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Consocational Democracy and Grassroots Conflict Resolution: A Stable Alternative

Daniel Hummel

Florida Atlantic University



: Consocational democracy provides one means of joining various
identifiable, autonomous groups under one democr
atic government. The idea of elite
cooperation assumes that these various groups are shaped explicitly by the elites in their
community, a top
down process. Bottom
up processes may be complementary to the
current framework in generating country loyalty.

Multiple loyalties exist in a
consocational context where a need to generate hierarchical loyalties is pertinent for the
survival of the State. Bosnia and Lebanon provide two examples where divergent
communities within the State are struggling to appropr
iate enough loyalty to the State to
legitimize efforts for stable development.


Democracy exits to increase the voice of the represented people in the affairs of
the government. Government no longer becomes the ends, but the means
of societal
This function
depends on the consent of the people. The age old problem of
democracy everywhere is how democratic is a country if the people do not participate.
The problem becomes even more

when a country that is ethnic
ally and
religiously diverse is composed of groups that do not wish to cooperate with each other.
Under these conditions democracies will not be stable and may even fall apart.

Sammy Smooha (2002) identifies five different styles of democracy. The first

individual liberal democracy, which in essence is just a collection of individuals who
share, ‘common citizenship but do not constitute a community (Smooha,


p. 423).’
The second is republican liberal democracy where the state imposes an identity

upon the
citizens thus forming one community inside the state. The third is ethnic democracy



where the ethnic majority is given precedence over ethnic minorities while minorities
possess collective rights that the state and the majority find non
ing. The fourth
is multi
cultural democracy in which ethnic differences are recognized while these

are not incorporated into the general structure of government i.e.
institutionalized. The fi
fth form of democracy is consoc
ational democracy wh
ich was
proposed by Arend Lijphart in 1977

(Smooha, 2002)

and will be the focus of this paper

Consocational democracy addresses problems in democratic state building that
result from deep segmentation or identified by extreme pluralism. These divisions
as a
result are easily defined and measured where real boundaries (political or otherwise)
exist. As a result of these environmental and social conditions there exists a natural
tendency for competition and the supporting of
based parties


Lijphart used four criteria to describe the consocational framework which are a
grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality and mutual veto. A grand coalition
is the gathering of divergent groups into the governmental framework. Seg
autonomy, in contrast, means that each sub
group has control over the internal affairs of
their community. Proportionality is the representation

set aside for

each group in the
national government and in the allocation of resources. Mutual veto en
sures that all
legislation is compliant with all groups (Andeweg, 2000).

The consocational framework is dependent on elite cooperation. This is the
centerpiece of the model and is based on the premise that communal violence between
groups is often exacer
bated by elites so that when these elites have voice in government
they have a vested interest in maintaining its integrity. Although elite meddling in



conflict is the most potent it is not the only incendiary in inter
group relations (Andeweg,

der the current model
a society has the characteristics necessitating a
consocational framework the sub
groups have two choices, to remain a part of the
country or to separate. These two forces pull on individuals of each group in which
decisions ar
e often based on various factors. Those societies that do not cooperate are
termed centrifugal. In this case the sub
groups emphasize separation over integration.
Consocationalism is a top
down integration/cooperation mechanism that seeks to
overcome ce
ntrifugal forces (Andeweg, 2000).


One of the forces that

these centrifugal tendencies is


one of the
characteristics that make communal lif
e possible i.e.

group loyalty. According to A.A.M.
Kinneging (2004) loyalt
y, ‘pertains to a bond that withstands the passing of time and the
winds of change: a bond that is conceived of as lasting, permanent, unbreakable, even
holy (p. 68).’

definition of loyalty indicates how intractable it is when integrating
many differ
ent groups with different loyalties under one government. In this case as
Kinneging (2004) points out, the community is higher than the individual. In ethnically
homogenous countries this presents no problem and allows democracy to flourish at all
. Often times this is not the case in heterogeneous societies where either the state
enforces a loyalty to its institutions such as in the republican liberal democracy model
while still maintaining individual rights or enforces it in such a way that viola
individual rig
hts in an undemocratic manner.



Loyalties typically follow racial or religious lines. They can even be more
fragmented such as loyalty to one’s town or city. Evidence can be seen in the sport’s
world. Loyalty is typically to a person o
r an institution (Healy, 2007). Loyalty to the
state has been somewhat of a recent phenomenon. Healy (2007) notes that loyalty
to the rule

continued until the 16

and 17

centuries in Europe (vertical loyalty) and then
sometime in the 18

ury this loyalty transferred from the sovereign to the citizens
(horizontal loyalty). This means that people began to associate with each other as being
members of that country and were thus loyal to each other. This of course is the most
optimal form of

loyalty because of the relatively few resources needed of the government
to maintain its integrity.

The lack of loyalty can be detrimental to state


towards another

Smooha (2002) notes that the individual liberal democracy is b
arely even a
democracy. Kinneging (2004) is discouraged by the extreme individualism brought on
by economic liberalism. The lack of loyalty between sub
groups is something that
consocationalism does not address as it represents an administrative/electora
l solution to
a heavily divided society. It does not address the psychological/emotional element that
loyalty forms a part of and which in essence is the backbone of society.

Lijphart envisioned consocationalism as a temporary solution
in which it

was on
meant as a transitory phase to greater levels of democratic cooperation (Andeweg, 2000).
This of course assumes that through elite cooperation and living peacefully alongside
each other under one roof

these groups would eventually reconcile th

and move to greater integration. Unfortunately there is the other direction



such as entrenched differences that only get worse with time that may stalemate/postpone
the conflict i.e. not resolving the conflict (Miller & Fox,



Simon (1997
) recognized the function loyalty played in creating an
individual identity that closely matches the organization. Simon noted that for an
organization to be truly efficient, each and every member of the organization would have
to internalize
the organization

objectives. Loyalty then came from one of two
sources, loyalty to the goals of the organization or loyalty to the organization itself. The
internal values then would reflect either correspondingly with external values belonging
to t
he organization or there would be a conflict. A conflict would indicate a cognitive
dissonance which would cause individuals to make a tough choice of changing values or
leaving the organization.
Organizational instability would follow if there were enou
gh of
those individuals willing to leave

Loyalty and identity are key components of building a society, but they can also
destroy it. The challenge for state
builders is to create a framework that can bring
together divergent loyalties/identities under
one banner. The consocational model offers
one solution to make this framework democratic.



a study by Clive
Fullagar and Julian Barling on union loyalty and
organization loyalty, four types of l
oyalties can be constructed in this context. These four
loyalty types are adapted to the case of democratic state
building while Fullagar and
Barling’s analysis was based on a private company. See figure 1

4 below (Fullagar &
Barling, 1991).



In figure

1 the goal would be to merge those two circles as much as possible so
that there is a match between the group’s identity/loyalty and the state. This would be
considered the most optimal scenario for a stable, democratic society. Figure 2 and 3
would rep
resent some form of dysfunction which would be potentially destabilizing.
Figure 2 would be more stable for the state, but at

cost for diversity. Figure 3 would
destabilize the country particularly if these groups wish to
leave the state
. Figure 4 is
also destabilizing as the group or state have no relevance and may even collapse.

Figure 1: Loyalty to state and group (dual loyalty)

Figure 2: Loyalty to state only (unilateral loyalty to state)



Figure 3: Loyalty to group only (unilateral loyalty t
o group)

Figure 4: Loyalty to
neither group nor

state (dual non

Now imagine the above scenario being far more complex with multiple groups
under one state. The optimal solution would mean merging several groups into one area
which may no
t even be possible
. This is conceptualized in figure 5 below.

This highlights each group as an autonomous body moving into the state. The
fact remains that these groups maintain their autonomy and only give a segment of their
loyalty to the state. The
area in green may represent the elites converging on the national
government scene i.e. consocationalism. The fact that a majority of the ‘group bubble’
remains outside the ‘state bubble’ indicates that it is relatively easy for that bubble to
move outsid
e the ‘state bubble’ destabilizing the country and potentially leading to civil



war or a war for independence. Consocationalism would not represent a stable outcome
unless there are efforts to merge these bubbles more closely together.

Figure 5: Dual loya
lty for multiple groups

he ultimate outcome would be a complete merging of these groups and the state.
Simon would consider this the most efficient, but in government

in highly
stratified societies, this is seemingly impossible. Activist
s like J.S. Furnivall, who was a
British colonial officer in Burma, advocated for a common identity and felt that pluralism
or the plural society was detrimental to state development and stability (Pham, 2005).
J.G. Herder, a German philosopher during the

European Enlightenment, also felt this way
noting that identity was dependent on a common culture in which it was the very basis of
the state (White, 2005).

It may be impossible to form a common identity or loyalty in a stratified country

Some of the d
emocratic options as pointed out earlier were ethnic democracy, multi



cultural democracy, and consocational democracy (Smooha, 2002). Consocational
democracy is considered here the best option out of the three because it recognizes
among other things that

some sub
groups have a complete way of life that requires a
certain level of autonomy from the state.

The risk in this approach is that these sub
groups may look at the government as a
burden or unnecessary overhang on complete control of their affairs.

This would occur

the scenario under figure 3. In response the state may have a few choices at its disposal
that may either create incentives such as the consocational framework or force a state
identity upon all sub
groups essentially eliminating them

as under figure 2.

The option in figure 2 has often been the most popular in state
building for the
reasons mentioned above such as increased efficiency, state internal security and
democracy. What is loss in diversity, though, is the cost of this appro
ach. Despite
Herder’s imploration for a common
cultural identity for the state,
White (2005) explains


, ‘that every particular culture is incomplete, and there is probably
something to be learned about the nature of goodness from every diffe
rent culture (p.

, Josiah Royce, an American philosopher

wrote considerably about
community and identity
was concerned with developing what he termed genuine
individuals and genuine communities. A genuine community,

definition, is

community that develops ‘fulfilling life plans’ for its members (Kegley, 2005, p. 223). A
similar concept is covered by Furnivall in the Fabian idea of making better individuals
through the community (Pham, 2005, p. 326).



Royce noted that a ‘healthy p
rovincialism’ is present in communities that attempt
to understand others not only be recognizing them, but trying to understand them. Royce
and Herder manage to argue a case for diversity as an asset for nations, not a hindrance.
Community life can be s
trengthened and ‘moral/genuine’ individuals can be produced
(White, 2005). An optimal outcome

may look like figure 6 below.

Figure 6: Inter
group and state multi

Figure 6 would seem the best outcome as groups are no longer loyal only to their

group or to the state. They are loyal to their group, the state, and other groups. The area
of loyalty increases and a general harmonization of s
ociety under the state exists.
6 might hardly be accomplished if those groups represen
ted had advers
arial relations.
Conflict resolution can be one means of breaking down these barriers that may lead to the
outcome in figure 6.


In countries where the sub
groups are adversarial conflict resolut
ion needs to be
undertaken. Conflict resolution is when there is some sort of solution that satisfies all



parties involved in the conflict i.e. ending the conflict. This is opposed to conflict
management which is only limiting or controlling a conflict b
etween opposing parties
(Harris, 2007). The aim should be conflict resolution, but any level of conflict
management can be considered acceptable if all parties simply ‘agree to disagree’ and
live in peace side

This paper argues that of the vari
ous forms of conflict resolution the best
addresses the grassroots level. The work of Harold Saunders and John Paul Lederach
highlight this (Racioppi & See, 2007). Given that consocational democracy is essentially
a democratic solution to a conflicting s
ociety the ideas of grassroots conflict resolution
lends support to an idea of consocational democracy being more stable.

In 1995 the European Union started a peace program for Northern Ireland called
the Special Support Program for Peace and Reconciliati
on (EUSSPPR). This program
had two phases of which the second phase ended in 2006. The program promoted
tolerance, cross
community understanding, social inclusion, and the balancing of
economic imbalances between the largerly poor Catholic community and
the better off
Protestant community (Racioppi & See, 2007).

Along the ideas of Lederach, who pointed out that there are three tiers of political
players with the highest being the elites and the lowest being the grassroots, the EU
program sought to utiliz
e NGO’s as intermediary funding bodies or through district
partnerships to address all levels of society. This program sought to focus primarily on
the citizens through cooperative intervention based on the ideas of Saunders. This focus
on the third tier

(grassroots) and the second tier (intellectuals, religious leaders, etc.) was



meant to encourage a more comprehensive and lasting peace in Northern Ireland
(Racioppi & See, 2007)

Racioppi and See (2007) note, “As cultural brokers, intellectuals,


activists, they can speak to the non
material components and consequences of ethnic
competition (p. 365).”

The focus upon the second tier of political players is interesting because it puts
emphasis on the role religious leaders can play in the peac
e process. Religious leaders
are particularly important because of the role they play in the emotions/spirit of their
congregations, their ability to ac
t as mediators and
engage in dialogue and their emphasis
on peace (Haynes, 2009). The problems they ma
y pose are the results of them not
recognizing their potential role in the peace process and their lack of ability to use their
strategic advantage (Haynes, 2009).

“The point is that, when successful, religion’s role in helping to resolve conflicts
and bu
ild peace is a crucial component in helping to achieve human development more
generally (Haynes, 2009, p. 60).”

Bosnia and Lebanon represent cases where religion is particularly important in the

as discussed later
. Involving this second tier in
religious dialogues may be a
significant step in resolving these conflicts. Unfortunately sometimes religious leaders
can also impede the peace process

by supporting negative images of the other group and
stoking the flames of conflict
. In this case they

are a roadblock thus requiring greater
connections with the third tier, the grassroots citizenry.

Rothman and Olson (2001) identify three areas of conflict resolution based on the

behind the conflict. The two that have a material and somewhat mo



manageable solution are resource
based conflict and interest
based conflict. The third, in
which is

with here, is identity
based conflict which resides in the socio
psychological realm and

not present any real manageable solution. The authors

that many of the material conflicts are just branches of the identity
based conflict making
most conflicts seemingly intractable and unmanageable.

Rothman and Olson (2001) recommend utilizing small
group dynamics in what
they term the ARIA method.
This method which stands for Antagonism, Resonance,
Invention and Action is meant to expose underlying needs/value (
), get the
parties to communicate concerns, threats and frustrations (resonance), create new
solutions (invention) and implement t
hose new solutions (action). According to the
authors this process is reserved for the elites (first or second tier), but utilizing the
impetus discussed previously for grassroots involvement, this process is consi
dered for
citizen involvement.
During th
is process opposing parties are expected to engage in
reflexive dialog i.e. talking about themselves in front of others (Rothman & Olson, 2001).
This can explore one’s own inner needs/values while giving the other sid
e the potential to
hear these.

In ad
dition, Rothman & Olson (2001) note that conflict is both inevitable and on
going. This means that instead of viewing any solution to the conflict as static or based
in one time
period, it needs to be viewed as a constant process that does not stop. This

may seem tiring or even unsustainable; the consequences of not engaging in it can be
quite severe.

The importance of grassroots conflict resolution may have no importance for the
state unless there is an element of integration. Integration is the prim
ary concern of this



paper and the primary concern of consocationalism. For democracy to work
individuals/communities have to be integrated

while still maintaining their diversity
. The
optimum solution for multi
group states highlighted in figure 6 involv
es integration. This
integration is at the group level and the state level.

Nan (2008) points out the importance of networks not only in conflict r
but in integration
. These networks can be based on many different things such as
business, polit
ics, religion, etc.

goal of conflict resolution

through this means

is to
create inclusive networks versus exclusive networks.

“Inclusion ranges from weak to strong inclusion, but there is always some degree
of inclusion in peace negotiations (Nan, 20
08, p. 114).”

Utilizing the ARIA method in conflict resolution it would seem important to find
a niche in

different networks that would increase this inclusivity. The ARIA method

open up this

niche in a

when solutions are being inv
ented and
implemented. An example is in figure 7 and figure 8 below.

Figure 7: An inclusive religious network (second tier)



Figure 8: An inclusive social network (third tier)

Figure 7 shows a network surrounding a second tier figure such as a religio
leader. The religious leaders are the networked entities and through them others in their
congregation can meet each other at the encouragement of the religious leader. Figure 8
is a network at the third tier where all individuals come together in som
e central meeting
area. This meeting area can be a problem
solving workshop, a club or any other
organization. In figure 8 it is easier for businessmen to meet or laborers to meet from
different backgrounds. This meeting area may require some mediation
depending on the
level of conflict between parties. If this conflict is too great than figure 7 may be more
optimal than figure 8.

Once these networks as solutions are invented and implemented than they begin
to evolve and transform the landscape. They
create meaning in and of themselves and
given positive reinforcement begin to integrate the divergent communities together and
with the state. This may lead to the outcome in figure 6 (Nan, 2008).

“Creating meaning through increased awareness of one’s ow
n and other’s
experiences is a core element of deep democracy (Nan, 2008, p. 116).”



Frankenberg (2000), who noted

that a society’s constitution can be an integrative
, felt that these solutions can be successful if there is a focus on the end resu
he society
evolve together. As networks evolve, society evolves and some sort of
state identity evolves with it. The catch is that individuals have to view with equality
other members. This might only happen if
society that has several dive
rgent groups
that are adversarial begin

to build bonds with each other i.e. solidarity and then some
form of loyalty that then transfers to the state that represents them.

Certainly this makes the matter of integration

sticky issue in stratified societ
where sub
groups do not view each other as equals. The civil rights movement in the
United States owes much of its success to making cases in the higher levels of
government such as with the judiciary because certain segments of society were not
d as equals. This means that at the very least a healthy government with the right
ideas can possibly precede the ‘perfect society’.


Bosnia is composed of three adversarial communities that hav
e existed since the

century. Primarily these communities came into existence around a particular
religion. These religions of interest in the Bosnian case are Orthodox Christianity,
Catholic Christianity and Islam. The Serbian people primarily foll
ow Orthodox
Christianity, the Croats follow Catholic Christianity, and the Bosniacs follow Islam.
These communities erupted into full
fledged war in the early 90’s when the Orthodox
Serbs engaged in genocide against the Muslim Bosniacs (Kasapovic, 2005).



These people were subject to the first consocational system of the world, the

system which

implemented by the Ottoman Empire shortly after conquering
the area that is now the former Yugoslavia. The

system, which has roots in the
n of Islam, gave different religious communities their own autonomy headed by an
elite (milletbashi) who was responsible for different religious and civil areas. After the
fall of the Ottoman Empire the various nation
states that emerged did not

so ki
ndly on
the remaining Muslim groups and either forced most of them to leave or massacred them.
The Bosniacs represented a unique example as well as other

ethnic groups
who converted to Islam during Ottoman rule (Katsikas, 2009).

These communit
ies have historical differences that cannot disappear over night.
The Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croatians owe their divide to the Great Schism in the

century between Constantinople and Rome

(Norwich, 1999)
. The Muslim Bosniacs

Serbs o
we their divide to Serb defeat at the hands of the Ottomans in the


(Kinross, 2003)
. Although present
day communities probably give little
thought to these events the mimetic transmission of hatred means that these communities
are seemingly lo
cked in an adversarial relationship.

After the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord a consocational

type government was
established. Kasapovic (2005) described it as an ‘asymmetrical confederation’ in which
the country is divided into two parts with one part being

more consocational between
Bosniacs and Croatians and the other representing a more homogenous state of Serbs. At
the national level equal representation is given to the three groups, mutual veto exists,
autonomy is given to each group, and consensus is



After 15 years the Dayton Peace Accord there is peace, but as Kasapovic (2005)
pointed out this is only because all groups consented to peace. Kasapovic (2005) notes
that the state is still highly unstable because there is no consensus on its

organization and
there are continuing external threats that may tear the country apart. This instability
means that these groups, by and large, have not resolved their differences.

“There are three reasons for this inefficiency of the model of consocati
democracy at the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state, and one more at the level of
the Federation as a state sub
entity: no consensus on the state, no consensus on the
political system, no

strategy of international actors in establis
hing a democratic
state, and the unfavorable two
segmental structure of the Federa
tion with one segment

the other (Kasapovic, 2005, p. 9).”

Lebanon presents

example of a society that has adversarial groups. These
groups are the Druze
, Maronite Christians, and Sunni and Shia Muslims. The
Druze are a
religious sect of Islam who started under the reign

of Al Hakim bi
Amr Allah of the
Fatimid dynasty, a Shia dynasty that was based in Egypt

Funk & Wagnalls
. This leader
was extremely ad
versarial to his Christian subjects and in all likelihood this relationship
transferred to the early founders of the Druze sect. This is evident in the sectarian clashes
in Lebanon between Druze and Christians which were the worse in all Ottoman domains
Fawaz, 1985).

The Maronite Christians are one of the oldest Christian sects in the world. They
are closely associated with Catholicism. During their long history starting in the 5

century they migrated to present
day Lebanon to escape persecutions fro
m other sects in



Christianity. They supported the French who discriminated against the Muslims during
their reign (1920

1943) (Zamir, 2005).


Muslims are one sect of Islam. The other major sect is Shia. Although
there are different interpretatio
ns on how these two groups formed the distinction

Sunni and Shia came in 680 A.D. at the Battle of Karbala between a small force
of Shia and a large force of Sunnis. This can be considered the breakaway point though it
probably occurred earlier th
an that. These differences have materialized in different
conflicts, such as recently in the chaos that followed the U.S. invasion of Iraq (Oler,

According to Jabbra & Jabbra (2001) everything was consocational in Lebanon,
matching the conditions
necessary to make it successful before the breakdown into civil
war in 1975. Yet they note that many elements helped overturn the democracy. They
note that high unemployment, high inflation, weak commitment of the elites to the
system, changing ratios be
tween the groups and external pressure from Israeli incursions
all helped to push Lebanon into a civil war (Jabbra & Jabbra, 2001).

These two cases point out some very important shortfalls of the consocational
system. First despite living in a consocatio

type system for six centuries the
different groups that compose Bosnia’s adversarial groups have not cooperated at any
level that would have caused them to avoid the deluge in the early 90’s. Second,
although the Lebanese had a consocational system
that may be considered textbook, they
still broke down into fighting because of various reasons. This indicates that although
these people are living together under one country they harbor distrust or hatred of those
who compose the other group. The fact

that they are all part of one country appears to



have no influence on the perceptions towards the other group. In this case both Bosnia
and Lebanon are strong representations of figure 3. The consocational framework keeps
trying to move them to figure 5
, but the only way to advert these conflicts while still
maintaining diversity is to move the situation to figure 6.


Based on the synopsis in the pervious section on Bosnia and Lebanon, some
similarities become apparent
. First in Bosnia and Lebanon there was colonialization,
with successive waves of various empires the last being the Slavic in the form of the
varieties of the Yugoslav nation in Bosnia and the French in Lebanon. Under these
colonial powers one group was

favored over the other, while the Yugoslav state favored
Slavs and the French regime favored Christians. This most certainly created ingrained
animosities between the privileged and the neglected.

Second, both countries have been marked with civil war.

The war in Bosnia took
place between 1992 and 1995. The war in Lebanon took place between 1975 and 1990.
The timeline of these wars does not mean that skirmishes did not occur before or after,
but represent the largest scale of fighting in the modern e
ra. The Bosnian Serbs are
considered a part of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the conflict is thus termed a
civil war. These civil wars most certainly opened new wounds between the divergent

Third, the wars had international significanc
e. The Bosnian war attracted the
attention of NATO and the Lebanese war attracted the attention of Syria and the Arab
League. In both these conflicts outside actors intervened to bring an end to the hostilities.



These interventions ended the violent hos
tilities, but preserved the abrasion between the
combative groups.

Fourth, the groups in both cases had religious similarities. Brushing aside
sectarian differences, the conflicts were widely between Christians and Muslims. The
identity of these two gro
ups with major international religions also

attention from co
religionists. These
, of course,

are simplistic considering
diversity in religious practice and awareness.

Considering that these conflicts have been ongoing

at varying intensities for
several hundred years an unfreezing process is needed.

The concept of unfreezing may
have its roots with the organization theorist Kurt Lewin who proposed an unfreezing,
moving/changing, and re
freezing process. In the process

values are changed and thus
can be labeled change management. This process can be mapped across the framework
of this paper with the moving/changing aspect the area of concern in the ARIA model of
invention and implementation/action. The re
freezing may

have more clout with
individual organizations, but the re
freezing creates an organized way of thinking akin to
concepts of efficiency i.e. an established uniform identity (Human Resource
Management, 2001).

Secondly, the methods of conflict resolution ca
n be applied which would feed into
building a new country together. This could materialize in the ARIA method being used
amongst second and third tier actors

to develop solutions locally and in the aggregate
amongst first tier elites. The results of thes
e workshops can help foment a common
identity out of the solutions agreed upon.

that conflicts may be ongoing
these workshops may take on the form of recurring town hall meetings where the primary



objective would be unity. Since both conflict
s in Bosnia and Lebanon required the use of
a mediating force to end them, this would translate into extensive mediation through all
these meetings, possible hundreds, across the country

The involvement of second
tier actors such as religious leader
s has importance
across both cases. Since these conflicts involved Christian and Muslim communities
which are international religions and since these conflicts also involved an international
response, these local conflicts have implications that are not o
nly local.

religious leaders should remember to be sensitive to religious sentiments despite their
distance from Bosnia and Lebanon.

Haynes (2009) pointed out that one of the problems of the roles religious leaders
face is that they lack t
he capacity for building on strategic capacity. As members of an
international faith these leaders would have access to a large network of resources that
would facilitate them in their role as peace
makers. One of the aspects that may be
appropriately ad
dressed in Bosnia and Lebanon is training these leaders to both acquire
these resources as well as use them appropriately. This would make their role far more
influential than the elites or any grassroots movement.

The side effect is that many of these r
eligious leaders may have instigated
violence against the other or continue to preach hatred towards the other. These leaders
need to either be isolated by the national government or reprimanded severely by those
s international representation.

globalized world makes all thi
s possible.
world in this essence can either be a harbinger of peace or a catalyst for war at the local



Religious leaders should be engaged in dialog with each other as much as other
community members are engaged

in workshops both inventing solutions and
implementing them. Once a healthy environment of dialog is fostered than either
naturally or through planned social action inclusive networks should be developed.
These networks, as pointed out in figures 7 and
8, can create cooperation and community.

Thirdly, t
he existence of these networks and the resolution of conflict at all tier
levels means that the state as a reactionary entity in this case becomes a mirror of that
society. In this case the consocational

model of governance might work and if possible a
more unified democratic

may be chosen. The result would be a multi
democratic state with shared loyalties to the state, one’s own group, and to another’s
group. This does not guarantee contin
ued peace, but at least secures it much more tightly
than as proposed under the consocational framework alone.




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