>>Free Trade Good<<

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23 Οκτ 2013 (πριν από 4 χρόνια και 22 μέρες)

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Free Trade Good
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Generic


Avoiding protectionism by preserving multilateral trade is key to prevent global
economic collapse, military conflict, and political instability in the developing world.

Patrick, 09

(Stewart Patrick
. senior fellow and
director of the Program on International Institutions and Global Governance at the Council
on Foreign Relations

March 13, 2009 “Protecting Free Trade.” The National Interest.
http://nationalinterest.org/article/protecting
-
free
-
trade
-
3060?page=show
)

President Obama has committed to working with U.S. trade partners to avoid "escalating protectionism." He is wise to do so. A
s never before
,
U.S. national security requires a

commitment to open trade
.
President Obama and his foreign counterparts should
reflect on the lessons of the 1930s
-
and the insights of Cordell Hull. The longest
-
serving secretary of state in American history (1933
-
1944), Hull
helped guide the United States

through the Depression and World War II. He also understood a fundamental truth: "When goods move,
soldiers don't."

In the 1930s, global recession had catastrophic
political

consequences
-
in part

because
policymakers took

exactly

the wrong approach
. Starti
ng with America's own Smoot Hawley Tariff of 1930,

the world's
major trading nations tried to insulate themselves by adopting inward looking protectionist
and
discriminatory

policies.

The result was a
vicious
,
self
-
defeating cycle of tit
-
for
-
tat retaliatio
n
.
As states took
refuge in prohibitive tariffs, import quotas, export subsidies and competitive devaluations,
international commerce devolved into a desperate competition for dwindling markets
.
Between 1929 and
1933, the value of world trade plummeted fro
m $50 billion to $15 billion.
Global economic activity went into a death spiral,
exacerbating the depth and length of the Great Depression.

The economic consequences of
protectionism were bad

enough. The political consequences were worse. As Hull
recognized,

global economic
fragmentation lowered standards of living, drove unemployment higher and increased poverty
-
accentuating social upheaval

and leaving destitute populations "easy prey to dictators and desperadoes."
The rise of Nazism
in Germany, f
ascism in Italy and militarism in Japan is impossible to divorce from the economic
turmoil
,

which allowed demagogic leaders to mobilize support among alienated masses nursing nationalist grievances.

Open economic
warfare poisoned the diplomatic climate and

exacerbated great power rivalries, raising
,

in Hull's view
,
"
constant temptation to use force
, or threat of force,

to obtain what could have been got through normal
processes of trade."

Assistant Secretary William Clayton agreed: "
Nations which act as ene
mies in the marketplace
cannot long be friends at the council table."

This is what makes growing protectionism

and discrimination
among the world's major trading powers today so alarming
.
In 2008 world trade declined for the first time since 1982.
And

desp
ite their pledges, seventeen G
-
20 members have adopted significant trade restrictions
. "Buy
American" provisions in the U.S. stimulus package have been matched by similar measures elsewhere, with the EU ambassador to
Washington
declaring that "Nobody will
take this lying down." Brussels has resumed export subsidies to EU dairy farmers and restricted imports from the
United States and China. Meanwhile, India is threatening new tariffs on steel imports and cars; Russia has enacted some thirt
y new tariffs and
export subsidies. In a sign of the global mood, WTO antidumping cases are up 40 percent since last year.

Even less blatant forms of
economic nationalism, such as banks restricting lending to "safer" domestic companies, risk shutting
down global capital flo
ws and exacerbating the current crisis.

If unchecked,

such economic nationalism
could raise diplomatic tensions among the world's major powers
.
At particular risk are U.S. relations with China,
Washington's most important bilateral interlocutor in the twen
ty
-
first century. China has called the "Buy American" provisions "poison"
-
not
exactly how the Obama administration wants to start off the relationship. U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner's ill
-
timed comments about
China's currency "manipulation" and
his promise of an "aggressive" U.S. response were not especially helpful either, nor is Congress'
preoccupation with "unfair" Chinese trade and currency practices. For its part, Beijing has responded to the global slump by
rolling back some
of the liberali
zing reforms introduced over the past thirty years. Such practices, including state subsidies, collide with the spirit and so
metimes
the law of open trade.

The Obama administration must find common ground with Beijing on a coordinated
response, or risk ret
aliatory protectionism that could severely damage both economies and escalate
into political confrontation
.
A trade war is the last thing the United States needs, given that China holds $1 trillion of our debt and
will be critical to solving flashpoints ra
nging from Iran to North Korea.
In the 1930s, authoritarian great
-
power
governments responded to the global downturn by adopting more nationalistic and aggressive
policies. Today, the economic crisis may well fuel rising nationalism and regional assertiven
ess in
emerging countries.

Russia is a case in point.

Although some predict that the economic crisis will temper Moscow's
international ambitions, evidence for such geopolitical modesty is slim to date. Neither the collapse of its stock market nor

the decl
ine in oil
prices has kept Russia from flexing its muscles from Ukraine to Kyrgyzstan. While some expect the economic crisis to challeng
e Putin's grip on
power, there is no guarantee that Washington will find any successor regime less nationalistic and agg
ressive.

Beyond generating
great power antagonism, misguided protectionism could also exacerbate political upheaval in the
developing world
.

As Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair recently testified,

the downturn has already
aggravated political

instability in a quarter of the world's nations
.
In many emerging countries, including important
players like South Africa, Ukraine and Mexico, political stability rests on a precarious balance.

Protectionist policies could well
push developing economies
and emerging market exporters over the edge.

In Pakistan, a protracted
economic crisis could precipitate the collapse of the regime and fragmentation of the state
.
No surprise,
then, that President Obama is the first U.S. president to receive a daily econo
mic intelligence briefing, distilling the security implications of the
global crisis. What guidance might Cordell Hull give to today's policymakers?

To avoid a protectionist spiral and its political
spillovers, the United States must spearhead multilateral

trade liberalization involving all major
developed and developing countries
.


Free trade promotes democracy, reduces risk of conflict, and allows resource
diversification
to increase wealth in developing countries.

Griswold 05
,
Daniel.

Director of the Cato Institute
Center for Trade Policy Studies
.

“Peace on Earth? Try
Free Trade Among Men.” CATO Institute. http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5344

First,
trade and globalization have reinfor
ced the trend toward democracy
, and democracies don't pick fights with
each other. Freedom to trade nurtures democracy
by expanding the middle class in globalizing countries and
equipping people with tools of communication

such as cell phones, satellite TV
, and the Internet.
With trade comes
more travel, more contact with people in other countries, and more exposure to new ideas. Thanks in
part to globalization, almost two thirds of the world's countries today are democracies

--

a record high.
Second,
as na
tional economies become more integrated with each other, those nations have more to
lose should war break out.
War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government, but
also
ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting
damage on the economy.
In short,

globalization
has dramatically raised the economic cost of war
. Third,
globalization allows nations to acquire wealth
through production and trade rather than conquest of territory and resources
. Increasingly,
wealth is
mea
sured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Those are assets that
cannot be seized by armies.

If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can
acquire them peacefully by

trading away what they can produce best at home. Of course, free trade and globalization do not guarantee peace.
Hot
-
blooded nationalism and ideological fervor can overwhelm cold economic calculations. But
deep trade and investment ties
among nations make

war less attractive.


Multilateral cooperation through trade regimes solves global problems


unilateralism, trade blocks, and localism are all insufficient to solve global conflict,
poverty and development


Matthews 2007,

Carnegie Endowment President,
11/8/

(Jessica, "Europe and the US: Confronting Global Challenges,"
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/transcript_mandelson.pdf
]

Now, the question I want to answer today is, how do we do this and to what purpose? Firstly, fundamentally, we must engage wi
th economic
globalization, accept it, shape it. We’re not going to roll it back, and if we could, we shouldn’t seek to do so. In fa
ct, I’d argue that
the
preservation of an equitable economic globalization should be the core political commitment at the
heart of the transatlantic economic relationship
, equivalent in its way to the mutual commitment to democracy that the
Atlantic Charte
r embodied six decades ago,
because managed right, an economically integrated world is ultimately
not only a more stable and a more equitable world; it is also our principal means of meeting the
increasing number of global challenges that require collectiv
e action
. The reshaping of the global economy and the
huge dramatic changes that are taking place in the economic landscape of the world certainly test the nerves of us in Europe
and the nerves of
you too in the United States. But just because it tests our

nerves doesn’t mean to say that these changes are not in our interests.
It’s true
that some parts of our manufacturing sectors are
certainly

facing
some

tough competitive pressure.

It is true
that this will force us to think about how we choose to educate

and to train ourselves in the future, and how we ensure that the benefits of
economic growth are equitably shared. That’s a major policy challenge for us on both sides of the Atlantic.
It is true that because of
these great changes and the huge anxiety th
at they are generating

amongst people on both sides of the Atlantic that
policymakers are under increasing pressure to show that our embrace of economic globalization is not
naivety
, that we’re not being taken for a ride, in other words, by the rest of the

world;
to show that



as we need to do as policymakers


to show that
closing the gate to the outside world is not a better alternative to keeping that gate open to
the rest of the world
. Now, these debates are broadly the same in Europe and the United St
ates. But
in an open global
market, we have to understand that the growing economies of the developing world are also a
competitive stimulus and a real engine for the growth of our own economies
.
They are a market for
our goods and for our investment.

They

are a source of downward pressure on consumer prices and inflation at home.
They
are also the driving force that has lifted perhaps half a billion people out of poverty in half a human
lifetime
, which is hard to argue against. In defending and preserving
this openness to the world and this growth of the global economy and
its integration, the EU and the U.S. are faced with some simple realities. The first is that we now live in a world that is i
ncreasingly economically
multi
-
polar. One billion new workers
have entered the global labor force in the space of just two decades in the world. In those 20
-
odd years,
China has risen from a country with which the EU traded almost literally nothing to becoming our biggest trading partner for
manufacturers. In
some wa
ys, an older balance of economic power is reasserting itself in the world. In 1830, India and China were the two biggest econ
omies in
the world


in 1830. By 2050, they will again be amongst the very largest economies in the world. Of course, this is not t
he only way of weighing
power in the modern world, far from it. But it is fundamental. And that’s in the nature of the fundamental revolution in econ
omic terms, and
also political terms, therefore, that the world is undergoing. Now, the machinery of what y
ou might call the Atlantic consensus


the World
Bank, the IMF, GATT, G7 or G8


was conceived and rooted in the assumption that the global economic and political order could and would
indeed be governed largely by the Atlantic world. That assumption now n
o longer holds. There has been a reorientation from the Atlantic to the
Pacific and beyond. Now, the multilateral institutions that survive, therefore, will be those ones that are able to adapt to
this new 21
st
century
landscape. The second simple reality
that I would identify for you is that
economic globalization means interdependence
.
This is not simply a question of global supply chains and production lines. Our open markets are a
ladder out of poverty for the developing world. Their growing markets are

a source of growth for us.
That is the fundamental interdependence that links and joins us and our interests together in the
global economy
.
A world of growing prosperity and economic integration is a more stable world, even
if it doesn’t always feel that

way
.

Now, for that reason,
multilateral institutions in the multilateral trading
system will matter more than ever in the new global age of the 21
st
century
.
There is no going it alone
in this century
, in this global age. Interdependence doesn’t allow goi
ng it alone in the way that we have tried to practice or imagine it was
possible in the past.
Our ability to get things done multilaterally will define
the extent to which we can shape
globalization in a way that makes it equitable and sustainable and bind
s in the big new players who are emerging in that global economy. It will
certainly define
the extent to which we can confront huge pressing problems such as global warming,
migration, nuclear proliferation, and energy security.

You look at
any of those is
sues
, issues and challenges, which
touch us personally and intimately in our societies and our communities where we live, they all
have their roots and their origins
in global challenges and global issues
. Never was it less the case that politics is local.

Politics is global and we have
to recognize that and understand that the only way in which we’re going to come to terms with and
allow our politics to gestate in a more hopeful and positive direction is by using more and better
multilateral processes and
institutions,

in order to use our collective weight and influence and strength in order to bring about
the changes, the improvements and changes that we want to see in the world that will benefit all. So an Atlantic economic cha
rter, today, I
think would r
ead like this.
Promote open global markets as a source of development and opportunity for our
businesses and our jobs and everyone else’s. Resist protectionism at home
. Work for a positive reciprocity that
creates openness in all markets abroad. Welcome th
e big, new players. Welcome, embrace the big, new players, and ensure that they have a
stake in a rules
-
based, multilateral trading system. Defend the rules of that system and use effective trade defense measures when people
break those rules.


---
War


Fre
e trade promotes peace


democratic peace theory, economic integration, and
resource
-
trading.

Griswold 2009
,
Daniel T.

director of the Cato Institute
Center for Trade Policy Studies
.

Mad about Trade:
Why Main Street America Should Embrace Globalization. Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute,. Print. Pg.
141
-
142.

Trade has been seen as a friend of peace for centuries
.
In the 19th century,

British statesman Richard
Cobden pursued free trade

as a way not only to bring more affordable bread to English workers but
also to promote peace with Britain's neighbors
. He negotiated the Cobden
-
Chevalier free trade agreement with France in
1860 that helped to cement an enduring alliance between two coun
tries that had been bitter enemies for centuries.

In the 20th
century
, President Franklin

Roosevelt's secretary of state, Cordell Hull, championed lower trade barriers as
a way to promote peaceful commerce and reduce international tensions
. Hull had witnes
sed first
-
hand the
economic nationalism and retribution after World War I.

He believed that "unhampered trade dovetail[s] with peace;
high tariffs, trade barriers and unfair economic competition, with war."
"
Hull was awarded the

1945

Nobel Prize for Peace
,

in part

because of his work to promote global trade
.
Free trade and globalization have
promoted peace in three main ways. First,

trade and globalization have reinforced the trend towards democracy,
and democracies tend not to pick fights with each other
.
A second and even more potent way that
trade has
promoted peace

is

by raising the cost of war. As national economies become more intertwined, those
nations have more to lose should war break out
.

War in a globalized world means not only the loss of human l
ives and tax
dollars but also ruptured trade and invest
ment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy.

Trade and economic integration
have helped to keep the peace in Europe for more than 60 years
.

More recently,

deepening economic ties
between China

and Taiwan are drawing those two governments closer together and helping to keep
the peace
.
Leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait seem to understand that reckless nationalism would jeopardize the dramatic
economic progress that the region has enjoyed
. A third reason why

free trade

promotes peace

is

because it has reduced
the spoils of war. Trade allows nations to acquire wealth through production and exchange rather
than conquest of territory and resources
.
As economies develop, wealth is increasingly

mea
sured in
terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Such assets cannot be easily seized
by armies
.
In contrast, hard assets such as minerals and farmland are becoming relatively less important in high
-
tech, service economies.

If
people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can
acquire them peacefully by freely trading what they can produce best at home.


Free trade reduces domestic incentive for war.

McDonald 2004,

Patrick J.

PhD Ohio State University.

“Peace Through Trade or Free Trade?” Sage Publications. The Journal of Conflict
Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Aug., 2004), pp. 547
-
572. August 2004. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4149808

This section argues that a neglected fifth va
riant of the commercial liberalism motivated by the writings of Cobden (1868, 1870), Schumpeter
(1919/1951), and standard trade theory
--
offers important insights into how
international commerce shapes the domestic
politics of war
.
These classical scholars
connect the domestic politics of international conflict with the domestic distributional
consequence of commercial policy to explain how trade promotes peace.

The elimination of protective commercial policies
empowers societal groups most opposed to war an
d constrains the ability of governments to
redistribute the costs of war onto groups outside its ruling coalition
. Together
,
these twin pressures
suggest that the adoption of free trade policies and not simply an increase in aggregate economic
integration
should bode well for peace
.

Both Cobden (1868, 1870) and Schumpeter (1919/1951) built these explanations from a
broader liberal model of war, which holds that
the external costs and benefits of waging war are inseparable from
its domestic costs and benefit
s
.6
Just as a state goes to war to extend its influence in the international
system or eliminate a threat to its security, war simultaneously creates opportunities for a
government to redistribute income toward its political supporters and solidify its do
mestic position
.
For example, Cobden (1868, 1,44
-
45; 1870, 2,429) argued that wars and "war scares" allowed governments to postpone domestic reforms that
would necessarily expand individual liberty and 5.
The U
nited
S
tates
stands out as an important exampl
e to this
. Tariffs
were the primary source of public revenues until World War I. For a discussion of the relationship between tariffs and taxes
in the U.S. case, see
fHansen (199tY). 6. Summarizing a liberal theory of war, Michael Howard (1978, 31) writes,

By the end of the eighteenth century a complete
liberal theory of international relations, of war and peace, had thus already developed.... According to this doctrine, manki
nd would naturally
live in a state of perfect harmony if it were not for the veste
d interests of governments.... The whole "war system" was contrived to preserve
the power and the employment of princes, statesmen, soldiers, diplomats, and armaments manufacturers, and to bind their tyran
ny ever more
firmly upon the necks of the people. l
imit the role of government in domestic life.

To prevent war, societies therefore need
mechanisms to monitor and punish their government's effort to utilize foreign policy for domestic
political gain
.
7

The next step linking trade and peace focused on the d
omestic distributional
implications of commercial policy
.
Behind much of the clamor for free trade in the classical literature was a strong opposition to
monopolies in the domestic economy.

Because tariffs tended to shield noncompetitive sectors and shift
the
distribution of wealth in a society toward these groups and away from consumers, the political
motivation behind free trade was just as often domestic as it was international,

that is, to promote peace.8

By
removing tariffs and encouraging free trade,
a transformation of the domestic balance of power
would necessarily empower broader elements of society and simultaneously erode regulatory
protection for merchants.
9 The consequences of free trade on the domestic distribution of power then shaped the dome
stic
distributional implications of war.
Just like restrictive commercial policies, the costs of war generally fall on the
poorer elements of society who possess no interest in conflict. The elimination of trade restrictions
undermined the ability of the s
tate and protected sectors of the economy or the domestic groups
most responsible for war to shift the burdens of public finance onto disorganized members of society
who were benefiting most from open international markets
.
In this second
-
image variant of
the commercial peace
hypothesis,

the ability of commerce to promote peace depended crucially on trade's ability to alter the
distribution of domestic political power. Free trade and not necessarily trade was the key to peace
.
These classical arguments find

support in standard trade theory. While increasing the aggregate income of an economy,

trade
simultaneously

alters the domestic distribution of income
.
This possibility links international commerce with domestic distributional issues
that often lie at the

heart of a liberal theory of conflict and creates a foundation to understand the processes by which these economic
pressures shape foreign policy. In what follows, I build on the insights of Cobden (1868, 1870) and Schumpeter (1919/195 1) t
o identify a se
ries
of mechanisms emanating from both society and the state whereby free trade enhances the prospects for peace between states.



Free trade reduces war


awesome

empirical studies

using IF models

comparatively
prove.

Hillebrand 10



Professor of
Diplomacy @ University of Kentucky and a Senior Economist for the Central Intelligence Agency. [Evan E.
Hillebrand, “Deglobalization Scenarios: Who Wins? Who Loses?,” Global Economy Journal, Volume 10, Issue 2 2010]

A long line of writers

from Cruce (1623)

to Kant (1797) to Angell (1907) to Gartzke (2003)
have theorized that economic
interdependence can lower the likelihood of war. Cruce thought that free trade enriched a society in
general and so made people more peaceable; Kant thought that trade shifted
political power away
from the more warlike aristocracy, and Angell thought that economic interdependence shifted
cost/benefit calculations in a peace
-
promoting direction
. Gartzke contends that
trade relations enhance
transparency among nations and thus hel
p avoid bargaining miscalculations. There has also been a
tremendous amount of empirical research that mostly supports the idea of an inverse relationship
between trade and war
. Jack Levy said that, “While there are extensive debates over the proper resear
ch designs for investigating this
question, and while some empirical studies find that trade is associated with international conflict
, most studies conclude that
trade is associated with peace, both at the dyadic and systemic levels
” (Levy, 2003, p. 127).

There is another
important line of theoretical and empirical work called Power Transition Theory that focuses on the relative power of states
and warns that
when rising powers approach the power level of their regional or global leader the chances of war
increase (Tammen, Lemke, et al, 2000). Jacek
Kugler (2006) warns that the rising power of China relative to the United States greatly increases the chances of great power

war some time in
the next few decades.
The IFs model combines the theoretical and emp
irical work of the peace through
trade tradition with the work of the power transition scholars in an attempt to forecast the
probability of interstate war
. Hughes (2004) explains how he, after consulting with scholars in both camps, particularly Edward
Ma
nsfield and Douglas Lemke, estimated the starting probabilities for each dyad based on the historical record, and then foreca
st future
probabilities for dyadic militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and wars based on the calibrated relationships he derived

from the empirical
literature
. The probability of a MID, much less a war, between any random dyad in any given year is very
low, if not zero.

Paraguay and Tanzania, for example, have never fought and are very unlikely to do so. But there have been thousan
ds of
MIDs in the past and hundreds of wars and many of the 16,653 dyads have nonzero probabilities
. In 2005 the mean probability of
a country being involved in at least one war was estimated to be 0.8%, with 104 countries having a
probability of at least
1 war approaching zero
. A dozen countries
12
, however, have initial probabilities over 3%.
The
globalization scenario projects that the probability for war will gradually decrease through 2035 for
every country

but not every dyad
--
that had a significant (gr
eater than 0.5% chance of war) in 2005

(Table 6).
The decline in prospects for war stems from the scenario’s projections of rising levels of democracy,
rising incomes, and rising trade interdependence

all of these factors figure in the algorithm that calcu
lates the
probabilities. Not all dyadic war probabilities decrease, however, because of the power transition mechanism that is also inc
luded in the IFs
model. The probability for war between China and the US, for example rises as China’s power

rises gradua
lly toward the US level but in these
calculations the probability of a China/US war never gets very high.
14
Deglobalization raises the risks of war substantially.
In a world with much lower average incomes, less democracy, and less trade interdependence, t
he
average probability of a country having at least one war in 2035 rises from 0.6% in the globalization
scenario to 3.7% in the deglobalization scenario
.
Among the top
-
20 war
-
prone countries, the average
probability rises from 3.9% in the globalization sc
enario to 7.1% in the deglobalization scenario.
The
model estimates that

in the deglobalization scenario there will be about 10 wars in 2035, vs. only 2 in the
globalization scenario
15
. Over the whole period, 2005
-
2035, the model predicts four great power
wars in the deglobalization scenario
vs. 2 in the globalization scenario.
16






---
Growth


Economic collapse causes leadership collapse
--
> Terrorism and ME Nuclear War

Burrows & Harris in 9

Mathew J and Jennifer; Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis;
The Washington
Quarterly • 32:2 pp. 2738
;
http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_burrows.pdf



Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed belie
ves the future is likely to be
the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of
outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences,
there is a growing sense of
insecurity
. Even so, history

may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the
Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the
harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central
Europe in 1920s and
1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period).
There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty
-
first as much as in the twentieth
century. For that reason
,
the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem
to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would
be steadier
.
In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that t
errorism and
nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda.
Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth
unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups
that remain active in 2025, however, the
diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous
capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of
long establis
hed groups


inheriting organizational structures, command
and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated
attacks


and newly emergent collections of the angry and
disenfranchised that become self
-
radicalized, particularly in

the absence of economic outlets that
would become narrower in an economic downturn
.
The most dangerous casualty of any economically
-
induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East.
Although
Iran’s acquisition of nuclea
r weapons is not inevitable,
worries about a nuclear
-
armed Iran could lead
states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional
weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions.
It is not clear that t
he type of stable
deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge
naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran.
Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking
place under a nuclear umbrella co
uld lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red
lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear
rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual
-
capa
ble Iranian
missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of
an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short
warning and missile flight times, and unc
ertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on
preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises
.

Free trade promotes growth through economic opportunity.

Ikenson and Lincicome 11
,

Daniel

(associate director of the Center f
or Trade Policy Studies at the Cato
Institute)

and Scott

(international trade attorney with the law firm of White & Case, LLP, in Washington,
D.C.)
. “Beyond Exports: A Better Case for Free Trade.”
CATO Institute. January 31, 2011.

When goods, services, an
d capital flow freely across U.S. borders, Americans can

take full advantage of the
opportunities of the international marketplace. They can
buy the best or least expensive goods and services the world
has to offer;
they can

sell to the most promising mark
ets;
they

can

choose among the best investment
opportunities; and
they

can

tap into the worldwide pool of capital. Study after study has shown that
countries that are more open to the global economy grow faster and achieve higher incomes than
those that are relatively closed
. From an economic perspective, then,
the case for unil
ateral trade liberalization

reducing our own trade barriers and subsidies without preconditions or reciprocal commitments from other countries

is sound.
Politically,

however,
the concentrated and organized beneficiaries of protectionism are powerful relati
ve
to the much
larger, but

diffuse and disorganized, beneficiaries of free trade
. Politicians tend to be most responsive to
the loudest interest groups and are therefore inclined to view imports unfavorably. Thus, the reduction of import barriers is

consid
ered
‘‘costly,’’ and therefore must be compensated by the benefits of increased export market access.


Free trade promotes growth
-

cost
-
benefit analysis and empirical studies prove.

Bhagwati

07
,
Jagdish

(international trade attorney with the law firm of
White & Case, LLP, in
Washington, D.C.).

In Defense of Globalization. Oxford [u.a.: Oxford Univ., 2007. Print.
60
-
62

Two examples of such analyses, both supportive of the merits of freer trade, can be found in the empirical literature.
Just because
specifi
c tariffs led an industry to grow, we cannot conclude that the strategy contributed to economic
prosperity and hence growth
. Recognizing this,
Irwin has produced a
fascinating case

study of whether a
classic

“infant industry” tariff levied in the late nine
teenth century in the U
nited
S
tates

on the tinplate industry
really promoted that industry

and
whether that promotion was cost
-
effective.
28
Irwin’s careful answer is that
the McKinley tariff protection accelerated the establishment of the industry by a mer
e ten years
, since
the U.S. prices of iron and steel inputs were already converging with those in Britain and therefore making U.S. production o
f tinplate profitable
in any event,
but that this acceleration was economically expensive because it does not pa
ss a cost
-
benefit test
. At the same time, the
modern evidence against an inward
-
looking or import substitution trade
strategy is
really quite

overwhelming
.
In the 1960s and 1970s
, several
full
-
length studies of the trade and
industrialization strategies of

over a dozen major developing countries
, including India, Ghana, Egypt, South Korea,
the Philippines, Chile, Brazil, and Mexico,
were undertaken at the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (
OECD
)
and the National Bureau of Economic Resear
ch, the leading research institution in the United States.
29
These studies were very
substantial and examined several complexities that would be ignored in a simplistic regression
analysis across a multitude of nations.

Thus, for instance,
in examining whe
ther the 1966 trade
liberalization in India worked
, T. N. Srinivasan and I wrote a whole chapter assessing whether,
after making allowance
for a severe drought that blighted exports, the liberalization could be considered to have been
beneficial compared t
o a decision to avoid it
.
Only after systematic examination of the actual details of
these countries’ experience could we judge whether trade liberalization had truly occurred and when;
only then we could shift meaningfully to a limited regression analysis

that stood on the shoulders of
this sophisticated analysis
. The result was to overturn decisively the prevailing wisdom in favor of autarkic policies.
30
Indeed,
many of us had started with the presumption that inward
-
looking policies would be seen to be
w
elfare
-
enhancing, but the results were strikingly in the opposite direction, supportive of outward
orientation in trade and direct foreign investment instead.

Why?
31
• The
outward
-
oriented economies
were better able to gain from trade
. The layman finds it
hard to appreciate this because, as the Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson
has remarked, perhaps the most counterintuitive but true proposition in economics has to be that one can specialize and do be
tter. •
Economists today also appreciate that
there are scale

economies in production that can be exploited when trade
expands markets. This is particularly the case for small countries
. For this reason, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya,
which had protected themselves with high tariffs against imports in the 1960s, found

that the cost of their protection was excessively high, with
each
FACE
country producing a few units of several items. They decided in the 1970s therefore to have an East African Common Market so
that
they could specialize among themselves and each could
produce at lower cost for the larger combined market. • Then
there are the
gains from increased competition
.
Restriction of trade often is the chief cause of domestic
monopolies. Freer trade produces enhanced competition and gains therefrom
.
India provides

an

amusing
illustration.

Sheltered from import competition, Indian car manufacturers

produced

such
shoddy cars

that, when they went up to India’s Tariff Commission for renewal of their protection, the commissioners wryly remarked that i
n Indian cars,
ever
ything made a noise except the horn! •
In order to maintain outward orientation, countries must create
macroeconomic stability (chiefly, low inflation
).
Inflation
-
prone economies

with fixed exchange rate regimes,
where countries only reluctantly adjust the
ir exchange rates in response to inflation,
would soon find that their currency had
become overvalued
. This overvaluation would make exporting less profitable and importing more rewarding,
thus undermining
the outward
-
oriented trade strategy.

Hence countri
es committed to export
-
promoting trade strategy
had to have macroeconomic stability, and they therefore earned the economic advantages that follow
from good management of the economy.


Protectionism leads to lower GDP growth, lower average income, and higher poverty.

Hillebrand 10



Professor of Diplomacy @ University of Kentucky and a Senior Economist for the Central Intelligence Agency. [Evan E.
Hillebrand, “Deglobalization Scenarios:

Who Wins? Who Loses?,” Global Economy Journal, Volume 10, Issue 2 2010]

Economists have used the Stolper
-
Samuelson (1941) theorem to show that
trade is likely to have distributional effects on
society,

especially that the scarce factor of production (in the US case, labor) might be disadvantaged in favor of capital, and vice
versa in a
labor abundant country such as China.
The IFs model captures distributional effects by tracing the impact of trade
on e
conomic output by sector, each sector employing differing sets of labor skills and capital intensity

(Hughes and Hossain, 2003). In general,
relative returns increase for skilled labor as the overall level of
development increases and as manufacturing incr
eases its share in total value added relative to
agriculture. In

these
trade
-
restricting simulations
, which tend to increase the relative size of the manufacturing sector in many
of the non
-
OECD countries, we would expect the share of the work force engage
d in manufacturing to increase, resulting in more highly paid
workers and thus reducing poverty and income inequality.
Reducing imports of manufactured goods and FDI
, however,
reduces technological advance especially in the poorer countries. Slower technol
ogical advance
results in slower productivity gains and smaller wage gains in all sectors
. How these conflicting forces affect
incomes, poverty headcounts, and inequality depends on the interaction of many institutional and historical factors for each
coun
try
represented in the model.
The overall results
, however,
are quite clear: while deglobalization may encourage
poor countries to increase the relative size of the domestic manufacturing industry and this may shift
the relative wage structure in a way tha
t increases overall equality

(in 61 out of 155 non
-
OECD
7
countries the Gini
8
coefficient fell),
the slower growth in productivity resulting from a slowing of international trade results in
lower GDP growth, lower average income growth and higher poverty he
adcounts in all but a very few
countries
(Table 3).




---
Heg


A)
Protectionism would decrease US global influence


emerging countries will have
more sway.

NPC 7

(National Petroleum Council study for the Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, “Chapter 4: Ge
opolitics” in Facing the Hard Truths
About Energy,” July 18)

As new entrants

such as China and Russia
play

an increasingly important role in the international economic
system, the fundamental, Western
-
inspired values that have underpinned the system

repres
entative
government, the rule of law, transparency, accountability, and open markets

can no longer be taken for granted. The
balance of global economic power is shifting to emerging countries,
not only to major, fastexpanding nations such
as India and Braz
il, but also to the main group of developing countries that populate the halls of international organizations such as the Wor
ld
Trade Organization (WTO), the international financial institutions, and United Nations agencies. Increasingly,
these developing
countries are joining forces to increase their political clout. Not all are as committed to
the principles of

free trade
, transparency, and the rule of law as the governments that founded the current world institutional framework after World War

II.
Intern
ational institutions,

and particularly the WTO,
may have to adjust to the requirements and wishes of
these new economic powers, as they assert increasing influence over the global agenda and the rules
of the international trading system
. Many international

economists hope that, as developing countries grow richer, they will
increasingly appreciate the need for open markets and the rule of law in order to protect their own exports and growing prosp
erity.
If
,
however,
moves toward more open markets stall, and
even

reverse, the world economy will become less
efficient, costs will rise, and individual governments may apply their own rules
to investments, taxation, and
the way they select energy trading partners.
There

may

be more preferential trading among regions and an
increasing number of bilateral or regional deals struck for political

rather than purely economic
reasons
.
U.S.
influence for resolving these problems would diminish if agreed multilateral rules are disreg
arded
. Such
developments are all the more likely as a worldwide backlash against globalization has been growing in recent years, not leas
t in the Western
countries themselves.
Rising economic nationalism and protectionism at home would make it harder for t
he
United States to continue to exert global leadership in favor of open markets
. Various countries and interest
groups are resisting the forces of globalization and many of the international norms and institutions designed to facilitate
the spread of libe
ral
market systems.
At one extreme, rising anti
-
Western and particularly antiAmerican sentiments and
actions

as exhibited by militant movements, terrorism, and economic populism

pose fundamental threats to
globalization.
Whether resistance is directed agai
nst the pace of globalization, its perceived inequities or alleged failures, or its
social/cultural impacts,
countries and ideological movements often challenge the international system and
the forces of economic liberalization.



B)
Hegemony solves great

power wars, economic growth and stability, and human
rights

Bradley A.
Thayer
, November/December,
2006

“In Defense of Primacy,” NATIONAL INTEREST
Issue 86

THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where
there was a dominan
t power
--
Rome, Britain or the United States today.
Scholars and statesmen have long
recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics.
Everything we think of when we consider the current international order
--
free trade
,
a robust
monetary regime, increasing
respect for human rights, growing democratization
--
is directly linked to
U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be
maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it
. In

that
they are dead wrong

and
need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons:
Appalling things happen when international
orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order
established at Versailles
. Withou
t U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end j ust as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Don
ner
sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are.

I
n addition to ensuring the security of the United States
and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world.
The first has been a more peaceful world. During the
Cold War, U.S. leader
ship reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today,

American primacy
helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned
--
between Greece and Turkey,
Israel and Egypt, South Korea and J
apan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia
. This is
not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war.
Wars still occur

where Washington's interests are not seriously
threatened, such as in Darfur,
but a Pax Americana does reduce war'
s likelihood, particularly

war's worst
form:
great power wars
. Second,
American power gives the United States the ability to spread
democracy

and other elements of its ideology of liberalism: Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as

well
as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely

to align
with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.( n3) So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.
S. primacy. In
addition,
once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is
significantly reduced
. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is
because
they are more open, mor
e transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in
concurrence with U.S. leadership
.
And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United
States. Critics have faulted the Bu
sh Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such aft effort a modern form of tilting at

windmills. It is the
obligation of Bush's critics to explain why :democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest
, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of
course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the shor
t run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states
wo
uld be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to
Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent
of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Ta
liban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the
military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Eur
ope, Latin America, Asia and t
he Caucasus. Now even
the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western
-
style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq,
Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt
.
By all accounts,
the march of democracy has been impressive
. Third,
along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the
growth of the global economy
. With its allies,
the United States has labored to create an
economically liberal
worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect
for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic
stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from
which a
ll states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World
. The United States created
this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well
-
being of America. This economic order forces American
industries to be competitive,
maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the
defense burden manageable.
Economic spin
-
offs foster the development of military technology, helping
to ensure military prowess
.
Perhaps the greatest
testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service
diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post
-
independence India. Abandoning the positi
ons of his youth, Lal now
recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free

market economic policies and globalization, which are
facilitated through American primacy.( n4) As a w
itness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to

the
economic prosperity it provides. Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power

not only to advance its interests but to promote the
welfare of people all over the globe.

The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for
the world
. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of

the Cold War
--
and most of those missions
have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed,
the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"
--
it serves, de facto, as
the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is
a natural

disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the
United States assists the countries in need
.
On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian
Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 3
00,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid a
nd deployed the U.S.
military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000
U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing
water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of thos
e killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished
this Her
culean effort.

No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical reach
of the U.S. military
. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces.
American
generosity has done more to help the Unit
ed States fight the War on Terror than almost any
other measure
.
Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favo
rable opinion of America.
Two years after the disaster, and in pol
l after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthqu
ake struck
Kashmir, killing about 74 000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, divert
ing helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby
Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakis
tan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the
munificence of the Uni
ted States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found
that more people are favorable toward
the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al
-
Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. W
hether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well
-
spent because it helped people in
the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. m
ilitary conducting a humanitarian mission, the
re is a
clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States.

As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much
as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a
blitzkrieg
.




Global trade protectio
nism compromises strength of the US dollar and US foreign
policy objectives.

Harris & Burrows 9

Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor of the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer,
member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “
Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”
http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf


At the same time,
the image of the U
nited

S
tates

may have suffered anew,

and this time not because of the global war on
terror or Washington’s policies in the Middle East. Hostility toward the United States as the source of this global crisis, w
arranted or not, may
have received too little credence
. With the decoupling myth now gone but U.S. antipathy not forgotten,
the commonly described
‘‘unhappy marriage’’ between China and the U
nited
S
tates
could metastasize into a mistrusting union
between Beijing and Washington, spilling over into widespread d
istrust of the U
nited

S
tates

among
swaths of emerging and mature economies
.
Global financial protectionism
, while not a big feature in the report,
represents a new danger. Its forms
, such as numerical leverage ceilings and outright bans on entire markets,
may be
greater and more systemic than traditional trade and investment protectionism
. Should imminent domestic
regulatory battles aggregate into destructive and futile ‘‘what touches here, clears here’’
-
style regulation,
credit markets would be
left balkan
ized even as regulatory blind spots would grow
.
The dollar’s recent strengthening suggests
that the NIC was perhaps unwarranted in flagging concerns over the dollar’s ability to maintain its role
as the world’s leading global reserve currency
. Comforting a
s it would be to believe in such an eternal flight to quality, the
dollar’s rebound may have more to do with the unwinding of dollar
-
denominated assets than any safe haven effect. Even so,
the scale of
recent fiscal stimulus efforts would seem to suggest t
hat
the United States

is indeed relying on an exorbitant privilege
that may not always exist. Even
beyond national economic decisions, the U
nited

S
tates

has built its foreign policy
and military positions atop these privileges. Lasting dollar declines woul
d force difficult tradeoffs
between achieving ambitious foreign policy goals and the high domestic costs of supporting those
aims.


Free trade promotes US strategic and national security interests


fighting terrorism,
promoting democracy, and forging stro
nger relationships


Middle East proves.

Johnson 06,
Paul G
(
" J.D. Candidate, 2007. University of Minnesota Law School; M.A., University of South Dakota, 2003; B.A.. University of
South Dakota, 2001)

“Shoring U.S. National Security and Encouraging Economic Reform in the Middle East: Advocating Free Trade with Egypt.”
15 Minn. J. Int'l L. 470

Most importantly
for the U
nited
S
tates,
the adoption of FTAs seems to be especially linked to national security

considerations
.75
The U
nited
S
tates
has used FTAs to strategically further relationships that it believes are
key in fighting terrorism
.76 This factor seems to have been
especially

prevalent in the negotiation of agreements
with Middle Eastern countries
such as Israel and Jordan
.77 That is not to say that economic concerns play no role for the
United States in the development of FTAs
-
such pacts help increase the access of U.S. exporters to foreign markets because they reduce trade
barriers.78 They can als
o assist U.S. companies by countering the discriminatory preferences in other FTAs to which the United States is not a
party.79 The Bush administration has also suggested that this approach to international trade can complement multilateral tra
de liberaliz
ation
by "helping to forge common negotiating positions with partners, or compensate for slow progress in these negotiations."8° Th
e political
relationship between the United States and the Muslim and Arab countries of the Middle East has changed and deter
iorated in many ways in
the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.8' Many people throughout the world believe that the United States
is targeting the
Middle East solely because of its oil, especially after the war in Iraq.82 Many Middle Eas
terners also feel that U.S. foreign policy favors Israel
over Palestine.8s These beliefs could be an especially significant problem when trying to form trade partnerships with Middle

Eastern countries
but also show that
increasing the trade relationship wi
th the region could benefit the image and reputation
of the U
nited
S
tates.84 On the other hand,
many in the U
nited

S
tates

attribute the Middle East's dissatisfaction
with America to poverty and the lack of economic progress compared with that of Western na
tions
.85
Even if such perceptions are without merit,
both sides would benefit by taking steps to improve relations and
encourage further development in the Middle East
. While not a panacea,
negotiating an FTA with a powerful
country in the region
,
like Egy
pt, could be a positive step in the right direction for the U
nited
S
tates.
Egypt
is an extremely influential player in the Middle East, having hosted the Arab League since its inception
in 1945, and often shapes the policies of the entire region
, such as b
y leading the region in its efforts to resolve the
conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians.86 Additionally, pro Israeli groups seem to support Egypt's role in the pe
ace process. The
American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) has noted that

Egypt "honors its treaty commitments to Israel."87 In fact, since AIPAC has
expressed concern with growing Islamic fundamentalism threatening the Mubarak government,"8 it follows that economic developm
ent
strengthening the state would be welcomed by the o
rganization.
Due to Egypt's role in the Middle East, the country is an
excellent point for expanding America's FTAs in the region and could not be left out of an ultimate
U.S.
-
Middle East agreement
.89 For the United States, an FTA with Egypt would "indicat
e a willingness to promote the economic
dimension and facilitate development."9°
The United States would benefit by moving its relationship with Egypt
further away from aid with more of a focus on trade and from adding an additional economic
component to t
he Middle East peace process
.91 Such a move is not without precedent, as
facilitating free trade has
been viewed as a method to encourage regional stability since at least the aftermath of World War
11.
92
Economic reform and creating a tighter relationship

among the Middle Eastern states "is now
discussed as vital to bring the region out of the peace process and into the peace
.",98 Also similar to the
aftermath of World War II,
an FTA could help the U
nited
S
tates

further political reform in
Egypt

and

the re
gion as it
could use a closer trade relationship to encourage further moves towards true democratization
.94


---
Environment


A)
Free trade helps environment


bigger market incentivizes producers to clean up
production techniques.

James 09
, Sally

(policy
analyst at the Cato Institute's
Center for Trade Policy Studies
)
. “Free Trade is a
Boon to the Environment.” Cato Institute. October 8, 2009.
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10618

Indeed,
because trade leads to wealth, and wealth to an increased desire and ability to protect the
environment, the two are complementary
. Nonetheless, many G
-
20 leaders are doing their best to set them up as being
inalterably opposed. President Sarkozy earlier t
his month became the latest politician to call for carbon tariffs to "level the playing field" for
French products that will attract a carbon tax and yet compete with untaxed imports. Similar sentiments are held among certai
n U.S. politicians
too.
Senators

from manufacturing states
crucial to securing passage of a climate bill have repeatedly insisted that their support
depends on protection for vulnerable domestic industries. They
continue to argue that Chinese imports are threatening
U.S. jobs in energy i
ntensive industries, even though more than two
-
thirds of those types of products
come from other similarly rich (and, in some cases, greener) countries
. President
Obama

spoke out against
punitive trade measures inserted into the House bill when it passed i
n June, but declined to say whether he would veto a final bill if it contained
the same elements. He
has

demonstrated little willingness to resist the siren song of protectionism, judging from his actions on trade since
assuming the presidency. He also
dis
played a lack of appreciation for the foreign policy implications of
protectionism in announcing tariffs on Chinese tires
just prior to a climate summit where the country's cooperation was
considered crucial.
Alienating the Chinese by threatening them with

trade barriers would be a big mistake.
And

considering that the U.S. accounts for less than one percent of the market for Chinese energy
-
intensive goods as is, tariffs would create even less of an incentive among producers to clean up their
production tec
hniques for what would be a shrinking market
. What they will do is increase the costs of U.S. producers
who use Chinese inputs, and ultimately, of U.S. consumers.
Protectionism in the name of climate change carries little
upside and much risk, for the envi
ronment and for the global economy.
Leaders who care about either or both
goals should start fulfilling


B) Environmental collapse
causes extinction
-
disrupts the food chain

Diner in 94

David N. Judge Advocate General’s Corps of US Army, Military Law Revi
ew
, Lexis

No species has ever dominated its fellow species as man has. In most cases, people have assumed the God
-
like power of life and death
--

extinction or survival
--

over the plants and animals of the world. For most of history, mankind pursued this
domination with a single
-
minded
determination to master the world, tame the wilderness, and exploit nature for the maximum benefit of the human race. n67
In past mass
extinction episodes, as many as ninety percent of the existing species perished, and yet
the world
moved forward
, and new species replaced the old.
So why should the world be concerned now? The prime
reason is the world's survival. Like all animal life, humans live off of other species. At some point, the
number of species could decline to the

point at which the ecosystem fails, and then humans also
would become extinct
.
No one knows how many [*171] species the world needs to support human life, and to find out
--

by
a
llowing certain species to become extinct
--

would not be sound policy
. In ad
dition to food, species offer many
direct and indirect benefits to mankind. n68 2. Ecological Value.
--

Ecological value is the value that species have in maintaining the
environment. Pest, n69 erosion, and flood control are prime benefits certain species
provide to man. Plants and animals also provide additional
ecological services
--

pollution control, n70 oxygen production, sewage treatment, and biodegradation. n71 3. Scientific and Utilitarian Value.
--

Scientific value is the use of species for researc
h into the physical processes of the world. n72 Without plants and animals, a large portion of
basic scientific research would be impossible. Utilitarian value is the direct utility humans draw from plants and animals. n
73 Only a fraction of
the [*172] ear
th's species have been examined, and mankind may someday desperately need the species that it is exterminating today. To
accept that the snail darter, harelip sucker, or Dismal Swamp southeastern shrew n74 could save mankind may be difficult for
some. Many
, if
not most, species are useless to man in a direct utilitarian sense. Nonetheless, they may be critical in an indirect role, be
cause their extirpations
could affect a directly useful species negatively. In a closely interconnected ecosystem, the loss of

a species affects other species dependent on
it. n75 Moreover, as the number of species decline, the effect of each new extinction on the remaining species increases dram
atically. n76 4.
Biological Diversity.
--

The main premise of species preservation is

that diversity is better than simplicity. n77 As the current mass extinction has
progressed, the world's biological diversity generally has decreased. This trend occurs within ecosystems by reducing the num
ber of species,
and within species by reducing th
e number of individuals. Both trends carry serious future implications.
Biologically diverse
ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches.
These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diver
se systems. "The more complex the
ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . .

[l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by
several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of thread
s
--

which if cut anywhere breaks down as a
whole." n79 By causing
widespread extinctions
, humans
have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As
biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure
. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa,
and the
dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be
expected if this trend continues
. Theoretically
, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly
perceived and intertwined affects, could ca
use total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each
new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an
aircraft's wings, [hu]mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.





Protectionist quotas incr
ease pollution


trade liberalization improves agricultural
production, helping the environment.

Bhagwati 07
, Jagdish

(international trade attorney with the law firm of White & Case, LLP, in
Washington, D.C.).
. In Defense of Globalization. Oxford [u.a.: Ox
ford Univ., 2007. Print. 138
-
139

That this
may
happen is surely correct. That it
must
happen is incorrect. I and my GATT colleagues Richard Blackhurst and Kym Anderson
addressed this issue in 1991 when I was economic policy adviser to Arthur Dunkel, the di
rector general. The GATT Secretariat was working on a
special report on trade and the environment, and we took the occasion to clarify matters.
8
In particular, we provided
examples from
the real world

that
showed that
, contrary to the environmentalists’ pe
ssimistic certainties,
economic welfare increased
with trade liberalization
even though ideal environmental policies were not in place,

and that the environment
improved also.
9
The most compelling illustration came from agricultural trade liberalization
co
ntemplated in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.

Anderson calculated that
such
liberalization would shift agricultural production from higher
-
cost, pesticide
-
intensive European
agriculture to lower
-
cost, manure
-
using agriculture in the p
oor countries, so that both income and
welfare would increase in each set of countries, and total environmental quality would also improve
.
The GATT report also cited a study by Robert Feenstra that showed (as is illustrated in the following chart) that
im
port quota
protection had led,

as economists had predicted,
to increased imports of larger gasguzzling cars from Japan
and reduced imports of smaller, higher
-
fuel

efficiency cars because the bigger cars carried more
margin of profit than the smaller ones
and it paid the Japanese car manufacturers to export more of
the larger cars within a given quota
.
So the imposition of protectionist quotas had led to both lower
economic welfare and to increased pollution
.


Free trade
reduces pollutants


democratization
, national
income
growth, and
empirical studies prove
.

Bhagwati 07
,
Jagdish

(international trade attorney with the law firm of White & Case, LLP, in
Washington, D.C.).
. In Defense of Globalization. Oxford [u.a.: Oxford Univ., 2007. Print. 144
-
145

The bel
ief that

specific
pollutants
, such as sulfur dioxide, resulting from increased economic activity
will rise in urban areas
as per capita income increases depends on two assumptions: that all activities expand uniformly and
that pollution per unit output in
an activity will not diminish.
But

neither assumption is realistic. As
income rises, activities that cause more pollution may contract and those that cause less pollution
may expand, so the sulfur dioxide concentration may fall instead of rise
. In fact,
as

development occurs,
economies

typically
shift from primary production
, which is
often pollution
-
intensive
,
to manufactures,
which are often less so, and then to traded services, which are currently even less pollution
-
intensive
.
This natural evolution its
elf could then reduce the pollution
-
intensity of income as development proceeds. Then again,
the

available
technology used, and technology newly invented, may become more environment
-
friendly over time.

Both phenomena constitute an ongoing, observed proces
s.
The shift to environment
-
friendly technology can occur
naturally as households,

for example,
become

less poor and shift away from indoor cooking with smoke
-
causing coal
-
based fires to stoves using fuels that cause little smoke.
19
But
this shift is often

a result
also of environment
-
friendly technological innovation prompted by regulation
. Thus, restrictions on allowable
fuel efficiency have promoted research by the car firms to produce engines that yield more miles per gallon. But these
regulations are
c
reated by increased environmental consciousness, for which the environmental groups can take
credit. And the rise of these environmental groups is,
in turn
, associated with increased incomes.

Also,
revelations about the astonishing environmental
degradation in the Soviet Union and its satellites
underline how the absence of democratic feedback and controls is a surefire recipe for environmental
neglect
.
The fact that economic growth generally promotes democracy
, as discussed in Chapter 8,
is yet
a
nother way in which rising income creates a better environment
. In all these ways, then,
increasing incomes
can reduce rather than increase pollution.

In fact,
for several pollutants, empirical studies have found a
bell
-
shaped curve: pollution levels first

rise with income but then fall with it
.
20
The economists Gene Grossman
and Alan Krueger, who estimated the levels of different pollutants such as sulfur dioxide in several cities worldwide, were a
mong the first to
show this, estimating that for sulfur dio
xide levels, the peak occurred in their sample at per capita incomes of $5,000

6,000.
21
Several
historical examples can also be adduced: the reduction in smog today compared to what the industrial
revolution produced in European cities in the nineteenth ce
ntury, and the reduced deforestation of
United States compared to a century ago
.
22





---
Terrorism

A)
Free trade fights terrorism


encourages
job and economic growth.

Gresser and Dunkelman 2008
, Edward and Marc. “Free Trade Can Fight Terror.” Wall
Street Journal. August 15, 2008.

Moreover,
by opening up our market to Muslim countries,

we could

not only help American consumers, but also
serve
a larger strategic goal
: that
of boosting the economies which now produce large pools of unemployed,
embitte
red youth
.
We can make trade an effective weapon against terrorism
.
Our tariff regime puts
many nations in the Middle East, whose young people are susceptible to the sirens of Islamic
fundamentalism, at an unintended disadvantage
.
This works against our ef
forts to stamp out jihadism
.
Fortunately, the problem is easy to fix. The U.S. buys about a fifth of all the goods and services traded world
-
wide
--

importing $2.63 trillion
worth of the world's products last year alone. Socks come in from the Caribbean, towels from Pakistan, cheese

from France, and oil from Saudi
Arabia. But
apart from oil, very little comes from the Muslim world
. The 30 majority
-
Muslim states of the greater Middle
East, from Morocco through Egypt to Pakistan and Central Asia, account for about 10% of the world's po
pulation. They provide about 1% of our
manufactured imports, and an even smaller fraction of our farm imports. The statistics hint at one of the least
-
studied but most ominous
aspects of the modern global economy.
Most of us frame the last quarter
-
century
with narratives about
globalization, the rise of China and the spread of the Internet. But for the Muslim countries of the
Middle East
, and their neighbors in Pakistan and Central Asia,

it was a period of economic disaster rivaling our Great
Depression
. Be
tween 1980 and 2000, their share of world trade fell by 75%, and their share of investment fell even faster. The region's
unemployment rate became the world's highest, rising to an average of 25% for young people.
With the region's population rising
by nea
rly a quarter
-
billion, the high unemployment rates mean a pool of perhaps 25 million jobless
and sometimes hopeless young people, often easy targets for fundamentalists
.
Will oil

--

now selling at
record prices
--

put these legions to work? Historical expe
rience is not promising. Oil can bring in money,
but it also centralizes wealth and power
.
The effects mark a strong contrast with factory and farm
exports, where revenue is spread more evenly through the working public.

Apart from gasoline, we rarely find

consumer products from the Muslim world stocking our shelves (apart from the shirts and shoes trickling in from Turkey, Egypt

and Pakistan). In
part, that is because our tariff system makes life harder for developing countries. A Japanese car, for example
, is subject to a mere 2.5% tariff, a
Chinese TV 5%, and European medicines are subject to no import tax at all. Likewise, oil and natural gas get a nominal 0.1% t
ariff. But
tariffs
on the items that are most important to developing economies are much high
er.

Clothes are subject to an
import tax that averages 14.5% and can run as high as 32%. Luggage is taxed just as heavily. Shoe tariffs rise to 48%. Trade
pacts like the North
American Free Trade Agreement, and preference programs like the African Growth a
nd Opportunity Act, exempt many imported goods from
those tariffs. Jamaica, Peru, Jordan, Kenya, Mexico and dozens of other nations export towels, clothes and luggage here duty
-
free, so American
stores can sell their products at a lower price
--

or a highe
r profit margin. Nice for them
--

but not so attractive to the nations not privy to a
special trade agreement with the U.S., and whose citizens compete with Jamaicans, Peruvians, Kenyans and Mexicans for factory

jobs. Towels,
for example, are Pakistan's to
p export. Each container full of towels exported to the U.S. brings in enough income to employ about 500
Pakistanis. But
while Pakistani towels are subject to a 7.5% tariff, competing towels from the Dominican
Republic or Costa Rica
--

both of which benefi
t from the Central American Free Trade Agreement
--

come in duty
-
free
. Likewise, luggage made in Indonesia is subject to a tariff that can rise to 22%, but competes with tariff
-
free suitcases
manufactured in Mexico.
Lebanon, which exports preserved fruits
and vegetables, must compete with similar
duty
-
free items exported from Peru
. Sen. Maria Cantwell (D
-
Wash.) has taken a step toward fixing this problem, by introducing a
bill, the Afghanistan and Pakistan Reconstruction Opportunity Zones Act of 2008, to wa
ive tariffs on many goods from Afghanistan and
Pakistan's frontier provinces.
The next president should follow up with a broad, tariff
-
exemption initiative to
help the Muslim world break its downwards spiral, revive trade and put its young people back to
w
ork
. Of course, a comprehensive solution to Middle East economic problems will require efforts to stamp out corruption, improve
schooling
and end political oppression. But
few things could do more to combat terrorist recruitment than draining the
pools of
angry and unemployed youth that are spread across this region
. Fixing American trade policy would be a
good start.


B)
Terrorism may go nuclear in the future, risking global war.

Ayson ’10



Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for
Strategic Studies: New
Zealand at the Victoria

University of Wellington (Robert, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Ter
rorism, Volume 33,
Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via
InformaWorld)


A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would

not necessarily
represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed,
there are reasons to wonder whether
n
uclear
terrorism should

ever
be regarded as

belonging in the category of truly
existential

threats. A contrast can be drawn here
with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that
possess these
weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty
-
first
century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside
considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that
as long as the
major nuclear weapons states have
hundreds and even
thousands o
f nuclear weapons at their
disposal, there is
always the possibility

of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place
precipitated
entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two
nuclear worlds

a non
-
state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic inter
state
nuclear exchange

are not

necessarily
separable
. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially
an act of
nuclear terrorism, could precipitate
a chain of events leading to
a
massive exchange of nuclear
weapons

between two or mo
re of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the
place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the

risks of a catalytic

nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s a
s concerns grew
about nuclear proliferation, the so
-
called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to dep
ict an especially plausible
situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter
-
state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear
attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or Chi
na could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least
because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would s