusion of possibilities outlined above.

8.1. Heaven or hell on Earth?

As discussed above,
the

claim that the
Earth’s resources are running out

is used to