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1




“I
nformation Operations (I
O
)

2020”: A White Paper for Developing
the Future Joint Force

Purpose

This paper

envisions the information environment (IE) and how IO will be employed in 2020.

Its
purpose is to

foster

a shared vision for building the
future
joint IO force

as the
Quadrennial

Defense
Review process gets underway
. An appendix
to

this paper identifie
s
doctrine, organization, training,
materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities (
DOTML
-
PF
)

changes to be implemented in the near
-

and
mid
-
term in order to achieve the vision.

Background
and

Scope

In March 2012,
the
Joint Staff
Deputy Director for Global

Operations
(DDGO
)
and

the Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (
OUSD [
P
]),
Senior Director for IO
,

hosted an IO

force development
(IOFD)

s
ummit. The event featured a
working group
that
identified

the skills
the IO force
will likely need
in
2020
. This paper expands upon the work accomplished
by

that
working group
. It offers IO
-
focused
ideas, insights, and considerations relevant
to the

following
:



The military problem



The nature of IO



The future
information

environment




IO

and
the Capstone C
oncept for Joint Operations (
CCJO
)



T
he IO force refers to “units, staff elements, and individual military professionals in the Active, Guard,
and Reserve Components, and
Department of Defense’ (
DOD) civilian professionals who conduct or
directly support the integration of
information
-
related capabilities (
IRC
)

during military operations as
well as those who train these professionals.”


(Draft CJCSI 3210)

The Military Problem

The Secretary of
Defe
nse’s (
SecDef
)

“Sustaining US Global Leadership



Priorities for 21
st

Century
Defense
” envisions
the joint force of 2020 will be called upon to accomplish the
following diverse
missions:


(DOD1, 4
-
6)



Deter and defeat aggression



Counter terrorism and
conduc
t
irregular warfare



Project power despite anti
-
access/area
-
denial challenges



Counter
weapons of mass destruction



Operate effectively in cyberspace and space



Maintain a safe, secure
,

and effective nuclear deterrent



Defend the homeland and provide support to

civil authorities


2




Provide a stabilizing presence



Conduct stability and counterinsurgency
(COIN)
operations



Conduct humanitarian, disaster relief
,

and other operations


The challenge for the future

IO force
throughout the full range of expected operations
will be to
influence

adversaries

, potential adversaries

, an
d other foreign audiences’
decision

making
during these
operations
,

while protecting our own in
a hyper
-
competitive
IE.

The Nature of IO

DOD

puts

influence at the heart of IO,
defin
ing it
as the
integrated employment during military
operations of IRC
s

in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the
decision

making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.

This
p
aper fully
endorses the

view
espoused in
the
Marine

Corps Operating Concept for IO

that IO should also be
employed to affect the decision

making of
other

foreign

audiences

(e.g.
,

potential coalition and allied
partner nations’ leadership and population,
and foreign civilian
populations in the AOR.)

IO enables a joint force commander
(JFC)
to maneuver (move to a position of advantage) and engage
(generate nonlethal effects) within the

physical, informational and cognitive aspects of the

IE to affect
the behavior, capabilities,

will
,

or perceptions of foreign decision makers and populations
.
Within the
range of operations envisioned,
the

integrated employment of IRC
s

provides a cost
-
effective
way
to
deter armed conflict and
, should deterrence fail,

serves
as an integrated eleme
nt of combined arms.

Planning for IRC employment

occurs
within

a

structured
yet adaptive
process.


T
he Joint Operations
Planning Process (JOPP)
,

coupled with
o
perationa
l design
,

helps commanders and staffs think through
the challenges of understanding the
operational environment. Together
,

JOPP and
operat
ional design
serve to
answer ends

ways

means

risk questions and appropriately structu
re campaigns and
operations.

(JP 5
-
0
)

Joint
planning

is also characterized by
top
-
down
strategic guidance and periodic
reviews of contingency
plans. Guidance and reviews, in turn, enable the development and
maintenance

of “living” plans that
provide multiple options for decision makers.

Once plans are executed, commanders must continu
ously
assess the progress of a joint
operation
toward mission accomplishment. Assessment involves comparing forecasted outcomes to actual events
to determine the overall effect
iveness of force employment
.


(JP 5
-
0
)

A well
-
developed understanding of the
IE

must be integrated into joint planning. This understanding will
inform planners and
c
ommanders of the potential impact of proposed military action on decision

making and guide actions within the IE to gain a military advantage.


3


The Future
Information
Envi
ronment

The

IE
,

together with the physical domains of land, marit
i
me, air and space
,

comprise the
operational
environment
.
T
he operational environment
is a
composite of the conditions, circumstances, and
influences that affect employment of capabilities
and bear on the decisions of the commander.

Of particular focus to the IO force is the IE with its physical, informational and cognitive dimensions. The
physical dimension consists of
people
and the tangible means we use to communicate (phones,
microwave
towers, newspapers,
and computers
).
The informational dimension encompasses where and
how information is collected, processed, stored, dissem
inated and protected.
The cognitive dimension
,

the most important component of the IE
, is

where individual and cu
ltural beliefs, norms, vulnerabilities,
motivations, emotions, education, ideologies and views of self and group

affect how information is
transmitted, received, responded and acted
upon.


(JP3
-
13)

Wit
hin the physical dimension,
2020 will find
more people

living in cities

60% compared to 50% today
.
(Intuit, 3
)


As operations in Baghdad, Mogadishu, and Port
-
au
-
Prince over the past two decades have
revealed, u
rban areas present the most complex environment for military operat
ions because of
constraints/restra
ints imposed on forces. In all urban operations conducted since
1967
,

the JFC has had
to take into account one or more of the following:
limiting friendly

casualties;

minimizing civilian
casualties
and/or collateral dam
age; restrictions on

the

use of typ
es of weapons. Given these
constraints, IO will be critical to the success of
joint urban
operation
s
.


(JP

3
-
06)


Indeed, IO
offers the
potential to
avoid more expensive conflict, move rapidly, spread virally, and shift target
-
audience
positions and sympa
thies.


To succeed, the IO professional will have to be mindful of both the enduring and new
features
of urban

operations.
Concentrated
populations have spawned and will continue to spawn a density of media of
all types, whose reporting may be friendly, n
eutral or opposed to US interests. (JP 3
-
06) Additionally
,

newly built cities will be “smart cities
,


built from the ground up with

advanced
network infrastructure
s

to improve economic and political efficiency and enable
the
social and cultural and
development

of its
citizens
. The combination of
enduring
dense media and
new and
ubiquitous sensor
-
laced cities

will
result in intense competition

in the IE
as friend and foe
seek to influence the urban populace and
achieve superior situational awareness
by denying the adversary access to the data from the sensor
networks.


T
wo

other
technological developments will shape the physical and informational dimensions of the
future IE

the reaching of a mature stage

of Web 2.0
and the beginning of a growth stage
for
Web 3.0

and
mobile device
-
generated


big data
.



Much has been opined about the role Web 2.0 supposedly played during the Arab Spring. Contrary to
popular belief, Twitter, for example, played a global
,

but not a
significant country or regio
nal
,

role in

the
collective political action that unfolded in 2011.
(USIP, 3)


The mature stage of Web 2.0 will be
characterized by the availability
and society
-
wide use of
multi
-
media sharing (e.g.
,

YouTube), Micro
-
blogging (e.g. Twitter), and social networking (e.g.
,

Facebook) capabilities in the remaining regions of the

4


globe that are not already leveraging these capabilities on
a wide
-
scale
basis
.
As such, it is likely that
mature Web 2.0 technology will play a local and regional
role in rallying like
-
minded peopl
e and groups
.
But by 2020, it is also likely that
adversaries (
e.g.
,

tota
litarian regimes) will have honed tactics,
techniques and procedures for leveraging
social networking capabilities to identify and eliminate
anti
-
regime
activists.
The JFC will have
to address such opportunities and challenges in fashioning campaign
plans in the IE.


Web 3.0 (also known as the Semantic Web), meanwhile, envisions computers with the logic to search
for and apply data in much the same way that people do. Web 3.0 will all
ow software agents to carry
out tasks for users
,

thereby eliminat
ing

the tedious and time
-
consuming work

of

finding and combining
information that only then can be acted
upon
.

(Pew
,
2)

Web 3.0 will pose significant challenges to JFCs
asked to conduct 21
st
-
century defense missions of countering terrorism and irregular warfare. T
he
technological
implications for enhanced terrorist intelligence collection and analysis are obvious.
Perhaps less obvious, however, is Web 3.0’s capabilities for recruiting and tr
aining new members.
Applied
mathematics

professor Robin
Morris, for example
,

asserts that Web 3.0 has the potential to
produce tailored learning models for individual students which take into account the learner’s
background knowledge, skills, aptitudes, motivations, learning and media preferences.
(Morris) With
such tailoring
ca
pabilities,
recruitment and training of violent extremists could increase exponentially.


Web
-
based technologies in 2020 will
also
make the task of identifying key leaders who can facilitate or
hinder accomplishment of
campaign plans

more difficult. The U
.
S
.

experience in Iraq revealed the
influence one person can wield. The
cleric Moqtada al Sadr’s

call for protests could quickly put one
million
people

out on Iraqi streets
.
Yet his website received less than 20 hits a day.

(AIi, 67
-
68)
. Will the
future
find key influencers limited to a very small number of individuals? The maturing and growth of
Web technologies in 2020 could produce a shift from a handful of known personality figures to much a
much larger number of known and
perhaps
unknown influencers

who can create content and gain a
following that could assist or hinder the accomplishment of the mission.


Mobile devices will continue to proliferate and have an impact on 21
st
-
century defense missions.
More
than 70% of the world

s population already u
ses them. These devices generate an enormous amount of
“Big Data” which McKinsey & Company defines as datasets whose size is beyond the ability of today’s
typical database software tools to capture, store, manage and analyze. Sources of big data include
social media traffic, mobile transactions, and GPS coordinates. Today, data from these along generate
over 2.5 quintillion bytes daily (WEC).


The

ability to sift big data offers the potential
to gain granular insights about the needs and behavior of
individual users and groups
.

“Big Data, Big Impact


provides a futuristic example of how big data from
mobile phones
could

provide critical economic indicators. Rather than relying on traditional
aggregated
monthly or
quarterly reports on country or regional economic conditions, future
economist
s could
conceivably
data mine cell phone usage to develop more timely leading indicators. For example, if
mobile
-
provider data reveals decreasing top
-
off amounts by
pay
-
as
-
you
-
g
o
mobile
users
, it could be a
n

early
indication of
increased

economic
distress

before the data shows up in official indicators (WEC).

If

5


these technological forecasts
come to fruition,
the

most successful JFCs will be those who can
access
and

discern the
patterns of “big data” in planning, executing and assessing influence activities

during
military operations
.


Influence activities in 2020 will also be shaped by
two
demographic
tren
ds
in evidence

toda
y
:
aging

and
migration. These trends
,

coupled with
urbanization discussed previously
,

will
s
hape

how information is
transmitted, received, responded to and acted upon in the cognitive dimension
.


In 2020,
the median
age
in much of Europe and Japan
that the JFC may seek to influence
will
be
45.
In contrast
,

the median
age
s will be 35 and 25
in China (and much of south Asia) and Africa respectively
.
(
ODNI, 20
-
21).

Moreover, m
any of the

youth in developing countries will
have witnessed
(
and will continue to witness
)

significant
societal changes.

Such
demographic and

societal changes
will
make the identification of
target audiences
and the ways they can be influenced more challenging than ever before. The JFC

will
have
to
understand

not just the composite
cul
ture and language of a so
ciety but
a growing

number of

sub
-
groups, each having different
world views and preferred means for sending and receiving
information.


C
onsider the 30
-
somethin
g
population in Chin
a

in 2020.
That generation,
unlike their parents and
/or
grandparents
,
did not live through t
he

Cultural Revolution. Rather
they were the generation that grew
up after the introduction of China’s One Child policy. According to some studies they are less
conservative and less likely to adhere to traditional Chinese
values.


(
Hong
)

Living among
this

group, will
be those who grew up in the post
-
1990’s period of pros
perity whose world view
in 2020 may be
different from their

slightly

older peers. Compounding the challenge of target audience analysis in
China
in 2020
will be a small yet potentially

significant sub
-
group
who studied and travelled extensively
a
broad
during the 2000’s and

return
ed

to China to live, work and have children
themselves.

Recent Pew
Research Center polling illustrates the differences in world views a
mong these
Chinese
sub
-
g
roups
.
When asked if their views are favorable to the US the affirmative responses among those 18
-
29, 30
-
49
and 50+

age groups

were 51%, 40% and 38% respectively.


The IO planner of 2020 will also have to be cognizant of how various target audiences receiv
e and
process information.
For example,

Pew polling revealed that

the percentage of
Japan
ese
,
Americans
,
Egypt
ians
, Russia
ns
, Chin
ese
, and India
ns

who use their cell phones to take pictures numbered
79, 67,
56, 49 and 28%

respectively
.


A second trend

glo
bal migration

owing to an over
-
and
-
under supply of labor in various regions

will
likely accelerate.

The demographic changes caused by migration are
already being seen in

many
countries.
T
he percentage of the total population made up of international migrants living in
Qatar,
Sing
apore, and New Zealand is

86
%
, 40%, and 22%
respectively
. (MPI)


S
tudies suggest that workforce
shortages in advanced and developing countries will spur
even grea
ter numbers of
people to seek a life
outside the country of their
birth
.

(
ODNI
, iv
)


Such population movements will further add to the
complexity a
nd challenges of
identifying target audiences and key
influencers therein.

Additionally,
ethno
-
religious en
claves or “micro states” will have to be considered in planning and operations.


6


IO and
the
CCJO

The CCJO is a Chairman
-
approved
overarching concept
that provides

a broad

description of how future
joint forces are expected to operate across the range of

military operations 8
-
20 years into the future
.
As a capstone document, it is intended to guide

the development of
all other future joint concepts
.


The CCJO
identifies
precepts that will guide
the conduct of future 21
st
-
century defense missions in the
o
perational environment described in the previous section. Among
those most relevant

to IO
are
the
following
:



Mission command



Seize, retain and exploit the initiative in time and across domains



Partnering



Cross
-
domain synergy



Minimize unintended consequenc
es

Mission Command

M
ission command is a central
tenet
that will guide future complex jo
int force operations as envisioned
in 21
st

Century Defense.

Army Field Manual (
FM
)
3
-
0
,

Operations
,

defines
mission command

as “the
exercise of authority

and direction
by the commander using

mission orders to enable disciplined

initiative within the commander’s

intent to empower agile and

adaptive leaders in the conduct of full

spectrum operations.



(Caslen, 84
-
86)
By adopting the concept of mission command, the joint
force
will be able

to act quickly during operations to dominate
the
narrative in an age of increasingly
compressed news cycles.

One of the first references to

the “narrative” is contained in the Army’s
2006 counterinsurgency manua
l.

The concept, however, is applicable to all types of envisioned
2
1
st
-
century defense missions.


A
narrative
is
a storyline that provides a framework for understanding events, both for the population of the
country in question and for international audiences
. In a 2010 interview
,

LTG Keith
Huber
,

Commander,
Combined Joint Interagency Task Force 435

(CJIATF 435)
,
explained that the story may
address

"why are
you here, why did this happen, or what's the future.”
(Huber, 5)

The US narrative

is one of many in the
operational

environment

other
s are proffered by

allies, adversaries, political proponents and
opponents, and the general

(sub)

cultural

narratives of day
-
to
-
day life.


T
he
less centralized and more proactive approach
to mission comma
nd offers the potential of greater
flexibility in
countering adversary efforts to create and communicate their own narratives.

Existing
policies and authorities, however, may need to be revised to provide greater freedom of action at lower
levels of com
mand. The past deca
de of war revealed encouraging
precedents.

For example, the
2009
Joint Center for Op
erational Analysis (JCOA) study
, “Iraq Information Activities (I2A),” points out that
“Commanders using left and right limits and delegated approval authorities empowered subordinates to
tailor messages effectively.” It also stated that psychological operations
(
PSYOP
)

now military
inf
ormation
support
operations
(
MISO)

product
-
approval authorities were progressively delegated to
lower echelons over time.


7



Of note, m
ission command also serves to
lend features

to an otherwise faceless US government.
Humanitarian and disaster relief operat
ions in
2020 will likely see
small tailored
teams

empowered more
than ever
to communicate
their contributions to the succe
ss of the mission.
Such communication can
potentially influence an audience

far beyond the local village,

district
, or
AOR through

th
e use of social
media that reaches a worldwide community having interest in assisting a developing or war
-
torn country
meet the needs of its citizens.
It may

even produce

valuable
planning, execution, and assessment
feed
back from an
other

organization

perh
aps a

non
-
governmental organization

(
NGO
)

with whom
,
heretofore,

the team

and larger government program office had not previously communicated.



Seize,
Retain
and
Exploit
the
Initiative
in
Time
and across
Domains

Gen
eral
James
Mattis, Commander,
USCENTCOM,

once
remarked that
capturing the perceptions of
foreign audiences will replace seizing terrain as the new high ground for
the future joint force.


(
Mattis
,

2
)

To accomplish this objective, the
JFC
will have to
understand the IE and take steps a
ccordingly to
seize, retain
,

and exploit the initiative in time and across domains.

S
enior leaders

and futurists

recently offered prescriptions
designed to ensure we lea
rn the

lessons of
the recent
past.

MG
Ralph Baker
,

currently the commander of

Jo
int Task Force


Horn of Africa,
emphasize
s

that controlling the pace of IO

in the battle for the narrative
requires commanders to be
alert
for
and quickly counter adversary efforts to create and communicate their own narratives.
He

asserts IO must become

a part of every facet of a unit’s daily frame
work so that the joint force can
“consistently and constantly send a message to the target audience.”
(Baker
, 3
)


Futurists Mary
Crandell
and
Dr. Ben
Sheppard

echo this view with their conclusion that command
ers can dominate the narrative
by continually “filling the frame with their own narratives
,
” making it difficult for adversaries to erode
the message.
(Crandell and Sheppard, 14).

LTG
William

Caldwell,

who served as the commander of
NATO Training Mission
-
Afghanistan
adds that “only by fostering a cul
ture of engagement where the
military proactively tells its own story in an open, transparent manner can we successfully navigate the
many challenges of the media environment now and in the future.” Failure
to do so
,

he notes
,

would
leave a vacuum in which the adversary’s version of reality becomes the dominant perception.
(Caldwell,
2
-
4)

All are adamant, however, of the necessity for deeds to match words.
Progress
in the battle for the
narrative can be for
naught

if actions are perceived to be, or are counter to the narrative being
communicated. Every action in an AOR sends a message. Personnel of all ranks must
understand

that
they are all part of IO by their daily actions, and perhaps most importantly, i
nteractions with indigenous,
host nation and coalition partners.

The JFC’s ability to influence and seize the new high ground will be just as important in conducting the
21
st

Century Defense mission of projecting power in an anti
-
access environment.
Indee
d, the
Joint
Operational Access Concept (JOAC), published in January, 2012
,

identifies 30 capabilities needed to
counter anti
-
access/area
-
denial efforts. Twelve (40%) of these capabilities feature a role for IO and
integrated IRC.


8


Partnering


At the stra
tegic level, forecasters at Shell Oil
,
w
ho have

a long history of groundbreaking work in the
area of futures studies
,

see the rise of “mini
-
lateralism
.
” Their forecast describe
s
a global order in which
large
-
scale multilateral organizations give way to a
more agile
,

mini
-
lateralism
approach
in which key
influencers seek collaboration and consensus of the smallest possible number of actors needed to
ensure the largest possible impact. This approach, in their view, is the only way to achieve the speed
and f
lexibility
required
to deal with future complex global issues (Shell)

At the operational level
, t
he CCJO stresses the need for the joint force to integrate effectively
on a local
and global level
with
USG
agencies, partner militaries, and
other
stakeholder
s. The Chairman
of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS),

in his
Strategic Direction to the Joint Force
, calls for

“expanding the envelope
of interagency cooperation.”


(CJCS, 5)

Further, the
D
O
D

Training Strategic
P
lan
adds
non
-
governmental
organizations
,
industry
,

and academia to the
diverse
list of partners with whom the joint force will likely
interact.

(
OUSD [
P&R
]
, 3)

This
paper envisages
the more frequent creation
of joint interagency task forces in
the future
to solve
complex problems

such as those a
ssociated with stability operations.

CJIAT
F
-
435 in Afghanistan
provides a contemporary example.


CJIATF
-
435 works with numerous Afghan ministries and includes
interagency

professionals from the Department of State

(D
O
S)
, Department of Justice, F
ederal
B
ur
eau of
I
nvestigation

(FBI)
,
United States Agency for International Development
,

and others. Their focus is on
creating self
-
sustaining Afghan national detention facilities
,

support to rule of law institutions and the
application of biometrics
.

(CJIATF
-
435
)

EUCOM’s Joint Interagency Counter Trafficking Center provides an example for other types of
operations.

The EUCOM

center reflects a whole
-
of
-
government, matrixed “fusion organization” to
combat the global problem of drugs, weapons,
and
human traffick
ing. Its 40
-
member staff includes
representatives of the
D
O
D
, FBI, Drug Enforcement Agency and other
USG
agencies.

(JICTC)

Cross
-
Domain Synergy

The above examples of agency partnering dovetail with anothe
r
element

of the CCJO

improve cross
-
domain synergy
. The CCJO envisions the future joint force will have transparent access to domains at
given times and places.
Such

access
will enable
the force
to

exploit advantages in one or more domains

to conduct operations ranging from defeating aggression to
defending the homeland.

In some instances
it may only be necessary to create pockets or corridors of local domain superiority for a limited period of
time to achieve the commander’s objectives.

Former V
ice
CJCS, General
James
Cartwright, was one of

the

fir
st senior leaders to articulate the concept
of cross
-
domain synergy. While serving a
s
Commander, U
S

Strategic Command

(USSTRATCOM)
,
he
postulated that “seams” or vulnerabilities in adversary capabilities exist when there is insufficient
integration betwee
n PMESII

components of
national
power.

The challenge for the
JFC
,


he noted
,


is
to identify and direct action through o
ne or more domains/environment
s

at
our adversaries


PME
S
I
I

fissures
.


(Cartwright, 19)


9


The CCJO

s and General Cartwr
ight’s earlier

vision
are
particularly relevant in 21
st
-
century defense
missions
involving an

anti
-
access/area
-
denial scenario. In this
scenario

an

IRC

can

be used
in cyberspace
to create a temporary e
ffect

directed against a military
or
inf
rastructure

(t
he “M” and “I”

in PMESII)
seam

to allow a fighter aircraft (air domain) enabled by GPS (space domain) to
negate

part of an enemy
integrated air defense system (land domain).

Minimize
Unintended Consequences

Like all major conflicts, t
he war in Afghanistan has been punct
uated by numerous
unintended
civilian
casualties caused by coalition targeting.


The
2012 Joint Staff J
-
7’s Decade of War Lessons Learned
report notes the Taliban
were

able to mount effective propaganda campaigns that mitigated or
,

in some
cases
,

completel
y
negated

the joint force’s hard
-
won victories in the land domain.


Defense analyst

Lara
M
.
Dadkhah

goes so far as
to
assert

that the Taliban’s IO
capabilities
have, at times
, been

among the
most effective air defense systems. In the end it doesn’t matter how an attacking aircraft is thwarted

by its physical downing via a missile or grounding as a result of propaganda.

(NYT 18 Feb 2010
)

To avoid
the latter,
t
he
DOW LL prescriptio
n is “
Be
fast but not wrong: Be first with the truth by using pre
-
planned messages and streamlined authorities for communications; at the same time, only report
confirmed details to avoid retraction and loss of
credibility.



(DOW LL)

The need to avoid unintended consequences, however, goes beyond the effective marshalling of
IRC
s

to
refute post
-
strike propaganda claims.


LTG
Thomas

Metz

(ret)
, who commanded Multi
-
national Force
-
Iraq,

in his article

Massing Effects
,


introduces the notion of “the IO th
reshold.”

He explains that the
continuous
employment of lethal force can lead to a
tipping
point at which
the level of lethality, aided
by adversary IO, begins to have an adverse effect on the overall campaign
.
For ill
ustrative purposes
, the
physical destruction of
buildings in a given locale could

achieve an
objective of driving
out
in
surgents

but
would result

in losing the support of key groups the JFC needs to achieve the overall mission of political
stability.

Give
n such a situation, General Metz emphasizes
that
a commander must

visualize a point at
which

the use of lethal force would li
kely reach that
threshold
.


(Metz, 103
-
105
)

Of note,
Metz also
argues that it is possible for the JFC to raise the
IO
threshold by

synchronizing in time, space, and
purpose
information effects

designed to prepare

key publics for the realiti
es of a brief

and final yet
exceptionally
violent stage of
a
battle plan
.

(
Metz, 107)

Perhaps in no other 21
st
-
century defense
planning
is the
need to minimize unintended consequences
more impo
rtant than deterring aggression and countering weapons of mass destruction.

As highlighted
in QDR 2010, succes
sful deterrence
require
s

an understanding of the capabilities, values, intent, and
decision maki
ng of
potential adversaries.


With such an understanding,
IO can contribute to whole
-
of
-
government efforts to
achieve

deterrence

in two ways.

On the one hand, IO can be a means for
convincing adversaries

their actions will i
mpose too heavy a cost and
not
result in the benefits they
believe aggression or coercion can achieve. On the other hand, IO can be used to convince adversaries
that benefits can accrue to them by exercising restraint
.

(
Strategic Deterrence
JOC)


Ambassador
Kenneth Brill, former direc
tor of the National Counter
-
proliferation Center, makes a sim
ilar point with
regard to
countering WMD. Planners must identify the “tool, levers,
incentives
, disincentives and
opportunities” in order to shape behavior and influence adversaries.
(Brill, 445
)


10


Conclusion

The IO community needs a shared vision
of how IO will be employed in the
IE

of 2020
in order to
inform
QDR 2014 and provide insights into DOTML
-
PF changes that will need to be implemented over time.

Th
e ideas contained
in this paper

are

anchored by
the Joint Force 2020 missions described in 21
st

Century Defense, the likely
IE,

and the precepts embodied in the CCJO
.
IO

will play an integral role in
the full range of operations envisioned in 21
st

Century Defense
and a shared vision must
b
e framed
within the context of the precepts of the CCJO given the capstone role in plays in future joint force
concepts.

The CCJO precept of
mission command

emphasizes
empowering subordinate commanders to decide
how best to achieve their commander’s intent
. Implementing mission command
will provide the joint
force the agility and flexibility to seize, retain and exploit the initiative

in the IE.
Seizing, retaining and
exploiting the initiative

in the IE
means
dominating “the narrative
.



Success
will depe
nd
upon

the
strength of the joint force
’s
partnerships

with stakeholders at
local and global level
s. With s
trong
partnerships
,

the
JFC can achieve
cross
-
domain synergy

in

identifying and directing action
through one
or more domains

aimed at exploiting

vuln
erable
PMESII
seams.


Care must be taken, however, to
minimize unintended consequences
. During operations in
volving
lethal force, commanders will have to
identify an “IO threshold”

a point at which adversary IO begins to undermine the joint force’s use of

lethal fires

to achieve objectives
.

Embracing these

precepts
will require changes in DOTML
-
PF

the
foundational
“building blocks”

that
enable the inte
grated employment of IRC
s
.
These changes are described in an appendix to this paper.
The appendix should

be viewed as a “living’ document that will change over time. Its current form
represents an attempt to capture the careful though
t

accomplished during the 2012 IO
FD

Summit and
subsequent dialogue among community professionals.




11




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