New Deal Fragility Assessment Somalia: Input Paper on PSG 2 Security

pleasantrollΑσφάλεια

16 Φεβ 2014 (πριν από 3 χρόνια και 7 μήνες)

113 εμφανίσεις


1


New Deal Fragility Assessment Somalia: Input Paper on

PSG 2


Security
1







1.

Brief Context

Somalia is in the midst of major new political and security developments that offer
a g
reat
er

possibilit
y
for peace and security than the country has seen in over 20 years.
Whether this
opportunity is seized or
missed will depend mainly on decisions made b
y Somali actors in the
mon
ths and years ahead.
Yet, also
the policies of external actors


regional neighbors, donor states, the United Nations, the African Union
and others


will also play a decisive role.

At present, however,
part of the
country is effe
ctively at war
and violent contestation is ongoing and hampering more progressive steps towards state and
peacebuilding.

T
he (re
-
)building of functioning government institutions and processes is central to the return of stability
and security
in Somalia
at

all levels. However, the contestation over the nature, functions and scope of the
state has long been an important feature of the Somali conflict since state dissolution in 1991, and
statebuilding processes have often exacerbated this dynamic. Understandi
ng and mitigating the risk of
contestation is therefore particularly important during the formation of administrations at the regional and
federal member state levels.

These political
-
security challenges are compounded by the ongoing violent
contestation b
etween

During the prolonged absence of effective state structures in Somalia and the varying phases of armed
conflict, a range of actors have contributed to the economy of instability, each having developed vested
interests in Somalia’s condition of insec
urity: criminal networks, including those involved in the
trafficking of arms, people, and contraband; piracy; illegal fishing; money laundering; and the
misappropriation of public resources, including humanitarian and development assistance. At the same
t
ime, those within more ‘formal’ security structures have developed strategies to extract rents from the
provision of security in an insecure environment: members of the armed forces, police and militia groups
collect “taxes” from local businesses or at che
ckpoints; police and intelligence officers routinely demand
ransoms for release of detainees; and ‘gatekeepers’ demand a percentage of aid resources delivered to
internally displaced persons in camps under their ‘protection
.’

The massive rate of displaceme
nt in Somalia has also affected the regional and national conflict
dimension by drawing neighboring countries even stronger into political decision making in Somalia



1

This paper was compiled by
experts from the UN and the World Bank.

This draft paper has been developed at the request of the Federal Government of Somalia and the New
Deal High

Level Task Force as part of Somalia’s Fragility Assessment. The objective of this draft paper
is to provide a short review of key challenges, drivers of fr
agility and resilience for PSG 2




Security
’. It
consolidates the current literature, research and
analysis from government programs
, notably the Six
Pillar Strategy.

The pa
per includes a brief assessment and
possible policy implications on the basis of
existing analysis. Along with input papers for the other PSGs, this paper is part of the background
r
esearch phase of the fragility assessment. It will serve as analytical basis for the pre
-
consultations,
multi
-
stakeholder consultations and the final fragility assessment report
.


2


itself. With an estimated 1.5 million internally displaced, and one million refugees resid
ing in Kenya,
Ethiopia and Yemen, this has impacted on local political and economic outcomes, and brought issues like
land tenure, impunity and grievances to the forefront.

On the positive side, the sustained power sharing arrangements in sector in Somalil
and, Puntland and
other areas provides insightful examples of necessary elite coalitions to enable the emergence of
integrated and coordinated security forces that provide the crucial public good for development


citizen
and state security.

Non
-
state acto
rs have also played important roles as security providers. Traditional institutions, such as
clan councils and traditional elders employing customary law, have been instrumental in containing
violence, resolving disputes and dispensing traditional justice.

Women’s groups, youth groups, and civil
society actors, including community
-
policing initiatives, have also assumed responsibility for public
security. These same traditional systems have nevertheless also contributed to conflict in the past and
have fail
ed to protect women and children to a sufficient degree, often dispensing ‘justice’ contrary to
human rights.

Main Challenges and Questions Ahead


(i)

Centre
-
Periphery Relations:

to what extent political settlements can be organized under the
provisional
constitution (PSG 1) that will help determine the nature and size of the Somali
National Army and the status of the armed forces in the regional administrations.


(ii)

Counter
-
insurgency:
to what extent can the FGS adopt a broad political
-
security
-
development
a
pproach to undermine and end the insurgency

and disengage combatants.

(iii)

Building of a national security sector including the military and police:
once political
arrangements have settled question of role and security status, to what extent can a n accountabl
e
and sustainable security sector be built from national resources.

(iv)

Transparency
,
Accountable
and Capable
Institutions:

what kind of civilian oversight and
planning institutions need to be crated to ensure the integrity of the security sector.

(v)

Security se
ctor and Revenue Generation:
how can the ‘taxation’ of ordinary citizens by militia
扥⁲e摵捥dK


(vi)

National Security Plan Framework:
detailed policy dialogue, legislation and planning for the
security sector including inter alia the above issues as well as e
.g. re
gulat
ion of
the private sector
providing security services
.


2.

Main issues/challenges

On
-
going armed contestation and violence


Political violence

-

political violence and related conflict have reduced dramatically since 2009, but has not ceased
completely; targeted political violence against members of the SFG remains likely and possibly
even increasing against members of the SFG in order to derail re
form processes and protect
members of former predatory cartels and governments

-

Al
-
Shabaab has been weakened by joint AMISOM
-
SFG
-
Ethiopian military operations, yet it
continues to pose a threat across many parts of Somalia after the retreat of the organiza
tion to the

3


rural areas; Al
-
Shabaab still controls up to half of the country in the south and restricts access for
humanitarian assistance; frequent attacks on members of government and its allies highlight the
on
-
going threat from a weakened, but still op
erational organization; in the remaining areas under
Al
-
Shabaab control, the civilian population suffers from a variety of criminal acts (including
recruitment and abduction of children into its ranks)

-

criminal behavior by some elements of the security fo
rces against the citizens has further eroded
the legitimacy and trust in these SFG
-
allied troops; women, IDPs and members of minority clans
have been targeted and suffer the most from various forms of violence

Inter
-
communal violence

-

political and inter
-
co
mmunal violence over local resources and authority occur across Somalia in
varying degrees and levels of intensity (e.g. Kismayo, Sool); in Mogadishu land conflicts in a
context of unclear titles and laws potentially inhibit the on
-
going investment in, and

expansion of,
the urban sphere, fuelling a booming real
-
estate market and the competition over its profits;

-

violence also often erupts between pastoral groups competing for resources, such as water and
pasture; traditional conflict resolution mechanisms a
re unable to cope with violence brought by
modern weapons and results often in escalation

Piracy

-

anti
-
piracy measures have reduced incidents of capture, although this has shifted some criminal
and destabilizing militia behavior to the shore; sustainable so
lutions involve forging a political
contract with local power holders

a shift in attention, from the perpetrators to the enablers of
piracy;

Inter
-
personal violence

-

inter
-
personal violence and crime are generally associated with urban areas and reach very

high
levels among vulnerable groups of the society

-

sexual and gender
-
based violence (SGBV), including domestic violence, has reached alarming
proportions across most of Somalia and lead to further vulnerability to HIV and other disease
especially among vu
lnerable and marginalized groups

Incidence of cross
-
border destabilization

-

regional and local authorities have assumed responsibility for border control in the absence of a
unified SFG border control force


borders remain essentially porous, with unregul
ated
movement of people and goods

-

UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Somalia in 1992 in order to curb the flow of
weapons into the country
; outflow of arms and fighters to neighboring countries has raised
concerns regionally and within the inte
rnational community at
-
large


4


-

large numbers of refugees and irregular human cross border movement in the region incentivize
the active interference of neighbors in Somalia’s political process, most recently evident in the
IGAD
-
led process to establish autho
rity in the southern regions

Fragmented security sector

-

recent political developments in Somalia are encouraging, yet the current government faces
enormous security challenges
. T
he e
stablishment of state monopoly over
the legitimate use of
force in Somalia

by security force in support of state building must be linked to effective political
strategy and outreach of the government

-

many armed actors within Somalia operate outside the SFG’s authority: private security
companies, multilateral troops, neighboring

troops, private militias, etc.; extensive scope for
contestation over the exercise of the state’s security
-
related functions among the various actors
and territories

-

lack of legislation necessary to integrate structure, functions and levels of the securit
y agencies;
NSSP outlined next steps and strategic objectives, yet implementation lags behind (Note: the
NSSP has been replaced with the National Security Plan Framework (NSPF), which will form the
basis of a comprehensive approach to security with a ‘Nati
onal Security Strategy (NSS)’ and
‘National Security Plan (NSP)’; the NSP covers military, police and judiciary)

-

limited capacity within FGS structures to develop strategic policy direction due to extensive
demands on individuals/ departments time and reso
urces

-

lack of formal strategic security related coordination structures with international community has
the potential to duplicate effort and waste valuable resources

-

proliferation of arms is widespread and many Somali citizens currently rely on non
-
state

forces
for their security; no effective and accountable police exists yet

-

lack of continuous payment of security forces results in increased criminal violence and predatory
behavior by those forces; this behavior by state security forces, and lack of lega
l accountability
for such conduct, is a persistent trend that threatens the peace and statebuilding process

-

incomplete integration and influence by clan affiliations and loyalties of SFG security forces
occasionally leads to violence among groups within th
e forces of the SFG and potentially an issue
of clan
-
based contestation

-

Somali public is deeply mistrustful of political and military leaders in face of various providers of
local and national security services, and horrific experiences in the past; most o
f the human rights
violations by perpetrators, with and without uniform, are committed with limited recourse to a
functioning judicial system




5


Civilian oversight and accountability of security sector institutions

-

currently no effective oversight and
accountability mechanism of Somali security sector
institutions

-

l
ack of legal framework for civilian oversight; Parliament has not yet enacted the relevant
legislation in this regard (Art. 130); the mandate of the independent National Security
Commission t
o be established under Art. 111H emphasizes the importance of human security but
Commission

not yet
established or
effective, civilian control of the armed forces, and means of
redress from abuses by security personnel.

-

provisional Constitution stipulates
that the “armed national security agencies” shall be governed
by the rule of law (126(2)) and controlled by civilian agencies (Art. 126(6)); the NSSP further
specifies the need for “Inclusive and participatory, democratic oversight”.

-

Constitution establis
hes the Office of the Ombudsman; powers include investigation of alleged
abuses by the security forces, and initiation of legal action before the courts
;
Office has not yet
been established

-

redress mechanisms for citizens lack existence and/or effectivenes
s to address existing and on
-
going violations and grievances

Capacity of security sector institutions

-

concept of operations agreed by the international community for AMISOM’s deployment
envisaged the development of a Somali National Army

(SNA)

of 2
0
,000;
this is currently far
from being achieved

and is impacting AMISOM’s ability to expand operations

-

lack of appropriate logistic support for SNA forces is severely hampering their ability to move
from a defensive to an offensive stance to engage AS elements;
critical supplies/support
required
includes, arms & ammunition, fuel, rations and pay

-

l
ack of leadership capacity across SNA poses significant challenges for command and control

-

r
ecruitment for the security services
was
primarily drawn from pre
-
existing
units and militia
formations, requiring trade
-
offs between the absorption of clan
-
based formations, transparency
and discipline
;

m
ore recent recruitment of individuals has been more transparent and fair, but
they inevitably become subject to the influence
of clan
-
based elements with
in

the security forces

-

m
any SFG
-
allied

units composed predominantly from one area or clan, and their members retain
residual loya
lties to individual commanders; a
s a result, the SFG security forces are not yet fully
inclusive or
representative, and existing units are only partially integrated

-

w
omen and minorities remain under
-
represented in all b
ranches of the security forces

-

r
eintegration of ex
-
combatants has been largely
and successfully
compl
eted in Somaliland and
Puntland

Rela
tionship between security and justice system

-

Somali judicial system has
in the past
effectively been subordinate to the Executive Branch, and
is therefore not widely perceived as an i
ndependent branch of government

-

l
ocal

formal
courts are often
perceived as
corrupt

and biased towards stronger groups and
individuals making redress for personal violence not a matter of justice but relative power to
enforce ruling
;

public perceptions represent a formidable challenge in rebuilding confide
nce in
the s
tate justice system


6


-

specific violent targeting of members of the judiciary and court system reduces performance of
the justice sector and its ability to attract talented individuals committed to the practice of law

-

n
ew military court, established in May 20
12, was intended to curb abuses by members of the
security forces, but external observers have
criticized

the court for lacking fair trial standards, and
the August 2012 Provisional Constitution voided the
court’s

jurisdiction over members of the
armed for
ces, by requiring that they be tried for abuses against civilian
s in civilian courts (Art.
128)
; threat of repercussions from trials against members of terrorist groups inhibit ability and
willingness of civil institutions to prosecute and try


3.

Sources of

resilience/capabilities

-

some regional

authorities have achieved progress in demobilizing clan
-
based militias,
establishing functional security forces, and controlling the display and use of firearms (especially
heavy weapons) in public spaces

for a number of decades;

-

development of a formal security sector

in
some of the regions
was preceded
,

or accompanied
,

by
political
negotiations with clan elde
rs and other community leaders;
‘Somaliland Communities
Security and Peace Charter’, the ‘Sanaag
Peace Charter’ and the Garowe Community
Constitutional Conference
appear to offer

valuable

examples of negotiat
ed, community
-
based
frameworks

(peace charters)
;

-

m
ore than 90 local

peace processes are estimated t
o have taken place in southern Somalia since
1
991,
valuable insights can be gained from this rich experience
.

4.

Looking ahead


-

Political dialogue
and agreement
with the federal states on the status of armed forces

and the
nature and role of the state and its national army;

-

Within that context, support
through the National Security Plan Framework, as presented at the
‘London 2’ Conference in May 13
;
recogniz
ing

that it is only a framework document, and as
highlighted earlier a National Security Strategy and a full National Security Plan will need to be
d
eveloped in the months ahead.

It is important to note that the NSPF includes ‘Justice’

-

t
he recently issued
N
ational Stabilization Plan also covers important areas for th
e

Security PSG,
and it’s objectives will need to be supported through cross
-
cutting pro
grams that contribute to the
effects required in more than one PSG

-

discussion is required
with FGS
on which

security force
’ e
ntry points should be included, i.e. all
structures with
in

MOD and MINS (incl
.

Police, Immigration and NISA)

-

esta
blishment of Nati
onal Security C
ommission as a crucial first step to increase the capacity for
civilian oversight

-

public expenditure review of the security sector to coincide with policy dialogue on aspects of the
stabilization plan and provision of basic security and just
ice services.





7



Relevant existing programs:

-

National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP) 2011 to 2014, Somalia

-

National Security Plan Framework 2013

-

Strategic Action Plan for Policing 2013
-
2017, Somalia

-

Stabilization through peacebuilding and peace
dividends
-

A pathway to local governance,
Somalia

-

National Programme for the treatment and handling of disengaging combatants and youth risk in
Somalia

-

Public Financial Management (PFM) Self
-
assessment Report and Proposed Public Financial
Management Stren
gthening Initiative (2013
-
2016), Somalia

-

Revival of the Somali Traditional and Religious Justice System, Somalia

-

Somalia Justice Sector Action Plan 2013
-
2015, Somalia

-

National Development Plan, Somaliland

-

Five
-
Year Development Plan, Puntland


5.

Key
documents

Brickhill, J. (2010)
Security and Stabilization in Somalia: L
earning from Local Approaches.
Soma
li Peace Processes, Accord,

21,
pp
.
27
-
29
.

Bradbury, M. (2009):
A Synthesis Rep
ort of the Peace Mapping Study.

Interpeace.

Bradbury, M. (2010): State
-
building, Counterterrorism, and Licensing Humanitarianism in Somalia. The Feinstein International
Center, Briefing Paper. (
https://wikis.uit
.tufts.edu/confluence/download/attachments/38356065/Bradbury
-
Somalia.pdf?version=1
).

Brons. M. (2001):

Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State in Somalia: From Statelessness to Stateles
sness? International
Books.

Bryden, M./ Brickhill J. (2010):
Disarming Somalia: Lessons in Stabi
lisation from a Collapsed State.

Confli
ct, Security and
Development
, 10
,
2,
pp 239
-
262
.

Bryld, E./ Kamau, C. (2012): Political Economy Analysis in Mogadishu.
(
http://tanacopenhagen.com/uploads/Political%20Economy%20Analysis%20of%20Mogadishu%20
-
%20full%20report.pdf
).

Danish Immigration Service (DIS) (2012): Security and human rights issues in South
-
Centra
l Somalia, including Mogadishu
Report from Danish Immigration Service’s fact finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia.
(
http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/90821397
-
6911
-
4CEF
-
A8D0
-
6B8647021EF2/0/Security_human_rights_issues_South_CentralSomalia_including_Mogadishu.pdf
).

De Jong et al. (2011): Exposure to Violence and PTSD Sym
ptoms Among Somali Women. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 24, 6,
pp. 628

634.

Dehérez, D. (2009): The Scarcity of Land in Somalia Natural Resources and their Role in the Somali Conflict. BICC, Occasional

Paper III. (http://www.bicc.de/uploads/tx_bicctools/occ
asional_paper_III_04
-
09.pdf).

Federal Republic of Somalia (2013):
Revival of the Somali Traditional and Religious Justice Sys
tem
. Ministry of Justice,
Religious Affairs, Constitution, Fede
ral and Reconciliation.

Federal Republic of Somalia (2013): Somalia
Justice Sector Action Plan 2013
-
2015. Ministry of Justice, Religious Affairs,
Constitution, Federal and Reconciliation.

Federal Republic of Somalia (2013): Strategic Action Plan for Policing 2013
-
2017. Ministry of Interior and National Security.


8


Federal Republic of Somalia (2013): Stabilization through peacebuilding and peace dividends
-

A pathway to local governance.

Federal Republic of Somalia (2013):
National Programme for the treatment and handling of disengaging combatants and youth at
risk in Somalia. The Inter
-
Ministerial Task Force on Disengaging Combatants.

Federal Republic of

Somalia (2013): National Stabilization Programs.

Forti, D.R. (2011):

A Pocket of Stability: Understanding Somaliland. Occasional Paper Series: Issue 2, 2011. Accord.
(
http://hawk.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/137755/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/d93b369d
-
2d59
-
4f4c
-
aaaf
-
712a48dbb106/en/op_2011_2.pdf
).

Human Rights Watch (2013):
Hostage of the Gatekeepers: Abuses against Internally
Displaced in Mogadishu, Somalia
.

Interpeace (2012): Pillars of Peace. In Pursuit of Peace


Challenges and Opportunities in the Central Regions.
(
http://www.inte
rpeace.org/index.php/publications/doc_download/324
-
pillars
-
of
-
peace
-
in
-
pursuit
-
of
-
peace
-
english
).

Interpeace (2012a): A Vote For Peace II


A Report on the 2010 Somaliland Presidential Election Process.
(
http://www.interpeace.org/index.php/publications/doc_download/327
-
vote
-
for
-
peace
-
ii
-
english
).

Interpeace (2011): Pillars of Peace
-

Puntland Note: Mapping the Foundations of Peace Challenges to Secur
ity and Rule of Law,
Democratisation Process and Devolution of Power to Local Authorities.
(
http://www.interpeace.org/in
dex.php/publications/doc_download/67
-
puntland
-
note
-
mapping
-
the
-
foundations
-
of
-
peace
-
english
).

Interpeace (2011a): Pillars of Peace
-

Democracy in Somaliland Challenges and Opportunities.
(
http://www.interpeace.org/index.php/publications/doc_download/220
-
pillars
-
of
-
peace
-
somali
-
programme
-
english
).

IRIN (2013):
Stiffer penalties, formal justice to curb rape in Somaliland.
(
http://www.irinnews.org/report/98116/stiffer
-
penalties
-
formal
-
justice
-
to
-
curb
-
rape
-
in
-
somaliland
).

Le Sage, A. (2010): Somalia’s Endless Transition: Breakin
g the Deadlock. Strategic Forum, No. 257, NDF.
(http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/SF%20257.pdf).

Lindley, A. (2013): Displacement in contested places: governance, movement and settlement in the Somali territories. Journal
of
Eastern African Studies, 7, 2
, pp. 291
-
313.

Marchal, R. (2012): The mercy of neighbours: security and governance in a new Somalia. NOREF Report. NOREF.
(http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/NOREF_TheMercyOfNeighbours_SecurityAndGovernanceInANewSomalia
.pdf).

Menkhaus, K. (2012
): Conflict analysis: Somalia. UNPOS.

Menkhaus, K. (2004): Kenya
-
Somalia Border Conflict Analysis. United States Agency
for International

Development.
(
http://www.somal
i
-
jna.org/downloads/Kenya
-
Somalia%20Menkhaus%20(2).pdf)
.

Moeller, B. (2009): The Somali Conflict: The role of external actors. DIIS Report 2009:03.
(
http://www.diis.dk/graphics/publications/reports2009/diis_report_2009_03_somali_conflict.pdf
).

Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP) (2011): Safety and Security Baseline Report: Bossaso.
(
http://ocvp.org/resources/publication/doc_download/22
-
bossaso
-
district
-
safety
-
and
-
security
-
baseline
-
report
).

Observatory of Conflict an
d Violence Prevention (OCVP) (2011): Safety and Security Baseline Report: Burao.
(
http://ocvp.org/resources/publication/doc_download/23
-
burao
-
district
-
safety
-
and
-
security
-
baseline
-
report
).

Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP) (2011): Safety and Security Baseline Report: Galkayo.
(
http://ocvp.org/resources/publication/doc_download/24
-
galkayo
-
district
-
safety
-
and
-
security
-
baseline
-
report
).


9


Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP) (2011): Safety and Security Baseline Report: Las Anod.
(
http://ocvp.org/resources/publication/doc_download/21
-
las
-
anod
-
district
-
safety
-
and
-
security
-
baseline
-
report
).

Observatory of Conflict and

Violence Prevention (OCVP) (2011): Safety and Security Baseline Report: Mogadishu.
(
http://ocvp.org/resources/publication/doc_dow
nload/25
-
mogadhisho
-
district
-
safety
-
and
-
security
-
baseline
-
report
).

OECD (2011): International Engagement in Fragile States: Can’t we do better? OECD Publishing.
http://www.oe
cd.org/development/conflictandfragility/48697077.pdf
.

Oksamytna, K. (2011): The European Union Training Mission in Somalia
-

Lessons Learnt for EU Security Sector Reform. IAI
Documents and Working Papers. Istituto Affari Internazionali.
(
http://hawk.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/130855/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/08fb8c83
-
6bff
-
4edb
-
83d5
-
e5a827d
9d146/en/iaiwp1116.pdf
).

Onyut, L./Neuner, F./Ertl, V./Schauer, E./Odenwald, M./Elbert, T. (2009): Trauma, poverty and mental health among Somali and
Rwandese refugees living in an African refugee settlement
-

an epidemiological study. Conflict and Health,

3, 6.

Osiro, D. (2011): Somali Pirates Have Rights Too. Judicial Consequences and Human Rights Concerns. ISS Paper 224. ISS
South Africa. (
http://hawk.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/136726/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/8a936a85
-
29ef
-
4ba1
-
9801
-
6febfee6681a/en/PAPER224.pdf
).

RMI Somalia (2011): Assessment of the capacity of the civilian police forc
e in Mogadishu

A review for the European Union,
Somalia Office.

Saferworld (2012):
Mogadishu Rising? Conflict and Governance

Dynamics in the Somali Capital.

Somalia Tr
ansitional Federal Government (2011):
National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP
)
2011 to 2014
.

Somalia Transitional Federal Government (2011): Somalia Security Sector Analysis.

Somalia Transitional Federal Government

(2012): Action Plan between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia,
Somalia National Armed Forces and the United Nations regarding Children Associated with the Somali National Armed Forces
.

Somalia Transitional Federal Government (2012
): Action Pl
an between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia,
Somalia National Armed Forces and the United Nations Action Plan to eliminate the killing and maiming of children in
contravention of international law.

UNDP (2012): Strengthening the Quality and S
cope of Justice Provision and Policing in Somaliland. Baseline Study conducted
by the Faculty of Law, the University of Hargeisa, Somaliland, with support from the UNDP Governance and Rule of Law
Programme (GROLS).

UNGA (2011): Report of the Special Rappor
teur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Rashida Manjoo.
A/HRC/20/16/Add.3. (
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Rep
ort_4027.pdf
).

UNSC (2010): Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1853 (2008). S/2010/91.
(
http://daccess
-
dds
-
ny.
un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/246/89/PDF/N1024689.pdf?OpenElement
).

UNSC (2011): Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 1916 (2010),
S/2011/433.

UNSC (2012): Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and
Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011), UN
S/2012/544. (
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/544
).

Wezeman, P.D. (2010): Arms Flows and the Co
nflict in Somalia. SIPRI Background Paper.
(
http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRIBP1010b.pdf
).


10


World Bank (2004): Female Genital Mutilation / Cutting in Somalia.
(
http://imagebank.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2006/05/02/000160016_20060502170731/Rendere
d/PDF/
360330SO0Female0mutilation0FGM01PUBLIC1.pdf
).

World Bank (2005): Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics.
(
http://site
resources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEV/Resources/3177394
-
1168615404141/SomaliaCountrySocialAnalysis.pdf
).

World Bank (2011): World Development Report 2011
-

Conflict, Security and Development.
(
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf
).

World Bank (2012): Societal Dynamics and Fragility Engaging Societies in Responding to Fragile Situations.
(
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362
-
1164107274725/3182370
-
1164110717447/final_eBook_PDF.pdf
).

World Bank (2013): A B
ackground Literature Review on the Drivers of Conflict Fragility and Resilience in Somalia, Social
Development Department, World Bank, April 2013.

World Bank (2013a): The Pirates of Somalia.