The Human Rights Movement: Incomplete Narrative/Contested Imaginary By Joseph Kling Professor of Government

wastecypriotInternet και Εφαρμογές Web

10 Νοε 2013 (πριν από 3 χρόνια και 11 μήνες)

70 εμφανίσεις













The Human Rights Movement:
Incomplete

Narrative/Contested Imaginary


By Joseph Kling

Professor of Government

St. Lawrence University















A Paper Prepared for

the 2
nd

Global International Studies Conference

World International Studies
Committee

Ljubljana, Slovenia

23
-
26 July 2008













Introduction and Overview: Framework for the Study of Human Rights as Global Social
Movement



What does it mean to talk about human rights as ‘a social movement’? Who are the mem
-
bers of this movem
ent? Where is its organizational center? What are its policy goals? What acti
-
vities and processes does one look to if one wants to study the move
ment’s parameters and its
character as an existent
in the field
s

of the social? Of course, these are question
s that can be
applied to any broad
-
based movement

the environmental movement, the women’s movement,
the ‘anti
-
globalization’ movement
.
i

In this paper I want to focus on the development of human
rights as a
social

movement, but I wish to place this study in

the context of a particular way of
trying to understand the overall emergence of social movements, and propose an analytic
framework that can be applied to the emergence of transnational social movements generally. I
want to use the idea of
narrative

as a

conceptual entry point into the practices through which
people make choices, shape action, and, finally, create social move
ments. My
argument
,
however, is that, in the contemporary era, the movement for human rights operates in terms of a
much larger fie
ld than that of narrative.
The discourse of human rights

has begun

to
function
not
only as narrative, but
as

contested social
ima
gin
ary
.


Human rights compose a
n

imaginary
,

because
, in the years since World War II,

they have
come to act as
a funda
men
tal set of norms and
assumptions about social
processes and
organiza
-
tion

through which the members of a society

construct,
appropriat
e
,
and
interpret
the meanings
of
both
every
day
and broad historical
events
.
It is a contested imaginary because it has ye
t to
subvert

the alternative and competing imaginaries of state sovereignty and
communal

identity
,
and because there

are many

who distrust

it
as an expression of Western
exclusionary
values and
imperial domination.


The project of understanding human right
s as contested imaginary is inseparable from the
project of understanding it as historical and global social movement. But a
primary difficulty
with
understanding

human rights as global social movement

is
that such an

inquiry
has to occur
within

at least t
hree different

theoretical fields
:

that

of
social movement

theory generally
,

of
the
workings of
transnational

movements

generally
,

and
of
the specific
ways

a
human

rights
dis
-
course

plays itself out
in arena
s

of
regional and international conflict
.
There i
s no way to
dis
-
tinctly
separate these three levels of analysis, since they overlap and feed into one another, but, at



i

I use this conventional term for describing movements protesting the neo
-
liberal domination of globalizing
processes, but it is not always clear what it means to be ‘against globaliz
a
tion’ as a historically grounded
transformation of technolo
gies of production, distri
bu
tion, consumption, and information flow. Some scholars
distinguish between ‘globalization from above’ and ‘globalization from below.’ Manfred Steger makes a distinc
tion
between globalization and globalism. What the literature has often tended to identify as globalization he refers to as
‘globalism’. ‘Globalization’ describes a technological transformation analogous to the industrial revolution of the
early 19
th

centu
ry. ‘Globalism,’ on the other hand, describes the ideology and practices which seek to dominate
those empirical processes in the interests of multinational capital and the corporate state. From Steger’s perspective,
technological ‘globalization’ is a polit
ically open process which is subject to redirection towards a more socially and
ecologically just world. Thus, for Steger, it would make more sense to talk about an ‘anti
-
globalism’ movement. See
Steger, 2003.


the same time, a

thorough discussion of each of these
conceptual areas

is far beyond the scope of
a single paper
, and the
analysis
to fol
low
reflect
s

this limitation.


In the present
paper
,

I want to offer a case for the proposition that the dis
course of human
rights
may be read as taking on the

role of
a
social imaginary.
The next section
will address some
definitional questions concernin
g how human rights fit into the study of both domestic and
transnational social movements. S
ection

II

will explore a conceptual trajectory which starts out
by understan
ding human rights first, as frame, then, as narrative, and, finally, as imagin
ary.
Se
ction
I
II

will propose some key historical nodes for tracing the emer
gence of human rights as
an ideation
al matrix
,

and
discuss some of the differing forms of agency


formal institu
tions,
voluntary organizations, personal narratives
--

which serve to rep
roduce the
discourse of h
uman
rights collective and individual consciousness.
Finally, I

will look at some of the ideas and
practices which render human rights a
contested

imagin
ary, for its status remains tenuous,
unsettled, and wavering.



I
What Are W
e Talking About Whe
n We Talk About A Human Rights
Movement
?


The idea
that

a
human rights movement

exists seems unquestioned and unquestionable.

E
xcept

that
, the more closely
one looks
, the more difficult it bec
omes

to identify exactly what
that movement
is
, where it
can

be found, and what, if any, organiza
tional centers it ha
s
.

The issue
is not whether
it is meaningful to talk about

a human rights movement.
The
construction

of
the

dis
course of
natural
rights in

the sevente
enth century;

the Amer
i
can
and French Revolutions; the
rise of workers’ movem
ents in the nineteenth century
deman
ding

decent living conditions in face
of a predatory industrialism;

the 1945 UN Char
ter
,

and the establishment of

the Uni
ver
sal Dec
-
l
aration of Human Rights in 1948

a
s
a
stan
dard for the beha
vior of states

both d
omestically and
internationally;

the innumerable Compacts, Conven
tions, Treaties,
and
Com
missions

following
upon the UN Charter
;
the

variety of

interna
tional courts

which c
a
me into existence over the
cours
e of the
pre
vious

century

(starting with the Permanent Court of International Justice estab
-
lished in 1922
by

the Cov
en
ant of the League of Nations)
;

the overthrow of colonialism;
the ex
-
plosion of human rights
non
-
governmental
organizations

at both na
tional and international levels

(NGOs
,

and INGOs)

in the post war years
, many of which became allied

with

bitterly fought

strug
gles
to resist

human rights
abuses
in all regions of the world


all
lead ines
ca
pably to the
conclusion

that,
by the end of th
e twentieth century,

a
power
ful and norm
-
setting
movement for
human rights ha
d

emerged
.




T
he human rights movement

exists, but, like all global formations,

it
is
a
decentered,
amorphous

pheno
m
enon
, and
is
characterized by layers of complex
ity.

It carr
ies social move
-
ments
within itself
,
but i
s not defined or exhausted by them
,
and includes

a variety

of other
agents as well
.

Social

movements
, Sidney Tarrow
states
,


…are only one form
along

a spectrum of types of contention.

Reducing them all to ‘global

social
movements’ makes good grist for activists but not for serious analysis. Nongovernmental organi
-
za
tions, labor movements, transnational coalitions, and elements of international institutions are
important actors, even if their actions are not obvi
ously ‘social movement’

actions. (
2005

7)


Tarrow is
on sure
empirical
footing

in his attempt to break the diffuse notion of a

global social
move
ment


into specific and identifiable parts
, and right to be suspicious of
grand,
loosely for
-
mulated abstract
ions.
Yet there is something intuitive
ly
sound

about the
idea
of
a

human rights
movement
,
and,
especially given the
import of the
historical
moments
enu
merated above
, few
find i
ts use problematic.
Thus, at the very begi
nning of his brief introduction to t
he
study of
human rights, Andrew Clapham can write,
“This book looks at where the concept of human
rights came from and how the human rights movement has developed a set of obligations that
apply world
wide
.”

T
here is nothing puzzling

about what
Clapham

me
ans

by

‘human rights
move
ment’ in that sen
tence


one does not
get a
sense
, as one reads past the term,
that there is
any conceptual confusion or lack of clarity

about it
--

though there might be some who would
question the

asserted
pro
po
sition

that
the

norms

of such a movement

represent

a set of
oblig
a
-
tions that apply world
wide
’ (Clapham,

1
).
ii

It is only when one
searches for
an

empirical referent
that
the idea

begins to break
down into a

composite of many different sorts of structures,
pro
-
cesses, a
nd collective actors
.

But t
he
se
, I suggest,

are most effectively brought together via the
notion of

a

transnational advocacy network.



Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink provide a developed and sophisticated analysis of
this
theoretical
construct in their
work
Activists Beyond Borders

(Keck and Sikkink, 1998). “A

transnational

advocacy network,” they write, “includes those relevant actors working interna
-
tionally on an issue who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense
exchanges of

information and services
” (2).
Such networks
include
:

domestic and inter
national
non
-
govern
men
tal organizations;

social movements
,

understood
,

conventional
ly,

as

broadly
open,
participa
tory, member
ship

groups

with
some
level
of social change agenda
iii
;

founda
tions
,
such as the Ford Foun
dation, which
, in the 1970s and 1980s
,

gave financial support to

human
rights movements in Latin America and
, in 1979,

to
the U.S Helsinki Watch Com
mittee

(Thomas
2001 151)
; media outlets;
churches, trade
-
unions, and
consumer
associations
; parts of regional
and interna
tional
intergov
ernmental

organiza
tions, such as the Inter
-
American

Commission on
Human Rights
,
established by

the Organization of American States,

and the United Nations
Human Rights Coun
cil, which of
ficially replaced the UN Commission on Human Rights in
March of 2006

(Keck and Sikkink)

The list could be broadened, but the critical point is that
social movements
per se

are only
one
el
em
ent

on such a list.
Thus
, when we use the term ‘human
right
s moveme
nt,’
we are refer
ring

not only
to
a rich and
unregimented

transnational advocacy
network
,

but
to
those histori
cal
doctrines,
events
,

and
collective
actions

which, since the
beginnings

of the Enlighten
ment, fed into the discourse
s

out of which such a net
work
even
tually

carve
d

itself.

Rather than
give up language
that implies

the exist
ence of

a broad
-
based human
rights move
ment,

therefore,
I suggest

we view the term as signifying
a stream of continually re
-
invented institutional structures, volun
tary o
rganizational engage
ments with the world, self
-
created processes of collective action, and individual decisions to witness against happenings
that

violate and abuse

the human personality.

The construct ‘human rights movement,’ it turns
out, is a metapho
r.




ii

For a skeptical view of the proposition tha
t human rights norms are recognized in any material way as a set of
‘worldwide obligations,’ see Reiff, 2002. “No century has had better norms and worse realities,” he writes (70).


iii

In their 2004 scholarly review of research in the field, Snow, Soule an
d Kriesi defined social movements as
“…
collec
tiv
ities acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organ
iza
tional
channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionall
y or culturally
based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they are a part.
” (Italics in the original.
11).




When we talk about the human rights movement,
then,
we are using metaphor. It is, in
this case, a metaphor that stands for an indetermin
ate variety of
formal and informal
agents, pro
-
ces
ses, and
actions
which combine in unruly constel
la
tion to cre
ate the image of a singular
m
ove
ment. Through metaphor, these agents, processes, and actions
are
linked in

what becomes a
social

imaginary
,
“…
an enabling but not fully explic
able symbolic matrix within which a people
imagine and act as world
-
making colle
ctive agents” (Gaonkar, 1)
.

O
ne of

the defining qualities
of an imaginary

is that

it
discovers

the family resem
blan
ces

among dispar
ate phenomena
, and
weaves together
, from beneath the surface
of their difference,
core meanings and

identit
ies
.

The
discou
rse of h
uman
rights
, I want to argue,
compose
s

such
an imaginary
.



As an imaginary,
human rights

inform
the
sweep

of

experience
,
providing, to
the con
-
scious
ness of those

within
its
ideational reach
, premises

for
interpreting
,

assessing
,

and seek
ing
to
challenge

the apparent fixity of the events

and conditions which
give shape to

that experience
.

The human rights imaginary, therefore, entails a human rights
movement
, which

offer
s

a set of
prac
tice
s
wh
ich
have as their ground

a

c
ommit
ment to
re
-
order
ing

the world
in the cause of
human equality and autonomy.


To speak of the social imaginary
,” Craig Calhoun writes,


is to
assert that there are no fixed cate
gor
ies of external observation adequate to all history; that ways
of thinking and structures of fe
eling make possible certain social forms, and that such forms are
thus products of action and historic
ally vari
able

(152)
.

The concept of s
ocial imaginary
reads

history as sub
ject to
alteration

by human
practice
;
in like manner,
the concept of human rig
hts as
social imag
in
ary reads
the
particular
history
of willful harm and abuse exercised by state
s

against
their inhabitants
, or by
dominant

cultural
group
s

against

those less powerful
, as

also

subject to
resistance and redirection.



II
Frames to

Narra
tives

to

and Imaginaries


An

argument of this paper is that

the

human rights movement
’ is not a movement

as
such
, but a much broader social matrix which con
tains
human rights
movements

as part of its
make
-
up
. These movements exist

within an extensive web

that includes

inter
governmental

and
govern
mental
institutions; established and

specially created courts, commissions, and review
boards;
voluntary

organizations

of all kinds and
on
all political

levels;

grant
-
offering

founda
-
tions
; and popular culture ve
nues, such as film festivals,

world
-
beat music

groups
--

often com
-
posed of you
nger people

who are themselves in flight from oppressive regimes
--

global
rock
con
certs,

and
videos
of all stripes,
which,
seeking to raise human rights consciousness,
spin
vir
ally through

the internet from
websites too numerous to count
.
And that is only a partial lis
-
ting
.

I
n any conven
tional sense,

the

human rights movement


is

a much more complex forma
-
tion

than th
e

concept

usually entails
.

I
t follows
, I would suggest,

t
hat

social move
ment theory,
at
least as
one of its central strains

has developed in
Europe and
the United States
since the world
-
wide explosion of collective action in the 1960s
, is of limit
ed
focus

in study
ing

the
field of hu
-
man rights practice
.

For
k
ey tenets of that theory can be drawn upon to illuminate
the character
and prac
tice of
only a portion
of

the many
collective actors who

populate
that field
--

in particu
-
lar,
it can be applied to
a wide range of expertise and
staff

based
NGOs
, such as Mé
d
ecins
S
an
s
Frontiè
rs,

or
GreenPeace
,
as they seek
both
visibility and
social and financial
support from larger
pub
lics, and
to
those groups whose

organi
za
tional structures

and mission
correspond

to
more
conven
tional
social
movement
forms
.



In order t
o identify the parameters of social movement
formations

within the larger field
of human
rights
, i
t is important to recognize, as
Sidney Tarrow

has written
,

that
“move
ments are
seldom under the control of a single leader or organization
.
” (
1994;
6) A soci
al movement,
“is
really a congeries of social networks loosely linked to one another
.”(22).
iv

Tar
row’s

theo
retical
scaffolding
, here,

is
consistent with

the
view,

more fully d
eveloped by Keck and Sikking (se
e
above)
,

that

the human rights move
ment
,
broad
ly

conceived,

is best
under
stood

as a

‘transna
-
tional advocacy net
work.

But this recognition in itself
leaves unresolved

the
ques
tion

of
how
con
ceptu
ally

to
differentiate
social movement

organizations

from other
kinds

of
organiza
tions
and
collec
tiv
e
actors which function

in the human rights field
.
The distinction matters, because it
is essentially the behavior and functioning of
social movement

organizations within the discourse
of human rights that we will be exploring in the remainder of this pape
r.



I will offer only the briefest sketch of the structure of social movements, drawing upon
the
three elements of ‘movement organization’
which Tarrow
identifies
:

formal organization, the
organ
iza
tion of collective action,
and
mobilizing structures.

1
)
The
formal

social movement
or
-
gan
i
za
tion
(
SMO
)
,
usually, though not always, has a
formally
recognized admin
istrative struc
-
ture,

paid or vol
unteer staff members to fill the offices of that structure,
whose
duties are
to
co
-
ordinate and carry out the

organization’s
activities and mission
,
and
a wider member
ship base
who pay dues, attend meet
ings, and form th
e core of group actions
.

A social movement usually
contains a
number

of like
-
minded SMOs, wh
ich

both ally and compete with one another in a
broa
d multi
organizational field that includes
non

or
gan
ized actors as well
. 2)
The
organi
za
tion of
collective action

ranges from temporary formations of chal
lengers
,

who are on the ready to be
cal
led out and show up for demonstrations or other forms of
con
tes
ta
tion
, to more formal but dis
-
tinct groupings

that can also be called on to respond to and participate in cam
paigns, but have a
certain degree of autonomy,
such as union locals, commu
nity coun
cils affiliated with national
par
ent
associations

l
ike the NAACP
,

or branches
of
nation
ally or
gan
ized
move
ments
that seek
on
occasion
to
bring out

the grass roots, such
as NARAL (National Abortion Rights Action League)
or National
Right to Life
.

(
3)
The third element is “the con
nective
mobilizing stru
ctures

that link
leaders with the organization of collective action

center with periphery

permitting movement
co
-
ordination and allowing movements to persist over time.”

It is through s
uch mobilizing struc
-
tures
that
SMOs
are
able

to maintain both central

strategies of resistance and movement contin
-
uity.
The dilemma is that there needs to be enough
strategic
coherence
and organizational
strength
among the SMOs within a movement
so that
they are

able to move toward
their

com
-
mon
goals, but not so much
cohe
rence

and control at

the center
that
flexibility, indepen
dence,
and innova
tion at the base are suffocated.


(
1994.
135
-
136).



We need to d
elineat
e
the boundaries of
a social movement,
and the organizations giv
ing
continuity and strategic direction to t
hat movement, in order to

address the
critical
empirical
and
theoretical
question
s

of how social movements work,
that is,
what the
processes

are by which
they mobilize people

to

engage in actions which challenge authority
,

contest
(or, if
from the
right
, s
eek to re
-
enforce)
existing distributions of power, and
compel

change
in

the social envi
-
ronmen
t
, which, after all, is their reason for being in the first place.
The major set of theore
tical
approaches
which, since the late 1970s, have evolved
to
grapple
with
this issue

come

together
under the
general
rubric of
the

framing perspective
.

The framing perspective assumes that the



iv

Reissued in 1998 as
Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics.


major work of social

movements

that is, of SMO activists, since move
ments of themselves
don’t ‘act,’ only the individuals who parti
cipate in
them d
o
--

is to provide restive populations
with new ways of interpreti
ng the world, and making sense of the grievances they may be
experiencing, as the everyday conditions of their lives begin to alter.



As stable institutional orders undergo
strain


from, for example, new technologies of pro
-
duction, new modes of communication, information access, and transport, new entrants into the
middle classes, new patterns of upward (or downward) mobility, population flows, and consump
-
tion
--

the legitim
ating beliefs and existing justifications for the received social order, with its
taken for granted hierarchies,
apparently just
distributions of
dominance and
power, and
accepted
ways of doing things, begin to weaken.
In such eras of rapid social transfor
mation, people,
through social networks and iden
tity
-
based group
ings, begin to question the dominant social
arrangements, and to talk of alterna
tives. The informal structures of everyday life become the
conduits through which ordinary people construct
resistance. The history of social movements
could, per
haps, be written as the history of aggrieved members of society, in times of crisis,
reframing dominant systems of belief, drawing on traditional repertoires of resistance, and
remaking them into innov
ative modes for establishing control over the conditions which shape
their lives
.
What was once stable and
unquestioned

becomes prob
le
m
atic, new grievances
emerge, and spaces
for re
-
visioned
interpretation
s of everyday life

open up
.




What social movem
ent theorists began to recognize

under, perhaps, the intellectual
influence of thinkers like
Antonio
Gramsci (1971), the critical theory of Frankfurt school writers
like Horkheimer and Adorno (1944; English Translation 1972),
cultural anthropologists like
Clifford Geertz (1973),
and social phenomenologists like Gregory Bateson (1972) and Erving
Goffman (1974)

-
-

was that there were no fixed or
automatic

ways in which populations would
react
to those changes and grievances

and
re
-
order their
modes
of thinkin
g
about
them.
While the
appear
ance of cracks in received political orders changes people's experience of their world, it
does not of itself lead to collective action. The
meaning

of those orders must be re
framed, so that
subject populations come to see s
ocietal trans
formation as both desirable and possible. Thus,
frame re
-
alignment

becomes a major fac
tor in the articulation of organ
ized resistance to existing
forms of domination.



According to frame theory, the work of social movements, given that no
conceptual frames
automatically appear for understanding and assign
ing meaning to breaks with the past, is
pre
-
cisely to develop and diffu
se new framing ideas

for the purpose of mobilizing people, in
the
face
of
changing

conditions, to gain some measure
of control over their lives. As a seminal article,
originally
pub
lished in 1986, described the process,



SMOs and their activists not only act upon the world, or segments of it, by
attempting to exact concessions from target groups or by obstructing dai
ly rou
-
tines, but they also frame the
world in which they are acting.

(Snow et al, 1997
237).


A dialectical relationship exists between SMOs and what Snow and Benford
, in a later article,

refer
red

to as “the tar
gets of mobilization,” the populations whic
h activists seek to
bring to
collective action
.

For e
mergent
framings
need to
mesh

with
the events and experiences in the
everyday
worlds of their tar
geted groups. The effectiveness of social move
ments in re
-
directing
and re
-
orienting
vulner
able

belief

syst
ems

turn
s

on the extent to which such framings possess
empirical credibility, or ‘frame reson
ance.


The dialectical tension between movement entrepre
-
neurs
v

and their ‘target populations’ is that the n
ew frames

brought by the former
must resonate
w
ith
, at the same time as they re
-
align
,

existing “cultural narra
tions
,
” that is, the stories, myths,
and folk tales that are part and parcel of
a community’s cultural heritage

[
1988
pp. 207
-
211]
.
Activists

have the daunting task of constructing and dissem
inating frames
t
hat align
with even as
they seek to realign
popular belief.



Frame alignment processes are crucial to collective action: the tension between received
and newly articulated ideologies have shaped all mod
ern move
ments for change
.
vi

We can,
for
example, have no appreciation of the move
ments of the last century, from the labor movement of
the 1930s, to the civil rights, peace, and women’s movements of the 1960s and 1970s, to the
envi
ron
men
tal
and gay rights
movement
s of the 1980s and
199
0s, to the post
-
war rise of the
human rights movement itself, without compre
hen
ding how and under what condit
ions broad
constituencies shake loose from
received under
standings of the world. Frame theory argues that
such shifts
are

made possible by the e
fforts of activists
as they

con
struct new frames, create
bridges between them (between, for example, feminist, ecologi
cal, and human rights frames),
and seek frame transformation
, since

“new values may have to be planted and nurtured, old
meanings or und
erstandings jettisoned., and erroneous beliefs…

re
framed in order to garner
support and secure participants.”

(Snow et al.

1997).




Precipitated by the activism and political turbulence of the 1960s, f
raming

was a powerful
challenge to older versions of
social movement theory
,

which
defined stability and social equilib
-
rium as both natural and normative,
saw collective action as a set of irrational responses to the
st
rains created by
the disruptions of moder
n
ity
, and
read
social conflict as a form of

dy
sfunction
to be contained
by the re
-
integra
tion of dissi
dent actors
back
into the overall consensual
codes
of
the society. (See
, among others,

the work of Talcott Parsons, Neil Smelser,
and
William Korn
-
hauser.)
Frame and resource mobilization theory, on

the other hand,

dr
awing upon

what Doug
McAdam

called
, in his 1982 study of the Civil Rights Movement
,

the ‘political process model,’
argued that conflict and social disruption could be most fruitfully understood as responses to
growing
per
cep
tions of
re
ceived

social arrangements
as

u
njust.
The
se scholars

extended the
origins

of social protest to include such factors as face to face networks, collective action frames,
politi
cal culture, and broad
-
based societal mentalities. (Tilly,
1
978;

McAdam,
1982; Mor
ris,1984;
Rud
é,1980
).

O
ne might argue
, however,

that frame theory
set
s

too much store on the extent to
which SMO
entre
pre
neurs, as the theory label
s

them
,

br
ing

new frames
to

aggrieved constitu
-
encies
, and d
o

the work of frame construc
tion, bridging,
amp
lification, and transformation
for
these groups, catching
their members
up in what might be des
cribed as a slowly unfolding
process of ‘ah
-
hah!’ and
ther
eby
bringing them into

challenging
move
ment
s

tenants’
movements, for example, where residents of

decay
ing buildings in urban ghettos discover, under



v

“…when sociologists use t
he term ‘entrepreneur,’ they are referring…to people who exhibit strategic initiative in
spreading the word about their cause and promoting its message…” (Noakes and Johnston, 2004, 7).


vi

For a discussion of the differences and similarities between ‘fra
mes’ and ‘ideologies’ see the essays in Noakes
Johnson,
Frames of Protest
. The concepts overlap, but differ in theoretically significant ways as well.


the tutelage of
housing
advo
cates based in local
grass
-
roots and
com
mu
nity organizations,
discover,
that
, with some organi
za
tional structure

under their belt
,

th
ey c
an

mount a rent strike.



Certai
nly
the
leadership,
the skills and
repertoires of intervention, and
the
familiarity with

strategy and organization
al processes

that activists bring to the work of mobilization
are

critical.
Thus, w
hile g
ranting
the conclusion of

a number of studies that fr
ames “occasionally develop in
the streets as protesters mobilize,” Noakes and
Johnston
nevertheless
assert that



…many collective action frames are still primarily the product of social movement entre
-
preneurs making practical decisions in response to the

styles, forms, and normative codes
of the target audience. The construction of most collective action frames requires the con
-
scious action of social movement entrepreneurs interested in mobilizing people to engage
in collective action (200
5
, 7).”


Frame
theorists are correct in recognizing that

t
here is a knowledge
-
base to social practice
,

and

that

it is
carried by experienced organi
zers
;
divorced from that knowledge
-
base, movements are
likely to
drift and decline
.

The people seldom ‘just rise up,’ and,
when they do, their actions are
often directionless and self
-
defeating.
vii

At the same time,
mobili
za
tion

theory
must be careful

not
to
under
play the extent to which
identity
-
based groupings construct
the
meaning
s of action

for themselves
.

For, f
rom the p
erspective of those embed
ded in the daily routines of
work,
neighborhood, and
family, move
ment practitioners

and
the
activit
ies

they
promote

are just one
small element
in th
e flow of imme
diate experience,
on
e
among

a set of catalytic agents

whose
combin
ed historical presence
serve
s

as
necessary condition

for
the emergence of
collective
action
.



We need a
theoretical
language for exploring the internal and autonomous processes by
which commu
ni
ties

and face
-
to
-
face networks

con
struct interpretive frame
s

out of their own
experience
,

drawing
on the
presence and force of move
ment organi
zers

for insight and direction,

perhaps, but

functioning independently of them as well
.
To be fair, such a discourse
began to
appear along
with the
development

of frame the
or
y

in the 1970s and 1980s
, and was often imbri
-
cated in the writings of those theorists themselves.

Researchers examined the role played by
tra
-
di
tions of resistance (‘ancient rights and liberties,’ for example), social net
works, community
sol
i
daritie
s, and
free spaces

in the construc
tion of social action.

(
Evans and Boyte, 1986;
McAdam, 1982; Morris, 1984; Morris and Mueller, 1992; Piven and Cloward, 1979; Snow et.
al., 1986; Tarrow, 1994; Tilly,

1978
, 2002
).
By the 1990s these various studies and a
pproaches
had begun to converge on the idea of
narrative

as an analytic c
onstruct for pulling together and
illuminating a wide range of issues and concerns in the

study of social movements
. This turn
towards
narrative,

Joseph E. Davis writes,

was

clearly
part of a renewed emphasis in thes
e
fields on human agency and its efficacy, on context and the embeddedness of human experience,
and on the centrality of language to the negotiation of meaning and the construction of identity in
everyday life (2002 3)”.




vii

The notion that the people will spontaneously rise as one to defeat their oppressors, ‘The people, un
ited, will
never be defeated,’ is a venerable myth of social protest. It has recently been recycled in the writings and specula
-
tions of such advocates of global populism as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, but with some sophisticated
theorizing, and usin
g the language of postmodernism. See
Empire
, 2000, Harvard University Press.




Davis believed the idea of narrative could speak to some of the limitations he recognized in
frame theory.



…The framing perspective… emphasizes

in fact overemphasizes

the role of clearly
articulated and coherent reasons for movement activism. Narrative
analysis, by contrast,
illuminates persuasion and shared vision at more subtle, imaginative…levels


Through
stories, participants are called to take an evaluative stance toward unjust social conditions


and imagine together an alterna
tive so
cial order.
This mobilizing work does not mean
that stories supplant frames or render them unnecessary. But it does suggest that in many
contexts of action stories precede frames

and

overshadow frames in mobilizing power
and as a political resource
… (Ibid 24)


The fr
ames through which people come to action may be shaped by organizers, but they

evolv
e
primarily
from the
stories people tell to them
selves and to one another about who they are
,

and
how and
to whom they are connected.
They
grow out of

the inter
weav
ing o
f personal and social
bio
gra
ph
y


fr
om the stories people rehearse
in their communities and rounds of daily life

about
the nature of
that

life,
and from the
remembered
h
istories
which

they draw upon to
provide them
with

common

identity
.

Movements

are the
material embodiment of
narratives of resistance
.




The literature exploring the concept of narrative has become too vast for any single work
to encompass

indeed, it is a
n entire

field of specialization

and certainly no single definition
can exhaust the
variety of meanings which have been assigned to it.
viii

One might approach the
topic oblique
ly
, drawing on
the literary insight of

a writer like

Joan Didion
.

“We tell ourselves
stories in order to live,”
Didion
says in t
he first sentence of
The White Album
.



...We look for the sermon in the suicide, for the social or moral lesson in the
murder of five. We interpret what we see, select the most workable of the multiple
choices. We live entirely…by the imposition of a narrative line upon disparate
images, by
the ‘ideas’ with which we have learned to freeze the shifting
phantasmagoria which is our actual experience. (11)


Didion goes on to talk about her breakdown, and what happens when the constructed narratives
through which we live disappear. The self cannot

exist without a narrative to hold it together, and
neither can a community. Stories
show each of
us how
our
own
li
fe

is reflected in the life of the
other,
motivate us

to
join in common predicament
, tell us
what to value and how to
judge, and
not only whe
n and how to act, but which acts are acceptable, and which are not

which does not
mean we
always
choose those actions which

the received narratives of
our social worlds
tell us
are the acceptable ones. Indeed, it is precisely in the process of people’s com
ing together
to chal
-
lenge what the

stories of their

society

tell them is

acceptable, that social movements are born.



More rigorous conceptions of narrative are available in the social science literature, of
course. These usually start with the intuitive

idea that narrative
gives meaning to
the
subjectively
experienced
flow of events
by

connect
ing them

in ways not present
to

the
immediate experience



viii

For suggestive, bibliographies see Hinchman and Hinchman, 1997, and Franzosi, 1998.


of the
events themselves
. The meaning lies in
the nature of the connection
.

“It is the story

the
chronologi
cal succession of events
-

that provides the basi
c

building blocks of narrative,” writes
Roberto Franzosi. “Without story, there is no narrative.” (520

Italics added
).
Another often cited
definition of narrative is from Margaret Somers and Gloria Gibson:


Above all, narratives are
constellations of relation
ships

(connected parts) embedded in
time and space
, constituted by
causal emplotment’.

(
1994: 59.)
A third example is a definition from two students of semiotics.
Narrative “links events into sequenti
al and causal chains, and gives them a beginning and end
(Hodge and Kress. 1988: 230).”



Such

definitions, as well as numberless others
,

Franzos
i tells us,
all have common roots
in
the Russian formalists of the beginning of the twentieth century
,
and
so
,
despite minor differ
-
ences
in emphasis and terminology
,
reflect

basic agreement.
(519)
ix
.

I am certain
ly in no posi
-
tion to contest
Franzosi’s assertion, or
th
e

central conception of narrative as
a mode of

expres
-
sion
which
meaningfully
connect
s

events thr
ough temporal and spatial relationships, but I do
think

these formulations
have to go further in order to
capture
the

larger sense in which narrative
might
shape people’s understanding
s

of their world.

For example,
I would suggest that it is
mean
ing
ful

to view the discourse of human rights
,

which emerge
s in beginning form

in the West

sometime in the 17
th

century,
as a narrative. It is
a narrative
which ‘tells the story’ of
who we are
as per
sons living within social orders,
and
what
arenas of autonomy
s
hould be available to us as
inhabi
tants of

those orders
.

‘Human rights,’ in that sense,
is a narrative about the dignity
of per
-
sons
under the conditions of modernity
.
But
it is not clear what
the spatial and temporal events
which compose
such a narrativ
e

are
.




Social narratives, it seems to me, must be understood as more than
just
a series of
emplot
-
ted events.
They are forms of

symbol
-
systems, to borrow a trope
offered by
Clifford Geertz

in
his

discussion of

ideology
(1972, pp. 193
-
229).

I hasten to a
dd that
I do not consider
n
arratives
as
variants of ideology
,
as Geertz
portrays

the
latter
concept,

but, as with the
fram
ing

perspec
-
tive
, there are overlaps and similarities

between the two
.
Borrowing from Geertz, I would pro
-
pose that n
arratives

be thou
ght of as

cognitive and expressive symbol systems, “…extrinsic sour
-
ces of information in terms of which human life can be patterned

extrapersonal
m
echan
isms for
the perception, understanding, judgment and manipulation of the world
..
.

(T)
hey are, most dis
t
-
inc
tively, maps of problematic social reality and matrices for the creation of collective con
-
science

(1972 216
, 220
).”

In order to
illustrate

the
meanings of a social narrative, o
ne m
ight

focus

upon a series of events which culminate in a resolution

of the tensions emanating from the
ways in which those events are connected,
but the larger social narrative is not necessarily a

story


in the sense that it is itself made up of
temporally related

events.

Narratives convey
meanings

on
to

events, but not
necessarily
by being
a set of related events themselves.



If the human rights narrative is not composed of a set of temporal or spatial events that
are
meaningful
ly connected
to one another, then
,

what is its content? As I suggested above,
the



ix

Here is one more definition
,

from
political theorists Lewis P Hinchman and Sandra K. Hin
chman in the
Introduction to their
1997
edited collection of essays
.

“In sum, we propose that narratives (stories) in the human
sciences should be defined provisionally as discourses with a clear sequential order that connect events in a
meaningful way fo
r a definite audience, and thus offer insights about the world and/or people’s experiences of it…

(xvi).



human right
s narrative
is
about the
character

of human dignity under conditions of modernity.
‘Dig
nity
,

however,
is
a
notoriously difficult idea to pin down
,
eithe
r conceptually or empiric
-
ally. It
appears as an undefined term in the Universal Declaration of Huma
n Rights, which sim
-
ply
avers
, as first premise, that “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”
(Lauren, 2003 306).
The Nobel Prize economist
Amartya Sen does not talk about human dignity,
and
no doubt
with good reason, but he does
talk about ‘capabilities,’ and the
principle

that
,

in the
contemporary world, a basic evaluative measure of
the state of development of
any society is the
extent to which its members have “the substantive free
doms

the capabilities

to choose a life
one has

reason to value (1999 74).’

The particulars of w
hat individ
uals will have ‘reason to val
-
ue’ cannot be
identified
, of course, since
those

will depend
, not only on the individual’s prefer
en
-
ces, but, more cri
t
i
c
ally,

on the historical context, cultural
norms, and level
s

of economic and
poli
ti
cal
develop
me
nt of the societies in which those preferences are expressed
. But let us

build
on Sen, and

assume that
, in the globalized society of today,

persons
generally
value social spaces
in which they
can live

without fear of physical harm
or

threats to their
auto
nomy,
and have
access to the material goods that make possible life choices
consistent with per
sonal sec
urity and
biological well
-
being (i.e.
, access to food, clothing,
shelter
, health

services
, and
educational
levels appropri
ate to their social aspirations
). Of course, to spell out further what a life lived with
‘dignity’ looks like

in the modern world
, one would have to turn to the specifics of the 30 articles
of the UDHR.




The narrative of
human

rights
legitimates, by telling the story of, a world in which all
persons
should have available the capacities for achieving
dignity, that is, have access to the
material and social modalities which
will
allow them to live with security and freedom.
T
his
type
of story

does not
meet

the conventional
definition of
narrative as
a
set of events which follow
one another in some sort of
temporal

order

(
emplotted

narratives do not have to be chronolo
-
gical


they can be told in flashback, jump around in time, or e
ven unroll backwar
d
--

but an
audience does usually need to be able to garner, at some point, where they are or were in the
temporality of the story),

connected by threads of construc
ted meaning. Rather,
to
borrow
ideas
from

Geertz
,
some narratives are

con
figured like

map
s.

Maps situate us, and literally tell us how
we might get from one point
to another

where the roads and pathways are, where
the
shortcuts,
res
ting points,
or
hazards
,

and
where the safest or most
challenging

routes to our des
tin
ations

c
an
be found
.

The difference is that social narratives are maps
, not of a physical terrain, but

of an
ideational and moral
one
,
relying upon
, not cartographic signs, but
images,
textual
codes, sym
-
bols, metaphors,
and, yes, emplotted stories
.
Broad social n
arratives

can contain

emplotted stor
-
ies
.

B
ut
, without themselves being emplotted with beginnings, middles, and ends,

social narra
-
tives
use

those stories
to
point the way to conceptual and normative structures
. They

pro
ject

premises, certainties, convent
ions, tenets, impera
tives, ways of thinking,
determina
tions of what
is just and unjust,
conclusions about the nature of the world,
and
convey
what behaviors are
expected of
the
individuals

whose consciousness th
ose narratives

inform.

They
might include

d
iscourses of popular and political economy, national identity, religious virtue, and family and
household life (Steinberg, 1988 857).
A dialectic of con
flict and change
appears

as new narra
-
tives, both wel
ling up from populations fac
ing profound disrupt
ions

in the content of their lives,
and drifting downward from progressive elites concerned with extending the reach of social
justice, clash with rooted narratives of power and domination.



Human rights,
I have argued

in this section
, emerge historically

as such a narrative, its
origins going back to the
original

stirrings of the idea of individual and natural rights in the
European West

in the seven
tee
nth century. But, just as, at
certain point
s

in a social
dynamic,
frames of interpretation broaden out
to become narratives, so do narratives, whether composed of
symbolic
images or emplotted
stories,

broaden out to what
students of society

have

identified

in
recent years as

social
imaginaries.


A social imaginary,
writes Charles Taylor,
“…
incorporates a
s
ense of the normal expectations we have of each other, the kind of common understanding that
enables us to carry out the collective practices that make up our social life.

Crucially, we are not
necessarily
aware of the
workings of these
imaginaries,
they
are part of a
“largely unstructured
and inarticulate understanding of our whole situation,” a background we do not quite see a
s we
make choices and go about our business in the world.
Their quiet and
taken
-
for
-
granted

presence
is one of the central
w
ays th
ey differ from narratives

(2004 24).


I
n the concluding section of the paper,
I want briefly to explore
the
extent to which the
discourse of

human rights
might
be
said to take on the characteristics of an
imaginary,
and,
given
the existence of state and cu
ltural regimes which seem intent on nullifying its
presence

as a
moral force,
what processes continue to reproduce it,
even as it remains, as narrative, open and
incomplete
, and as imaginary, contested.


III

Producing the

Hu
man Rights Imaginary


Taylor mak
es clear
at the beginning of his work,
Modern Social Imaginaries
,
that the
particular imaginaries whose de
velopment and functioning he discusses
in
t
his work, are
products of the West, and that there
are different paths of contemporary modernization. (2)
I
ndeed, the charge that human rights
sometimes take on the mantle of
a Western
imperial
discourse is
a

frequent
criticism
, and
I will have reason to look mo
re closely at this issue as we
consider some of

the ways
the
human rights

imaginary is contested.
But
, for the remainder of the
paper, I want to concentrate
on the ideas and practice of human rights discourse

primarily
as
they
have

developed under
the
influence of Western beliefs and inherited institutions.


In his text, Taylor explores three forms of soc
ial existence that, since the beginnings of
the Enlightenment

have come
, he argues, to define the content of the Western imaginary: the
market economy, the public sphere, and the self
-
gov
erned people. But to these he wants to add a
fourth, “which


has

bec
ome embed
ded in our understanding of the normative order
..
.

(and) …
has come to structure our social imaginary in somewhat the same way and by the same process
as popular sovereignty has.


(172 Italics added.)
In England, under the regime of the Enlighten
-
ment,
the
laws, instead of enshrining merely the rights

of Englishmen,

“began to be seen as
reflec
tions of the Natural Right, of which the great seventeenth century theorists [Grotius and
Locke] had spoken.”

These Natural Rights, assumed in concept, if

not in practice, to belong
equally to all Men, bec
a
me invoked in
such charters as
the Declaration of Independence, the
Rights of Man and Citizen,
and the American Bill of Rights. “This whole development reaches
its culmination in our time, in the period a
fter the Second World War, in which the notion of
rights as prior to and untouchable by political structures becomes widespread
-

although they are
now called ‘human’ rather than ‘natural rights…
’ (173)

In Taylor’s view, h
uman rights have
become one of the
principal defining characteristics of the
supra
national order

which

the
1945
United Nations Charter and
1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
,

sought to bring into
being. In that sense, however tragic its shortcomings and devastating its failures,
the

discourse of
human rights

may be conceived as

an evolving

part of a contemporary global imaginary.


The human rights imaginary, though sparked by the unimaginable horrors and
abomina
-
tions

of the Second Great War of the twentieth century, was certainly no
t initiated by that enor
-
mity. The point, here, is that social imaginar
ies

must have deep historical roots,
becoming

embed
ded in the soil of
their

origins slowly and over time.

While
,

between the wars
,
the work

of
progressive thinkers and public figures l
ike H.G. Wells and
the exiled Soviet lawyer
Andre
Mandelstam
, for example,

helped lay the groundwork for the United Nations Charter (Lauren,
103
-
134), most studies of human rights focus on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as
the point where it beg
ins to make sense to talk of the rise of a human rights regime
.
But there is
an entire trajectory dating back to the seventeenth century which prepares the ground for the
appearance of human rights as a dominant discourse in the second half of the twentiet
h century.
There are full length studies tracing this
trajectory
,

texts
such
as

Paul Gordon Lauren’s
The
Evolution of International Human Rights

(2003), and Micheline Ishay’s
The History of Human
Rights

(2004),
and

there is no way a brief academic paper

ca
n do it justice
. But the argument that
the contemporary human rights discourse

has the properties of a social imaginary
,

needs to
identify at least some of the nodes through which that imaginary
became

historically
grounded.
I
select a only a few.


My list
ing starts with

the
1648
Peace of Westphalia, which literally created the interna
-
tional order by establishing the prin
ciple of sovereignty, but which, more critically for what
begins as the human rights
narrative
, also set in place the first glimmerings
of the principle of
freedom of conscience, for kings could
now
no longer force their subjects to adopt the religion of
the crown
,

and
Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinist

dissidents
, at least,

were allowed
to ‘frequent
privately their place of worship without

being subjected to enquiry or disturbed.’ (Kamen 1967
159). In 1690 John Locke’s
Second Treatise of Government

was published. 1776 witnessed the
American Declaration of Independence, and 1789, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man
and Citizen. The f
irst half of the nineteenth century saw the rise of workers’ movement
s

and the
concept of social and economic rights.
A profound turning point in what Taylor might call the
‘long march’ of the human rights imaginary, was

the establishment of the Internatio
nal Com
-
mittee of the Red Cross at Geneva in 1864
.
For the first time since Westphalia, national sover
-
eignty
, by agreement of the parties to the Convention,

was
held in abeyance
,
as

the
Red Cross
took on the mantle of neutrality, and its
workers
granted t
he right to treat all
those
wounded

in
the fields of war

as human beings
independent

of any particular national allegiance or identity.
(Thus did the Bush administration, by insisting the Geneva Convention did not apply to those
incarcer
ated at Guantanamo

Bay, place those it suspected of terrorism beyond the bounds of
humanity.) The next
major

historical
moment in the development of the human rights narrative/

imagin
ary d
oes not occur for
another
80 years, with the signing of the UN Charter in 1945, and
t
he acceptance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights three years later.
(See the chrono
-
logy at the end of the Ishay volume, 357
-
367). I include in this list, as well,
the founding of
Amnesty Interna
tional

in 1961
, one of the first grassroots NGOs t
o be created in the post
-
war
years
. Amnesty’s mission was

to use
letter writing campaigns

and other forms of public
ity

to

bring pressure on
governments
,
regardless of their i
deological
position or political align
ment
,
which

‘imprisoned, tortured, or exec
uted’
any of
their

citizens
for
expres
sing

dissident political
or religious beliefs.
For Amnesty, human rights came before political partisanship, and p
art of
the organization’s
accomplishment,
therefore,
was to
discredit the practice of partisans who
igno
red or
justif
ied

human rights abuses in

nations
they ideologically supported.

(Clark2001 5).


Today, t
he work of continuing the production and reproduction of

a human rights imagin
-
ary
goes

on through a wide network of
formal and informal
organizations
,

in
tergovern
men
tal,
governmental
,

and nongovernmental
.

Global s
ocial movements

are integral to that process
,
and
,
as I argued above, have both material and idea
tional impacts that extend far beyond their imme
-
diate structures and memberships.
Kay
Schaffer
and
Sidonie
Smith
seek

to convey the
breadth
and
dynamic

of
these global human rights

practices
,

whic
h
are

almost too complex for
the
abstractions of
language to capture.

I cite
one of
their description
s

at length.


By the phrase ‘the field of human rights
’ we signal formal networks and informal
mesh works of intersecting domains through which life
-
narratives are enjoined to human
rights activism. Networks refer to independent, organized, hierarchical, and geographic
-
ally dispersed organizations and institu
tions that promote, monitor, and adjudicate rights
claims. The UN and its regional commissions constitute one formal network; NGOs such
as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch and affiliated websites another….
Webs of alliances within and among var
ious groups resisting oppression

women, racial
and ethnic minorities, First Nation peoples, environmental and other groups… constitute
… meshworks of the human rights regime

the dense flows of connections among
groups and peoples working on behalf of human

rights that transcend national, ethnic,
racial, class, class, gender, and other social boundaries. Networks and meshworks inter
-
sect and interpenetrate in ways both mutually supportive and unpredictably contentious
and adversarial. (2004 8).


The existenc
e of
such
grim

realities as
the exercise of state sovereignty to
prevent

human rights
interventions
,
the
continuing
practice of
slavery, including

sex slavery,
and

the violence and
murder unleashed by
ethnic hatred
s
,

make
s

it

easy to condemn human rights a
s a failed
imaginary. But one must, at the same time, take into account what the world might look like if
the legal and moral standards set by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
had not come
into existence
.



S
erious challenges remain to the groundi
ng
of

a

human rights imaginary.

The argument
that many developed nations in the West hide behind the discourse of human rights to justify
expl
oitative forms of corporate globalization
, and further their own position
s

of

global power
,

cannot be easily dism
issed.
Nor is the
argument that

religious governance, and
commun
al

and
collective
values

are

integral
to the
cultural outlooks

of non
-
Western
societies

simply
a cover for
authoritarian

political prac
tices
.

There are genuine concerns here.

The human right
s imaginary
remains
contested and unsettled.

References



Bateson, Gregory. 1972.
Steps to an Ecology of Mind
. New York: Ballantine Books


Calhoun, Craig. “
Imagining Solidarity: Cosmopolitanism, Constitutional Patriotism, and the
Public Sphere,”

in
Public

Culture

14.1 (2002) 147
-
171


Clapham, Andrew. 2007.
Human Rights: A Very Short Introuiction
. Oxford University Press.


Clark, Ann Marie.2001.
Diplomacy of Conscience
. Princeton University Press.


Davis, Joseph E., “Narrative and Social Movements: The Pow
er of Stories,” in Davis,
Stories of
Change: Narrative and Social Movements
. 2002. State University of New York Press.


Didion, Joan.1979.
The White Album
. Pocket Books.


Evans, Sara M. and Harry C. Boyte. 1986.
Free Spaces: The Sources of Democratic


Cha
nge in America
. New York: Harper and Row.


Franzosi, Roberto. “Narrative Analysis

Or Why (And How) Sociologists Should Be Interested
In Narrative.” 1998. Annual Review of Sociology 24: 517
-
54

Gaonkar, Dilip Parameshwar, “Toward New Imaginaries: An Introduc
tion,” Public Culture 14.1
(2002) 1
-
19

Geertz, Clifford. 1973.
The Interpretation of Cultures
. Basic Books.


Goffman, Erving. 1974.
Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience
.


Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press


Gramsci,
Antonio. 1971.

Selections from the Prison Notebooks
. Edited and Translated by
Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. International Publishers.


Hinchman, Lewis P., and Hinchman, Sandra K. 1997.
Memory, Identity, Community: The Idea of
Narrative in the Hu
man Sciences
. State University of New York Press.


Hobsbawm, E.J. 1959.
Primitive Rebels
. New York: Norton and Co.


Hodge, Robert, and Kress. 1988.
Social Semiotics
. New York: Cornell University Press.


Horkheimer, Max, and Adorno, Theodor W. 1972.
Dialect
ic of Enlightenment
. Translated by
John Cumming. Herder and Herder Inc.


Ishay, Micheline R. 2004.
The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the
Globalization Era
. California University Press.


Kamen, Henry. 1969.
The Rise of Toleration
. McGraw
-
Hi
ll.


Keck, Margaret E. and Sikkink, Margaret. 1998.
Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks
in International Politics
. Cornell University


Kornhauser, William. 1959.
The Politics of Mass Society
. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press.


Lauren, Paul Gordon. 200
3.
The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen, 2
nd

Edition.
University of Pennsylvania Press.


McAdam, Doug. 1982.
The Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency
.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press.


Morris, Aldon. 1984.
The

Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities


Organizing for Change
. New York: The Free Press.


Noakes, John A., and Hank Johnston. “Frames of Protest: A Road Map to a Perspective,” in
Noakes and Johnson, eds.,
Frames of Protest: Social Moveme
nts and the Framing
Perspective
. 2005. Rowman and Littlefield.


Piven, Frances, and Richard Cloward. 1979.
Poor People’s Movements: Why They


Succeed, How They Fail
. New York: Vintage Books.


Rude’ George. 1980.
Ideology and Popular Protest
. New York: Pan
theon Books.


Schaffer, Kay, and Smith, Sidonie.
Narrated Lives: The Ethics of Recognition
. 2004. Palgrave
Macmillan


Sen, Amartya. 1999.
Development As Freedom
. Anchor Books.


Snow, David
A
. et. al. 1986. “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and


Movement Participation,”
American Sociological Review
. 51:464
-
81.


___________ and Benford, Robert D. 1988. “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant


Mobilization” in
International Social Movement Research
. Vol. I, pp. 197
-
217.


Snow, David A., Soule
, Sarah, and Kriesi, Hanspeter. “Mapping the Terrain,” in Snow et. al.,
eds.,
The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements
. 2004. Blackwell Publishing.


Somers, Margaret R., and Gibson, Gloria D. 1994. “Reclaiming the Epistemological Other:

Narrative and
the Social Constitution of Identity” in Craig Calhoun, ed.
Social Theory
and the Politics of Identity
. Cambridge, USA: Blackwell.


Steger, Manfred. 2003.
Globalization: A Very Short Introduction
. Oxford University Press.


Tarrow, Sidney.

2005.
The New Tran
snational Activism
. Cambridge University Press.


______________
1994.
Power in Movement
.

Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics.

New York and Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.


Tarrow Sidney, Bates, Robert H. (Editor), Lange, Peter,

(Editor). 1998.
Power in Movement:
Social Movements and Contentious Politics. Cambridge University Press.


Taylor, Charles. 2004.
Modern Social Imaginaries
. Duke University Press.


Thomas, Daniel C. 2001.
The Helsinki Effect
. Princeton University Press


T
hompson, E.P. 1963.
The Making of the English Working Class
. New York: Random House.


Tilly, Charles. 1978.
From Mobilization to Revolution
. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison
-
Wesley Publishing Company


Tilly, Charles. Stories, Identities, and Political Chang
e. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc., 2002. 255 pp