(1) Encryption and (2) Access to

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5 Νοε 2013 (πριν από 3 χρόνια και 11 μήνες)

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Conflicting Privacy Regimes:

(1) Encryption and (2) Access to
Cloud Records

Peter Swire

Ohio State University

Future of Privacy Forum

IAPP Global Summit 2012

Washington, D.C.

March 6, 2012

Overview


Part I: Encryption and globalization


Brief history of wiretaps


Encryption on the Internet


Crypto Wars of 1990s


India and China today


Part II: Emerging battles on access to the Cloud


Where will law enforcement get communications?


Encryption


CALEA
-
type laws


Seize before/after encryption


The cloud


Relevant Background


Chair, White House Working Group on
Encryption, 1999


Chair, White House Working Group on
updating wiretap laws for the Internet, 2000


Current project at Future of Privacy Forum on
government access to data in
global setting


Are These Good Ideas?


India: maximum crypto key length of 40 bits


China: require use of Chinese
-
created
cryptosystems, prohibit use of global
standards

Local
switch

Local
switch

Phone
call

Phone
call

Telecom
Company

3

Alice

Bob

Local
switch

Local
switch

Phone
call

Phone
call

Telecom
Company

3

Alice

Bob

Bob ISP

Alice ISP

%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%

%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%

Hi Bob!

Hi Bob!

Internet:
Many
Nodes
between
ISPs

Alice

Bob

%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%

%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%

%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%

%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%

%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%

%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%

%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%

%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%

Problems with Weak Encryption


Nodes between A and B can see and copy whatever passes
through


From a few
telcos

to many millions of nodes on the Internet


Hackers & criminals


Foreign governments


Amateurs


Strong encryption as feasible and correct answer


US approved for global use in 1999, after the “crypto wars”


India, China new restrictions on strong encryption


“Encryption and Globalization” says those restrictions are
bad idea, at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1960602


India


Since 1990s, law on book: 40 bit legal limit on key
length


No enforcement then


Mumbai attack, 2008


RIM and newly vigorous enforcement


Key escrow proposal 2011 (blocked)


Security agencies insist on ability to wiretap in real
time


Didn’t like the new technical reality


Encrypt

Encrypted message



Hi Bob!

Alice

Bob's public
k
ey

Bob's private key



Alice's local ISP

%!#&YJ@$

%!#&YJ@$

Decrypt

Hi Bob!

%!#&YJ@$

%!#&YJ@$



Bob's local ISP



Backbone provider

Bob

Encrypt

Encrypted message



Hi Fred!

Jill

at Corporation A, Tata

Public key of Corporation
B


Reliance

Private key of
Corporation B,
Reliance



Corporation A's ISP

%!#&YJ@$

%!#&YJ@$

Decrypt

Hi Fred!

%!#&YJ@$

%!#&YJ@$



Corporation B's ISP



Backbone provider

Fred at Corporation B

Reliance.

Lawful process:

(1)
Ask Tata before
encryption

(2)
Ask Reliance after
decryption



India


RIM enforcement


Threaten import controls if no cooperation


RIM announces server in India


Nokia announces server there as well


Ban SSL, VPNs, and all the other crypto?


Still have old law


40 bit limit


Big gap between law and reality


Not clear how India will use its leverage going
forward

China


Its Apparent Goals


Internal surveillance


General limits on effective crypto


Trade promotion


Indigenous Innovation Policy


To sell in China, make in China


Give them your IP


Use non
-
standard crypto
-
systems


If make in China and export, their system
spreads


China


1999 law generally prohibits commercial crypto, and
requires license for import or domestic use of crypto


Later soft law that no need for license except where
“core function” is encryption


Microprocessors, PCs, mobile phones OK


VPNs are not OK, “core function” is crypto


Great uncertainty about meaning of “core
function”, where you need their license

China


License requires use of non
-
standard crypto


Algorithms were provided only to Chinese
companies


In 2011, public release of 3 algorithms


Testing from non
-
Chinese has begun


Chinese algorithms/cryptosystems robust?


Problems of interoperability with global
standards


Additional limits on sales to state sector, which is
large


What’s Chinese Strategy?


Surveillance


“Air gap” at border, plaintext there


International standards


Support Chinese standards


Trade promotion


Spread Chinese standards


BUT


Threat to interoperability


Threat to end
-
to
-
end cybersecurity


No effective peer review of Chinese crypto

Why Crypto Matters


Crypto central to computing & thus cybersecurity


Crypto deeply embedded in modern computing:


SSL, HTTPS, VPNs, Skype/VOIP, Blackberry


Offense is ahead of the defense


The world is our bad neighborhood


Defense and the weakest link problem


Crypto as perhaps the largest category for effective
defensive


Don’t play cybersecurity with two hands tied behind your
back

The Least Trusted Country Problem


1990’s Clipper chip debate


Many expressed lack of trust in government access to the
keys


Globalization and today’s encryption debate


What if a dozen or 50 countries with the keys, or enforced
crypto limits?


What if your communications in the hands of your least
trusted country?


India/Pakistan; China/Taiwan; Israel/Iran


Don’t create security holes in global Internet


Wrap
-
Up on Part I


Strong crypto crucial to your cybersecurity


Are you implementing VPNs and other crypto
globally? (I hope so)


If so, legal risks in any of your countries?


Should your organization get more involved in
assuring secure computing and
communications?


Part II:


The Cloud


International Conflicts to Come



Law Enforcement Perspective


You’re the police


how do you wiretap
communications on the Internet?


9/11, Mumbai bombing


Want to implement lawful court order


Want to get content


In the clear (not encrypted)


In real time (the attack may be soon!)



BUT (finally) voice and e
-
mail are being encrypted

Ways to Grab Communications

1.
Break the encryption (if it’s weak)

2.
Grab
comms

in the clear (CALEA)

3.
Grab
comms

with hardware or software before or
after encrypted (backdoors)

4.
Grab stored communications, such as in the cloud



My thesis: #4 is becoming FAR more important, for
global communications


Global rules for the “front doors” of cloud providers
become far more important

Break the Crypto?


Just analyzed why crypto is pervasive and strong


India limits unlikely to work


Chinese standards might work, breaking
cybersecurity


How much of the rest of standard Web technology
will they refuse?

Ways to Grab Communications

1.
Break the encryption (if it’s weak)

2.
Grab
comms

in the clear (CALEA)

3.
Grab
comms

with hardware or software before or
after encrypted (backdoors)

4.
Grab stored communications, such as in the cloud

Local
switch

Local
switch

Phone
call

Phone
call

Telecom
Company

3

Alice

Bob

Bob ISP

Alice ISP

%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%

%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%

Hi Bob!

Hi Bob!

Internet:
Many
Nodes
between
ISPs

Alice

Bob

%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%

%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%

%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%

%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%

%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%

%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%

%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%

%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%

Limits of CALEA



Very bad security to have unencrypted IP go through
those web nodes


Skype and VOIP pervasive


How deep to regulate IP products & services?


WOW just a game?


Pre
-
clearance for IP communications?


FBI’s “going dark” argument has serious flaws and
will face opposition in the IP space

Ways to Grab Communications

1.
Break the encryption (if it’s weak)

2.
Grab
comms

in the clear (CALEA)

3.
Grab
comms

with hardware or software before or
after encrypted (backdoors)

4.
Grab stored communications, such as in the cloud

Governments Install Software?


Police install virus on
your computer


This opens a back door,
so police gain access to
your computer


Good idea for the police
to be hackers?


Good for cybersecurity?

Governments Install Hardware?


Reports of telecom
equipment that
surveil

communications
through them


Can “phone home”


Good to design these
vulnerabilities into the
Net?



2/16/2012, The
Atlantic:


“Chinese
Telecoms May
Be Spying on Large
Numbers of Foreign
Customers”

Ways to Grab Communications

1.
Break the encryption (if it’s weak)

2.
Grab
comms

in the clear (CALEA)

3.
Grab
comms

with hardware or software before or
after encrypted (backdoors)

4.
Grab stored communications, such as in the cloud

The New Emphasis on Stored Records


Strong crypto now widely deployed for email & web


Webmail using SSL, so local ISPs go dark


From switched voice to VOIP & other IP


CALEA less effective at the tower/local switch

Stored Records: The Near Future


Growth of the cloud


Global requests for stored records


Encrypted webmail, so local ISP less useful


VOIP, so local switched phone network less useful


If no Magic Lantern, then police go to stored records


Push for “data retention”, so police can get the
records after the fact

Wrap Up on Part II




If you are in law enforcement or national security,
new emphasis on access to stored records


If in country with cloud server, local service


If stored elsewhere, big new obstacle


Copyright holders want stored records, too


Stronger communication encryption


But new battles about stored record security


Many knocks on the front doors of cloud providers
and other record holders

For Your Organization



How respond to records requests in
-
country?


How respond to records requests from other
countries?


Internal procedures


Lawyers


Want to cooperate with lawful access


Want your brand to say that records are stored
securely


Worth a review for the coming requests?

Sources


Swire & Ahmad, “Encryption
and
Globalization”, at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1960602


“Going Dark vs. A Golden Age
of Encryption”,
https://www.cdt.org/blogs/2811going
-
dark
-
versus
-
golden
-
age
-
surveillance


www.peterswire.net