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T
-
HUMYN


A. Interpretation
-

Exploration means to expand humy
n presence to space

Logsdon, 9


professor of political science at George Washington, former director of the Space Policy Institute

(John, “Fifty Years of
Humyn

Spaceflight
Why Is There Still a Controversy?,”

http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20100025875_2010028362.pdf
)

Exploration as a Compelling Rationale

Many believe that the only sustainable rationale for a government
-
funded program of
humyn

spacefligh
t is to take the lead in exploring the solar system
beyond low Earth orbit.
20
The
MIT
white paper

provides an insightful definition of exploration:

Exploration is a
humyn

activity, undertaken by certain cultures at certain times for particular reasons. It
has components of national interest, scientific
research, and technical innovation, but is defined by none of them.
We
define exploration as an expansion of
the realm of
(humyn)
experience
, bringing people into new places, situations, and environments
, expanding and redefining what it means to be
humyn
. What is the role of Earth in
humyn

life? Is
humyn

life fundamentally tied to the earth, or could it survive without the planet?

Humyn

presence, and its attendant risk, turns a spaceflight into a story t
hat is compelling to large numbers of people. Exploration also has a moral
dimension because it is in effect a cultural conversation on the nature and meaning of
humyn

life.
Exploration

by this definition
can only be
accomplished by direct (humyn) presence

and may be deemed worthy of the risk of
humyn

life.
21

In the wake of the 2003
Columbia
accident that took the lives of seven astronauts and the report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board that criticized
the absence of a compelling
mission for
hum
yn

spaceflight as “a failure of national leadership,”
22
the U
nited
S
tates, in January 2004,
adopted a new policy to guide
its
humyn

spaceflight activities
. The policy directed NASA to “implement a sustained and affordable
humyn

and robotic program to explo
re
the solar system and beyond” and to “extend
humyn

presence across the solar system, starting with a
humyn

return to the Moon by the year 2020, in
preparation for
humyn

exploration of Mars and other destinations.”
23
This policy seems totally consistent w
ith the definition of
exploration provided in the MIT white paper
. The issue is whether such a policy and its implementation, focusing on
humyn

exploration
beyond Earth orbit, can provide an adequate and sustainable justification for a continuing program o
f government
-
sponsored spaceflight that will make
contributions that will outweigh the costs and risks involved to the “primary objectives” of national pride and prestige, and

also to some of the several
“secondary objectives.”


Development means humyn

Li
vingston 07



former adjunct professor in the Graduate School of Business at Golden Gate University his doctoral dissertation was titled
“Outer Space Commerce: Its History and Prospects” citing Eric Westling co
-
author of “The Space Elevator” and numerous papers on s
pace tech and
development [quals in card] (9/10/07, “This Week On The Space Show: Eric Westling”,
http://www.thespaceshow.com/guest.asp?q=298
)


Eric Westling is a

science writer
, pundit on science, technology, and economics. He is the
co
-
author of “The Spa
ce Elevator”

with
Dr. Brad Edwards . In addition, Mr. Westling is retired
and

is a
former Army officer

and helicopter pilot, civilian Airline Transport Pilot (ATP),
former consultant to many small companies regarding engineering, computer, and business tro
ubleshooting.
His most recent papers are on

S
olar
P
ower
S
atellites, Economics of
the Space Elevator, Energy

and time lag in the 21st century ,
and Eric’s axioms

(a list of principles
of science, technology and economics). Mr. Westling stats that “Space Dev
elopment is the only long term answer to the, just starting, energy shortage;
which will otherwise continue until we have an economic collapse.” He
believes that no
-
one is doing space development . Instead,
we have space technology, not development
. NASA h
as no TRL 10


therefore no plans to develop space

.
He defines space development as the rapid expansion of
manned

(staffed)
commercial
projects
in space
.


B. Violation


the a
ffirmative doesn’t increase humy
n missions in space


C. Voting issue




1. lim
its


they allow all robotic missions and satellites, this could be dozens of small additional
affs


2. negative ground


we don’t have disad links to launc
hing one additional probe


humy
n
missions are visible and contentious, and the core of the debate


POLITICS DA


Jackson Vanik

r
epeal coming now


Obama has launched an all
-
out push. Capital is key

Verona 3
-
29
[Ed, pres and CEO of the US
-
Russia Business Council, “The true cost of Jackson
-
Vanik,”
National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the
-
true
-
cost
-
jackson
-
vanik
-
6702?page=1

In January, the
Obama

administration publicly
stated that
lifting Jackson
-
Vanik

and extending Permanent Normal Trade Relations
(PNTR) to Russia
is now its top

trade
priority
. Se
cretary of State Hillary
Clinton
, U.S. Trade Representative Ron
Kirk and other
officials have testified

on Capitol Hill in support of such action.
Business has intensified its congressional
-
lobbying efforts

over the past three months,
briefing members

and
staff
on the urgency of action

to prevent damage to U.S. commercial interests and the
loss of American jobs. The
National Council on Soviet Jewry
(NCSJ),
a leading proponent of Jackson
-
Vanik

during the debate
over its adoption,
has joined the Coalition for

U.S.
-
Russia Trade

in calling for the amendment to be lifted. Hearings have been held in
the Senate Foreign Relations, Senate Finance and House Foreign Affairs Committees focusing on Russia, including Jackson
-
Vanik.
Senators and
Representatives

with whom I

have spoken overwhelmingly
accept the economic and commercial rationale

for lifting Jackson
-
Vanik and extending PNTR. At the same time, most of those Senators and Representatives express strong reservations about many

aspects of Russia’s
foreign and domes
tic policies. In addition, they largely hold the view that lifting Jackson
-
Vanik without replacing it with more relevant legislation in the
area of human rights would amount to acquiescence in the face of human
-
rights violations and the weak rule of law in

Russia. Discussion on Capitol Hill
revolves around the Sergey Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act (S.1039), a bill sponsored by Senator Benjamin Cardin (D
-
Maryland) which as of
this writing now has thirty
-
one cosponsors. Essentially, that bill would
deny visas and impose financial sanctions on Russian officials allegedly
responsible for the wrongful incarceration and death of a Russian lawyer working for an American law firm, apparently in repr
isal for his denunciation of
official corruption. It is up

to Congress and the administration to determine the merits of the Magnitsky bill or other measures that may be introduced in
conjunction with the lifting of Jackson
-
Vanik. An association such as the U.S.
-
Russia Business Council is reluctant to take a stan
d on an issue beyond our
commercial and economic remit. But we are confident that
failure
to take action

on Jackson
-
Vanik
would place U.S.
businesses

and workers
at a serious disadvantage

once Russia becomes a member of the WTO, certain to occur no later t
han the end of August. It is
abundantly clear that
Jackson
-
Vanik provides no leverage on the Russian government

now that the country is joining the WTO.
On the contrary,
Jackson
-
Vanik may even serve as a convenient anti
-
American foil for hard
-
liners within

the
Russian political establishment, as was asserted in recent open letters by leading members of Russia’s political
opposition
.


Expanding space exploration is perceived as controversial new spending
--

guarantees
backlash.

Handberg, 11

-

Professor and
Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Central
Florida (Rodger, “
Small ball or home runs: the changing ethos of US human spaceflight policy,” The Space
Review, 1/17,
ht
tp://www.thespacereview.com/article/1759/1
)

The US space program remained focused, not on duplicating Apollo, but on achieving another difficult goal such as going to Ma
rs, a logical extension
truly of the Apollo effort. Twice, the presidents Bush provided

the presidential rationale, if not support, for achieving great things.
The

Space
Exploration Initiative

(
SEI)

in 1989
and

the
Vision for Space Exploration

(VSE)
in 2004
were announced with great
fanfare but neither survived the realities of congressional

and presidential
budgeting
.

The VSE appeared on paper more
realistic about funding, but its choices were draconian: the ISS and space shuttle were both to be sacrificed on the altar of

the new program. The earlier
SEI died quickly, so hard choices were no
t required,
while the VSE in the form of the Constellation Program lingers on
although its effective demise appears certain. The Obama Administration prefers another approach while
the
new Congress is likely more hostile to big ticket discretionary spendin
g
. If the Tea Party faction in the
Republican House caucus means what it says, the future for Constellation or any other similar program is a
dim one
. The reality is that the Apollo program, the SEI, and the VSE are examples in space terms of the home run
approach. Such efforts confront
the cruel but obvious reality that
the human spaceflight program is considered by the public and most of Congress to be
a “nice to have,” but not a necessity when compared to other programs or national priorities.

Congressio
nal support is
narrow and constituency
-
driven (i.e. protect local jobs), which means
most in Congress only support the space program in the
abstract.
Big ticket items

or programs
are not a priority

for most, given other priorities.
What happens is what can

be loosely
termed normal politics: a situation where human spaceflight remains a low priority on the national agenda.
Funding for bold new initiatives
is going to be hard to come by even when the economy recovers and deficits are under control
.

The home r
un
approach has run its course at least for a time; now the small ball approach becomes your mantra.


Obama’s capital is key

Allison and Blackwill 11

[Graham Allison and Robert D. Blackwill October 2011 Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs Harvard University Russia and U.S. National Interests: Why Should Americans Care?
A Report of the Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interest Grah
am Allison Director of Harvard Kennedy
School’s Belfer Assistant Secretary of Defense in the first Clinton Administration Robert D. Blackwill is the
Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Deputy nation
al
security adviser for strategic planning under President George W. Bush, presidential envoy to Iraq and was the
administration’s coordinator for U.S. policies regarding Afghanistan and Iran]

Finally, given the disparities between U.S. and Russian interes
ts and governance,
lasting cooperation is
unlikely if not
impossible
without
determined
leadership from

far
-
sighted leaders
in the executive and legislative branches, particularly
the President
. To take the difficult steps necessary to build a foundation f
or a sustainable U.S.
-
Russian
relationship,

the White House must

not only discipline the executive branch
and focus its efforts,

but also
spend political capital in the U.S. Congress. Preoccupation with domestic priorities

in a highly polarized domestic po
litical
environment cannot Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests Report 19 but
limit the administration’s ability to build a
bipartisan consensus

on a controversial topic like American policy toward Russia
.


Failure to repeal undermines US
-
Russi
a relations

Miller 11

[Jacqueline, senior associate, “The WTO and the Reset” EastWest Institute
--

April 8
--
http://www.ewi.info/wto
-
and
-
reset]

It took Barack Obama several months and some tough lobbying to finally win congressional approval for the New ST
ART treaty last December, which
was seen as the key to the administration’s reset with Russia. Another fight could already be brewing over Obama’s support fo
r Russia’s World Trade
Organization (WTO) membership, which is the next big goal of the administrat
ion’s Russia policy. Citing Russian human rights abuses and lack of
democratic development, congressional critics want to keep Russia subject to the
Jackson
-
Vanik

amendment

a Cold War relic that,
if left in
place,
would

effectively
nullify

both Russian and U.S.
gains from Russian WTO membership
. But, somewhat surprisingly,
the administration could develop a win
-
win outcome by taking a page from its dealings with China, another country whose human rights practices stir
congressional unease.
The Jackson
-
Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade Act denies permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to non
-
market economies
that restrict emigration. The amendment was passed unanimously by both houses of Congress to pressure the Soviet Union to all
ow Soviet
Jews to
emigrate. In 1994, the Clinton administration found Russia to be in full compliance with the amendment’s freedom
-
of
-
emigration requirements. And in
2002, the United States officially began describing Russia as a market economy. Presidents Clinton,
Bush, and now Obama all declared their intention to
work with Congress to repeal the legislation as it applies to Russia, but no action has been taken. The reason: Congress stil
l sees Jackson
-
Vanik as a lever
to punish Russia for its human rights record ev
en when the executive branch is prioritizing the security aspects of the bilateral relationship.
Jackson
-
Vanik’s
ongoing application

has been a
major symbolic irritant

in the relationship
,
even though

the
U
nited
S
tates
has
granted Russia a waiver

every yea
r since 1992. But
once Russia joins the WTO,

which could happen next
year,
Jackson
-
Vanik
will go from being a symbol of mistrust to inflicting actual harm

both
to

Russia and
the U.S.
-
Russia relationship
.



Relations solve
nuclear war and turn the case

Alli
son

and Blackwill

11

[
Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs;
Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School, Robert D.
Blackwill, International Council Member, Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs
10
-
30,
"10
Reasons Why Russia Still
Matters"http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21469/10_reasons_why_russia_still_matters.html
]

That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S. govern
ment seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin’s decision to return
next year as president
makes it all the more critical for Washington to manage its
relationship with Russia

through coherent, realistic policies. No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do
business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless,
Russia is a player whose choices affect

our
vital interests

in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan
and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons
. Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by
engagin
g and working with Moscow. First,
Russia remains the only nation that can erase the United States from the map

in
30 minutes
. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized,
Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting
nuclear war
. Second,
Russia
is
our most consequential partner in preventing

nuclear
terrorism
. Through a
combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn
-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian
professionalism, two decades after t
he collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose. Third,
Russia
plays an
essential role in preventing

the
proliferation

of nuclear weapons and missile
-
delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive
toward nuclear we
apons,
Russian choices to sell or withhold sensitive technologies are the difference between failure
and the possibility of success
. Fourth,
Russian support in sharing intelligence and cooperating

in operations
remains
essential to the U.S. war to destroy

Al Qaeda and combat other transnational
terrorist groups
. Fifth,
Russia provides a vital
supply line to 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan
. As U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline
has grown ever more important and n
ow accounts for half all daily deliveries. Sixth, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and second largest gas
producer. Over the past decade, Russia has added more oil and gas exports to world energy markets than any other nation. Most

major energy t
ransport
routes from Eurasia start in Russia or cross its nine time zones. As citizens of a country that imports two of every three of

the 20 million barrels of oil that
fuel U.S. cars daily, Americans feel Russia’s impact at our gas pumps. Seventh, Moscow

is an important player in today’s international system. It is no
accident that Russia is one of the five veto
-
wielding, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as a member of the G
-
8 and G
-
20. A
Moscow more closely aligned with U.S. goals
would be significant in the balance of power to shape an environment in which China can emerge as a
global power without overturning the existing order. Eighth,
Russia is the largest country

on Earth by land area, abutting China on the East,
Poland in the
West and the United States
across the Arctic. This territory provides transit corridors for supplies to global
markets whose stability is vital to the U.S. economy
. Ninth, Russia’s brainpower is reflected in the fact that it has won more Nobel
Prizes for s
cience than all of Asia, places first in most math competitions and dominates the world chess masters list.
The only way U.S.
astronauts can now travel to and from the International Space Station is to hitch a ride on Russian rockets
. The
co
-
founder of the

most advanced digital company in the world, Google, is Russian
-
born Sergei Brin. Tenth,
Russia’s potential

as a spoiler
is
difficult to exaggerate
. Consider what a Russian president intent on frustrating U.S. international objectives
could do


from stopp
ing the supply flow to Afghanistan to selling S
-
300 air defense missiles to Tehran to
joining China in preventing U.N. Security Council resolutions
. So next time you hear a policymaker dismissing Russia with
rhetoric about “who cares?” ask them to identify

nations that matter more to U.S. success, or failure, in advancing our national interests.



DECADAL SURVEY CP

Text: The National Research Council should include
deploy
ment of

the Joint Milli
-
Arcsecond
Pathfinder Survey beyond the earth’s mesosphere
as a P
riority 1 recommendation in the 2013
-
2022 Decadal Survey for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.


[Generic]
The NRC’s decadal surveys are key to NASA mission design
-

NASA uses the surveys as
a core tenant of their space policies

NASA 11

[NASA, “
Decadal Survey”,
Oct. 19, 2011, http://science.nasa.gov/earth
-
science/decadal
-
surveys/

NASA relies on the science community to identify and prioritize leading
-
edge scientific questions

and the
observations required to answer them. One principal me
ans by which NASA’s Science Mission Directorate
engages the science community in this task is through the National Research Council (NRC).
The NRC
conducts studies that provide a science community consensus on key questions posed by NASA

and other U.S.
Gov
ernment agencies.
The broadest of these studies

in NASA’s areas of research
are decadal surveys
.

As the name
implies,
NASA and its partners ask the NRC

once each decade
to

look out ten or more years into the future and
prioritize research areas, observatio
ns, and notional missions

to make those observations.


[Human Spaceflight Specific] The CP results in the plan and builds consensus

Space Politics11

[“Would a Human Spaceflight Decadal Survey be Useful?”, 3/23/11, http://www.spacepolitics.com/2011/03/23/
would
-
a
-
human
-
spaceflight
-
decadal
-
survey
-
be
-
useful/]

Tucked away
in last year’s
NASA authorization act is

a provision
calling for an independent study about human
spaceflight
: SEC. 204. INDEPENDENT STUDY ON HUMAN EXPLORATION OF SPACE. (a) IN GENERAL.
-
In fi
scal year 2012 the Administrator
shall contract with the National Academies for a review of the goals, core capabilities, and direction of human space flight,

using the goals set forth in the
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, the National Aeronau
tics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2005, and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2008, the goals set forth in this Act, and goals set forth in any e
xisting statement of space
policy issued by the President
.
The study
’s scope, timeframe (the legislation
calls for

“findings and
recommendations
” for
fiscal years 2014
-
2023
), and use of the National Academies has caused
many people

to
liken this to the decadal surveys

used in
various space science disciplines, s
uch as

the recently
-
released planetary science decadal survey

.
But would such a study for human
spaceflight be effective?

That question was debated last week during

the Arthur C. Clarke Foundation “Living in Space” session

, part of the
Satellite 2011 trade show in Washington. While the session was sparsely attended, with no more than about 15 people in the au
dience, the event featured
a good debate
about whether such a study will make much

of a
difference in shaping the lo
ng
-
term future of human
spaceflight.

“Part of the problem,
the reason

why
we’ve been

going around and around

and around
, is that we have
not been forced to reach a consensus


on the goals of human spaceflight, said NASA’s Phil McAlister. “This is why I bel
ieve in this
Academies
-
like study that will allow the human spaceflight community to come together
, like the science community
has done for years and years,
effectively.
” “
With that kind of document

and blueprint… then finally, maybe,
we can get the long
-
t
erm consensus required to actually finish one of these programs
,”

he said. “That is my sincere hope.”



CP is popular



Congress defers to the recommendations

Brumfiel 2006

(Jeff; physical sciences correspondent; “Wishing for the Stars”; Nature; Vol 443;
28 September 2006)

It’s that kind of power that has left astronomers enamoured of
the decadal review
. “It
builds a consensus

in the field and it prioritizes,”
says Turner. “Any group of scientists can produce a wish list that exceeds the GNP of the Milky W
ay,” adds Roger Blandford, director of the Kavli
Institute for Particle Astrophysics and Cosmology. The decadal
-
review process helps astronomers to whittle the list down to a realistic level and “make
tough calls”.
If
the surveys

appealed only to scientist
s they would be of limited value, but they
appeal to
Washington

too.
Agencies such as NASA and the National Science Foundation often depend on the survey to
help them determine which programmes to back. And the tidy list of priorities makes it a favourite
with the
White House

Office of Management and Budget, which recommends yearly spending for those agencies.
It also
steadies the

United States’ famously chaotic
congressional budget process
, according to David Goldston, chief
of staff for the House Committe
e on Science. “In general,
on real science questions, Congress tends to defer to
the community
,” he says. “It’s an area where
Congress really recognizes that it doesn’t have the expertise to
make a decision on its own.”


GENDER K

IR is gendered


this
makes violence inevitable

Steans 98

[Senior Lecturer in International Relations Theory, Director of the Graduate School for the
University of Birmingham, 1998 (Jill, Gender and International Relations, An Introduction, page 108
-
109)]

Critical approaches to

International Relations criticize the state centrism of realism, not only because it is inherently reductionist, but also bec
ause it
presents a view of the state as a concrete entity with interests and agency. Not only does the state act, but the state ac
ts in the national interest. Those
who adopt critical approaches view the state in dynamic rather than static terms, 15 as a 'process' rather than a 'thing'. Th
e 'state' does not exist in any
concrete sense; rather it is 'made'.
The state is made by the pr
ocesses and practices involved in constructing boundaries
and identities, differentiating between the 'inside' and the 'outside'
. Andrew Linklater has recently argued that critical
approaches to the study of International Relations centre around understand
ing the processes of 'inclusion' and 'exclusion', which have in a sense always
been the central concerns of the discipline. However, as Linklater contends, critical theorists understand that these proces
ses have also worked to
‘include’ and ‘exclude’ peop
le on the basis of race, class and gender.
In

the ‘
making’

of
the state

the
construction of the
hostile
‘other’ which is threatening
and
dangerous is central to

the
making
of
identitites

and the securing of
boundaries
. Indeed, David Campbell argues that
the legitimate on of state power demands the construction of danger
‘outside’. The
state requires this
‘discourse of danger’
to secure its identity

and for the
legitimation of

state
power
.

The consequence of this is that
threats to security

in realist

an
d neo
-
realist
thinking are
all
seen
to be in the
external
realm and
citizenship becomes synonymous with

loyalty to the nation
-
state and
the
elimination of
all that is
foreign
.

Jean Elshtain has argued that the problems of war and the difficulties of achieving security in the so
-
called ‘anarchy’ of the international realm, should
not be seen as problems which are not rooted in the compulsion of interstate relations as such. Ra
ther, they arise from ‘the ordering of modern,
technological society’ in which political elites have sought to control the masses by the implementation of ‘the mechanism of

the perfect army’. Elshtain
argues that to see war as a continuation of politics b
y other meanns, is to see a continuation of the ‘military model’ as a means of preventing civil
disorder. In critiquing dominant conceptions of security in International Relations, feminists have, to some extent, echoed t
he arguments of non
-
feminist critic
al thinkers, but have been concerned to show what is lost from our understanding of security when gender is omitted. As was n
oted in
chapter 4,
feminist

political
theorists
have
demonstrate
d that
in much Western political thought

the conception of
politics

and the public realm

is

a 'barracks community', a realm
defined in opposition to

the
disorderly forces which threaten
its existence
.22
This
same conception of politics
is constructed out of masculine hostility towards the female
'Other'.
One sees in the d
evelopment of this political discourse a deeply gendered subtext in which the citizen
role is in all cases identified with the male
.23

Hartsock believes that this sets a hostile and combative dualism at the heart of the
community men construct and by which

they come to understand their lives.24


Ignorance of gender m
akes their methodology suspect
. The alternative is to
vote negative to
investigate how reality is constituted
this is key to

develop a basis for action and avoid error
replication

Peterson and
Runyan 99

[professor of political science at the University of Arizona and professor of
women’s studies at Wright State University, 1999 (V. Spike and Anne,
Global Gender Issues
, 2
nd

edition, p. 1
-
3)]

Whenever
we study

a topic, we do so
through a lens
that

necessarily
focuses our attention in particular ways
. By
filtering or "ordering" what we look at,
each lens enables us to see some things in greater detail or more accurately or in
better relation to certain other things. But this is unavoidably
at th
e expense of
seeing
other things

that are
rendered out of focus
--
filtered out
--
by each particular lens
. According to Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi,
various

theoretical
perspectives, or
"
images," of international politics contain

certain
assumptions

and
lead
us "to

ask certain
questions,
seek certain

types of
answers
, and
use certain methodological tools
."1 For example,
different
images act
as lenses

and
shape our assumptions about who

the
significant actors are

(individuals? states? multinational corporations
?),
what their attributes are (rationality? self
-
interest? power?), how social processes are categorized (politics? cooperation? dependence?),
and
what
outcomes are desirable

(peace? national security? global equity?).
The images or lenses we use have impo
rtant
consequences because they
structure what we look for

and
are able to "see
."

In Patrick Morgan's words,
"Our
conception of [IR acts as a] map for directing our attention and distributing our efforts, and using the wrong
map can lead us into a swamp in
stead of taking us to higher ground
."2 What we look for depends a great deal on how we make
sense of, or "order," our experience. We learn our ordering systems in a variety of contexts. From infancy on, we are taught
to make distinctions enabling
us to per
form appropriately within a particular culture. As college students, we are taught the distinctions appropriate to particular

disciplines (psy
-

chology, anthropology, political science) and particular schools of thought within them (realism, behavioralism,

liberalism, structuralism). No matter in
which context we learned them, the categories and ordering frameworks shape the lenses through which we look at, think about,

and make sense of the
world around us. At the same time, the lenses we adopt shape our e
xperience of the world itself because they shape what we do and how and why we do
it. For example, a political science lens focuses our attention on particular categories and events (the meaning of power, de
mocracy, or elections) in ways
that variously inf
luence our behavior (questioning authority, protesting abuse of power, or participating in elec
-

toral campaigns
).
By filtering
our

ways of
thinking about

and ordering experience, the categories and
images

we rely on
shape how we behave

and thus
the world
we live in
: They have concrete consequences
.
We observe this readily in the case of self
-
fulfilling prophecies:
If we expect hostility, our

own
behavior

(acting superior, displaying power)
may elicit responses

(defensive posturing, aggression)
that
we then

interpret as "
confirm
ing" our
expectations
. It is in this sense that we refer to lenses
and "realities" as interactive, interdependent, or mutually constituted.
Lenses shape who we are, what we think, and what actions
we take, thus shaping the world we li
ve in.

At the same time, the world we live in ("reality") shapes which lenses are available to us, what
we see through them, and the likelihood of our using them in particular contexts. In general, as long as our lenses and image
s seem to "work," we keep
t
hem and build on them. Lenses simplify our thinking. Like maps, they "frame" our choices and exploration, enabling us to take

advantage of knowledge
already gained and to move more effectively toward our objectives. The more useful they appear to be, the m
ore we are inclined to take them for granted
and to resist making major changes in them. We forget that our particular ordering or meaning system is a choice among many a
lternatives.
Instead
,
we tend to believe we are seeing "reality" as it "is" rather tha
n as our culture

or discipline or image
interprets or
"maps" reality
. It is difficult and sometimes uncomfortable to reflect critically on our assumptions, to question their accuracy or desirab
ility, and to
explore the implications of shifting our vantage
point by adopting a different lens. Of course, the world we live in and therefore our experiences are
constantly changing; we have to continuously modify our images, mental maps, and ordering systems as well. The required shift

in lens may be minor:
from l
iking one type of music to liking another, from being a high school student in a small town to being a college student in an
urban en
-

vironment. Or
the shift may be more pronounced: from casual dating to parenting, from the freedom of student lifestyles t
o the assumption of full
-
time job
responsibilities, from Newtonian to quantum physics, from East
-
West rivalry to post
-
Cold War complexities. Societal shifts are dramatic, as we
experience and respond to systemic transformations such as economic restructuri
ng, environmental degradation, or the effects of war. To function
effectively as students and scholars of world politics, we must modify our thinking in line with historical developments. Tha
t is, as "reality" changes, our
ways of understanding or ordering

need to change as well. This is especially the case to the extent that

outdated worldviews or lenses place
us in danger, distort our understanding, or lead us away from our objectives
. Indeed, as both early explorers and urban
drivers know, outdated maps
are inadequate, and potentially disastrous, guides.


Interrogating the gendered nature of IR solves.

Peterson and Runyan 99

[professor of political science at the University of Arizona and professor of
women’s studies at Wright State University, 19
99

(V
. Spike and Anne,
Global Gender Issues
, 2
nd

edition, p. 14
-
15)]

Gender issues surface now because new questions have been raised that cannot be addressed within traditional
frameworks
. The amassing of global data reveals the extent and pattern of gender in
equality: Women everywhere have less access to political power
and economic resources and less control over processes that reproduce this systemic inequality. Moreover, our knowledge of th
e world of men and the
politics they create is biased and incomplete

in the absence of knowledge about how men's activities, including their politics, are related to, even
dependent upon, what women are doing
--
and why. Additionally,
recognizing the power of gender as a lens forces us to reevaluate
traditional explanations,

to
ask how they are biased
and hence
render inadequate accounts
. As in other disciplines,
the
study of world politics is enriched by acknowledging

and systematically
examining how gender shapes
categories

and
frameworks

that we take for granted
. This is necessary for answering the new questions raised and for generating fresh
insights
--
about the world as we currently "know" it and how it might be otherwise. Finally,
gender
-
sensitive studies
improve our
understanding of global crises
, their inter
actions, and the
possibilities of moving beyond them.

These include
crises of political legitimacy

and security
as states are
increasingly
unable to protect their citizens against
economic, epidemic, nuclear
, or
ecological threats
; crises of maldevelopmen
t as the dynamics of our global economic system enrich a
few and impoverish most; and crises of environmental degradation as the exploitation of natural resources continues in unsust
ainable fashion.
These
global crises cannot be understood or addressed wit
hout acknowledging

the
structural inequalities of the

current world
system
, inequalities that extend well beyond gender issues: They are embodied in interacting hierarchies of race, class, ethnicity,

nationality, sexual orientation, physical ability, age,
and religious identification. In this text, we focus on how the structural inequalities of gender work in
the world: how the hierarchical dichotomy of masculinity
-
femininity is institutionalized, legitimated, and re
-

produced, and how these processes
diffe
rentially affect men's and women's lives. We also begin to see how gender hierarchy interacts with other structural inequalit
ies. The dichotomy of
masculinity and femininity is not separate from racism, classism, ageism, nationalism, and so on. Rather, gen
der both structures and is structured by
these hierarchies to render complex
social identities, locations, responsibilities, and social practices. Gender shapes, and is shaped by, all of us. We daily
reproduce its dynamics
--
and suffer its costs
--
in multipl
e ways.
By learning how gender works, we learn a great deal about
intersecting structures of inequality and how they are intentionally and unintentionally reproduced. We can
then use this knowledge in our struggles to transform global gender inequality by
also transforming other
oppressive hierarchies at work in the world
.


HEG FRONTLINE

Decline is best
-

limits nation
-
building and huge
-
scale interventions

Mandelbaum, 8/9/2011
[Michael, the Christian A. Herter Professor and Director of American Foreign Poli
cy at
Johns Hopkins School of International Studies; “America’s Coming Retrenchment: How Budget Cuts Will Limit the
United States’ Global Role,”
Foreign Affairs:
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68024/michael
-
mandelbaum/americas
-
coming
-
retrenchment
]

So
the United States will be able to afford to do less in the world in the future than it has in the past. Which
parts of U.S. foreign policy will be
--

and which should be
--

discontinued
? As
I argue in my 2010
book
,
The
Frugal Superpower
, the feature of twenty
-
first
-
century foreign policy likeliest to be eliminated, and the one
with which the country can most easily do without, is the type of military intervention that the United States
has conducted in the first two post

Cold War decades

in
Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and
Iraq.
Different as these operations have been, they
have all saddled the United States with the unwanted,
protracted, expensive, and frustrating task of nation
-
building

--

that is, restoring the institut
ions of
government where they had collapsed or building them where they never existed.
The policy of nation
-
building
has
three
drawbacks.
First
, it is not popular with the American people,

who are willing to pay to defend
themselves but not to govern other
s, or to help others govern themselves.
Second, it has enjoyed modest
success at best because
neither the United States nor any other country knows how to create working,
competent, democratic institutions quickly and cheaply.
Third
, however successful pos
t

Cold War American
nation
-
building has been,
it has not contributed much to the well
-
being or security of the United States.

Should
Afghanistan be appreciably more peaceful and prosperous when American troops leave than it was when they
arrived, it will c
ertainly be of great benefit to the people of that country but it will do little for the people of the
country from which the troops came.
Together, these drawbacks make nation
-
building the leading candidate to
disappear from the repertoire of U.S. foreign

policy, which would make carrying out that foreign policy less
expensive. The Obama administration inherited ongoing interventions and nation
-
building exercises in
Afghanistan and Iraq and has begun to wind them down. Although it launched a similar interv
ention in Libya
in March 2011, the way it has conducted that operation
--

promising not to insert U.S. ground troops and
emphasizing NATO’s role
--

shows that it is determined to minimize its
costs. Eliminating interventions for
nation
-
building would still

leave the United States with a major global role
--

and an important one. Indeed,
today the United States provides to other countries some, although by no means all, of the services that
governments furnish to the societies that they govern. The United St
ates functions, that is,
as the world’s de
facto government. It supplies the world’s leading currency, the dollar. It has the world’s richest and most open
market. Its navy safeguards the world’s two most important trade routes, the Atlantic and the Pacifi
c Oceans.
U.S. military power helps assure the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf, which is vital for the global economy.
The U.S. military presence in East Asia and Europe reassures the countries of those regions, which are not
formal adversaries but
in many cases do not fully trust one another, that the United States will be on hand to
deal with any serious threat to peace. Most of the U.S. defense budget goes to support these beneficial missions.
As the country comes to spend less on defense, some of

them will be in jeopardy. Just how endangered the
American role as the world’s government will be in the coming era of economic constraint will depend on how
deeply the relevant spending is reduced. That, in turn, will depend on how much deficit reduction

the U.S.
political system is able to deliver from other sources, above all by reining in the cost of entitlements and raising
taxes. What is certain is that, because U.S. foreign policy is so important for the whole world, the consequences
of the inevitab
le budget
-
cutting in Washington will reverberate far beyond the United States.


Heg solves nothing
-

past two decades prove

Mearsheimer 2011

(John J., R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, The

National
Interest, Imperial by Design, lexis)

One year later, Charles
Krauthammer emphasized in "The Unipolar Moment
" that the United States had emerged from the Cold War as by
far the most powerful country on the planet.2 He urged American leaders not to be reticent about using that power "to lead a
unipolar world,
unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and b
eing prepared to enforce them." Krauthammer's advice fit neatly with Fukuyama's vision of the
future: the United States should take the lead in bringing democracy to less developed countries the world over. After all, t
hat shouldn't be an especially
diffic
ult task given that America had awesome power and the cunning of history on its side. U.S. grand strategy has followed this
basic prescription for
the past twenty years, mainly because most policy makers inside the Beltway have agreed with the thrust of F
ukuyama's and Krauthammer's early
analyses. The results, however, have been disastrous. The United States has been at war for a startling two out of every thr
ee years since 1989, and there
is no end in sight. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of worl
d events knows, countries that continuously fight wars invariably build powerful
national
-
security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior; a
nd they invariably end
up adopting ruthle
ss policies normally associated with brutal dictators. The Founding Fathers understood this problem, as is clear from James M
adison's
observation that "no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare." Washington's pursuit of policies
like assassination, rendition and
torture over the past decade, not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home, shows that their fears were justified.

To make matters worse,
the
United States is now engaged in protracted wars

in Afghanistan and I
raq that have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in
around forty
-
seven thousand American casualties. The pain and suffering inflicted on Iraq has been enormous. Since the war began in March
2003,
more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civi
lians have been killed, roughly 2 million Iraqis have left the country and 1.7 million more have been internally
displaced. Moreover,
the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts
, despite all the phony talk about how the
"surge"
has worked in Iraq and how a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. We may well be stuck in both quagmi
res for years to
come, in fruitless pursuit of victory.
The United States has

also
been unable to solve

three other major
foreign
-
policy problems
.
Washington has worked overtime
-
with no success
-
to shut down Iran's uranium
-
enrichment

capability for fear that it might lead to
Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. And
the United States, unable
to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear w
eapons

in the
first place, now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up
. Finally,
every

post
-
Cold War
administration has
tried and failed to settle the Israeli
-
Palestinian conflict; all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate furth
er

as the West
Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater Israel. The unpleasant truth is that
the United States is in a world of trouble today on the
foreign
-
policy front
, and this state of affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years, as

Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the blame game
escalates to poisonous levels. Thus, it is hardly surprising that a recent Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found tha
t "looking forward 50 years,
only 33 percent of Americans think the United States
will continue to be the world's leading power." Clearly,
the heady days of the early 1990s
have given way to a pronounced pessimism
.


New age of American decline


shift in economic and political power
proves
, that means
r
etrenchment
now
is key to stable
tr
ansition to multipolarity
-

only way to ensure cooperation.

Zakaria, 2/1/
2012
[Fareed, host of CNN’s flagship international affairs program, Editor at Large of TIME, Washington Post columnist and
bestselling author; “The post
-
American world demands a new
approach from the U.S.,” The Washington Post, February 1, 2012;
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the
-
post
-
american
-
world
-
demands
-
a
-
new
-
approach
-
from
-
the
-
us/2012/02/01/gIQAba5ziQ_story.html?hpid=z3
]

Dear Mitt Romney, Congratulations on
Florida
. Now th
at you are again the front
-
runner, and your campaign focus is returning to President Obama, I’d
like to call attention to a line you have used repeatedly: “This is a president who fundamentally believes that this next cen
tury is the post
-
American
century.”

I leave it to the president to describe what he believes, but as the author of the book “
The Post
-
American World
,” let me make sure you know
what exactly you are attacking. “This is a book not about the decline of America but rather about the rise of
everyone else,” I note at the very outset. I am
optimistic about America, convinced that it can prosper in this new world and remain the most powerful country on the planet.

But I argue that

the
age of American unipolarity



which began with the collapse o
f the Soviet Union


has ended
.
For a quarter
-
century after the collapse of
communism, the United States dominated the world with no real political or economic competitors. Its ideas and its model


the Washington consensus


became received wisdom
everywh
ere.
Today we are in a different era. In 1990
, China
represented 2 percent of global
gross domestic product. It has quadrupled, to 8 percent, and

is rising.
By most estimates
, China’s economy will
become the world’s largest between 2016 and 2018.
This is n
ot simply an economic story.
China’s military
capacity and reach are expanding
.
Since 2008 Chinese naval fleets have escorted more than 4,300 ships through the Gulf of Aden.

Beijing’s defense spending is
likely to surpass America’s by 2025
.

For its foreign

policy activism, look on any continent: A
gleaming new African Union headquarters was unveiled in Addis Ababa, Ethi
o
pia, last week. The $200 million
-
plus complex was financed by China and
inaugurated by a high
-
ranking Politburo member, who arrived with
a check for $94 million.
It is not just China
that is rising.

Emerging
powers on every continent have achieved political stability and economic growth and are becoming active on
the global stage.

Twenty years ago Turkey was a fragile democracy, dominated b
y its army, that had a weak economy constantly in need of Western
bailouts. Today,
Turkey has a trillion
-
dollar economy that grew 6.6 percent last year
.
Since April 2009,
Turkey has
created 3.4 million jobs



more than the European Union, Russia and South
Africa put together.
That might

explain
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s confidence and his country’s energetic foreign policy. Look in this hemisphere: In 1990
,

Brazil

was emerging
from decades of dictatorship and was wracked by inflation rates that
reached 3,000 percent. Its president was impeached in 1992.

Today,

the

country

is a stable democracy, steadily growing
with foreign
-
exchange reserves of $350 billion.
Its foreign policy has
become extremely active
.
President Dilma Rousseff is in Cuba this week, “marking Brazil’s highest
-
profile bid to transform its growing
economic might into diplomatic leadership in Latin America,” the
Wall Street Journal reported Wednesday
. Brazil’s state development bank is financ
ing
a $680 million rehabilitation of Cuba’s port at Mariel
.
For three decades
, India
was unable to get any Western country to
accept its status as a nuclear power. But as its
economy boomed
and Asia became the new cockpit of global
affairs, the mood shifte
d.

Over the past five years the United States, France, Britain and

others have made a massive exception for New Delhi’s
nuclear program and have assiduously courted India as a new ally. I could go on.
This is a new world, very different from the
America
-
ce
ntric one
we got used to over the last generation.
Obama has succeeded in preserving and even
enhancing U.S. influence in this world precisely because he has recognized these new forces at work.

He has
traveled to the emerging nations and spoken admiringly

of their rise. He replaced the old Western club and made the Group of 20 the central decision
-
making forum for global economic affairs.

By emphasizing multilateral organizations, alliance structures and international
legitimacy, he got results.

It was Chi
nese and Russian cooperation that produced tougher sanctions against Iran. It was the
Arab League’s
formal request

last year that made Western intervention in Libya uncontroversial. By and large, you have ridiculed this approach to foreign
policy,
arguing
that you would instead expand the military, act unilaterally and talk unapologetically. That might appeal to Republican prima
ry voters, but
chest
-
thumping triumphalism won’t help you secure America’s interests or ideals in a world populated by powerful new

players. You can call this new
century whatever you like, but it won’t change reality. After all, just because we call it the World Series doesn’t make it o
ne.



Hegemony and increases in military power result in backlash

Fiammenghi 11
(Davide, postdoctor
al fellow in the Department of Politics, Institutions, History at the University of Bologna. “The Security
Curve and the Structure of International Politics,” International Security, Spring 2011.)
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_0003
7

Beyond a certain point,
the gains that a state accrues from further increases in its power will start to diminish
.
This result stems from a structural disequilibrium between allied relations, on the one hand, and relations with
enemies and neutrals, on t
he other
.

When the state’s coalition is able to effectively discourage aggression, its allies and that further
increases in its power become gradually less useful. Meanwhile
,
the control that the major partner exercises over its allies
becomes stronger.
At

some point
, the game is no longer worth the candle for the allies: the threat posed by their
enemies is relatively less significant than the threat of growing control posed by their major partner.

In the
meantime,
neutral states begin to reflect on the co
sts of their neutrality
, especially if one side should defeat the
other,
leaving them with little choice but submission
.
Further increases in the major partner’s power will
exacerbate differences with its allies,

and

some will leave the alliance.
The flow
of defectors encourages the major
power’s rivals, which acquire new energy
.
Neutral states realize that the moment has come to take sides
. The
situation eventually reaches a tipping point, where further increases in the major state’s relative power no long
er compensate for the defection of its
allies and the mobilization of neutral states into the enemy coalition.
Further increases tilt the balance in favor of the major
power’s rivals, leaving the aspiring hegemon less secure than before
.
A parabola nicely
illustrates the relationship between
power and security that I have just described. The apex of the parabola corresponds to an implicit concept in realist balance

of power theory: the security
threshold. This threshold represents the maximum amount of powe
r a state can accumulate before further increases begin to reduce its security. The
security threshold corresponds to the quantity of power that Waltz calls “appropriate” for a state to be secure in an anarchi
c international system. The
concept of balancin
g necessarily implies that there is a maximum amount of power that a state can accumulate to achieve maximum security. Beyond

that threshold, power maximization and security maximization become incompatible goals. Classical realists did not make this
point

explicitly, because
they thought in terms of absolute, not relative, power.30 Obviously, there is no amount of absolute power that can guarantee
a state’s security once and
for all.
The concept must be understood in a relative sense, so that it can accomm
odate the evolution of
technology and the eventuality that an arms race could frustrate a state’s expansionist efforts
.


A.
US Heg causes terrorism


US presence in the Middle East and 9/11 proves

Layne 9

(Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush Schoo
l of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with
the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, literary and national editor of the Atlantic, Review of Interna
tional Studies (2009),
5/25/9, “America’s Middl
e East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived”, Cambridge Journals,)


Terrorist organisations like Al
-
Qaeda are non
-
state actors, and as such, they are not, strictly speaking, engaged
in ‘balancing’ the US

(because balanci
ng is a form of state behaviour). Yet, at the same time, the
actions of groups like Al
-
Qaeda
reflect some of the key attributes of balancing
. After all, beyond connoting the idea of counterweight, balancing also signifies opposition,
or resistance, to a he
gemon.
Terrorists

may not be able to balance against the US, but they can
engage in

a related form of
activity aimed at
undermining American primacy by raising its costs.

Organisations like Al
-
Qaeda may be non
-
state actors, but
their actions are of a kind
frequently found in international politics: the use of violence against a state(s) to
attain clearly defined political objectives. Indeed the use of violence for such purposes is the hallmark of
terrorism
. As Bruce Ho
ff
man says,
terrorism is ‘about power:
the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the
use of power to achieve political change’
.38

Terrorism, moreover, is fundamentally an asymmetric form of
conflict, because it is an instrument that the weak use against the strong
.39

From this perspec
tive, the 9/11
assault on the US was not a random, senseless, ‘irrational’ act of violence.

In fact, the
9/11 attack was in keeping
with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the US by its adversaries to advance their
political objectiv
es
.

As German military strategist Carl von Clausewitz himself observed, ‘War is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled

by its political object’.
40
Here, President Bush’s endlessly reiterated claim that the US was attacked because Islamic radical
s ‘hate us because of our
freedom’ betrayed a complete misunderstanding of the dynamics that underpin the clash between the US and Middle Eastern terro
rists.

For sure, there
are Islamic radicals who, indeed, do hate the US for cultural, religious, and ideo
logical reasons. But that is not why the US is a target for Islamic
terrorists.
9/11 represented a violent counterreaction to America’s policies in the Middle East



especially its drive to
dominate the region both geopolitically and culturally. As Michael

Schuerer


who headed the CIA analytical team monitoring Osama bin Laden and Al
-
Qaeda


says, it is dangerous for the US to base its strategy for combating terrorism on the belief ‘that Muslims hate and attack us
for what we are and
think rather than for
what we do’.
41
In a similar vein, Richard K. Betts observed following the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center that, ‘It is hardly
likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the US had n
ot been identified so long as
the mainstay of Israel, the Shah of Iran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam’.
42
It is the US’ attempt to impose its
primacy and preferences on the Middle East that fuels groups like Al
-
Qaeda and fans Islamic fundamental
-

ism.
Terrorism is a form of
‘blowback’ against America’s preponderant role in international affairs.

Despicable and brutal though it was, the 9/11 attack
was undertaken with cool calculation to achieve well
-
defined geop
olitical objectives. Underscoring this point, Scheurer observes that, ‘In the context of
ideas bin Laden shares with his brethren, the military actions of Al
-
Qaeda and its allies are acts of war, not terrorism . . . meant to advance bin Laden’s
clear, focu
sed, limited, and widely popular foreign policy goals . . .’.
43
Specifically, Al
-
Qaeda wants to compel the US to remove its military presence from
the Persian Gulf, and force Washington to alter its stance on the Israeli

Palestinian conflict.
44
Al
-
Qaeda’s
leaders also apparently hoped that the
September 11 attacks would provoke a US overreaction, and thereby trigger an upsurge of popular discontent in the Islamic wor
ld that would lead to the
overthrow of the Saudi monarchy and other pro
-
American regimes in
the Middle East (Egypt, Pakistan, and Jordan, for example) and their replacement
by fundamentalist Islamic governments.
45
In other words, Al
-
Qaeda seeks to undermine US primacy, and thereby compel changes in America’s Middle
Eastern grand strategy.

The US
presence on the ground in the Middle East also incites terrorists to attack American
interests
.

In his study of suicide terrorist groups, Pape has found that ‘
what nearly all

suicide
terrorist attacks have in common is a
specific secular and strategic
goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory
that the terrorists consider to be their homeland

.
46 Al
-
Qaeda fits this pattern, and one of its principal objectives ‘is the expulsion of
American troops from the Persian Gulf a
nd the reduction of Washington’s power in the region’.47 Here, the Bush adminis
-

tration’s inflexible
determination to maintain a long
-
term American military presence in Iraq is exactly the wrong policy to reduce terrorism.

The Bush administration, of
cour
se, claimed that the US is fighting terrorism in Iraq. To make this point, it has grossly exaggerated the links between the i
nsurgent group Al
-
Qaeda in
Iraq (AQI) and Osama Bin Laden’s Al
-
Qaeda organisation and, hence


in a blatant prevarication


tied AQ
I and the war in Iraq to 9/11.48 Bush
repeatedly asserted that, in Iraq the US is fighting the same terrorists who attacked the US on 9/11. Of course, this claim o
verlooked the fact that AQI
came into existence only after the March 2003 US invasion of Iraq
, and that its links with Bin Laden’s Al
-
Qaeda are, at best, tenuous. The Bush
administration’s deliberate fabrications were designed to win Congressional and public support for a prolonged ‘surge’.49 Whe
n it first announced the
surge, the administration s
aid it would last through 2007. Instead it lasted well into 2008, and it is likely that there will be more US forces in Iraq
in
January 2009 than there were prior to the surge. And, even when the surge itself has ended, any draw
-
down of US forces will take

place gradually.50
General David Petraeus, who served as senior American commander in Iraq during the surge and now heads CENTCOM (the US milita
ry command with
overall responsibility for the Middle East) has repeatedly emphasised that the US commit
-

ment
to Iraq is long
-
term in nature, and American military
planners are preparing for a long
-
lasting ‘post
-
occupation’ US presence there.51

In fact, it is clear that the Bush administration never intended to
withdraw from Iraq militarily and aimed for the US to

retain permanent US military bases there. President Bush all but confirmed this in May 2007
when he said that he wanted the US to play the same kind of role in Iraq that it has in South Korea since the end of the Kore
an War.52 What will happen
under the n
ew US administration is unclear. During 2008, the government of Iraqi Nouri al
-
Maliki indicated that Baghdad wanted to set a timeline for
US troop withdrawals. The Iraqi government refused to accede to the Bush administration’s desire to negotiate a long
-
t
erm security agreement that
would allow the US to maintain permanent bases in Iraq. Although the Bush administration had strongly opposed any suggestions

that there should be a
fixed timetable for US withdrawal from Iraq in July 2008, Bush’s position seeme
d to soften and the administration said the US would support a ‘time
horizon’ for US troop withdrawals from Iraq as an ‘aspirational goal’.53 What the new US admin
-

istration will do about the US presence in Iraq is an
open question, but based on the posit
ions taken by Senator Barak Obama (D. Ill.) and Senator John McCain (R. Ariz.) during the 2008 US presidential
campaign, it seems certain that there will be a significant American military presence in Iraq for some time to come
.

Instead of reducing
America
n vulnerability to terrorism, the presence of US troops in Iraq and the Middle East increases it by
reinforcing the widespread perception in the Islamic world that the US is pursuing a neo
-
colonial policy in the
Middle East in furtherance of its own imperi
al ambitions
.

The huge US politico
-
military footprint in the Middle East region


including Iraq


is, along with America’s policy on the Israel/Palestinian issue, the primary driver of Middle Eastern terrorism. The admin
-

istration’s
overall policy in the

Middle East has inflamed anti
-
American sentiment, and turned the entire region into a source of recruits for various radical terrorist
groups. Instead of solving this problem, staying in Iraq will exacerbate it.


The impact is extinction

Sid
-
Ahmed, 04



A
l
-
Ahram political analyst (Mohamed, “Extinction!,” Al Ahram Weekly, No. 705, August/September 1,
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)

What would be the consequences of
a nuclear attack by terrorists
?
Even if it fails
, it
would

further
exacerbate

th
e negative features
of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be

stepped up at the expense
of human rights,
tensions between civilisations

and religions would rise and
ethnic
conflicts would proliferate. It would

also
speed up the arms race

and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive.

But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds.
This could lead to a
third world war
, from which no one will emerge victorious.
Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another
,
this war will be without winners

and losers.
When nuclear
pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers
.


B.

Ob
ama’s hegemonic strategy involves military adventurism in Asia
-

risks destabilization

Xinhua 1
-
6
-
12 [“Commentary: Constructive U.S. role in Asia
-
Pacific welcome, but not warmongering,”
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012
-
01/06/c_131346348.htm
]

U
.S. President Barack
Obama rolled out a new defense strategy

Thursday
that will shift the country's
military focus to

the
Asia
-
Pacific region
, and cut 489 billion U.S. dollars in defense spending in the next decade. With the strategy
sure to considerably r
eshape the U.S. defense structure, the United States is welcome to make more contribution to peace and stability in the Asia
-
Pacific
region, but
its possible
militarism will cause a lot of ill will and meet with strong opposition in the
world's most dynami
c region
. Legitimate interests of the United States, the world's biggest power, in the Asia
-
Pacific region are
generally respected by other countries. The U.S. role, if fulfilled with a positive attitude and free from a Cold War
-
style zero
-
sum mentality, w
ill not only
be conducive to regional stability and prosperity, but be good for China, which needs a peaceful environment to continue its
economic development.
However,
while boosting its military presence in

the
Asia
-
Pacific, the United States should abst
ain
from flexing its muscles, as this won't help solve regional disputes. If
the United States
indiscreetly applies militarism in the region, it will

be like a bull in a china shop, and
endanger
peace instead of enhancing regional stability
. Despite its la
test defense budget cuts, the Pentagon still spends over 600 billion
dollars annually for baseline budget and war
-
fighting tasks, and the U.S. defense budget continues to be larger than those of the next 10 countries
combined. Therefore,
the United States

has the greatest potential to secure world peace and stability, but it also
has the greatest
power to create chaos
. With power comes responsibility, so the United States should exercise the utmost caution in the use of its military
forces. According to the

new strategy, the United States should maintain a force that can win one major war while still being able to deter a second o
ne,
in contrast to the Pentagon's previous plan that empowered the U.S. military to win two major wars at the same time. The new
s
trategy suggests a retreat
from former military ambitions for the United States, which is dealing with a severe economic crisis domestically and two exp
ensive wars overseas. Over
the past decade, the United States fought wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which

cost thousands of lives and over 1 trillion dollars. The two wars became a
heavy burden for the United States and caused a tremendous amount of suffering for the two Asian countries. History teaches u
s that military
intervention can't usher in lasting pea
ce and prosperity in another country. The United States should learn from its past painful experiences and play a
constructive role in the Asia
-
Pacific instead of recklessly practising militarism. After all, might does not always make right.


And applies
militarism in the region

that endangers peace and leads to conflict


That goes nuclear

Ogura and Oh ‘
97

[Toshimaru and Igyu, Monthly Review, April]

North Korea, South Korea
,

and

Japan
have

achieved quasi
-

or virtual nuclear armament. Although these countries do not produce or possess
actual bombs, they

possess sufficient technological
know
-
how to possess

one or

several
nuclear arsenals
.

Thus,
virtual armament
creates

a new
nightmare

in this

region
-

nuclear

annihilation
. Given

the concentration of
economic affluence

and
military
power in this region

and its
growing importance to the world system, any

hot
conflict among these countries would

threaten
to
escalate

into

a

global

conflagration.


Retrenchment
now
is key to stable transition to multipolarity
-

only way to ensure cooperation

Patrick 2010

(November/December, Stewart, Senior Fellow and Director of the Program on International Institutions and Global Governance at

the Council on Foreign

Relations, Irresponsible Stakeholders? Subtitle: The Difficulty of Integrating Rising Powers, Foreign Affairs, lexis)

And yet Obama's engagement strategy pragmatically recognizes that
addressing global problems
such as climate change, nuclear
proliferatio
n, and financial instability
calls for meaningful cooperation
, not only with democracies but also with nondemocracies.
Global governance requires collaboration among the unlike
-
minded. But
partnership

among the like
-
minded
cannot be assumed
, either.
Democr
acy is an unreliable predictor of allegiance to U.S. interests. Some of the United States' recent diplomatic tussles have bee
n with big emerging
democracies. Brazil, under its flamboyant president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has assumed a prominent global
profile thanks to its criticism of the
United States' international role, ranging from the U.S. military presence in Colombia to Washington's alleged pro
-
Israel bias. Turkey, for decades a
reliable U.S. ally, has staked out an independent posture on Middle

East policy under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, abandoning its historical
neutrality and making its relations with Israel contingent on the latter's policy toward Gaza CHANGE FROM WITHIN The world
today is not a blank
slate, as it was after World

War II, when, as the Obama administration frequently notes, a farsighted generation of U.S. leaders laid the foundations of a

Western liberal international order. They left many institutional products
--

international and regional, formal and informal, ge
neral purpose and issue
specific. Absent a cataclysm such as a world war, reallocating influence within existing bodies will be an uphill struggle. T
he more important the
institution, the more its powerful members will resist diluting their authority withi
n it. China and Russia, for example, oppose allowing any new
permanent members to join the UN Security Council. None of the council's permanent five nations will countenance either limit
ing its veto power or
extending that power to others. And consider th
e International Energy Agency. It excludes major energy consumers such as China and India, as well as
major energy suppliers such as Russia. Ostensibly, the reasoning behind this is that IEA members must belong to the Organizat
ion for Economic
Cooperation
and Development. But there is another, more self
-
interested explanation: voting at the IEA is weighted based on each country's share of
global oil consumption in 1974, and its current members want to retain this arrangement even though oil consumption has
remained essentially static in
North America and Europe while increasing eight
-

and sixfold in China and India, respectively. Vested interests also plague ongoing debates about
governance of the World Bank, the IMF, and other international financial instit
utions. To be sure, the shock of the recent global economic downturn has
driven some degree of change. The G
-
20 has become the principal forum for international economic coordination, the first major adaptation in
multilateral cooperation to reflect drama
tic shifts in global power. The G
-
20 created the Financial Stability Board in April 2009 to strengthen
international standards for global finance. The resources of the IMF have expanded. And the members of both the IMF and the W
orld Bank have agreed
to adj
ust those organizations' voting weights and quotas by several percentage points in favor of emerging
-
market economies. But the overall impact of
these reforms is modest. This is not a global constitutional moment akin to the one 65 years ago. In any event
, even more ambitious efforts to bring
rising powers into existing institutions will be limited by the prospect of tradeoffs between effectiveness and legitimacy. T
his concern is at the core of the
debates over UN Security Council expansion. As Susan Rice,

the U.S. ambassador to the UN, explained to the UN General Assembly in February 2009,
"The United States believes that the long
-
term legitimacy and viability of the United Nations Security Council depends on its reflecting the world of the
twenty
-
first ce
ntury." At the same time, she continued, any expansion must "not diminish its effectiveness or efficiency." A larger, more in
clusive
Security Council could complicate U.S. efforts to garner sufficient votes for critical resolutions. Expanding existing for
ums can also harm consensus.
This is most obvious in the shift from the G
-
8
--

still a cozy Western
-
dominated forum despite Russia's presence
--

to the G
-
20, a much more diverse
body. Given its heterogeneity, the G
-
20 is unlikely in the short term to becom
e a venue for addressing sensitive security and political issues, such as
Iran's nuclear program or the violence in Sudan A GRAND BARGAIN
The United States has no choice but to rely on rising powers to
help address today's global challenges
.

But it must
engage these countries in a way that preserves the core of the postwar order. The political
scientist G. John Ikenberry has argued that
the time is ripe for an "institutional bargain": by ceding influence within multilateral
frameworks while it remains dom
inant, the United States might lock in support from the rising powers

for an international
order based on the Western model. But how should the United States go about doing this? Should the rising powers be integrat
ed quickly on the
assumption that giving

them a stake soon will make them responsible faster? Or would it be wiser to adopt an incremental approach, one that
conditioned the rising powers' entry into the club on their demonstrated willingness to play by global rules and shoulder new

burdens? Bot
h approaches
could entail frustrations. There is no guarantee that the world's rising powers will become the United States' strategic par
tners. Washington may want
them to do more on the world stage, but it cannot control their choices and it will not alw
ays like the results of their participation. There is, of course, no
common worldview among today's emerging countries. But as U.S. power declines, the rising powers will seek to test, dilute, o
r revise existing
institutions to suit their purposes. The Un
ited States will need to decide when to stand firm, when to engage, and when simply to agree to disagree. This
will likely produce ongoing debates about the appropriate boundaries of national sovereignty, the desirable balance between t
he state and the mar
ket,
and the proper foundations of political legitimacy. During the Cold War, the United States could count on solidarity among t
he capitalist democracies. In
the twenty
-
first century, the normative foundations for multilateral cooperation will be weaker.

An imperfect historical parallel might be the Concert of
Europe of the early 1800s. That arrangement leavened the traditional balance of power with a balance of rights, which helped
bridge differences between
the Western powers (France and the United King
dom) and the authoritarian monarchies (Austria, Prussia, and Russia) of the Holy Alliance. Global
cooperation today may follow a similar logic. The United States may need to pay less attention to regime type and tolerate na
tions in which democracy is
lacki
ng or absent. It must be attuned to nationalist sensitivities in the rising powers
--

including those linked to the United States' perceived
interventionism, unilateralism, or militarism
--

and to the temptation of all governments to harness these grievanc
es for their own political purposes.
Accommodating new powers while retaining as much of the old order as possible will be a constant balancing act, much like the

Concert of Europe was
two centuries ago. Yet as Thomas Wright of the Chicago Council on Glob
al Affairs has observed, the Obama administration has done little serious
thinking about how to foster cooperation when the United States' interests diverge from those of other countries. The brief d
iscussion of potentially
clashing interests with rising p
owers in the National Security Strategy document of May 2010 seems too limited: "And when national interests do collide
--

or countries prioritize their interests in different ways
--

those nations that defy international norms or fail to meet their sovere
ign responsibilities will
be denied the incentives that come with greater integration and collaboration with the international community." The warning
clearly applies to Iran,
North Korea, and Venezuela but may or may not also apply to those emerging count
ries that fall short of being "rogue." What if Brazil, China, or Turkey
simply prioritizes its interests differently from the United States on critical issues? In this complex international realit
y, fixed alliances and formal
organizations may count for l
ess than shifting coalitions of interest. Fortunately, the United States is well positioned to exploit these dynamics, since
it
will remain for the foreseeable future the hub for most agreements that will be discussed in the G
-
20 and other major forums. Bu
t to make the most of
this advantage, U.S. officials will need to be unsentimental about forming partnerships of convenience. They will need to con
vene different clubs for
different purposes, balancing encompassing arrangements such as the G
-
20 with smalle
r affinity groupings such as the G
-
8, which permit the United
States to collaborate with longtime partners that broadly share its fundamental political and economic values. Meanwhile, th
e United States must not
allow the emerging powers to avoid contribut
ing to global public goods. At times, these contributions might follow the notion of "common but
differentiated responsibility." Adopted at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio and incorporated into the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, this p
rinciple establishes
different obl
igations for developed and developing countries, based on their internal capacities. But the United States should resist the
promiscuous
invocation by fast
-
growing economies of internal development constraints and insist on clear benchmarks for balancing t
he responsibilities of the
established and the emerging powers over time. More generally, the United States must link any extension of international sta
tus, voice, and weight to
the emerging powers to their concrete contributions to world stability. Refor
m of the increasingly outdated UN Security Council is an area in which the
United States must insist on ground rules for inclusion. Any new permanent seats should be granted only to those states that
make tangible efforts to
foster international peace and
security. Reasonable criteria for measuring such efforts could include whether a state has military (as well as civilian)
capabilities that could be deployed globally or regionally on behalf of the UN; significantly supports the UN's regular and p