Civilian Military Rapporteur Remarks [MS Word] - Joint Forces Staff ...

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10 Δεκ 2013 (πριν από 3 χρόνια και 8 μέρες)

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MEMBERS:

COLONEL JOHN CULLETO
N, AUSTRALIAN ARMY




COLONEL BILL MCCOY,
USAR




COLONEL MIKE WARD, C
ANADIAN ARMY




CDR NICK SPENCE, RN




AMBASSADOR EDWARD MA
RKS






MODERATOR: MR. D.
PURNELL DELLY, U.S.
STATE DEPT REP TO TH
E
AFSC


RAPPARTEUR:

PROF. JOHN DAVEY, JT

FORCES STAFF COLLEGE


OVERARCHING THEMES:



EXECUTION AND CHALLE
NGES TO MULTINATIONA
L OPERATIONS:



COMPLEX CONTINGENCIE
S IN THE RECENT PAST

HAVE PROVEN TO BE
DISTINCTLY DIFFERENT

IN TERMS OF STRATEGI
C CONTEXT, NATURE OF

THE CRISIS AN
D THE ENVIRONMENT, A
ND THE COURSE OF ACT
ION
CHOSEN TO DEAL WITH
THE SITUATION; HOWEV
ER, COMMON
CHARACTERISTICS DO E
XIST:



IN DEALING WITH COMP
LEX CONTINGENCIES, T
HE NATIONS HAVE
GENERALLY CHOSEN TO
FORM COALITIONS OF T
HE WILLING. THESE
MULTINATIONAL TASK F
ORCES, WHILE PROVIDI
NG BURDEN
-
SHARING AND LEGITIMA
CY, REQUIRE A LOT OF

WORK TO ACHIEVE
UNITY OF EFFORT AND,

FINALLY, MISSION SUC
CESS.



WHERE MILITARY OPERA
TIONS ARE UNDERTAKEN
, THE TRANSITION
TO CIVILIAN
-
LED, CIVILIAN OPERAT
ED ACTIVITIES IS NOT

ALWAYS
WELL
PLANNED AND EXECUTED
.



TRANSITION OF PEACEK
EEPING/NATION
-
BUILDING FUNCTIONS T
O UN
HAS MET WITH VARIED
RESULTS. TOO FREQUE
NTLY, THE MANDATES
GIVEN BY THE UN SECU
RITY COUNCIL HAVE BE
EN UNDER
-
RESOURCED AND CONTRI
BUTIONS DO NOT ARRIV
E ON TIME.



INTERACTIONS BET
WEEN THE MILITARY AN
D NGOS/IOS HAVE BEEN

PROBLEMATIC. POOR C
OMMUNICATIONS, AND L
ACK OF MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING OF PER
SPECTIVES AND EXPECT
ATIONS HAVE
RESULTED, IN SOME CA
SES, IN UNPRODUCTIVE

RELATIONSHIPS.


THE WAY AHEAD
:


CIVIL
-
MILITARY COORDINATION PANEL



WE NEED TO RECOGNIZE

THE CENTRALITY
OF THE U.N. IN PEACE

OPERATIONS. FOR BET
TER OR WORSE, THIS O
RGANIZATION IS OUR B
EST
HOPE FOR ACHIEVING T
HE STRATEGIC OBJECTI
VES IN COMPLEX
CONTINGENCIES.



EARLY COLLABORATION
(INTEGRATED CAMPAIGN

PLAN), DAY TO DAY
PREPAREDNESS, AND UN
DERSTANDING OF TCNS
AN
D OTHER PLAYERS’
CAPABILITIES AND LIM
ITATIONS WILL ENHANC
E PROSPECTS FOR
MISSION SUCCESS.



WE NEED TO TRAIN AND

EXERCISE, WITH ALL T
HE STAKEHOLDERS, IN
PEACE IN ORDER TO SU
CCEED IN CRISIS. RE
ALISTIC TRAINING AND

EDUCATION ARE KEY FO
R THOSE MOST LIKELY
TO B
E CALLED TO
RESPOND. RAPID DEPL
OYMENT OF CAPABLE FO
RCES IS CRITICAL TO
SUCCESS OF THE MISSI
ON.



WE NEED TO THINK THR
OUGH 2
ND

ORDER EFFECTS OF MIL
ITARY
-
CIVILIAN OPERATIONS:

E.G., WHAT TO DO WIT
H TENS OF THOUSANDS
OF
DEMILITARIZED TROOPS

IN AN ECONOMY WITH 6
0 % UNEMPLOYMENT;
WHAT IS THE IMPACT O
F STRICT FORCE PROTE
CTION MEASURES ON
EFFECTIVENESS OF CER
TAIN CIVIL
-
MILITARY ACTIVITIES.



WITH RESPECT TO CIVI
LIAN POLICE: TO ASS
URE LAW AND ORDER AR
E
SUSTAINED ONCE INTER
NATIONAL/COALITION F
ORCES ARE
WITHDRAWN, WE NE
ED A POLICE FORCE TH
AT ISVETTED, TRAINED
, AND
DISPATCHED IN SUFFIC
ENT NUMBERS.


PANEL MEMBER PRESENT
ATIONS
:


COLONEL JOHN CULLETO
N
, AUSTRALIAN MILITAR
Y ADVISOR AT THE UN.




EAST TIMOR: INTERFET OPERATIONS, CONSISTING OF 21 NATIONS.



FOLLOWING VOTE FOR INDE
PENDENCE, BLOODBATH ENSUED, WITH
RESULTING 400 THOUSAND IDPS.



AUSTRALIA, AS LEAD NATION, HAS IMPORTANT INTERESTS AT
STAKE. DOES NOT WANT INDONESIA TO DISINTEGRATE.



KEYS TO SUCCESS:



QUICK RESPONSE: 5 DAYS FROM UN RESOLUTION TO TROOPS ON
THE GROUND.



TRAD
ITIONAL RELATIONSHIPS (US, CANADA, UK, OTHERS)
ALLOWED RAPID FORMATION OF COALITION.



SHAPING THE ENVIRONMENT, WORKING WITH UNSC


INCLUDING
PROVIDING STRAWMAN. (UNDERSTANDING THE UN
ORGANIZATIONS AND PROCESSES).



STANDING TF HEADQUARTERS RATHER THAN AD HOC
.



CLEAR CONCEPTS, INTENSE LIAISON, INFORMATION SHARING,
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT ALL PLAY A ROLE. WRT NGOS, BRIEFINGS
HELD IN DARWIN BEFORE DEPLOYMENT (NGOS HAD FLED E.T.).



LEARN THE RIGHT LESSONS: THIS WAS NOT AN ARMED
INTERVENTION, MNF NOT ALWAYS THE ANSWER
, INTERFET WAS NOT
STRICTLY A REGIONAL COALITION …MANY OUTSIDE PARTICIPANTS.



THIS WAS NOT A COMPLEX DOCTRINAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL
CHALLENGE: COMMUNICATIONS WAS THE KEY.




COL BILL MC COY,
COMMANDER OF THE 354
TH

CIVIL AFFAIRS BRIGADE,
WAS COMMANDER, JOINT C
IVIL
-
MILITARY TASK FORCE IN SARAJEVO.




SIX LINES OF OPERATION:



HELP SFOR COMPLETE ITS MISSION



SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE CIVIL
-
MILITARY EFFORT



SUPPORT DPRE RETURNS



SUPPORT RECONSTRUCTION



SUPPORT DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS



SUPPORT IMPROVEMENT IN PUBLIC SAFETY



FU
LLY INTEGRATED TASK FORCE STAFF



COMPETING NATIONAL AGENDAS, BUT HARMONIZED GOALS AND
OBJECTIVES.



MEANING OF WORDS IMPORTANT: DIFFERENT ALPHABETS,
DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS



WORKED WITH NGOS



COOPERATION, COORDINATION VITAL.



FORCE PROTECTION ISSUES.



IOs LE
AD, CIMIC SUPPORTS



CONTRASTS WITH RWANDA: POLITICAL IMPORTANCE, THREAT,
COMPLEXITY (RWANDA PURELY HA, BOSNIA MULTIFACETED)



BASIC CHALLENGE:



ECONOMICS…AFFECTS REFUGEE RETURN



CRIME AND CORRUPTION…PERVASIVE.




COLONEL MIKE WARD,
DIRECTOR OF LAND STRATEG
IC CONCEPTS, WAS
COMMANDER OF CANADIAN ARMY CONTINGENT IN KOSOVO LAST YEAR.




MISSION, AND MISSION CREEP (LAW AND ORDER ADDED TO THE
SECURITY MISSION).



DISARMING KLA



ENGENGERING COOPERATION (WHILE ALL THE WHILE BEING
ACCUSED OF FAVORING ONE SIDE OR THE OTHE
R).



NEED FOR HARMONIZING GOAL FOR ALL ENTITIES AND PARTICIPANTS



ENTRY AND STABILIZATION



AVOID A VACUUM, RESPOND TO REFUGEE NEEDS QUICKLY



UNHCR LATE TO ARRIVE, WAS NOT DEPLOYABLE, FLEXIBLE ENOUGH



UN SR LATE, UNMIK ARRIVED ONE MONTH AFTER REQUIRED



LAW AND OR
DER



LOW EBB IN SFOR PUBLIC IMAGE, WHEN SERBS WERE MASSACRED
TAKING IN THE HARVEST.



SOLDIERS A BLUNT INSTRUMENT, NEED POLICE FOR PRECISE LAW
ENFORCEMENT.



CMOC A FORCE MULTIPLIER



30 NGOS/IOS.



COMMUNICATE WITH NGOS, FILL IN THE GAPS.



PLAYGROUNDS, SCHOOLS KEY
TO SUCCESS IN RESTORING STABILITY
IN THE SOCIETY.



WE NEED:



FULL SPECTRUM INTERVENTION (ALL AGENCIES, ALL FUNCTIONS)



PLEDGES MUST BE HONORED



NEED BETTER PERFORMANCE BY THE UN













COMMANDER NICK SPENCE,
AT THE UK JOINT DOCTRINE AND CONCEPTS
CENTER, I
NVOLVED WITH DEVELOPMENT OF UK’S CONCEPT FOR CIVIL
-
MILITARY CO
-
OPERATION.

A PARTICULARLY FORWARD
-
LOOKING PRESENTATION



PREMISE: NO SINGLE ORGANIZATION CAN SOLVE THE PROBLEM



HOW DO WE DO BETTER THE NEXT TIME?



START NOW, BUILD RELATIONSHIPS, LAY GROUNDWORK



K
EY: DEVELOP MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, COMMON PERPECTIVE



TRAIN TOGETHER



DO GENERIC CONTINGENCY PLANNING



DON’T OVERLOAD NGO’S__ THEY ARE MOSTLY IN THE FIELD.



NEED INTEGRATED CAMPAIGN PLAN, BROADER CONTEXT



BALANCES MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND HUMANITARIAN
IMPERATIVES
.



PROVIDES FOR ROBUST CAPABILITY AND FLEXIBILITY



INVOLVE ALL STAKEHOLDERS



GENERATE COHERENCE AT ALL LEVELS



LIVING DOCUMENT, READILY ADAPTIBLE



RESPONSIBILITIES, AUTHORITIES DELINEATED.



ESTABLISHES MEASURE OF SUCCESS



INTEGRATED MINDSET…STOP INTERAGENCY CONFR
ONTATION



DEVELOPMENT OF CIMIC IS
EVOLVING
, NOT A REVOLUTION




AMBASSADOR EDWARD MARKS




HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE NATION STATE




INTERNATIONAL NORMS ARE CHANGING, ESPECIALLY IN THE LAST 50
YEARS. INTERNAL BEHAVIOR OF NATION STATES AGAINST THEIR OWN
PEOP
LE HAS BECOME A MATTER OF INTERNATIONAL INTEREST AND
INTERVENTION.




THERE ARE TWO CENTERS OF PEACE OPERATIONS: UN AND
WASHINGTON. THEY ARE REWRITING PROCEDURES AND
ORGANIZATION.



UN: TRIAD FORMED, WITH CREATION OF PKO, HA, PM DEPTS



BRAHIMI REPORT: REFOR
MING UN PEACE OPERATIONS



HOW TO HELP UN MANAGE PK BETTER



CREATE INFO CENTER, SET UP ROSTERS FOR LEADERS, STAFF
OFFICERS, CIVPOL



STREAMLINING OF LOGISTICS AND FUNDING



MESSAGE TO UN (ESPECIALLY THE PERM FIVE):



NO MORE UNDER
-
RESOURCED MANDATES, NO MANDATES
W
ITHOUT THE WILL TO DO IT RIGHT (DROC EXAMPLE).



IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US: WHAT TYPE OF PEACE OPS TO
SUPPORT, OR PARTICIPATE IN.




WASHINGTON POLICY:



PDD
-
25. CRITERIA FOR INTERVENTION



PDD
-
56: POL
-
MIL PLAN, EXEC COMM ESTABLISHED



PDD
-
71: CIVPOL, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM. LEAD IS DOS (DOJ KEY
PARTNER)



UNDER NEW ADMINISTRATION, POLICIES WILL BE REVIEWED


USG IS AT THE CROSSROADS: UN IS CENTRAL FACTOR, MUST BE PART
OF THE SOLUTION. US HAS NOT TAKEN THIS SERIOUSLY. DO WE HAVE
TO LEAD? WARFIGHTING VS PEACE
OPS: THE TRADEOFFS? WHEN TO DO
A MISSION UNILATERALLY, AND UNDER WHAT AUTHORITY?






COMMENTS, AND DISCUSSION: MAIN INTEREST AREAS
.




FIRST





SECOND





THIRD




QUOTABLE QUOTES:


“ IF YOU THINK PEACEKEEPING IS EXPENSIVE, TRY WAR!”….KOFI ANNAN


“I KNOW WH
AT THE DOCTRINE IS, NOW WHAT IS RIGHT?” GEN SULLIVAN


“STATE IS FROM MARS, DEFENSE IS FROM VENUS”…..