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Are the System Security
Watchmen Asleep?
Dr. Roger R. Schell
Roger.Schell@aesec.com
ICIW 2008
University of Nebraska Omaha
April 24, 2008
æ
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1
Overview
Executives often clueless about security
–
They rely on professionals to be their “watchmen”
–
“Acceptable risk” based on gross misperception
Serious failure by security professionals
–
Don’t warn of adversaries’ subversion attack tools
–
Don’t warn that current solutions are highly ineffective
“Watchmen” responsible for likely disasters
–
“Blood on the hands” of those not sounding alarm
Time to sound alarm
--
need radical change
–
Proven verifiable protection is available, but languishes
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Air Gap Between Domains Is Secure
–
But Crippling …
“Lack of multilevel security (MLS) not only slows information sharing but
often prevents it altogether“
-
Congressional Report on 9/11
SIPRNET
GWAN
(IWS)
NSANET
(IWS)
JWICS
(IWS)
Site
Ops Net
JWICS VTC
OSINT
READOUT
Multi
-
Net
(IWS)
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Misguided Management Response
Accredit & deploy low assurance platforms
–
SE Linux
–
Virtual Machine Monitor, e.g., NetTop
–
Trusted Solaris
–
DODIIS Trusted Workstation (DTW)
–
“Guards” and filters, e.g., Radiant Mercury, ISSE
Ignore that low assurance is unevaluatable
–
Technology can only assure finding “obvious flaws”
–
Attackers rule, disasters are likely
Exacerbate risks with plans to get well
–
Reliance on “added on” security makes things worse
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Outline:
Watchmen
–
Sound the Alarm
Subversion threat is serious and growing
Unconscionable use of overly weak solution
Verifiable protection technology languishes
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Operating
System
Cross Domain
Solution (CDS)
Cross
-
Domain Solution (CDS)
(Uninformed Executive Perception)
Low
Network
Domain
Executive
Perception
of
current CDSs:
Controlled
sharing
(Believes CDS
prevents high
information from
flowing down)
High
Network
Domain
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Challenge is CDS Connectivity
(A “theorem” from science)
Low Networks or
Internet Domain
Corporate or Government
High Networks Domain
Computer Security Intermediate
-
Value Theorem
(Dr. David Bell, 2006:
http://www.acsac.org/2005/papers/Bell.pdf
)
Connection of disparate domains is multilevel
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Cyber Warfare Subversion Likely
Tiger Teams: subversion is tool of choice
–
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1979/jan
-
feb/schell.html
–
http://www.acsac.org/2002/papers/classic
-
multics.pdf
Adversaries can use 30 + years experience
–
The threat has only increased with time
–
Trojan horses
–
application subversion
•
Thousands in products, e.g., viruses and “Easter Eggs”
–
Trap doors
–
infrastructure subversion
•
Root kits, malware
Buy IT solution from your mortal enemy?
–
Better figure out how, because likely you are
–
Software of uncertain pedigree
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Trojan Horse Attack:
Malicious code in use of CDS
Hidden functionality in application & CDS
–
Adversary usually outsider (stranger to victim)
–
Can be surreptitiously distributed
Application user is unwitting agent
–
Requires victim (user) to execute application
–
Constrained by system security controls on victim
–
Exploitation undetected & controlled by remote design
Current networks’ open vast opportunity
–
Testing & review to detect is futile and delusional
–
Little mitigation in applications and most CDS systems
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Operating
System
Cross Domain
Solution (CDS)
Trojan Horse Attack:
Cross
-
Domain Solution (CDS)
Determined
adversary
understanding
of
reality
of
current CDSs:
Trojan horses
exfiltrate data
(Substantial high
data leakage to low
domain)
Low
Network
Domain
High
Network
Domain
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Trap Door Attack:
Subversion of Infrastructure
Malicious code in platform
–
Software, e.g., operating system, drivers, tools
–
Hardware/firmware, e.g., BIOS in PROM
–
Artifice can be embedded any time during lifecycle
–
Adversary chooses time of activation
Can be remotely activated/deactivated
–
Unique “key” or trigger known only to attacker
–
Needs no (even unwitting) victim use or cooperation
Efficacy and Effectiveness Demonstrated
–
Exploitable by malicious applications, e.g., Trojans
–
Long
-
term, high potential future benefit to adversary
–
Testing not at all a practical way to detect
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Operating
System
Cross Domain
Solution (CDS)
Trap Door Attack:
Cross
-
Domain Solution (CDS)
Determined
adversary
understanding
of
reality
of
current CDSs:
Trap door gives
low attacker
access to data
(Low has repeated,
undetected access to
high information)
Low
Network
Domain
High
Network
Domain
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Summary of Subversion Process
Step #1
–
infrastructure subversion
–
Integral to installed software, e.g. trap door
–
Added to software suite during lifecycle, e.g., viruses
–
Big attraction: easy to avoid being apprehended
•
Perpetrator not present at time of attack
Step #2
–
execution of artifice software
–
Can activate by unique “key” or trigger
–
NPS demo, 12 lines of code (LOC) subverts Linux NFS
Step #3
–
(optional) “two card loader”
–
Bootstrap small toehold for diverse customized attacks
–
NPS demo with 6 LOC to subvert XP and then IPSEC
Step #4
–
access unauthorized domain data
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CDS Subversion Vulnerability
Low Networks or
Internet Domain
Corporate or Government
High Networks Domain
Computer Security Intermediate
-
Value Theorem:
Connection of disparate domains is multilevel
* CDSs not verifiably multilevel secure (MLS)
Loss of Secrecy
Loss of Integrity
*
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Outline:
Watchmen
–
Sound the Alarm
Subversion threat is serious and growing
–
Low cost, low risk to attacker, virtually undetectable
–
Highly effective, extensible, e.g., “two card loader”
Unconscionable use of overly weak solution
Verifiable protection technology languishes
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Weakest Link is Flawed Solutions
Single flawed interface exposes whole net
–
“Defense in depth” as used is myth: ignores subversion
–
Plethora of “band aid” solutions, e.g., firewall, IDS, …
–
Low assurance CDSs, e.g., guards invite disaster
–
Like WW II crypto use sent thousands to watery grave
“Secure application” is non
-
computable
–
Determining it is multilevel secure (MLS) is impossible
–
Common practice and policy cannot change science
–
Equivalent to stream of “perpetual motion” patents
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“Secure” Pixie Dust Components
Vested interest research “sand boxes”
–
Saps funds and attention with little accountability
–
Implied accreditation shortcut inhibit warnings
–
Subsidized contribution drive out system solutions
Hard problems for MLS
systems
remain
–
Encryption “opiate of the naive” needs trusted control
–
No security hardware, e.g., TPM, composition defined
–
Virtualization hardware need high assurance monitor
–
Separation kernel needs reference monitor
–
Security from guard script language is non
-
computable
CDS can be no better than platform it is on
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Flaws in System Solutions Missed
False security from isolated components
Accreditors cannot responsibly judge flaws
–
Lack “approved”
system
security evaluation criteria
–
Unskilled in assessing methods to address subversion
Only a verifiably secure CDS is evaluatable
–
On verifiable trusted computing base (TCB) platform
–
Last coherent codification in TCSEC “
Class A1
”
–
System
security must be designed in, not bolted on
–
Includes composition of “partitions” and “subsets”
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Impact Indications and Warning
Vendor downloadable product subverted
“Cracker gained user
-
level access to modify the
download file. . . . you pray never happens, but it did.”
–
WordPress, reported on wordpress.org, March 2, 2007
Intrusion can replace traditional espionage
“you can exfiltrate massive amounts of information
electronically from the comfort of your own office.”
–
Joel Brenner, counterintelligence executive in CNN.com, October 19, 2007
SW subversion steals credit/debit card data
“an ‘illicit and unauthorized computer program’ was
secretly installed at every one of its 300
-
plus stores.”
–
Hannaford Bros. Co., reported on eWeek.com, March 28, 2008
Military recognition of subversion
“vulnerabilities are introduced during manufacturing
that an adversary can then exploit.”
–
Lt. Gen. Robert Elder, USAF, at Cyber Warfare Conference, April 2008
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State of Cyber Warfare Defense
“Nearly thirty years ago, Roger Schell accurately predicted:
systems not
designed for the modern Internet threats
, poorly implemented, forcing
the installation of nearly daily security patches, and
many millions of
systems being compromised on an ongoing basis.
”
Dave Safford, Manager, IBM Global Security Analysis Lab
http://www.research.ibm.com/gsal/tcpa/why_tcpa.pdf
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Outline:
Watchmen
–
Sound the Alarm
Subversion threat is serious and growing
–
Low cost, low risk to attacker, virtually undetectable
–
Highly effective, extensible, e.g., “two card loader”
Unconscionable use of overly weak solution
–
Current practice invites catastrophic mission impacts
–
Pixie dust of “secure” components gives false security
Verifiable protection technology languishes
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Multi
-
Level
Secure
Connection
Any
low connection => MLS
–
Must be
Multi
-
Level
Secure
(MLS)
–
Low/Medium assurance ineffective
•
No protection against subversion
•
Vulnerabilities unknown (unknowable)
Class A1 resists subversion
–
Is verifiably secure (high assurance)
–
Verifies
absence
of malicious code
–
Key enabler for CDS accreditation
High
Network
Domain
Sharing Data Across
Disparate Domains Need MLS
Isolation obstructs missions
–
Tactical situational awareness
–
Efficient utilization of resources
Low
Network
Domain
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Share but Resist Subversion
Low
Network
Domain
Adversary
plants trap door
or Trojan horse
Verifiably Secure
TCB
Cross Domain
Solution (CDS)
High
Network
Domain
TCB still
prevents
information
from flowing
down
“an arms race we cannot win”
–
IBM VP at RSA, Apr 2008
Impossible
to find or Fix
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Proven Methods
Evaluated and Deployed TCB
Balanced assurance, composable subsets for
systems
Mature, proven trusted systems
technology
–
TCSEC/TNI need not be used as organizational utterance for policy
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Verifiably Secure: Class A1 / EAL7
Common
Criteria
TCSEC
A1
EAL7
UNKNOWN VULNERABILITIES
NO
VULNERABILITIES
Beware of “No Man’s Land”
B2
B3
C1
EAL2
EAL6
EAL5
B1
C2
EAL4
EAL3
Only
Class A1/EAL7 excludes malicious software
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Security
Services
Appliances
Applications
Operating
System
Proven Solution: Security Kernel
Verifiably
Secure
Platform
Verifiable
Security Kernel
“The only way we know . . . to build highly secure software systems
of any practical interest is the kernel approach.”
--
ARPA Review Group, 1970s (Butler Lampson, Draper Prize recipient)
Intel x.86
Hardware Platform
Disk
Network
Monitor/
Keyboard
A computable solution to process simultaneously
a range of sensitive information
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Illustrative MLS Demonstrations,
(at UNO on COTS GTNP Kernel)
Multilevel Secure Web Server
–
Browse down
–
Unhackable web resources
Multilevel FTP Server
Covert Communications Proxy
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Multilevel Web Server Demo
High integrity
administration (and
Web page authoring)
Browser
Browser
High
Network
Domain
Verifiable TCB
(e.g., Class A1 GTNP)
Multilevel Web
Server App
Low
Network
Domain
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Illustrative MLS Demonstrations,
(at UNO on COTS GTNP Kernel)
Multilevel Secure Web Server
Multilevel FTP Server
–
High network users see high & low files
–
Low network users cannot see high files
Covert Communications Proxy
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Multilevel FTP Server Demo
High
Network
Domain
Verifiable TCB
(e.g., Class A1 GTNP)
Multilevel FTP
Server App
Low
Network
Domain
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Illustrative MLS Demonstrations,
(at UNO on COTS GTNP Kernel)
Multilevel Secure Web Server
Multilevel FTP Server
Covert Communications Proxy
–
Low sources put files onto high servers
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Covert Comms Proxy Demo
High
Network
Domain
Verifiable TCB
(e.g., Class A1 GTNP)
MLS Covert
Comms Proxy
Low
Network
Domain
File
Server
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MLS Demonstrations Summary
(at UNO on COTS GTNP Kernel)
Multilevel Secure Web Server
–
Browse down
–
Unhackable web resources
Multilevel FTP Server
–
High network users see high & low files
–
Low network users cannot see high files
Covert Communications Proxy
–
Low sources put files onto high servers
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Previously Delivered MLS Solutions
Validated Verifiable Technology
BLACKER
–
VPN (NSA product on GTNP)
HSRP
–
Pentagon MLS gateway (on GTNP)
CHOTS Guard
–
UK MOD system (on GTNP)
COTS Trusted Oracle 7
–
(GTNP design)
SACLANT client/server (GTNP design)
AFFPB Crypto
-
seal guard (POC on GTNP)
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Examples of More Opportunities to
Apply Verifiable Technology
MLS Networked Windows (Thin Client)
MLS network attached storage (NAS)
Guards and filters
Real
-
time exec (e.g., SCADA appliances)
Verifiably secure MLS Linux, Unix, *ix
Identity mgt (PKI quality attribute)
MLS handheld network devices (PDA)
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Best Commercial
Practice
C1
EAL
2
C2
EAL
3
Resistant to
Trojan horses
B1
EAL
4
B2
EAL
5
B3
EAL
6
Insurable, No Trap Doors;
Immune to Trojan Horses
A1
EAL
7
BENEFIT
TO USER
TCSEC
Rating
Common
Criteria
Assurance
COSTS TO
DEVELOP
Development &
evaluation cost
for
new
verifiably
secure
product
Cost & Benefit of Evaluated
Protection Capabilities
THREAT
Development &
evaluation cost if
was rated, e.g.,
Aesec’s Class A1
GTNP
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Conclusion:
Watchmen
–
Sound the Alarm
Subversion threat is serious and growing
–
Low cost, low risk to attacker, virtually undetectable
–
Highly effective, extensible, e.g., “two card loader”
Unconscionable use of overly weak solution
–
Current practice invites catastrophic mission impacts
–
Pixie dust of “secure” components gives false security
Verifiable protection technology languishes
–
Government impedes proven COTS verifiable MLS
•
“Competition” from Government in funding experiments
•
Discrimination in evaluation, e.g., no “certificates”, no RAMP
–
Users fail to validate product hypothesis to vendors
•
Often uninformed/misinformed by security professionals
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Are the System Security
Watchmen Asleep?
Dr. Roger R. Schell
Roger.Schell@aesec.com
ICIW 2008
University of Nebraska Omaha
April 24, 2008
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