AT Bioterrorx - SCFI

chatteryellvilleBiotechnology

Feb 20, 2013 (4 years and 4 months ago)

248 views

SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

1


Won’t Use Bioterror Frontline

................................
................................
................................
................................
....
3

Won’t Use Bioterror Frontline

................................
................................
................................
................................
....
4

Won’t Use Bioterror Frontline

................................
................................
................................
................................
....
5

Won’t Use Bioterror Ext. #1: Terrorists Can’t Produce and Disseminate

................................
................................
.
6

Won’t Use Bioterror Ext. #1: Terrorists Can’t Produce and Disseminate

................................
................................
.
8

Won’t Use Bioterror Ext. #2: No Probability


Flawed Research

................................
................................
..............
9

Won’t Use Bioterror Ext. #3: Bioweapons Don’t Kill A Lot

................................
................................
.....................

10

Won’t Use Bioterror Ext. #4: Risk is Overblown


Misinformation

................................
................................
........

11

Won’t Use Bioterror Ext. #5: No I
mpact


Can’t Deploy Weapons / Treatment Solves

................................
........

12

Won’t Use Bioterror Ext. #6: Can’t Acquire Weapons


US Retaliation

................................
................................
.

13

US Response Frontline

................................
................................
................................
................................
.............

14

US Response Frontline

................................
................................
................................
................................
.............

16

US Res
ponse Frontline

................................
................................
................................
................................
.............

17

US Response Frontline

................................
................................
................................
................................
.............

18

US Response Ext. #1: CRI Solves

................................
................................
................................
.............................

19

US Response Ext. #2: SAFER Grants Solve First
Responders

................................
................................
..................

21

US Response Ext. #3: Texas Biocenter

................................
................................
................................
....................

22

US Response Ext. #4: Laboratory Response Network

................................
................................
............................

23

US Response Ext. #5: CD
C Partnerships / Emergency Communication
................................
................................
..

24

Solving Now Frontline

................................
................................
................................
................................
.............

25

Solving Now Frontline

................................
................................
................................
................................
.............

26

Solving Now Frontline

................................
................................
................................
................................
.............

27

Solvin
g Now Frontline

................................
................................
................................
................................
.............

28

Solving Now Frontline

................................
................................
................................
................................
.............

29

Solving Now Ext. #1: Security Council Resolutions

................................
................................
................................
.

30

Solving Now Ext. #2: Export
Regimes

................................
................................
................................
.....................

31

U.S. Retaliation Frontline
................................
................................
................................
................................
.........

32

Anthrax Frontline
................................
................................
................................
................................
.....................

33

Anthrax Frontline
................................
................................
................................
................................
.....................

34

Anthrax Ext.: No Impact


Not Communicable and Medication Solves

................................
................................
.

35

Anthrax Ext.: Computer Modeling Solves Impact
................................
................................
................................
...

36

Botulism Frontline

................................
................................
................................
................................
...................

37

SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

2


Deer Fly F
ever / Rabbit Fever / Tularensis Frontline

................................
................................
...............................

38

Plague Frontline

................................
................................
................................
................................
.......................

39

Plague Ext.: Medicine Solves

................................
................................
................................
................................
..

40

Plague Ext.: No Aerosol

................................
................................
................................
................................
..........

41

Ricin Frontline

................................
................................
................................
................................
..........................

42

Smallpox Frontline

................................
................................
................................
................................
...................

43

Marburg / Ebola Frontline

................................
................................
................................
................................
.......

44

Lassa Fever Frontline

................................
................................
................................
................................
...............

45

Water Source Terror Frontline

................................
................................
................................
................................

46

A2: Soviet Bioterror / Nukes

................................
................................
................................
................................
...

47

Soviet Bioterror Ext.: Nunn
-
Lugar Solving

................................
................................
................................
..............

48

A2: Al Qaeda Will Use Bioterror / WMD

................................
................................
................................
................

49

A2: Bioterror is Worse than Nuclear War

................................
................................
................................
...............

50

A2: WMD Commission (Bioterror w/in 5 years)

................................
................................
................................
.....

51

A2: Dual
-
Use Tech Makes Bioterror Inevitable

................................
................................
................................
......

53

Tabloid Geopolitics Links

................................
................................
................................
................................
.........

54




SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

3


Won’t Use
Bioterror Frontline



1.
Terrorists cannot attain

or

disseminate bioweapons


Too Technical


Biederbick
,
head of the Federal Information Centre on

Biological Safe
ty at the Robert Koch Institute of
Germany; 9

(Walter, “Terrorism and potential biological warfare agents”)
http://d.scribd.com/docs/1481o5vjxkw29bi3vw02.pdf
,
accessed 4/7/09


Compared to chemical warfare agents or nuclear weapons, BW
agents require

relatively little logistical support
for production. However,
the capability to disseminate BW agents as an aerosol requires profound knowledge not
only in microbiology, but also in aerosol techniques. This limits the threat of BW agents bec
ause only state
-
run
programs or groups supported by states seem be capable of mastering these technical challenges up to now. Not
even Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq shared its knowledge in this field with terror groups
.

In the media it is reported

from t
ime to time that
terrorists consider combining improvised explosive devices with
BW agents

as a method of dissemination.

This makes little sense. Most BW agents are very sensitive to heat and
would not survive the high temperatures of an explosion
.



2.
There is no way to understand the probability of their scenario


WMD acquisition research is flawed
for many reasons


Hayden, Senior Science Advisor at the Threat Reduction Agency; 9

(Nancy K., Senior Science Advisor at the Advanced Systems and Concepts O
ffice of the Defence Threat Reduction Agency in
Fort Belvoir, Virginia. “Terrifying landscapes: understanding motivations of non
-
state actors to acquire and/or use weapons of

mas
s destruction”)
http://d.scribd.com/docs/1481o5vjxkw29bi3vw02.pdf
, accessed 4/7/09


Deficiencies in research methodologies represented in the literature present cause for concern in the
internal and
external validity of analyses, judgments and predictions
.

These deficiencies include a continued, unchallenged
prevalence of “conventional wisdom” in the literature for explaining WMD motivations of nonstate actors, the
isolation of enclaves o
f experts among academia and practitioners of WMD threat analysis, and the paucity of
structured, evidentiary
-
based reasoning. In assessing the validity of scientific forecasts by experts, Dr. J Scott

Armstrong of the Wharton Business School, has shown tha
t the accuracy of unstructured analyses and/or
judgments by experts are no more accurate than novices (in some cases, high
-
school students) for predicting
outcomes and behaviors

(Armstrong 2001).
In one study based on 1,736 predictions about consumer behav
iors,
none of the subject groups performed better than chance
. Furthermore,

the experts performed much worse than
they or their peers had predicted they would, implying an inflated self
-
evaluation of the merit of their forecasts

(Armstrong 1991). Possible
explanations for poor forecasts are the lack of structure in the experts’ analysis and
the nature of the scientific research itself.

Armstrong’s subsequent studies have shown that when experts are aided
by

structured analytic methods appropriate to the pro
blem, forecasts improve.36

However, consistent with
principles of validity in conducting social science

research, he also argues that
these forecasts may continue to be
inaccurate unless based on research that yields generalizable findings, that the genera
lizations do not yield
unambiguous predictions, that the findings are effectively written, that the researchers themselves have
understood the full scope of all relevant science and (1) are willing to believe the findings and (2) know how to
effectively us
e and communicate the knowledge. The current research base on WMD suffers in these areas
.


SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

4


Won’t Use
Bioterror Frontline



3.
B
ioterror would only kill a few people


claims to the country is media propaganda designed to
militarize society


Novak,
Biologist; 5

Gary Novak, Biologist, “Anthrax as disinformation” updated feb 2005, http://nov55.com/athr.html


Biological warfare is a flawed concept. The only route usually considered is airborne
, because bombs and missiles
create the delivery system.
There is no disease in existence which is propagated in that manner. Even the airborne
diseases require close contact with the source
. The reason is because
wind disperses the agents too thinly, and
gravity brings them down too rapidly. Increasing the quan
tities massively will get a few persons, but only a few
.

And then,
very few of the diseases which are mentioned as biowarfare agents are suitable for airborne
dissemination
.
Brucellosis is not. It is disseminated through body fluids. Plague is not. It is c
arried by insects from the blood
of one animal to another. The insects do not pick it up from the ground.

Motives Taylor the Truth at every Level

Biowarfare is promoted through a combination of ignorance and propaganda. The researchers
, who should know
bet
ter and often do,
are getting paid to produce the agents, so they do not want to admit the futility of it. The
nonresearchers cannot realistically evaluate the claims, and they have propaganda motives. They want to
militarize society, and scare tactics go
a long ways in that direction.

The point

here is not that large countries cannot make a lot of persons miserable with biological weapons. It's that
the small countries and terrorists cannot do so on their own; and it cannot be done on a large scale and in
some
magical way as described in the media.


4.
Risk is overblown


misinformation overstates threat assessments


Extend Biderbick 9 that misinformation forces us to overestimate the risk of bioterror threats.

Biederbick
,
head of the Federal Information
Centre on

Biological Safe
ty at the Robert Koch Institute of
Germany; 9

(Walter, “Terrorism and potential biological warfare agents”)
http://d.scribd.com/docs/1481o5vjxkw29bi3vw02.pdf
,
access
ed 4/7/09


A general problem in assessment is the quality and reliability of the information available.

As an example,
the
“weapons grade” quality of the
B.
anthracis spores in the letters from 2001 can be used. In the media it was
reported that the materi
al from the letters contained four times more B. anthracis spores than the best material
from the Soviet program prior to 1992. A Russian expert in B. anthracis research commented on the quality of the
spores in the letters that “such poor material would n
ot have passed the quality control process in the times before
1992.”

“Information warfare” comes as an additional complication

in the analysis

process. Even
the assessment of
intelligence agencies is often based to a large degree on open
-
source informatio
n. The intended distribution of
misleading information can surely influence the assessment process in a way that cannot be underestimated. An
example for this is given in the report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States
re
garding Weapons of Mass Destruction

(2005).




SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

5


Won’t Use Bioterror Frontline



5.
No impact to bioterror


terrorists cannot deploy the weapons and treatment would prevent outbreak

Extend the Newhouse 2 evidence

Newhouse, Senior Fellow @ Center for Defense Information; 2002

(John
-

senior fellow at the Center for Defense Information, Summer, World Policy Journal)


Fortunately,
producing, sustaining, and dispensing biological and some chemical agents would confront

nonstate
terrorists with major risks and difficulties. Attempts to encapsulate, or weaponize, a deadly virus are likely to
render it dysfunctional.

Moreover,
the chances are that a terrorist bent on martyrdom would die before the
complex task of dispensin
g the weapon was actually completed
. Biological weapons fall into several categories.
These include bacteria, which cause such diseases as plague and anthrax, and viruses, which cause smallpox and
Ebola.
Most bacterial infections can be treated with antibi
otics
, provided the problem is identified at an early
stage and enough drugs are available.


Extend Newhouse 2


prefer it


He’s a Senior


6.
Terrorists
are deterred from obtaining using

bioweapons
through public deliberation and fear of US
military and

financial retaliation


Wainstein, former Homeland Security Advisory; January 7, 2009

(Kenneth, “Tackling the Terrorist Threat: Progress Made and Future Challenges”)
http://www.wash
ingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=438
, accessed 4/15/09


On a broader level, beyond
the defenses we have built against the nuclear and biological threat
, we have also
made progress in reshaping how we and our allies deter persons, networks, states an
d organizations from
engaging in any conduct that contributes to the terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.

While it is difficult to deter today's terrorists with the traditional notion of punishment or retribution,
there are
other
means of achievi
ng deterrence.

For instance, we know that
al
-
Qaeda and terrorist leadership and operatives actually care about the perceived
theological, moral, and political legitimacy of their actions, especially within Muslim communities. This is why
encouraging debat
e, especially among credible voices, about the legitimacy of using weapons of mass destruction
is important and can affect the intentions and planning of terrorists
.

We also know that
deterrent measures can gain purchase against states, organizations or f
acilitators who may
assist terrorists in their efforts to acquire or use WMD

--

measures such as the designation of proliferation
facilitators or financiers under Executive Order 13382,
which was issued in 2005.
This tool allows the secretaries
of Treasury

or State to freeze the assets and block the transactions

of the designated individuals or entities,
resulting in their isolation from the worlds of legitimate commerce and finance.

A strong deterrence also involves constantly reinforcing

the declaratory
policy that was first enunciated early last
year by National SecurityAdvisor Steve Hadley
--

which is the statement of principle
that we reserve the right to
respond with overwhelming force to the use of weapons of mass destruction against the United State
s
, our people,
our forces, and our friends and allies
; and that we will hold any state, terrorist group, or other non
-
state actor fully
accountable for supporting or enabling terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction
--

whether by
faci
litating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts.

While no deterrence strategy is foolproof when dealing with modern terrorists, these measures have an impact,

and I recommend that they be maintained and strengthened in the futur
e.





SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

6


Won’t Use Bioterror Frontline


7. Domestic and international efforts have secured global stockpiles of bioweapons preventing terrorists
from acquiring them


Wainstein, former Homeland Security Advisory; January 7, 2009

(Kenneth, “Tackling the Terrorist Threat: Progress Made and Future Challenges”)
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=438
, accessed 4/15/09


Like our work in the nu
clear arena,
our efforts on the biological threat begin with cooperation with Russia and
with the states of the former Soviet Union. Through a number of cooperative efforts, we are working together to
eliminate the biowarfare infrastructure that developed
during the Cold War, to consolidate and secure dangerous
biological materials, to enhance biosafety and biosecurity, to redirect former Soviet biological weapons scientists
to peaceful employment and to reconfigure former bioweapons facilities for the deve
lopment of drugs and
vaccines.

These efforts extend far beyond the former Soviet Union and to developing nations in every continent

--

particularly to nations
that face significant risks from transnational terrorist groups or that have poorly secured
biol
ogical laboratories.

These efforts to secure dangerous pathogens also extend here to the United States, where there has been a well
-
deserved focus placed on laboratory security since last summer when the FBI identified the 2001 anthrax killer

as
Dr. Bruce

Ivins, a government biodefense science who worked at the U.S. Army biodefense research laboratory at
Fort Detrick, Maryland.
That incident prompted an exhaustive Department of Defense review and upgrade of its
security and personnel assurance practices.


It has also led to a more comprehensive effort to review and enhance the security measures at laboratories that
handle dangerous biological agents and toxins.

In fact, as we end our final weeks in office, we continue our work
in this field.
We are establis
hing an interagency working group of government experts in the scientific and
security community to make recommendations to the next president in the coming months to further enhance
security in our nation's biological laboratories
.





SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

7


Won’t Use
Bioterror Ext. #
1
: Terrorists Can’t Produce
and Di
s
seminate


Extend Biderbick 9


Terrorists cannot acquire or disseminate bioweapons because of technical
issues


Prefer it. He’s best qualified as the head of the Federal Information Centre on Biological

Safety of Germany.
This takes out the internal link to their scenario. Terrorists

don’t have the
microbiolo
gy knowledge to produce weapons
--

And

even if they could, they wouldn’t be able to
aerosolize them


Only states with significant resources can
acquire the technology, and once they
do, it is so valuable, they wouldn’t share it with terrorists


This was proven by Sadam

who
refused to help Al Qaeda
. Also, terrorists couldn’t use conventional explosives to disseminate the
agents because they are v
ery sensitive to heat


And…
The
Tokyo
attacks
prove
bioweapons are too difficult to produce and
disseminate


Block; 1

(Steven, American Scientist, “The Growing Threat of Biological Weapons”)
http://www.americanscientist.org/issues/id.723,y.2001,no.1,content.true,page.1,css.print/issue.aspx
,
accessed 4/7/09


A lesson from the Aum Sh
inrikyo case is that any group bent on developing offensive bioweapons capabilities
must overcome two significant problems, one biological and the other physical
. First,
it must acquire and produce
stable quantities of a suitably potent agent
. For a variet
y of reasons this is not the trivial task that it is sometimes
made out to be.
Second, it must have an effective means of delivering the agent to the intended target
. For most,
but not all, bioweapon agents,
this translates into solving problems of dispers
al. Programs in both the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. devoted years of effort to perfecting these aspects.


Terrorists wont be able to attain
or produce
biological weapons


Too technical


Smithson, Senior Associate at the Stinson Center Chemical Biological
Weapons Nonproliferation Project;
2001

(Senior Associate and Research Associate at the Stimson Center Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project),
2001 (Amy and Leslie
-
Anne Levy, The San Diego Union Tribune, October 7, lexis)


Granted, short
cuts to germ or poison gas weapons exist, whether via hazardous chemical facilities or former Soviet bioweaponeers.
However
,
former Soviet weaponeers wisely said ‘no” when Aum knocked on their doors
in the early I 990s
seeking
chemical and biological
weapons help. Left to go it alone, the cult’s large corps of scientists hit the technical
hurdle that is likely to stymie other groups that attempt to follow in its footsteps.

They were unable to figure out
how to make their $10 million, state
-
of
-
the
-
art s
arin production facility work and therefore were unable to chum
out the large quantities of sarin necessary to kill thousands. As for Aum’s germ weapons program, it was a flop
from start to finish. So high were the technical obstacles that they failed to o
btain a lethal seed culture, much less
get anywhere near the mark on the dissemination end
. In other words,
the technical hurdles are such that even
terrorists with a wealth of time, money and technical skill, as well as a determination to acquire and use
these
weapons, have fallen short of their mark.




SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

8


Won’t Use Bioterror Ext. #
1
: Terrorists Can’t Produce and Di
s
seminate



The risk of bioterrorism is low


bioweapons are difficult to produce
5 reasons


Brown;
1995

(Matthew Brown, “Reconsidering the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Toward State
Regionalization in Bioterrorism Response,” 14 Ann. Health L. 95, Winter, lexis)


Despite the advantages and apparent ease of obtaining biological weapons. terrorist o
rganizations have used them very
infrequently. Since 1993, five comprehensive databases have compiled detailed biological and chemical weapons use
worldwide during the twentieth century. 69 All summarize the same findings:

.
there is an extremely low incid
ence of real biological (or chemical) events, in contrast to the number of recent
hoaxes

... [;]

.those events that were real, and were actual examples of use, were overwhelmingly chemical, and even in that category,
involved the use of easily available,
off
-
the
-
shelf, non
-
synthesized industrial products.

Many [* 105] of these were
instances of personal murder, and not attempted as mass casualty use... . Exactly one person had been killed in the
United States in the 100 years between 1900 and 2000 as a res
ult of an act of biological or chemical terrorism[;
and]

excluding the preparation of ricin, a plant toxin that is relatively easy to prepare,
there are only a few recorded
instances in the years 1900 to 2000 of the preparation of biological pathogens in
a private laboratory by a non
-
state actor. 70

This low incidence of bioterrorism is not an oversight
by terrorist organizations.
Contrary to popular belief and
media representation, effective biological weapons are extraordinarily difficult to produce. Pr
oducing biological
weapons requires mastery of five essential elements: 1) one must obtain an appropriate strain of the biological
agent; 2) know how to handle the agent properly; 3) know how to culture the agent so that it delivers the desired
effect; 4)
know how to store and produce sufficient quantities of the agent; and 5) know how to disperse the agent
properly
. 71
Historically, these criteria have proven extraordinarily difficult to fulfill.









SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

9


Won’t Use Bioterror Ext. #2: No Probability


Flawed Research




Extend the Hayden 9


the research beyond their threat assessments that terrorists will use WMD
is flawed


Prefer it


She’s the Senior Science Advisor at the Advanced Systems and Concepts
Office of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency a
nd her team conducted a study of all available
qualitative evidence supporting the possibility of terrorist acquisition and use of WMDs and
concluded that the predictions and analysis based on their research is skeptical at best. The
research relies on un
questioned “conventional wisdom”, WMD and security experts are in isolated
enclaves making their conclusions self
-
referential, and they do not rely on evidentiary
-
based
reasoning


She sites Dr. Armstrong from Wharton that scientific forecasts by experts a
re no
more accurate than novices because their analysis isn’t structured and the nature of the research
makes it unpredictable


These experts also predicted they would perform better than their peers,
even though they didn’t, which proves they have an inf
lated view of their selves. This means you
evaluate the probability of their scenario with skepticism.




SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

10


Won’t Use Bioterror
Ext. #
3
: Bioweapons Don’t Kill A Lot


Extend the Novak 5 that claims of catastrophe are media propaganda intended to
militarize the
public


the truth is a successful bioterror attack would kill very few people


Prefer it


He’s a
biologist. This means you do not trust the magnitude claims of their authors. Researchers are
getting paid to produce the biological agents
, so they trump the importance of their work, which is
not verifiable by nonresearchers. Bioterror is a flawed concept because it relies on airborne
transmission, but the best agents aren’t transmitted in this way. Even if they were, the agents
would be
dispersed too thinly from the wind and gravity brings them safely to earth


It would
take massive quantities of biological agents to kill only a few people, which takes out the internal
link to bioweapons attacks from small states and terrorists.

And…
Empi
rically


Bioweapons aren’t destructive enough to be WMD


O’Neill; 4

Brendan O'Neill, deputy editor of “Spiked politics”, August 2004,
http://www.spiked
-
online.com/Articles/0000000CA694.htm


'Believe it or not, what we
refer to as "
weapons of mass destruction" are actually not very destructive.'

David C
Rapoport, professor of political science at U
niversity of
C
alifornia,
L
os
A
ngeles
and editor of the
Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, has examined what he call
s 'easily available evidence' relating
to the historic use of chemical and biological weapons.

He found something surprising
-

such weapons do not cause mass destruction
.

Indeed,
whether used by states,
terror groups or dispersed in industrial accidents, t
hey tend to be far less destructive than conventional
weapons. 'If we
stopped speculating about things that might happen in the future
and looked instead at what
has happened in the past, we'd see that our fears about WMD are misplaced'
, he says.


Bioterro
r isn’t deadly


Only 15 people have been killed in 25 years


O’Neill; 4

Brendan O'Neill, deputy editor of “Spiked politics”, August 2004,
http://www.spiked
-
online.com/Articles/0000000CA694.htm


According to Rapoport,
the most striking thing about the Aum Shinryko attack is that no one died from inhaling
the sarin gas

itself
-

in every fatal case, the individual had made contact with the liquid. He cites Parachini again,
who says that the individuals killed by Aum Shinr
yko are the only people to have lost their lives as a result of a
WMD attack by a terrorist group over the past 25 years
.
(There were also five deaths as a result of anthrax attacks post
-
9/11, but Parachini doesn't include those because the individual resp
onsible and the motivation for those attacks remain
unknown.)

'When you think that fewer than 15 people have been killed by known terrorist use of chemical and biological
weapons, and contrast that to the thousands who were killed on 9/11 and in convention
al bombings in Madrid or
Bali or Istanbul, it's quite remarkable that we are so obsessed with WMD', says Rapoport.






SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

11


Won’t Use Bioterror Ext. #4: Risk is Overblown


Misinformation


Extend Biderbick 9


The threat of bioterror is overblown because of
misinformation


prefer it


He is an
expert and he sites empirical examples


the 2001 Anthrax spores were reported to be 4 times stronger than
Soviet Grade, but Soviet experts say the material was too poor of a grade to pass inspection


Also, Other
nati
ons and groups deliberately trump threats as a form of info warfare to diminish US intelligence
capabilities




SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

12


Won’t Use Bioterror
Ext. #
5
:
No Impact


Can’t Deploy Weapons / Treatment
Solves



Biological weapons are hard to deploy and even if deployed
properly, can be treated


Mueller, Professor of Political Science @ Rochester; 1999

(John
-

Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester and Karl Mueller Assistant Professor
of Comparative Military Studies at the School of Advanced Airpowe
r Studies, Foreign Affairs,
May/June)


Biological weapons seem a promising candidate to join nuclear ones in the WMD club because, properly
developed and deployed, they might indeed kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of people. The
discussi
on remains theoretical, however, because
biological weapons have scarcely ever been used, even though
knowledge of their destructive potential goes back centuries
. (The English, for example, made some efforts to
spread smallpox among American Indians durin
g the French and Indian War.) Belligerents have eschewed such
weapons with good reason, because
biological weapons are extremely difficult to deploy and control
. Although
terrorist groups or rogue states may overcome such problems in the future through adv
ances in knowledge and
technology, the record thus far is not likely to encourage them
. Japan

reportedly infected wells in Manchuria and
bombed several Chinese cities with plague
-
infested fleas

before and during World War II.
These ventures may
have killed

thousands of Chinese but apparently also caused thousands of unintended casualties among Japanese
troops and had little military impact.
In the 1990s
the large and extremely well funded Japanese cult Aum
Shinrikyo apparently tried at least nine times to s
et off biological weapons by spraying pathogens from trucks and
wafting them from rooftops. these efforts failed to cause a single fatality

--

in fact, nobody even noticed that the
attacks had taken place. For best results
biological weapons need to be dis
persed in very low
-
altitude aerosol
clouds, which is very difficult to do. Explosive methods of dispersion
, moreover
, may destroy the organisms
. And
except for anthrax spores,
long
-
term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult; even if

refrigerated, most have a limited lifetime. The effects of such weapons are gradual, very hard to predict, and could
spread back onto the attacker, and they can be countered with civil defense measures
.




SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

13


Won’t Use Bioterror Ext. #6: Can’t Acquire
Weapons


US Retaliation




Terrorists cannot acquire and use bioweapons


States are deterred by fear of US retaliation


Canadian Press Newswire, December 2002


It’s highly unlikely that terrorists could cause mass casualties with biological weapons such
as smallpox because
those agents would be difficult to obtain and use, says Canadian Forces intelligence report
.

And
while Osama bin Laden might want to get his hands on such deadly pathogens, the countries that possess
them would be wary of giving the ter
rorist leader access to the disease agents for fear of massive retaliation by
other nations
, the Ottowa Citzen reported Sunday.

The Canadian military report dated February 2000


almost two years before the devastating terrorist attacks of Sept. 11,
--

not
es that smallpox would be relatively easy to cultivate in sufficient quantity for small
-
scale attacks, but

originally
acquiring the virus would be a major hurdle
.

“However,
small quantities of viral pathogens have the potential to create widespread epidemi
cs, although the
perpetrators are more likely to infect themselves than their target
,” it notes.
The main threat of biological
weapons
, including smallpox,
is posed by rogue nations

which are much more capable of mounting effective
attacks, according to t
he study.

Countries which might possess biological agents could also be wary of turning over such diseases to terrorists
because of the consequences they would face
.

U.S. President George W.
Bush has hinted the American government would consider all resp
onses, including a
nuclear strike, against any country which provided weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups.


The severity of retaliatory responses

likely has little meaning to a loosely knit transnational confederation of stateless,
religion
-
bas
ed terrorist groups such as those connected with bin Laden,” the Canadian military points out.

“It likely
remains,

however,
a significant factor weighing upon state sponsors who may feel inclined to provide
(biological weapon) agents to terrorist groups
.





SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

14


US Response Frontline


1.
US security and medical overhauls since 9/11 have increased our ability to mitigate the effects of a
bioterror attack

Wainstein, former Homeland Security Advisory; January 7, 2009

(Kenneth, “Tackling the Terrorist Threat: Progress Made and Future Challenges”)
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=438
, accessed 4/15/09


Beyond working to secure dangerous pathogens,
we have improved our ability to mitigate the effects of a
biological attack.

• We have launched a program to improve early detection

of biological attacks,
with

the installation of
a state
-
of
-
the
-
art air monit
oring system

in 30 U.S. cities
that can detect the release of biological agents
.


We have taken steps to develop and ensure ample supplies of countermeasures in the event of an attack. We now
have enough smallpox vaccine to inoculate every American, and
we have greatly expanded our inventories of
other vaccines and medical countermeasures

we would use
in case of a

bioterrorist
attack or pandemic.

• We have increased biodefense research and development at the National Institutes of Health from $53 million

in
2001 to more than $1.6 billion today.

• And we launched Project BioShield
--

an effort to speed the development of new vaccines and treatments
against biological agents that could be used in a terrorist attack.





SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

15


US Response Frontline


2
.
Cities
Readiness Initiative has dramatically increased our bioterror response readiness in the squo

Schnirring; 3/25/09

(Lisa, staff writer, “Rand says program to boost bioterrorist readiness works”)
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/bt/bioprep/news/mar2509rand
-
br.html
, accessed 4/13/09

Mar 25, 2009 (CIDRAP News)


A program to help the nation's largest metropolitan area deliver medications
after a public health em
ergency such as an aerosol anthrax attack has improved their readiness levels, according to
initial findings released yesterday by the Rand Corp.

The Cities Readiness Initiative

(CRI), administered by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
was launched in 2004 to help cities distribute antibiotics and
other medications to 100% of the local population within 48 hours of a bioterror attack or other widespread
infectious disease outbreak. The program covers 72 metropolitan are, about 57% of the

nation's population
, at a
cost of $300 million so far, the Rand Corp. said in a press release yesterday. In 2007,
the CDC asked Rand to
conduct an initial evaluation to determine cities' progress on the basis empirical evidence,

a CDC assessment of 12 cor
e
functional areas, and discussions with countermeasure
-
dispensing personnel in nine metropolitan areas. The 118
-
page report appears on
Rand's Web site.

The evaluators from Rand reported the CRI has improved regions' readiness by allowing them to:

Increa
se the number of staff working on countermeasure dispensing

Strengthen partnerships with other responders who play key roles in dispensing, such as law enforcement and
emergency management

Adopt streamlined dispensing methods that incorporate nonmedical
staff and use nontraditional sites such as
schools, businesses, and bank drive
-
throughs

Purchase equipment and supplies such as mobile dispensing units and communications equipment

Conduct planning activities such as security assessments, training, and e
xercises

"One public health official summed up the situation by stating that these changes resulted in 'creating'
preparedness where it had not previously existed,"

the authors reported.


3
.
No Impact


SAFER Grants increase first responder capabilities


Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security; 3/16/09

(“Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano to the International Association of Fire Fighters in Washington,
D.C., on March 16, 2009“)
http://7thspace.com/headlines/305476/remarks_by_homeland_sec
urity_secretary_janet_napolitano_to_the_international_associat
ion_of_fire_fighters_in_washington_dc_on_march_16_2009.html
, accessed 3/16/09

Secretary Napolitano:
SAFER Grants

S
-
A
-
F
-
E
-
R

Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response. That's the
acronym.
These grants

support firefighters staffing and capabilities
.
FEMA has awarded 237 SAFER Grants, totaling over
$138 million last year. We will continue to work with you, to work with the IAFF to ensure that these grants, these SAFER Gra
nts also go
to where
they are needed most, and achieve their purpose.

And
we are also proud to fund

IAFF WMD [
weapons of mass
destruction] Training Program
. This program


Secretary Napolitano:
This program has provided literally tens of
thousands of first responders the abili
ty to respond effectively and safely to HAZMAT

[hazardous materials
] and
WMD incidents across our country. And these grants are

very, very

key
.

And why is that? It is that
because

this is
an area where if you think about both from the man
-
caused and
non
-
man
-
caused incidents, but particularly on the man
-
caused, the

weapon of mass destruction involving a hazardous chemical or biological weapon is very high up on the scenarios

that we are seeing, and the
scenarios that we need to be prepared for. And if
something like that were to happen,
then it is going to be you and your departments that are going to be called upon to respond
.
And woe be it to any of us
that such an incident ever happens, but woe be it to us also if people are not in place to respond,
who are trained, who have the right
equipment and are ready to go from the first minute a call
-
out happens. Secretary Napolitano: The grants that I just talked about are one
way that we can help each other, and give meaning to that vibrant partnership that

we need to have.




SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

16


US Response Frontline



4
.
Texas is solving Bioterror threat now


Hickley; 3/31/09

(Kathleen, Writer for Government Information Group, “Texas invests in bioterrorism center”)
http://gcn.com/articles/2009/03/31/texas
-
bioterrorism
-
center.aspx
, accessed 4/8/09


Texas will spend $50 million to develop a new center to protect against bioterrorism attacks
.
it

also will be used to
research and develop medications to combat diseases such as cancer, diabetes and influenza.

The first of its kind in the United States, the National Center for Therapeutics Manufacturing is funded through the Texas
Emerging Technology

program at in the Texas A&M University System.

The facility is “designed to incorporate any new technology that comes down the pike
,” said Brett Giroir, a
physician and vice chancellor for research in the A&M system. “
We tried to design it to be very modu
lar” to
accommodate multiple technologies that can be implemented simultaneously and in a replaceable manner, from
large to small scale,

Giroir said.

The center plans to collect data in a sharable format;

planning is being done with 3
-
D computer models th
at will be
shared using standard formats, Giroir said. “We are trying to make a prototype to change the industry as we know it,” he said
.
“Collecting data in a digital format that can potentially be used by a number of users is critically important.”

The “
flexible
-
by
-
design” manufacturing system will allow rapid production of drugs in targeted quantities, a
change from conventional manufacturing plans that specialize in mass production of one type of drug.
The system
will be created through collaboration be
tween academic researchers and commercial companies.

“This center will serve as a critical prototype for improving the nation’s ability to develop new vaccines and
therapeutics in an accelerated and cost
-
effective manner,
” Giroir said. “
It will be especia
lly important in the larger
goal of protecting our nation and citizens from the threat of bio
-
terror weapons such as anthrax and Ebola virus
.”

The center will become part of a biomedical cluster that will include the Texas Institute for Genomic Medicine an
d the Texas
Institute for Pre
-
Clinical Studies.



SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

17


US Response

Frontline




5
.
No Impact


Laboratory Response Network Solves


Association of Public Health Laboratories; 3/30/09

(FoxBusiness News, “Nation's Laboratory Response Network Marks First Decade of Protecting Public Health“)
http://www.foxbusiness.com/story/nations
-
laboratory
-
response
-
network
-
marks
-
decade
-
protecting
-
public
-
health/
,
accessed 4/8/09


SILVER SPRING, Md., March 30, 2009 /PRNewswire
-
USNewswire via COMTEX/
----
The Laboratory Response Network
(LRN: 15.28,
-
0.3,
-
1.93
%), the national laboratory system charged with protecting the public in health emergencies, will
mark its first decade at its national meeting in Orlando, Florida, April 1
-
3, 2009.

Founded in 1999 by the Association of Public Health Laboratories , the Ce
nters for Disease Control and Prevention and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to test for agents of bioterrorism,

the Laboratory Response Network has evolved to
become the nation's laboratory resource for response to emerging infectious diseases, toxic
spills, natural
disasters, chemical terrorism and other public health threats.

LRN member
laboratories conduct
confirmatory
testing
of specimens referred by clinical laboratories, law
enforcement agencies, the armed forces and other partner agencies.
The
results of their analysis determine
emergency response measures.

The first trial of the LRN came in 2001. "Two weeks after the state of Florida finished training its laboratorians in
emergency response measures, a Florida LRN reference lab identified Baci
llus anthracis, the index case for the anthrax
events of 2001, in a clinical specimen," remembers APHL Executive Director Scott Becker. "That day the concept of a
national, rapid response laboratory network proved its worth."

In subsequent years,
the LRN'
s portfolio expanded in response to outbreaks of SARS, monkey pox and avian
influenza. Its productivity level was high
. In one twelve
-
month period during 2006, over 5,000 tests for unknown
substances were performed by state public health laboratories.
A di
verse membership of state and local public
health labs, veterinary, agricultural, military labs, water and food testing laboratories tackled the workload using
standardized methods and tests to assure accuracy and consistency across the network
.

In 2003,
the LRN added a chemical component, the Laboratory Response Network for Chemical Terrorism Preparedness, or
LRN
-
C. Sixty
-
two state, territorial and metropolitan public health laboratories at three levels of capability now participate in
the LRN
-
C.



SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

18


US Re
sponse

Frontline


6
.
US Can Respond to Bioterror


CDC Partnerships and Emergency Communication Solve


CDC; 4/3/09

(“CDC promotes partnerships in emergency response”)
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/CJAL
-
7QRNNU?OpenDocument
, accessed 4/8/09


On March 18
, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) three business cooperative agreement

grantees, the National Business Coalition on Health, the Nationa
l Business Group on Health, and the National Safety Council
visited the agency to present information on their partnerships and how they help to

promote health, prevent disease, and
reduce injury. Together, these grantees have the potential to impact milli
ons of lives in the workforce, including
employers, employees, and their dependents

(i.e. children, parents, older adults, at risk populations).

Each year,
the public faces potential health threats, from pandemic influenza
, to hurricanes,
to bioterrorism
.

CDC's ability to disseminate communication messages during all hazards emergency response may be easier with
some new emergency communication tools. The National Center for Health Marketing's (NCHM) Division of
Partnerships and Strategic Alliances (DPSA)
collaborated with one of CDC's business cooperative agreement
grantees, the National Safety Council (NSC), to create the Emergency Alert Network (
EAN). EAN is a new e
-
mail
-

and voice
-
based system built on the Send Word Now platform and funded through DPSA'
s cooperative agreement with NSC.

The Emergency Alert Network

EAN has the capacity to reach more than 17,000 businesses with CDC
-
cleared information in the event of a public health
emergency. Collectively, these businesses have the potential to reach 8 m
illion employees and their dependents
.
The EAN
database contains all critical infrastructure sectors, including agriculture, forestry and fishing, manufacturing,
large
-

and small
-
retail establishments, schools, healthcare, banking, and insurance
.

The NSC
database will also be expanding to include coalition representatives of the National Business Coalition
on Health

(
NBCH), another CDC business cooperative agreement grantee, which represents 10,000 employers and 25
million employees and their dependents.

D
uring emergencies, businesses are a key component of the partnership
strategy and help reach a wide audience, including employees, their dependents, other business partners, and the
general public.

"
During emergencies, it's important for CDC to partner
with a variety of organizations and institutions
, such as
businesses,
to disseminate emergent health information and resources to protect the public's health
," said Marsha
Vanderford, director of CDC's Emergency Communication System (ECS).
By accessing NSC
's and NBCH's
memberships, CDC can efficiently and effectively provide emergency health information to a broad business
base.




SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

19


US Response Ext. #1: Laundry List



US Rapid response deters bioterror attacks


Center for Biosecurity @ University of
Pittsburgh Medical Center; 12/19/08

(“Preventing and Deterring Biological Attacks: Priorities that Should Emerge From the WMD Commission Report”)
http://www.upmc
-
biosecurity.org/website/resources/commentary/2008
-
12
-
19
-
preventdeterbioweapons.html
, accessed 4/15/09


A nation’s ability to limit deaths may deter development and use of a biological weapon
. In contrast to the
consequences of use of
nuclear weapons,
the consequences of a biological attack can be reduced significantly by
rapid medical response to detect, treat, and, if appropriate, vaccinate.

Therefore,
the ability to limit the effects of
an attack through rapid response may be an effe
ctive deterrent.




SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

20


US Response Ext.

#2
: CRI Solves





Empirically, CRI increased US
bioterror readiness


limits the impact of attacks


Global Security Newswire; 3/25/09

(“U.S. Medicine Distribution Plan Working Well, Study Finds”)
http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090325_6569.php
, accessed 4/13/09


A U.S. plan to rapidly distribute medicine following a bioterrorist attack has successfully impro
ved the nation's
readiness
, the
RAND

Corp.
said

yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 13, 2008).

"
The

C
ities Readiness
I
nitiative
has helped agencies in the nation’s most
-
populous regions become better able to
dispense life
-
saving medication following a bioterrorism ev
ent or after an infectious disease outbreak
,” Henry
Willis, lead author of the RAND study, said in a press release.

The study encourages the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to extend the program and to re
-
evaluate it
in two to three years.

The i
nitiative seeks to organize public health officials and emergency responders to distribute medical supplies
and encourages using creative outlets, such as providing supplies at drive
-
through businesses, to ease pressure on
health facilities
. Since beginnin
g in 2004, it has used roughly $300 million during work in 72 urban areas (see
GSN, March 23; RAND Corp. release, March 24).



SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

21


US Response Ext. #3
:
SAFER Grants Solve First Responders







SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

22


US Response Ext. #4
:
Texas Biocenter






SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

23


US Response Ext. #5
:
Laboratory Response Network






SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

24


US Response Ext. #6
: CDC Partnerships / Emergency Communication





SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

25


Solving Now Frontline


1.
UN is

Solving Now

A.
Security Council Resolution 1540 is solving now


It forces

state action


Kraatz
-
Wadsack, Chief of WMD
Watch Branch of UN; 9

(Gabrielle, “Capacity
-
building and proliferation: Biological terrorism”)
http://d.scribd.com/docs/1481o5vjxkw29bi3vw02.pdf
, accessed 4/7/09


In 2004
the United Nations

Security Council recognized the potential threat of the acquisition of nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons and related materials, as well as their delivery systems, by non
-
state actors and
mandated in its resolution

1540,2
that states be legally obli
ged to provide for necessary legislation to counter such
threats
.
Pursuant to the requirements of the resolution, states shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws that prohibit
any nonstate actor from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessi
ng, transporting, transferring or using nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, as well as prohibiting attempts to engage in, participate in as a
n
accomplice, assist or finance any of these activities. Resolution
1540

(2004)
is

the first United Nations Security Council
resolution that is directed to non
-
state actors’ potential use of
weapons of mass destruction
(WMD).

Through its resolution 1540 (2004)
the Security Council sent a strong message to prevent proliferation and plac
ed
requirements on states to prohibit the trade in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; their related materials;
and their means of delivery. Special emphasis was given to stopping support for such proliferation
-
related trade
by non
-
state actors, incl
uding producers and manufacturers, financiers, logistical supporters and a range of
individuals involved in the global supply chain. The resolution also includes trafficking as a form of proliferation
threat to international peace and security, widening th
e potential non
-
state actor to include traffickers, brokers,
technicians and scientists

that have direct access to related materials.
If 1540 is successfully implemented and
enforced it will achieve major goals in non
-
proliferation: to make a difference by

the end of the decade


if not
before


and by representing not only one but a number of coordinated and innovative approaches to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their means of delivery and related materials for
terr
orist purposes.




SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

26


Solving Now Frontline


B.
The General Assembly’s Global Terrorism Strategy creates a comprehensive framework and plan of
action that is solving for bioterror


Kraatz
-
Wadsack, Chief of WMD Watch Branch of UN; 9

(Gabrielle, “Capacity
-
building and proliferation: Biological terrorism”)
http://d.scribd.com/docs/1481o5vjxkw29bi3vw02.pdf
, accessed 4/7/09


Another resolution to counter terrorism was adop
ted in September 2006 by the United Nations General Assembly,
called the “
Global Counter Terrorism Strategy
”. 4 This
resolutions’ adoption marks the first time that member
states have agreed to a comprehensive and global strategic framework to counter terr
orism
.
The strategy spells out
concrete measures for member states to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, to prevent and combat
terrorism and to strengthen their individual and collective capacity to do so, to protect human rights,

and to uphold the rule of
law while countering terrorism.

The practical steps to be undertaken include a wide array of measures ranging from
strengthening state capacity to counter terrorist threats to better coordinating the United Nations System’s
count
er
-
terrorism activities. The resolution’s Annex contains a “Plan of Action” that addresses “measures to
prevent and combat terrorism,”

under which


among other measures


the United Nations System was invited to
develop, together with member states, a sin
gle comprehensive database on biological incidents, ensuring that it is
complementary to the biocrimes database contemplated by the International Criminal Police Organization. The
ultimate objective of the database is to provide information that will help
planners and emergency responders


worldwide


to have a better understanding of the range of incidents and responses that have occurred in the past
and to enable research and analysis to identify possible emerging trends and patterns, thus initiating and

coordinating proactive activities to prevent and combat terrorism. Data generated within such a database will also
be valuable in conducting analyses of responses to bioincidents and provide training for those in the security and
response area. Data on le
ssons learned can provide better preparation for similar future events to detect, contain,
treat and effectively manage a terrorist plot or event involving biological warfare agents.

In the context of
the “Plan of Action
,” the member states also
encouraged

the Secretary
-
General to update the
roster of experts and laboratories, as well as the technical guidelines and procedures, available to him for the
timely and efficient investigation of alleged Biological Weapons (BW
) use. The 6th Review Conference of th
e
BTWC, which was held in November

December 2006, had noted that the SG mechanism, established in 1987, represents an
international institutional mechanism for investigating cases of alleged BW or toxin weapons use and that the update of the
technical guid
elines was encouraged.

In addition to all of the above, the
member states

further
noted the importance of

the proposal of the Secretary
-
General to
bring together, within the framework of the United Nations, the major biotechnology stakeholders,
including
industry, the scientific community, civil society and governments, into a common program aimed at
ensuring that biotechnology advances are not used for terrorist or other criminal purposes, but for the public good
,
with due respect for the basic internatio
nal norms on intellectual property rights.
The global market for materials
and equipment, the global availability of requisite know
-
how, the fact that dangerous pathogens do not carry flags
marking their national origin, the irrelevance of national boundar
ies for containing the spread of disease


all
these

are just some of the reasons why purely unilateral, national initiatives cannot alone suffice in meeting this challenge.
That is why the Secretary
-
General in 2006 suggested promotion of dialogue on a glo
bal level in order to sensitize decision
-
makers to non
-
proliferation issues with respect to biotechnology advances and the General Assembly noted the importance of
this proposal.


SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

27


Solving Now Frontline


2.
Export control regimes limit the spread of
dual
-
use technology, which solves the threat of bioterror

and
other WMD


Kraatz
-
Wadsack, Chief of WMD Watch Branch of UN; 9

(Gabrielle, “Capacity
-
building and proliferation: Biological terrorism”)
http://d.scribd.com/docs/1481o5vjxkw29bi3vw02.pdf
, accessed 4/7/09


Addressing the geopolitical risk related to the proliferation of WMD and the measures to combat this proliferation includes
intelligence, export controls, international arms contro
l treaties and other mechanisms. Nodes of interaction are people,
money, goods and the supply side.

Some of the tools intended to reduce the risk of proliferation are called
“indicators” and can be interpreted as “fingerprints” or “trail.” A good indicator

alerts to a problem before the
problem is worse and helps to recognize what steps need to be undertaken.

The prerequisite to understanding
“indicators” is information and knowledge. Furthermore, generation of information, and the processing of it, creates

new
knowledge. This knowledge and assessment of indicators provide for a trend analysis which could lead to the detection of
illicit activity, followed by interdiction and disruption.


Multilateral export control regimes have used indicators for
interception and disruption of dual
-
use material in
exports. Those regimes are consensus
-
based, voluntary arrangements of supplier countries that produce
technologies useful in developing WMD and conventional weapons. The regimes aim to restrict trade in t
hese
technologies to keep them from proliferating to terrorist or states not part of these regimes.

The four principal regimes are
the Australia Group6

which
focuses on trade in chemical and biological items
;
the
Missile Technology Control Regime;7 the Nuc
lear Suppliers Group;8 the Wassenaar Arrangement9 (previously CoCom),10
which focuses on trade in conventional weapons and related items with both civilian and military (dual
-
use) applications. In
addition to these regimes, there is a multilateral nuclear
export control group called the Zangger Committee.11

Lists were developed within each of the regimes, which contain technical definitions of equipment, components,
items, materials, software and technologies that are considered important for the developmen
t of illicit weapons.

Regime members conduct a number of activities, including (1) sharing of information about each others’ export
-
licensing decisions, including certain export denials and, in some cases, approvals; and (2) adopting common
export control
practices and control lists of sensitive equipment and technology into national laws or regulations.

Since September 11, 2001, all export control regimes have acted to address terrorism
. For example,
the Australia
Group added counter
-
terrorism as an offici
al purpose of the regime and added a number of items to its control list
in an effort to control the types of items that terrorists, rather than states, would seek in order develop chemical or
biological weapons. These items included toxins, biological equ
ipment and the transfer of information and
knowledge that could be used for chemical and biological weapons purposes
. In addition, in June 2002
the

Australia Group adopted a provision in its new guidelines for licensing sensitive chemical and biological it
ems
that made it the only regime to require its members to adopt “catch
-
all” controls


so
-
called end
-
use controls.
“Catch
-
all” controls authorize a government to require an export license for items that are not on control lists but
that could contribute t
o a WMD proliferation program if exported.

However, export control regimes are not universal
and the degree to which norms in trading are being observed varies widely around the world
.




SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

28


Solving Now Frontline


3.
US counter
-
terrorism strategy overhauls
a
re

solving the overall threat of terrorism in the status quo



Multiple Reasons


Wainstein, former Homeland Security Advisory; January 7, 2009

(Kenneth, “Tackling the Terrorist Threat: Progress Made and Future Challenges”)
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=438
, accessed 4/15/09


First,
we have overhauled our overall counterterrorism program to enhance our ability to prevent terroris
m of any
type, no matter whether it entails weapons of mass destruction or otherwise
.
The architecture, organizations and
operations of our counterterrorism program have changed dramatically since the attacks of 2001
.

• We have stood up a number of
new de
partments and agencies with counterterrorism capabilities
, including the
Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National
Counterterrorism Center, NORTHCOM and

the White House organization I lead,
the Homel
and Security
Council.


We have strengthened the counterterrorism capabilities of existing institutions
--

enhancing the intelligence
capacity of the FBI, developing a stronger and better
-
resourced human intelligence capacity at the CIA, and
creating a ne
w division devoted to attacking terrorist and proliferation financing at the Treasury Department
.

• And,
we have worked with Congress to develop

new statutory and regulatory
authorities that equip our
professionals to meet

the

asymmetrical
terrorist threa
t

we face today. These authorities include statutes
like the
Patriot A
ct and its reauthorization, that lowered the wall that had separated our intelligence and law enforcement
operations and otherwise strengthened our hand against today's terrorists, and
t
he revised Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act
, that modernized our surveillance laws so that we can effectively monitor terrorists using today's
communication technologies. They also include regulations like the
new Attorney General Guidelines, that all
ow
the FBI to blend and use both intelligence authorities and traditional law enforcement investigative tools in their
effort to investigate and disrupt terrorist plots, and the new Executive Order 12333, which

was recently revised to
reflect the new struc
tures in our Intelligence Community and to
give our intelligence agencies clear guidance
about their roles and responsibilities in the effort both to protect our nation and to protect our rule of law.





SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

29


Solving Now Frontline


4.
New objectives in counte
ring WMD use by terrorists, along with increased domestic and international
cooperation are solving the threat


Wainstein, former Homeland Security Advisory; January 7, 2009

(Kenneth, “Tackling the Terrorist Threat: Progress Made and Future Challenges”)
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=438
, accessed 4/15/09


In addition to

these macro changes to our counterterrorism program, we have

also
developed
and pursued
a
strategy specifically

tailored
to the WMD threat
. This strategy is
based on the premise that all elements of national
power must be focused on the effort to undermine the terrorist capability to use WMD
.
To that end, this strategy
prescribes six different
operational objectives
--

or what we call "pillars"
--

that drive the formulation of our approach to
WMD terrorism. Those pillars
--

or operational objectives
--

are:

• To use our intelligence assets and operations effectively to learn the enemy's thinkin
g and plans for the use of WMD.

• To stop terrorists from getting access to WMD
-
related materials, expertise, and other enabling technologies.

• To strengthen deterrence by making clear the consequences of any WMD attack.

• To detect the movement of WMD
-
related materials, weapons and personnel and disrupt specific terrorist plots as they
unfold.

• To respond and recover effectively if we are, in fact, attacked.

• And finally, to have the capacity to identify the perpetrator of any WMD attack, so that w
e can develop our strategic
response quickly and effectively.

These are straight
-
forward objectives, but we have long recognized that we can accomplish them only if we work
cooperatively with all parties to this effort. And, that cooperative

approach is e
vident in our operations both
domestically and overseas.


On the domestic front
, we have devised new governmental structures

that are designed specifically to
ensure
cooperation and the sharing of information among all of the relevant agencie
s.

• For instance, we
established the National Counterproliferation Center, with the charge to coordinate strategic
planning for intelligence regarding WMD proliferators, to identify critical gaps in collection and analysis, and to
develop solutions

to fix th
ose shortfalls.


The FBI established a new WMD Directorate to consolidate and leverage

the Bureau's WMD and
counterproliferation initiatives and resources
.

• And at
the White House
, we
created a joint policy coordination committee to harmonize the count
erterrorism
and counterproliferation policy agendas
and focus them on the implementation of the president's WMD
-
terrorism
strategy across the government.

We have also worked hard to develop cooperative efforts across borders

with our foreign partners. Tha
nks to
dedicated and effective diplomacy by President Bush and others,
we and our allies are now jointly involved in a
number of international initiatives and multilateral coalitions that greatly enhance our global collective ability to
combat WMD terroris
m.

Thanks to these diplomatic efforts
--

and the willing cooperation of so many of our
foreign allies and friends
--

America now has more partners, in more regions of the world, who are doing more to
help keep our people safe from WMD terrorism.

These eff
orts at home and abroad have allowed us to make tremendous progress in the effort against weapons of
mass destruction and particularly

as to the two types that pose the most immediate threat of catastrophic harm to
the United States
--

nuclear and
biological weapons of mass destruction
.




SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

30


Solving Now Ext.

#1
: Security Council Resolutions


There are more security

council resolutions solving in the squo


Kraatz
-
Wadsack, Chief of WMD Watch Branch of UN; 9

(Gabrielle, “Capacity
-
building and prolifera
tion: Biological terrorism”)
http://d.scribd.com/docs/1481o5vjxkw29bi3vw02.pdf
, accessed 4/7/09


Other
Security Council resolutions are in place which are related to counterterrorism such
as the Counterterrorism
Committee and its Executive Directorate (Security Council resolution 13733) and the Security Council
Committee

established

pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999),
also known as “the Al
-
Qaida and Taliban Sanctions
Committee.”




SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

31


Solving

Now Ext.

#2
: Export Regimes


Bioweapons operations require specialized production and weaponization technology, which make their
activities easy indicators for export regimes and law enforcement


Kraatz
-
Wadsack, Chief of WMD Watch Branch of UN; 9

(Gabrielle, “Capacity
-
building and proliferation: Biological terrorism”)
http://d.scribd.com/docs/1481o5vjxkw29bi3vw02.pdf
, accessed 4/7/09


The acquisition of a biological capability such
as a fully assembled weapon may be considered difficult
. Access to
and trafficking of some of the related dual
-
use materials and technologies to produce biological weapons may be
considered less difficult, depending on the degree of assets and know
-
how ava
ilable, choice of candidate BW
agents, scale of program, etc. Scenarios could be the acquisition of classic biological warfare agents with state
assistance, working from scratch, engineering novel agents with advanced technologies, etc.

The biological area

in its entirety has no choke points or “telltale” signatures or early detection of whether
activities are for peaceful or other uses. Illicit biological activities can be hidden easily in institutions that have
legitimate interests in microbiology, geneti
cs and fermentation. Because of the dual
-
use nature, there are many
check points which would include exportcontrol measures, border controls or others.

Many technologies in the biological area, including the advanced technologies such as biotechnology, hav
e “dual
-
use” applications, offering simultaneous beneficial and malevolent uses. There are no unique signatures for fixed
or mobile sites for BW agent research, development, production, filling or storage.

In the case of a surveillance program or monitorin
g of activities, the net of check points would be huge and would
need to cover all civilian activities, such as biological equipment production capacity (e.g. for fermenters,
incubators, dryers), biological laboratories (e.g. in hospitals, universities, pu
blic health, food
-
testing institutions),
biological production facilities (e.g. vaccine production, drug formulation and production), food industry (e.g.
dairy facilities, breweries, distilleries), agricultural facilities (e.g. pesticide operations, herbic
ide spraying,
greenhouses), import and supply agencies, storage facilities, etc. It also covers the dual
-
use nature of military
defense programs.

Regarding equipment, no high
-
tech needs to be involved. Even biological containment is not required for the
p
roduction of the BW agents. BW agents can be produced in very small quantities, e.g. in five
-
liter flasks. Even
with this small
-
scale production capability, the aggregate production provides material for weaponization.

The main factors influencing indicato
rs are related and depend upon the intended activity and its scale, e.g.
weaponization, storage considerations, etc. The scale of the activity influences the acquisition sources and the
indicators for early warning regarding acquisition by imports or other
wise. Other factors are the degree of
possible utilization of country resources such as government and private laboratories, the knowledge available,
the adaptability, flexibility, the practicality of the intended activity and the means of meeting accepted

risks.

Indicators will vary, depending if activities are centralized, compartmentalized or dispersed to different locations.
The judgment about the necessity of accepting certain risks and the choice of the candidate agent will influence
whether arrangeme
nts for biosafety will be made. Any indicator to uncover covert and/or compartmentalized
activities is related to the individual proliferation areas, which are: recruitment of know
-
how; acquisition of
materials and facilities; the supply of a turnkey facil
ity with the logistics thereof; and the financial flow or
transfer, etc. Thus, essential functions necessary in a supplier’s network can be identified as providing a product
or a specific component as well as management of production with know
-
how and know
ledge.


SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

32


U.S. Retaliation Frontline


The DOD is in charge of WMD response and they prefer other options to nuclear retaliation


Carter, professor of science and international relations @ Harvard; 4

(Ashton, Ashton B. Carter, Ford Foundation Professor of Sc
ience and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, “How to counter WMD,”
Foreign Affairs
, September/October 2004)
http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=729
1
, accessed 4/15/09


In the 1990s, the term "counterproliferation" was used in the Pentagon to signify that contending with WMD was
an important mission in the post
-
Cold War world.
Nuclear retaliation for use of WMD against U.S
. troops was
always
understood to be an option, but not an attractive one, since it was not clear that all potential opponents
could be deterred
. If they proved not to be, presidents deserved a better menu of responses.
Various programs
were thus created to develop non
-
nuclea
r counters to WMD

on the battlefield,
including chemical and biological
warning sensors, improved vaccines against bioattack, individual and collective protective coverings,
decontamination systems, special munitions for attacking and neutralizing enemy WM
D, radiochemical forensics,
and active defenses such as ballistic missile defense.

Over time, these
programs were expanded to include the protection of rear areas
, such as ports and airfields in the
theater of war,
against chemical and biological attack
.
Subsequently,
these technologies were recognized as useful
to the protection of the U.S. homeland from WMD attack
. Thus,
by September 11, DOD was recognized as the
lead agency in the federal government for developing and fielding technology for countering
WMD.






SCuFI LD 2012

AT
: Bioterror Impacts

33


Anthrax Frontline


Anthrax is the best agent for b
ioweapons and it still sucks because there is e
asy access to the vaccine, lack
of communicability, and high number of spores required


Block; 1

(Steven, American Scientist, “The Growing Threat of Biological Weapons”)
http://www.americanscientist.org/issues/id.723,y.2001,no.1,content.
true,page.1,css.print/issue.aspx
,
accessed 4/7/09


All of this suggests why Bacillus
anthracis became the agent of choice for most biological warfare programs
.
Consider the properties of anthrax. It is convenient: Variants of the anthrax bacterium can be i
solated worldwide (although not all possess
equal virulence), and great quantities of spores can be readily prepared from liquid cultures. It is robust: Once desiccated
and stabilized,
hardy spores have a long shelf life and are well suited to weaponizatio
n in a device that can deliver a widespread aerosol. It is self
-
terminating: Airborne spores remain infectious until they fall to the ground, where most become inactivated by sunlight. It i
s effective:
After inhalation the spores produce disease with a hig
h mortality and morbidity.

It can be contained
:
Anthrax is not very
communicable, thereby reducing the risk that it will spread beyond the intended target
. Moreover,
a well
-
established vaccine exists that can prevent the onset of the disease,

allowing it to be used safely by the aggressor.
This is a two
-
edged sword, of course, since
the vaccine may be available to the target population as well. For this