Review of Deconstructionx - Srebrenica-project.com

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14 Νοε 2013 (πριν από 3 χρόνια και 6 μήνες)

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S
REBRENICA
:

T
HE
U
RBAN
L
EGEND

B
OOK
R
EVIEW

D
ECONSTRUCTION OF A
V
IRTUAL
G
ENOCIDE
:

A
N
I
NTELLIGENT
P
ERSON

S
G
UIDE TO
S
REBRENICA


BY
S
TEPHAN
K
ARGANOVIĆ
,

L
JUBIŠA
S
IMI
Ć
,

E
DWARD
H
ERMAN
,

G
EORGE
P
UMPHREY
,

ANDY

WILCOXSON
,

J.P.

M
AHER


Before WWI, Serbs accounted for
75% of the population of
the municipality of Srebrenica. Before WWII, they
accounted for 50% of the population. Before the outbreak
of the Bosnian War, they accounted for only 30% of the
population. This tremendous population decline was not
caused by a dr
op in the birth rate or migration. It was a
direct result of genocide carried out by Muslim and Croat
neighbors.

“Srebrenica Before It Happened,”

www.balkan
-
archive.org


The alleged Srebrenica massacre of Bosnian Muslims in July 1995 is referred to regular
ly
by the mainstream media as a moral touchstone, an example of “genocide” that can take place
when the U.S. is not the moral arbiter or when the U.S. hesitates to intervene on behalf of an
endangered part of humanity somewhere in the world. And many Ameri
cans, conditioned by
sixteen years of media saturation, responded reflexively and have come to agree, that a
genocide occurred in Srebrenica, even though there is still no proof sixteen years later.

The credulity of ordinary Americans did not last long. Th
e attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon on 9/11, triggered the invasion of Afghanistan. Later, Americans
found out that the
casus belli
, “that we’re fighting them over there so that we don’t have to
fight them here” was fraught with lies, as w
ell. UNOCAL, a U.S. oil company, was interested
in bringing Central Asian oil to market via a new Afghan oil pipeline. Then the American
public learned that Condoleeza Rice, Secretary of State, and Hamid Karzai, the President of
Afghanistan, were former me
mbers of UNOCAL’s board of directors. It turned out to be
simply another war for profit. After the invasion of Iraq, Americans began to doubt the
veracity of the U.S. government public statements. It appeared, after all, that Sadam Hussein
did not possess
weapons of destruction. “No matter,” replied the Bush II Administration,
“invading Iraq was still the right thing to do, because it was a good thing that the U.S. took
control of Iraq’s oil fields.” Few Americans know that U.S. intervention in Wars of
Succ
ession on the territory of the Former Yugoslavia were also based on lies, because the
U.S. Government still refers to these interventions with pride as necessary and successful
international efforts. Yet reality is sobering. It turns out, in hindsight, tha
t the Saudis wanted
a Muslim state in Bosnia in exchange for staying out of Gulf War I, so U.S. President Clinton
was delighted to show his good faith and granted, like a genie from the
Arabian Nights
, the
Saudis their wish. One cannot help but wonder why
“a Muslim state” (i.e., a theocratic state
based on sharia law) was created in Europe, when all the other European states are secular.
Later, it was revealed that there were untapped oil reserves in Tuzla in Bosnia, coincidentally
the location of U.S. Eagl
e military base. Then the war in Kosovo, also considered a model of
interventionist probity, turned out to have an oil pipeline hidden beneath the humanitarian
rhetoric. AMBO, the Albanian
-
Macedonian
-
Bulgarian Oil Company, began construction in
2010 of an
oil pipeline from Burgas on the Black Sea coast of Bulgaria to Durres in Albania.
Coincidentally, U.S. Camp Bondsteel is conveniently located in Kosovo to protect this
pipeline and its putative future profits.

Thus, the Bosnian War generally, and the alleg
ed Srebrenica massacre of July 1995
specifically, were testing grounds for not only new weapons, but also new media techniques
to win broad support from the U.S. population for future wars of imperialist aggression, such
as the current war being waged agai
nst Libya, which employs many of the same media
techniques that were developed during the Bosnian War, such as the introduction of “no
-
fly
zones” by NATO during the opening phase of the conflict. These propaganda techniques
were then, as now, enormously su
ccessful, and are based on selective reporting and selective
omission of critical facts in order to create a perception of U.S. virtue and enemy villainy.

The Srebrenica massacre stands as a nearly perfect propaganda campaign, which is
nurtured to this ver
y day. For example, given Don McLean’s lyrics “Drove my Chevy to the
levee…” almost any American can reflexively complete the verse with “but the levee was
dry”; likewise, any American, upon hearing “Srebrenica” can add a phrase standing in
apposition, whe
re the Serbs killed “8,000 men and boys,” without any prompting. But the
Srebrenica levee is, as we shall see, also dry.

Stephen
Karganović

is the director of The Srebrenica Historical Project (
www.srebren
ica
-
project.com
), whose mission statement on its website states:

Our broad purpose is to collect information on Srebrenica
during the last conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, defined not
as July 1995, but more broadly as 1992
-
1995. That means that
we shall

be creating a comprehensive and contextual, as
opposed to selective, record of the violence between the
communities in that area during the conflict. We shall focus
also on crimes committed against the Serb civilians not because
we favor them but because
so far they have been ignored. We
wish to redress that balance, but we will not work under any
ideological limitations. A corollary goal will be to launch
something along the lines of the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission….

The fundamental
objective of our project is to rise above
politics and propaganda and to create a contextual record of the
Srebrenica tragedy of July 1995 which can serve as a corrective
to the distortions of the last decade and a half and as a genuine
contribution to fut
ure peace.

In addition to regular press releases and news updates on topics related to Srebrenica, the
Srebrenica Historical Project has published
Deconstruction of a Virtual Genocide: An
Intelligent Person’s Guide to Srebrenica
, which Mr.
Karganović

has w
ritten and edited in
collaboration with four other noted authors. Years of research have gone into the production
of this book, which re
-
examines key aspects of the alleged Srebrenica massacre. The
empirical basis for these studies, and the verifiable info
rmation contained in these twelve
thoroughly researched and well thought
-
out essays will serve as a touchstone for journalists,
historians, researchers and students who wish to delve beneath the surface of corporate media
accounts of the Bosnian War and th
e fall of Srebrenica.

Deconstruction of a Virtual Genocide

is a landmark study devoted exclusively to the
events that took place in Srebrenica during the 1992
-
1995 period. It is meticulously
researched, closely reasoned, and it overturns allegations of gen
ocide having taken place in
Srebrenica, yet it does not deny that extrajudicial killings, i.e., executions, did take place. It
furthermore refutes, using The Hague Tribunal’s own evidence, that such an incident ever
occurred.

Mr.
Karganović
, who authored
seven of the twelve essays contained in the book,
establishes a towering level of dispassionate intellectual honesty in his pursuit of the truth,
which is matched by the four other contributors: Ljubiša Simić, Edward Herman, George
Pumphrey, and J.P. Maher
. Mr.
Karganović

alerts us in his preface that this study will take a
holistic approach to Srebrenica, and place it within the context of the 1991

1995 Bosnian
War. He does so masterfully by opening with a bombshell revelation.

Mr.
Karganović
’s approach is

academic: he summarizes the principal lines of inquiry his
study will pursue in his opening essay, “A Critical Overview of Srebrenica.” He reviews
three categories of evidence for the alleged massacre: the testimony of Dražen Erdemović,
the DNA testing pe
rformed on the human remains that were found, and satellite photos of the
county of Srebrenica. Much has been written about Dražen Erdemović, the mercenary from
the Tenth Sabotage Detachment, whose purported eyewitness testimony served as evidence in
The H
ague Tribunal for the conviction of General Krstić, among others, for genocide. Mr.
Karganović

quickly sketches the portrait of a perjurer who, although having confessed to the
murder of one hundred men, which ranks him as one of the foremost twentieth
-
cen
tury mass
murderers (does his story merit a made
-
for
-
TV movie?), served only a fraction of his ten
-
year
sentence, and has been rewarded with a new identity and a life
-
time subsidy in return for
providing testimony at The Hague Tribunal that often contradic
ts itself as well as known
facts. Few people recall the satellite photos that supposedly indicated the aftermath of a
genocide in Bosnia. Madeleine Albright waved prints of these images at a UN Security
Council, upstaging a session convened to discuss Croa
tia’s Operation Storm, which expelled
250,000 Serbs from their hereditary lands, in order to introduce the Srebrenica massacre to
the world. These satellite photos have since been sealed in archives and will not be available
for fifty years, so they are n
ot available for independent examination or review. Lastly, there
is the DNA evidence that The Hague has at its disposal. After the arrest of Gen. Ratko
Mladić, an article entitled “Monster Mladić and the Mothers Who Waited” (
Daily Express
,
UK, May 28, 201
1), made a typical assertion with respect to Srebrenica: “So far, DNA tests
and other forensic methods have led to the identification of 6,690 victims there.” The
ordinary reader, faced with such a scientific statement, simply accepts this as an indisputab
le
fact, as empirical proof that substantiates the claim that 8,000 “men and boys” were murdered
in Srebrenica. Doubt or inquiry recoil before such a luminous and self
-
evident truth.
However, George Pumphrey pointed out, however, that no independent third
party ever
reviewed the DNA matching data. Thus, the character of Mr.
Karganović
’s mind is revealed
by his asking an unlikely yet entirely reasonable question: “Who performed the DNA
testing?” Mr.
Karganović

learned the answer: the DNA testing was performe
d by an NGO
called
The International Commission on Missing Persons in the Former Yugoslavia
, which
was established after a G
-
7 summit in Lyon, France, in 1997 at the behest of U.S. President
Clinton. Its past presidents have included former U.S. Secretary
of State Cyrus Vance and
Senator Bob Dole. Its current President is James V. Kimsey, a former Director of America
Online, who was appointed by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in 2001. This actually
makes the ICMP an NNGO (a non
-
non
-
governmental agency
), in other words, an official
mouthpiece for U.S. State Department propaganda. Even so, this evidence was presented
during
Popović et al
. in closed session. When Radovan Karadžić, in the course of his trial,
requested the right to examine the DNA evidence
, the ICTY Prosecutor Hildegard Uertz
-
Retzlaff replied: “ICMP has not show the DNA to us either. So that is not correct that they
have given it to us, but not to others.” The judges ruled that Karadžić would be allowed to
examine a small number (300) of th
e samples, yet the judges made such examination
contingent on the written consent of the families of the victims.
Karganović

further learned
that the ICMP had been operating from its inception in 1996


to October 2007


without
certification from Gednap
, the international agency based in Germany that accredits DNA
laboratories. The ICTY Chamber, however, in a ruling that would stun any U.S. attorney in a
medical malpractice case, ruled that “the ICMP’s lack of accreditation prior to 2007 does not
undermi
ne the authenticity of the identifications concluded before this time.” (!) Furthermore,
Karganović

made subsequent inquiries with Gednap which led to another shocking discovery.
The ICMP has laboratories in three locations in Bosnia: Sarajevo, Tuzla, and
Banja Luka.
The ICMP has administrative offices in Sarajevo, and the Tuzla laboratory is reserved for a
small number of difficult cases. However,
Karganović

says of Tuzla, “That site, the only
operationally significant of the lot, it turns out never was in
spected by Gednap and no
explanation has been offered for that awkward exception.”
Karganović

also points out that
DNA samples, as well as results, can nowadays be faked. Nonetheless, the Chamber
congratulated the ICMP for avoiding accountability for havin
g operated without generally
accepted professional standards, and the Chamber saw fit to incorporate this data into its
judgment in the
Popović

case, which bodes ill for Serbian defendants at The Hague Tribunal
in the short term, and jurisprudence in the l
ong
-
term.

Karganović

argues eloquently that Srebrenica was
a case of genocide by political
arrangement
,

if not a staged event. He cites the testimony of Hakija Meholjić, President of
the SDA (the Muslim political party) in Srebrenica, who went on record to

say that U.S.
President Clinton, indicated to Alija Izetbegović what conditions would lead to U.S.
intervention in Bosnia. Meholjić goes on record to say that during a meeting with Izetbegović
in Sarajevo in 1993, Izetbegović declared that U.S. interventi
on could be obtained by the
deaths of at least 5,000 Srebrenica Muslims. Meholjić has never retracted this statement.

At that time in 1993, Alija Izetbegović

demanded not just the
killing of 5,000 Muslims in Srebrenica, but the slitting of their
throats…. I stood up and asked him if he were demented and
who was supposed to kill that many people…. Izetbegović
endorsed the commission of genocide, and the Serbs f
ell for
something that had been arranged in advance.

Dani
, Sarajevo, June 22, 1998

Izetbegović, of course, denied making these remarks when the article appeared in 1998.
UNPROFOR commander Philippe Morillon stated that “Mladić had walked into a trap.”
Mlad
ić took Srebrenica with 400 soldiers and two tanks, while 15,000 Muslim soldiers
gathered in the nearby village of Šušnjari to make a rolling retreat through difficult terrain
that had been heavily mined by both Muslims and Serbs. These soldiers made no ef
fort to
fight. Why? These are unlikely choices that were made by the Bosnian Muslim Army, which
provoke the suspicion of any dispassionate observer.

After such a bombshells, one might think that the rest of
Deconstruction of a Virtual
Genocide

might pale i
n a repetition of already known facts in the Srebrenica case. Nothing
could be further from the truth. Each chapter contains new conclusions drawn from rigorous
analyses of the available evidence that casts the alleged Srebrenica massacre as a hoax
sponsor
ed by the U.S. Government in order to advance its political goal: the domination,
privatization, and destruction of Serbia as a state and Serbians as a nationality.

These essays examine twelve critical topics that have either been omitted or ignored by
the

U.S. and European corporate media.
Karganović

furnished essays providing a critical
overview and recontextualization of the role Srebrenica played in the war: its promised
demilitarization (which never occurred); the question of whether the fall of Srebre
nica was
“genocide” or “blowback”; an analysis of Muslim losses due to minefields and combat
activity; and an investigation into the question of whether there was demonstrable intent on
the part of the Serbs to exterminate all Muslims. If there is any faul
t at all with Mr.
Karganović
’s writing, it is a thoroughness typically associated with German scholarship. On
the one hand, Mr.
Karganović

speaks out as a prophet in the wilderness; on the other hand, he
can ill afford to draw a false conclusion or to base

hypotheses on assertions that are not
empirical. If he errs on the side of thoroughness, so be it, because by doing so he shields his
determined effort to expose the truth from unwarranted criticism.
Karganović
, as an author,
keeps his powder dry for page
s at a time, but he allows his prose to catch fire and explode
when he makes his devastating points. Ljubiša Simić reports on the ICTY’s forensic reports
and the presentation and interpretation of these reports; Edward S. Herman, known for his
outstanding
work in dismantling U.S. propaganda in
Manufacturing Consent

(which he co
-
wrote with Noam Chomsky), contributed an essay on the U.S. media coverage of Srebrenica;
George Pumphrey, one of the most astute of the early commentators on the alleged
“massacre,”
contributes an analysis of the history and the legend of Srebrenica; and J.P.
Maher examines the argument and rhetoric of the ICTY Judgments. The result is not
damaging to the ICTY’s claim that genocide took place in Srebrenica; it is, instead, as Mr.
Karg
anović

says, fatal to such claims. It would be worthwhile to briefly highlight this study’s
lines of inquiry more closely, especially when it involves new evidence.

The corporate media does not acknowledge the fact that the Bosnian Muslim Army
stationed as

many as 15,000 armed members of the Bosnian Muslim 28
th

Division in
Srebrenica, who were under the command of Naser Orić. These soldiers were never disarmed
nor was Srebrenica ever demilitarized, despite agreements to do so that were signed by
French Gene
ral Philippe Morillon and Gen. Ratko Mladić. These soldiers regularly attacked
neighboring Serbian villages and hamlets during the 1992
-
1995 period. They killed
approximately 3,200 people, 2,700 of whom were civilians. The UN, by not enforcing its
own agre
ements on the demilitarization of Srebrenica, bears the brunt of the culpability for
failing to have disarmed the Muslim soldiers stationed there.
Karganović

quotes from the
debriefing of the Dutch soldiers stationed in Srebrenica that: “the BiH forces car
ried out
systematic actions from within the enclave, and subsequently withdrew to UN protected
territory.” Further killings of Serbian civilians continued unabated, even though the Serbian
military had promised not to attack the “safe zone.”
Karganović

quo
tes official Bosnian
Muslim Army documents that attest to troop strength in Srebrenica in February 1994 (5,133),
impressive stockpiles of weapons (e.g., 4,000 guns, sub
-
machine guns, and machine guns;
sixty 60mm mortars; thirty
-
six 82mm mortars). However,
throughout this period, the UN and
the “international community” blamed only the Serbs for rising tensions in Srebrenica.

As a rule, double standards reign supreme.

Effective propaganda shares one important quality: it is based on half
-
truths. If the UN
an
d the “international community” were to admit that General Mladić had taken Srebrenica
because the situation in the safe haven and surrounding areas had become intolerable, that the
Muslim soldiers of Srebrenica were not innocent victims, then the pretext
of the Srebrenica
massacre hoax collapses. One of the most foreboding elements in the Bosnian civil war in
Bosnia was the foreign actors, spearheaded by the UN but including influential government
officials from various states, who together called themselv
es the “international community”;
the corporate media which dumbed down its explanation of the war in favor of the Bosnian
Muslims and to the constant disadvantage of Serbs; and finally NGO (non
-
governmental
organizations), all of which, in the most prejud
icial manner, minimized or omitted Bosnian
Muslim crimes but exaggerated Serbian ones.
Karganović

quotes General Satish Nambiar:

Portraying the Serbs as evil and everybody else as good was
not only counter
-
productive but also dishonest.

General Morillon,
testifying in the Milošević trial, stated:

… Naser Orić was a warlord who reigned by terror in his area
and over the population itself…. [H]e could not allow himself
to take prisoners…. [H]e didn’t even bother to look for an
excuse. It was a simple stateme
nt: One can’t be bothered with
prisoners.


I wasn’t surprised when the Serbs took me to a village to show
me the evacuation of the bodies of the inhabitants that had been
thrown into a hole, a village closer to Bratunac. And this made
me understand the deg
ree to which this infernal situation of
blood and vengeance… led to a situation when I personally
feared that the worst would happen if the Serbs of Bosnia
managed to enter the enclaves of Srebrenica.

In contrast to Morillon’s military appraisal,
Karganovi
ć

offers more colloquial
corroboration from Naser Orić himself in Schiller’s often
-
quoted article:

On a cold and snowy night, I sat in his living room watching a
shocking video version of what might have been called Nasir
Orić’s greatest hits. There were b
urning houses, dead bodies,
severed heads, and people fleeing. Orić grinned throughout,
admiring his handiwork.

(…)

The next sequence of dead bodies had been done in by
explosives: “We launched those guys to the moon,” he boasted.

Toronto Star,

July 16, 19
95

Karganović

says that “The generally biased attitude favoring the Muslim side created a
psychological and political climate of impunity. The persistence of that climate explains in
great measure the heinous crimes to which, in his meetings with foreign c
orrespondents,
Naser Orić referred with evident pride or at least a total lack of remorse or shame, and clearly
without any visible fear that he might ever be called to account for them. In fact, Orić was not
misguided by his sense of impunity…. It should
be noted that The Hague Tribunal sentenced
Orić to just two years in prison for war crimes committed in the Srebrenica area, only to
annul on appeal that insignificant sentence.”

Karganović

then quotes Bosnian Muslim Army documents, namely the Operational
Report no. 04
-
114/95 which details attacks on Serbian areas from the Srebrenica “safe zone,”
and it lists the dates of the attacks, the number of “enemy forces” killed, and weapons and
equi
pment that were captured. The dry prose makes horrifying reading.

2. In order to draw enemy forces away from the Sarajevo
theater in the direction of Srebrenica and Žepa, on 26/6/95
several successful sabotage operations were conducted 20

40
km deep in the

territory under the temporary control of the
aggressor, in Han Pijesak and Vlasenica municipalities in the
following locations:



village of Višnjica and fortified point Bajte



Locality of Crna Rijeka [monument near crossroads]



Locality of Crna Rijeka
[Bojčino Brdo]



Locality of Vrani Kamen

In all those localities successful sabotage activities were
conducted targeting exclusively enemy manpower, with the
following results:



We estimate that more than 40 Chetniks were liquidated,
although we have unve
rified reports that the aggressor lost 71
soldiers



One enemy soldier was captured



Two radio stations were captured



One carbine was captured



About 5,000 bullets were captured



Several dozen head of cattle, large and small, were captured.

Note the d
ate of this action, June 26, 1995, about two weeks before the fall of Srebrenica,
and the pages of detailed reports such as these reveal the intensity of military activity
originating from a “safe zone,” which was not a “safe zone” at all, and which exhaus
ted the
patience of the Serbs. Likewise, these attacks against Serbs could not have taken place
without the tacit approval and support of UNPROFOR, which was aware of the military
activity.

In further support of his description of events in Srebrenica,
Kar
ganović

quotes
extensively from Ibro Mustafić’s memoir
Planirani Haos

(Planned Chaos). Before the
outbreak of the war, Mustafić was an elected deputy of the B
-
H Parliament, and he was
involved in organizing for the local chapter of the SDA, the main Muslim

party, in
Srebrenica. Mustafić’s memoir is valuable because it treats not only war
-
time events but also
“cultural” background information relating to his own Muslim upbringing.
Karganović

provides enlightening excerpts from Mustafić’s book, in which he pr
aises the Ustashi pro
-
Nazi collaborationist movement during WWII, general descriptions of Muslim prejudices
against Serbs, a condemnation of mixed Serb/Muslim marriages, praise for the Muslims of
Sandžak who purportedly hate the Serbs more than the Bosnian

Muslims do, etc. Excerpts
then follow that illustrate Mustafić’s conduct on the eve of the war.

P. 153: Description of a day in the BH parliament in Sarajevo,
where Mustafić was a deputy, when together with Moslem
politician Abdulah Konjicija he ran into
a group of female
journalists from Belgrade who were waiting for the conclusion
of a session in one of the conference rooms of the BH
parliament. Konjicija grabbed one of the women, and threw her
down a flight of stairs from the first floor.

Mustafić provi
des eyewitness testimony to numerous events that took place in Srebrenica
during the war.

P. 187: A group of Serb soldiers were taken captive and then
liquidated in the locality of Zalezje. Mustafić lists the names of
the victims, and then comments: “Far f
rom feeling sorry for
them, on the contrary, I rejoiced at the death of every Chetnik
[a derogatory term for Serbs] who perished….”

P. 187: “I learned in Tuzla that Kemo from Pale was showing a
severed head around Srebrenica to frighten people with it. Tha
t
made me realize that from those who were in charge in
Srebrenica you literally could expect anything.

P. 217: Attack on the villages Gniona, Viogor, and Orahovica
in order to link Moslem controlled territories: “In Gniona we
did not kill anyone, while in

Orahovica about 30 people were
burned in their houses, mostly the elderly, while some were
liquidated in brutal fashion.

Karganović

rightly concludes that this war was not conducted according to “European
standards,” much less according to the Geneva Conv
ention. The UN and UNPROFOR, by
failing to disarm the Bosnian Muslim Army in Srebrenica, failed to protect the civilian
population, Serbian as well as Muslim. Thus, the years of Serbian grievances accumulated to
the point where the “safe area” could no lon
ger be tolerated, so they disarmed the town
themselves.

In an essay entitled “Analysis of Srebrenica Forensic Reports Prepared by ICTY
Prosecution Experts,” Ljubiša Simić thoroughly examined the forensic materials used in the
various Srebrenica trials at T
he Hague Tribunal. His critique encourages the formulation of
“a new perspective not only about Srebrenica but, to the extent that this major component of
the accepted narrative of the Bosnian war 1992

1995 is found to be unsustainable, about that
conflict

as a whole.”

Simić casts a jaundiced eye on foreign intervention whose purpose was to “pick up the
pieces” in the aftermath of the Bosnian war. The Hague Tribunal used this forensic evidence
to convict individuals involved in the alleged Srebrenica massac
re of decades or prison time,
yet the forensic evidence itself, despite its consequences, has not been independently
reviewed. Simić calls to our attention the fact that the Tribunal had been granted complete
autonomy in their investigation of twenty or so

mass graves. However, the Tribunal typically
denied access to forensic scientists from the Former Yugoslavia to these same grave sites.
Thus, the Tribunal bears complete responsibility for the results.

The specific data Simić refers to is the results and
conclusions reached by “several teams
of prosecution forensic experts of the Hague Tribunal after the exhumations they conducted
between 1996 and 2001. These exhumations were performed in the Porcine (Dina Valley)
region of Bosnia and Herzegovina in mass g
raves believed to contain the remains of
Srebrenica victims.” These reports refer to victims in over twenty mass graves in thirteen
locations: Glogova, Kozluk, Konjević Polje, Hodžići road, Nova Kasaba, Pilica, Ravnice,
Zeleni Jadar, Lazete, the Dam, and Č
ančarni Road.

Richard Butler, the ICTY prosecution military expert, when asked during the Popović
trial whether it would serve a useful purpose to try to establish how many Srebrenica
Muslims were killed in combat, replied as follows:

It would be relevant
if the forensic evidence of mass graves
were showing evidence that would reflect that the bodies in
those graves reflected combat casualties. The forensic
evidence, as I understand it, coming out of those mass graves
reflects the opposite, that they are no
t combat casualties.

Later in the trial, however, Butler backtracked and admitted that it would be reasonable to
assume that “between 1,000 and 2,000 Muslims could have died as a result of combat
activity.” Simić

raises seven objections: 1) it is tacitly assumed that each forensic report
represents one body, which is incorrect because a significant number of reports refer to only
few bones; 2) the total number of bodies with blindfolds and/or ligatures by Simić’s
count is
442, however, in the Krstić judgment, two figures are cited, one referring only to blindfolds
(448), and the other to ligatures (423), suggesting that these are two separate groups whose
total is 871, but this is greater than the actual number of
bodies found at these locations
because the two groups overlapped, i.e., some had ligatures, others had blindfolds, and still
others had both; 3) the judgment fails to discuss the numerous autopsy reports which refer to
bodies where only shell or mortar fr
agments were found; 4) the issue of “high velocity bullet
injuries” is left unexplored as to the cause of death, even though it can be linked to the use of
the Praga cannon (a double
-
barreled anti
-
aircraft gun) that was used as an anti
-
personnel
weapon, wh
ose use was amply documented by survivors; 5) the Krstić judgment ignores
autopsy reports that refer to complete bodies that sustained no injuries, which suggests that
some individuals died of natural causes; 6) the Krstić judgment stated that “the minimum

number of bodies in the graves exhumed … was 2,028,” while Simić’s own count, which
included two additional mass graves, came to 1,920 bodes; 7) the Krstić judgment stated that
then
-
unopened mass graves contained “a minimum of 2,571” unexhumed additional
bodies,
yet after a decade of exhumations, these bodies have not been found, much less have they
been forensically demonstrated to be victims of Srebrenica
-
related execution.

The Tribunal relies on only one witness who allegedly participated in the events
of July
1995, and that is Dražen Erdemović, the Prosecution’s star witness, who makes the incredible
claim that he and seven other members of his unit executed 1,000

1,200 prisoners in less
than five hours in Pilica. However, the Pilica mass grave yielded
115 bodies of which 70 had
blindfolds or ligatures. His testimony has been discredited by Germinal Čivikov in his book,
The Star Witness
.

Simić goes on to shed light on a recurring detail in the autopsy reports, “high velocity
bullet injury,” that the ICT
Y has consistently ignored. Several mass graves contain a
considerable number of bodies that feature this trait, which Simić attributes to the M53/59
Praga anti
-
aircraft gun. These are called “burst out” injuries,” which are different from bullets
from aut
omatic and semi
-
automatic weapons, which according to survivor testimonies, were
used during executions. On the other hand, survivors from “the 28
th

Division of the B
-
H
Army who were in the column that was retreating to Tuzla under fire…. Confirm[ed] that
the
enormous number of casualties that the column suffered was in part the result of the use of
the Praga by Serbian forces.” The conclusion that can be drawn is that these deaths can only
be attributed to combat. It is incredible that the judges ignored t
his aspect of the forensic
evidence. Simić states:

The court failed to raise these new issues which might have
clarified the manner of death of some of the soldiers and
reclassified them as combat casualties. By failing to make
pattern
-
of
-
injury distinctio
ns in the prosecution forensic
reports, which clearly have different manner of death
implications, the court in effect misrepresented the forensic
material to the public by propagating the illusion that the
forensic evidence generally corroborated the exec
ution
scenario, although it manifestly does not.

Simić examines another category of reports which “demonstrates that soldiers who were
killed in combat were illegitimately conflated with Srebrenica execution victims.” He is
referring to the Prosecution’s o
wn forensic experts who stated that the cause of death was
inflicted by shrapnel, i.e., grenade or mortar fragments, which agrees with the statements
given by soldiers who took part in the military operations.

In neither the Krstić case nor in the subseque
nt Srebrenica cases did the Tribunal pay the
scantest attention to this considerable category of forensic reports. If it had done so, Simić
concludes, it would have undermined its own sweeping conclusions about execution as the
cause of death in the overwh
elming majority of Srebrenica casualties.

Simić includes numerous witness statements from Bosnian Muslims that corroborate the
shelling of the columns retreating to Tuzla.

Simić goes on to discuss other irregularities in the autopsy reports. Beyond the alr
eady
mentioned incompatibilities in the attempt to classify combat deaths as executions, there are
other anomalies to be found in the autopsy reports: bodies that did not reveal any signs of
injury and whose death may be attributed to natural causes (i.e.,

not execution); other bodies
exhumed from primary graves in 1996 which were skeletons (i.e., no soft tissue), which
indicates that they had died years before the events of July 1995 because it takes four to eight
years for soft tissue to disintegrate; the

Tribunal has made no effort to exhume further
gravesites, knowledge of which it claimed it had, in the intervening ten years since Krstić’s
conviction. These autopsy reports were all swept together in a heap and categorized as
“Srebrenica victims.”

Forens
ic specialists of The Hague Tribunal are perhaps the only
professionals in the field in the entire world who do not depend
on material evidence in order to determine the manner (and
sometimes even the cause) of death.

No U.S. court would have admitted such

evidence after the exposure of sloppiness and
intent to fit the facts to a scenario. Instead, The Hague Tribunal constructs its own reality in
order to successfully prosecute its trials, its
raison d’être
. After such revelations, how can
anyone believe th
e conclusions The Hague Tribunal has reached?

Simić concludes that 1,923 individuals perished of a variety of causes, but principally
because of combat activity, which is about half as much as the number of Tribunal autopsy
reports (3,658), and over four t
imes less than the figure (8,000) that has been memorialized
for the last fifteen years.

Lastly, Simić points out the strange choices made by The Hague Tribunal in selecting
forensic specialists, who came principally from the U.S. and Turkey (many of the c
orrected
reports were written in Turkish), but Serbian and independent specialists were barred from
access to the sites as well as from participation in the proceedings. Simić puts it with grand
understatement:

It would perhaps be legitimate to inquire why

countries like the
Russian Federation, Finland, Sweden, France, and others which
are arguably more advanced in medicine than Turkey or some
of the other countries that were represented on these
international teams, did not receive an invitation to take pa
rt in
these exhumations and in the critical task of preparing accurate
and reliable autopsy reports.

In his second essay, “Presentation and Interpretation of Forensic Data,” Simić reviews the
results of the forensic analysis performed by the expert teams o
f the Hague Tribunal between
1995 and 2002 at thirteen locations which were presumed to contain victims of the alleged
Srebrenica massacre.

Simić’s analysis of the forensic data is based on the hypothesis that if 8,000 captives had
been executed at Srebren
ica, then the majority of the remains that were exhumed would
reveal a pattern of injury consistent with execution. Simić divides the 3,568 cases he analyzed
into nine groups:

Group 1: bodies with a bullet in both the upper and lower region;

Group 2: bodi
es with a bullet only in the upper region;

Group 3: bodies with a bullet only in the lower region;

Group 4: bodies which in addition to bullet traces contain also traces of various kinds of
metal fragments;

Group 5: bodies which contain only metal fragment
s of various kinds;

Group 6: various body parts or fragments, i.e., cases where what was exhumed was not a
body but only a few bones, in some instances just one bone.

Group 7: incomplete bodies, i.e., reports which describe only the upper or lower region o
f
the body, or only the cranium;

Group 8: bodies without a finding as to the cause of death;

Group 9: bodies with blindfolds and/or ligatures.

Simić then analyzes, according to these criteria, the findings at the thirteen sites: Glogova,
Kozluk, Konjević P
olje, Hodžići road, Nova Kasaba, Pilica, Ravnice, Zeleni Jadar, Lazete,
the Dam, and Čančarni Road.

Simić draws the following conclusions on the cause of death for these victims:

1) 442 bodies were found with blindfolds and/or ligatures, which indicates

that these
persons may have been executed;

2)

there are 665 bodies that the ICTY as bullet
-
inflicted cause of death. Based on this
alone, it is impossible to determine whether they might have been executed or were killed
during combat activity. About 150
of these victims displayed a pattern of injury consistent
with the impact of a projectile launched by a Praga instead of an ordinary bullet.

3)

477 of victims display the presence of shrapnel and other metal fragments, which are
not bullet
-
related. Such a
pattern of injury is more consistent with combat activity.

4)

411 bodies are incomplete; therefore it is not possible to determine the cause of death.

5)

1,583, the largest group, consists of only a few bones and it is impossible to determine
a cause of de
ath. The Tribunal experts did not state any cause of death.

Simić decided to analyze these results further by counting the number of unique bones to
one body (cranium and femurs) in order to determine the total number of bodies. He arrived
at this figure b
y subtracting the largest group which consisted of only a few bone fragments
(1,583) from the total number of autopsy reports (3,568). His results indicate that the total
number of bodies in the thirteen mass graves is between 1,919 and 1,923, which includ
es the
number that were executed as well as combat casualties.

In his next essay, “Analysis of Moslem Column Losses Due to Minefields and Combat
Activity,”
Karganović

examines the number of Muslim casualties during the critical July 12

16 period, and secon
darily examines the ultimate number that may be attributed to execution,
which the ICTY has chosen to classify as an act of genocide, versus the number of who were
killed in legal combat operations. The purpose of this essay is to determine, based on Musli
m,
Serb, UN and other competent sources:

a) whether there was combat activity that could have caused substantial casualties on the
Muslim side;

b) whether there were minefields along the path of the Muslim column’s escape route
which could have caused subs
tantial casualties;

c) whether this column could have suffered legitimate casualties during its retreat which
could not be classified as genocidal executions;

d) what the likely total of Muslim casualties might be.

Karganović

informs us that the column of
retreating Muslims was indeed composed of
members of the Bosnian Muslim military as well as civilians. However, he points out that
under international law as defined by the Geneva Conventions, a mixed military/civilian
column is a legitimate target.
Kargan
ović

avails himself of witness statements made by
Muslims to the ICTY who verify the mixed civilian/military composition of those fleeing
Srebrenica. Next,
Karganović

provides evidence from the ICTY’s own records that indicate
the locations where the Bosni
an Muslim Zvornik Brigade suffered its greatest casualties,
based on thirty
-
three witness statements made by Bosnian Muslims to the ICTY. These
witness statements also tell of minefields. Many Muslims were killed in minefields; an
unknown number, fearing t
hat they would be captured, tortured, and put to death, perhaps
may have committed suicide; and some Muslims, who considered surrendering, may have
been executed by their fellow Muslim soldiers. Thus, argues
Karganović
, the number of
minefield victims must

be subtracted from “the total of Srebrenica victims claimed to have
been executed contrary to the laws and practice of war.”

In his next essay, “The Genocide Issue: Was there a Demonstrable Intent to Exterminate
All Muslims?”,
Karganović

argues that if on
e takes the accepted narrative that 8,000 Muslims
were killed by Serbian forces, then one must define the ensuing executions as: 1) a massacre
that violated the laws and customs of war; or 2) an act of genocide. The ICTY took a firm
stand in the
Krstić

cas
e: “The evidence shows that the VRS sought to kill all the Bosnian
Muslim military aged men in Srebrenica, regardless of their civilian or military status.”

The ICTY chamber in the
Popović

case is equally emphatic about the all
-
inclusive nature
of the geno
cide:

The Trial Chamber has found that several thousand Bosnian
Muslim males were killed by members of the Bosnian Serb
Forces. The scale and nature of the murder operation, the
targeting of the victims, the systematic and organized manner
in which it was
carried out, and
the plain intention to eliminate
every Bosnian Muslim male who was captured or surrendered

[emphasis added] proves beyond a reasonable doubt that
members of the Bosnian Serb Forces, including members of the
VRS Main Staff and Security Bran
ch, intended to destroy the
Muslims of eastern Bosnia as a group.

If this were true, it would establish an important criteria that a genocide had occurred. Yet
when the defense in
Popović

offered evidence that wounded Muslim prisoners had received
medical
treatment from the Serbs, the Chamber dismissed the evidence, and claimed that the
Serbs spared the lives of the wounded for propaganda purposes.

Genocide is one of the most difficult crimes to prove. “For that reason,” says
Karganović
,
“where genocide can

be proved the authors and instruments of that crime are subject to the
most severe legal, moral, and even material punishment.”

Karganović

then turns to the ICTY’s own sources, fifty
-
eight statements, made shortly
after the fall of Srebrenica, by Muslims
from Srebrenica and Žepa to the Muslim side or to
ICTY investigators after having reached territory under the control of the BH Army.
Karganović

notes that these fifty
-
eight statements are available on The Hague Tribunal’s
electronic data base, however, th
ey are merely a fraction of the 1,200 statements known to
exist, but that have not been made public. These statements, according to
Karganović
, are
invaluable for three reasons: 1) in thirteen statements relating to the critical period July 12
-
19, 1995, it

is obvious that the Serbs processed the prisoners normally and extended medical
attention to the prisoner if it were necessary; 2) of the total fifty
-
eight available statements,
which includes the thirteen referred to above, the prisoners were registered
with the Red
Cross; and 3) statements made by prisoners who were part of the retreating column that was a
legitimate military target and that engaged in combat with Serbian forces, and that suffered
enormous casualties in the process.

Karganović

poses the
key question: “Does the killing which occurred after the fall of
Srebrenica qualify as a genocidal event?” Even though the aforementioned witness
statements contradict the official narrative of genocide, the ICTY’s opinion was incorporated
in the decision
by the International Court of Justice in The Hague, which is a genuine
international judicial body, in its ruling on genocide.
Karganović

points out that the ICJ did
not conduct its own investigation, but simply incorporated the ICTY’s judgment in its own.

Even so, the ICTY’s own evidence disputes this conclusion on ten key points:

1)

Serbian forces evacuated about 20,000 women, children, and elderly from Srebrenica
after its fall on July 11, 1995;

2)

On July 16, 1995, the Army of the Republika Srpska opene
d a corridor which allowed
free passage to mixed military
-
civilian columns of the 28
th

Division in its march from
Srebrenica to Tuzla;

3)

A list of war crimes suspects was already in circulation when the Serbian Army
entered Srebrenica, which casts doubt
on the existence of genocidal intent;

4)

Richard Butler, the ICTY Prosecution’s military expert, saw no indication that there
was a plan to exterminate Muslims at least until immediately after the Serbian take
-
over of
Srebrenica on July 11, 1995;

5)

The ac
count given by Dutch doctor and officer of the Dutch Battalion, A.A. Schouten,
who was in Bratunac during the fall of Srebrenica, saw no indication of a massacre;

6)

A UN document on file with The Hague Tribunal,
Debrief of UNMOS from the
Srebrenica Enclav
e
, consists of debriefings of three UN military observers who were
stationed in Srebrenica, and who knew nothing of reports of the killing of military aged men;

7)

To belabor the obvious, why would the Bosnian Serb Army execute thousands of
Muslim
prisoners if they could be used as bargaining chips in a prisoner exchange?

8)

The Serbian side, deploying its forces in a horseshoe formation, took Srebrenica from
the south, which left an open corridor in the north for the Bosnian Muslims’ withdrawal,
wh
ich is inconsistent with claims that the Serbs intended to kill all Bosnian Muslims in
Srebrenica;

9)

The ICTY has been unable to prove genocidal intent on the part of the Serbs and
evidence indicates otherwise, such as, why did no genocide take place when

Serbian forces
took Žepa, another Muslim enclave to the north of Srebrenica, ten days after they took
Srebrenica? The fall of Žepa is particularly confounding for the Srebrenica genocide charge
because there is plenty of documentary evidence that Muslim s
oldiers from Žepa were treated
correctly and given medical attention by the Serbs.

10)

Lastly, the enigmatic testimony of Gen. Philippe Morillon, UNPROFOR Commander
in Sarajevo during much of the Bosnian War:

“… Mladic had entered an ambush in Srebrenica,
a trap in
fact. He expected to find resistance, but there was none. He
did not expect the massacre to occur but he completely
underestimated the amount of hatred that accrued. I do not
believe that he ordered the massacres, but I don’t know. That
is my per
sonal opinion.”

Karganović

goes on to recount “that a representative of the French government, who was
in the court room as the general was testifying in the trial of Slobodan Milošević, asked for
the trial to switch to a closed session.” Later, Morillon c
ommented on a statement he made
before a committee of the French parliament, which was conducting an inquiry into the
events at Srebrenica. He replied:

“I was convinced that the population of Srebrenica was the
victim of a higher interest, of a state reaso
n, a
raison d’état
,
but this higher interest was located in Sarajevo and New York
but certainly not in Paris.”

Karganović

calls for a more balanced interpretation of the events surrounding the fall of
Srebrenica on the basis of the statements of the captur
ed Muslim soldiers who were treated in
accordance with the Geneva Conventions and on the basis of wounded captured Muslims
who were given medical attention in accordance with laws and customs of warfare and who
were later exchanged, neither of which was co
nsidered or properly reviewed during any
Srebrenica trial.

The facts outlined by
Karganović

indicate that there was no systematic plan to kill
Muslim prisoners of war. The allegations of genocide collapse, yet the ICTY continues to use
them in pursuit of i
ts political objectives: the continued demonization of Serbs, and the
eventual destruction of Serbia itself.

There are three reasons,
Karganović

states In “How The Hague Tribunal Fabricates Its
Evidence” why a “relentless critical deconstruction” of the ev
ents that took place in
Srebrenica is necessary in order to arrive at the truth.

1)

Legal
. “The integrity of the international legal system will be seriously compromised
if the results reached by political instruments such as the ICTY are allowed to stand
unchallenged.

2)

Historical
. “When corrupt politics and journalism are reinforced by corrupt
jurisprudence, the result


for the period of time at least


is a phony historical record.”
This false historical record serves as the basis of future military in
terventions. “That is reason
why the high priests of the Srebrenica cult keep such a sharp eye out for the slightest stirring
of critical thinking, anywhere, about their false construction. They react invariably with the
threat that ‘any attempt at revisio
n of historical facts’ concerning Srebrenica is strictly
forbidden.”

3)

Moral
. The false allegations of genocide in Srebrenica have demonized an entire
nation. “The presumed beneficiaries of the moral charade, the Bosnian Muslims, are in fact
nothing of th
e sort. Just as the residents of the enclave of Srebrenica were abandoned and
betrayed in 1995 by their leadership in Sarajevo in a callous endgame transaction, so Bosnian
Muslims as a group were manipulated on the global chessboard by their solicitous Wes
tern
‘protectors’.” This was used to further poison relations between Serbs and Muslims.
Karganović

calls the Srebrenica myth a “multipurpose fabrication.”

The Hague Tribunal uses the tried and true technique of omission in order to fabricate a
virtual rea
lity. For example, the
Krstić

trial judgment refers to a document, Exhibit P 523.27,
which is supposed to be “an intercepted conversation which suggests that already by July 13
th

Serbian forces had about 6,000 Bosnian Muslim prisoners in their custody.” Ho
wever, this
document is cited in the judgment but does not appear in the trial transcript. Furthermore, this
document is nowhere to be found in the ICTY database for the
Krstić

case. “That is as good
as non
-
existent.”

Much of the evidence used by the Tribu
nal is alleged intercepts, translated into English,
for which there is no Serbian original. Further, a Serbian officer, “Major Jankelović, who
allegedly revealed that 6,000 had been captured, has never been identified or found. Other
transcripts merely ide
ntify the speakers as X and Y.”

Karganović

does not suggest that no prisoners were taken by Serbian forces. Instead, he
casts doubt on the veracity of the claim of 6,000 Bosnian Muslim soldiers having been
captured. In fact, such fabricated evidence is not

an isolated occurrence, but is the ICTY’s
modus operandi
. This is what distinguishes The Hague Tribunal from a genuine court of law.

In “The U.S. Media Coverage of Srebrenica,” Edward Herman subjects corporate media
accounts of the “Srebrenica massacre” t
o a frequency analysis, and isolates allegations
against verifiable facts. By the time the alleged “Srebrenica massacre” occurred, the U.S. and
U.K. media had come down on the side of the Bosnian Muslims, and adopted the common
position that the Serbs were

guilty of “ethnic cleansing” whose goal was the creation of a
“Greater Serbia.” This collusion between official government policy and the willing
participation of the media in broadcasting false claims, Herman observes, repeated itself in
the 2003 invasio
n of Iraq.

The U.S. created the ICTY to deal with alleged Serbian crimes not long after the State
Department declared the Serbs to be an enemy in December 1992. In fact, the ICTY serves a
political role that merely justifies NATO’s dismantling of Yugoslavi
a, in addition to
providing the corporate media with a steady stream of propaganda “news” content.

Herman examines the use of statistics in this war, beginning with the claim made by
Bosnian Muslim officials that 200,000 Bosnian Muslims had been killed as
early as
December 1992. This figure was repeated by U.S. journalists and reinforced claims of an on
-
going genocide taking place there. Herman cites the researchers of the ICTY Demographic
Unit, Ewa Tabeau and Jakup Bijak, and Mirsad Tokača of the Sarajevo
-
based Research and
Documentation Center, who independently of one another, produced estimates that the total
number of Bosnian war dead


on all sides


was approximately 100,000.

The U.S. and U.K. mainstream media resisted reporting this information, note
s Herman,
because it contradicted the party line they had assumed years earlier. “A study of fourteen
English
-
language newspapers showed that through May 2007, only once did a paper mention
the names of the authors of these two studies. Even after the deat
h of Slobodan Milošević in
2006, the inflated death toll of 200,000 was used 202 times, while the revised figure of
100,000 was used only 13 times.”

In July 1995, the U.S. and the Bosnian Muslims “needed a massacre to justify intensified
U.S. and NATO inte
rvention, and the U.S. needed a propaganda cover for the U.S.
-
supported
Croatian ethnic cleansing of Serbs in Krajina.” Herman covers the wispy evidence produced
by Madeleine Albright (the aforementioned satellite photographs) and the International Red
Cro
ss list of missing Bosnian Muslims, which was quickly turned into 8,000 Bosnian
Muslims who were “executed.” He also calls attention to the double standards at work
involving the attention given to a video, released to the ICTY in 2005 by Nataša Kandić,
al
legedly showing the execution of six Bosnian Muslims. The video was given terrific
publicity, even though it was probably faked; however, genuine snuff videos taken by Naser
Orić’s soldiers of the execution of 114 Serbian villagers (
see

above), which were
documented
by numerous sources, were ignored.

Herman analyzed 95 U.S. print media articles that featured Srebrenica in their titles that
were published between April 1993 and November 2004. He found a formulaic character in
their composition that reflected

adherence to the party line. The usual epithet is “the worst
massacre in Europe since WWII” and the victims described as “men and boys.” All of them
use the figure, more of less, of “8,000.” None of these articles expressed any doubt about the
executions,

and resorted to the subjunctive or potential modes of discourse to indicate that
grave sites “could contain” or are “believed to contain” larger numbers of victims. Only three
articles mentioned Naser Orić and downplayed the victimization and murder of Se
rbian
civilians in the Srebrenica area. Such depictions portrayed the Serbs as “evil,” and at the
same time prevented Srebrenica from being understood in terms of “revenge killings as part
of a tit
-
for
-
tat cycle.” Further, Herman reveals that only 2 articl
es even mentioned the 1995
ethnic cleansing of 250,000 Serbs from Krajina, and “only one of the two mentions a possible
link to the Srebrenica massacre.” Approximately 2,500 men, women, and children were killed
by Croatian forces, for which they went unpun
ished. None of these articles suggested that the
U.S. and its NATO allies had any interest in the Balkans except as honest brokers and
peacemakers. None of the articles suggests that the Bosnian Muslims needed a “Srebrenica
massacre” in order to obtain U.S
. intervention. None of the articles mentions Clinton’s telling
Izetbegović that he needed 5,000 Bosnian Muslim casualties in order for the U.S. to
intervene. None of them mention that the Bosnian Muslim government refused to provide the
names of those sol
diers from Srebrenica who arrived safely in Tuzla. These articles
emphasize that Srebrenica had been declared a “safe area,” but none of them mentions that
the Bosnian Muslim 28
th

Division was stationed there and had never been disarmed and that
they conti
nued their attacks on surrounding Serbian areas.

The ICTY asserts that punishment of the perpetrators of the Srebrenica massacre will lead
to justice being done and will lay the ground for reconciliation, but Herman calls our
attention to the fact that th
ere is no justice for the Krajina Serbs. In fact, the ICTY’s
dissemination of media lies has made reconciliation even more difficult, if not, for the time
being, impossible.

Herman concludes that:

the

U.S. media treatment of Srebrenica has lacked minimal journalistic
integrity. It has followed a de facto party line, tapped sources that take
that line as a given and excluded all others, failed to provide adequate
context and is simply unable and unwilli
ng to ask obvious questions
and investigate issues that cry out for investigation…. Like the U.S.
media’s news coverage of the Iraq threat of 2002
-
03, or the Iran threat
of today, this is propaganda under the guise of news.


I
n

“‘
The Srebrenica Massacre’:
An Analysis of the History and the Legend,


George
Pumphrey, who wrote one of the first important essays questioning the validity of allegations
of a Srebrenica “massacre” (“The Srebrenica Massacre: A Hoax?”
http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~bip/docs/kosovo_polje/srebrenica_hoax.html
), examines the
growth of the Srebrenica myth in the context of Serbia’s President Boris Tadić’s 2010
initiative to submit a resolution to the Se
rbian Parliament, requesting that the Serbs
acknowledge the “guilt” for the “Srebrenica massacre,” and to further declare this “massacre”
constitutes a “genocide.” Intellectuals from the EU, the U.S., and Canada subsequently
launched an appeal calling on t
he Serbian Parliament not to pass this resolution. Pumphrey
points out that the appeal overlooked two essential facts: 1) it is not for the Serbs of Serbia to
assume the guilt for an act they did not commit; and 2) no evidence of a mass execution of up
to
8,000 Muslims has ever materialized.

Within the framework of this appeal, Pumphrey examines the six sources of the origin of
the Srebrenica legend: 1) the revelations of Hakija Meholjić, the Bosnian Muslim police chief
of Srebrenica, who stated that Izetbe
gović had said that U.S. President Clinton offered U.S.
intervention in Bosnia on the side of the Muslims if 5,000 Bosnian Muslims were slaughtered
by the Serbs; 2) Madeleine Albright’s “peep show” at the U.N. during which she revealed
dubious satellite ph
otos of an alleged massacre site; 3) the writings of the perfidious David
Rhode who ignored “Operation Storm” even though he was staying in Zagreb at the time, and
chose instead to write about Srebrenica, his first article probably having been composed
wit
hout his ever visiting Srebrenica, and a second article in which he claimed to have
photographed mass graves while visiting Srebrenica, yet in a brilliant updating of the my
-
dog
-
ate
-
my
-
homework excuse, claimed that the Bosnian Serbs confiscated his film (b
ut such
mass graves have yet to be found today); 4) the conflation of the ICRC’s list of missing
Bosnian Muslim soldiers after the fall of Srebrenica with a list of Bosnian Muslim soldiers
captured by the Bosnian Serbs; 5) the charges of the ICTY for “crim
es against humanity” and
“genocide” against the Bosnian Serb leadership, based on the plea
-
bargained testimony of
Dražen Erdemović, who, as a result, received a token sentence and a new identity in a
Northern European country; and 6) the trial of General K
rstić, who was convicted on
genocide charges by the ICTY even though such evidence was conspicuously absent.

Pumphrey draws our attention to the lopsided sentencing of Gen. Krstić, who was
convicted in August 2001of being responsible for the deaths of “mor
e than 7,000” people,
even though the ICTY at the time had evidence of 2,028 bodies having been exhumed by
investigators. It comes down to convicting any Serb, says Pumphrey, because


to
paraphrase Gertrude Stein


“a Serb is a Serb is a Serb.” And he qui
te rightly calls attention
to the fact that Germany is seeking to divest itself of lingering WWII Nazi stigmatization by
charging the Serbs with being “worse than Nazis.” Therefore, “Serb ‘guilt’ is supposed to
replace ‘German guilt’ left in public memory
by the Second World War.” All this
demonstrates that the official version of the Srebrenica massacre ought to be called into
question, and treated as U.S. State
-
Department
-
generated folklore, the first deliberately
crafted urban legend.

J.P. Maher was one
of the first to reveal that the “destruction of Dubrovnik” by the
Serbian forces (actually, the JNA) was a hoax. In his essay “Argument and Rhetoric in ICTY
Judgments,” J.P. Maher traces the development of the catch phrase used by the corporate
media to ch
aracterize Srebrenica as the massacre “of x
-
thousands of Muslim men and boys”.
By examining articles and public statements made over the course of the month after the fall
of Srebrenica by the Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, Chris Hedges, Davi
d
Rhode, Madeleine Albright, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Maher points out that none mentioned
a massacre in Srebrenica after it fell to Serbian forces. Velayati instead, asked that the UN
“take immediate action to prevent a massacre of the defenceless people
of Srebrenica by
Serbian rebels.” Chris Hedges reported in
The New York Times

that thousands of Muslim
fighters had slipped through Serbian lines and had arrived safely in Tuzla. Even as late as
August

7, 1995, Zbigniew Brzezinski stated in an op
-
ed piece
for The New Republic that
“something awful ‘might happen’” after the fall of Srebrenica. Maher availed himself of
LEXIS
-
NEXIS to follow the development of the medial lie that “x
-
thousands of Muslim men
and boys” were massacred, which coalesced into its cur
rent form two months later. This
boilerplate language of advocacy journalism even made its way into the ICTY’s judgments in
the Krstić and Popović trials, even though contemporary reports indicate no information on
what really happened in Srebrenica.

Karga
nović

summarizes the collective effort made by the various contributors in “The
Balance Sheet.” First of all,
Karganović

plainly refutes charges of “revisionism” because “no
fundamental aspect of the matter has been clarified.” Srebrenica remains an open
question.
Therefore, “there is literally nothing to ‘revise’.”

Attempts to tar every independent inquiry into the events that took place in Srebrenica
with the brush of “revisionism” are not merely political sport. They arrest,
Karganović

rightly maintai
ns, the free intellectual inquiry on which Western society has developed over
the past five hundred years. It is, instead, a concerted effort to socially engineer the thoughts
of the public.

Deconstruction of a Virtual Genocide

was published after the em
ergence of two
heretofore inaccessible sources: 1) the complete set of autopsy reports prepared by the ICTY
Prosecution forensic teams from 1996 to 2001; and 2) statements given by Srebrenica
residents, most of them surviving members of the 28
th

Division,
who ultimately reached
Muslim
-
held territory after the fall of Srebrenica on July 11, 1995.

The autopsy reports are significant because they shed light on the fact that the bodies of
about 1,920 individuals were found in mass graves, and secondly, these au
topsy reports
established a pattern of injury that revealed at least two major causes of death: execution and
combat. The former is a war crime; the latter is not.
Karganović

and his contributors did not
ignore autopsy reports conducted by the ICTY afte
r 2001; they are not available because the
Bosnian Institute for Missing Persons assumed this task since 2001. Each year the Bosnian
government inters new victims in the Potočari Memorial Cemetery, yet none of the autopsies
of these alleged victims has ev
er been submitted to the ICTY as evidence. The Sarajevo
-
based government,
Karganović

emphasizes, is pursuing its own political agenda.

The survivor statements refer to fierce combat and enormous casualties, which are
unrelated to the executions. Why have

these combat casualties never been identified as such
by the ICTY? The ICTY never distinguished between deaths resulting from the lawful
conduct of warfare defined by the Geneva Conventions, and executions.

The ICTY has all this information readily ava
ilable on its databases, so it is not simple
oversight, but something more serious. Is the ICTY acting in bad faith? As
Karganović

reasons, “If we concede that [there were] 500 execution victims and add to them the 442 with
[blindfolds] and ligatures, the

maximum of potential victims of execution in this lot would be
about 950.” That comes to 26% of the Tribunal’s 3,658 cases, which falls far short of the
majority of those exhumed. And based on the internal evidence of the ICTY’s autopsy
reports, the ac
tual number of individuals who perished is 1,920. So the ICTY cannot reach its
target figure of 8,000 in this fashion.

The DNA evidence presented to the ICTY is unacceptable in any court of law, and its
introduction is a violation of the adversarial system

on which a court of law is based.
Karganović

can draw no other conclusion that the ICTY is a kangaroo court that acts in bad
faith and seeks politically correct judgments.

Diana Johnstone, author and political analyst, raised the question of “the uses of

Srebrenica.” The key question is not what happened, but
cui bono
? The Sarajevo
-
based
government uses Srebrenica as a national rallying cry to motivate “patriotism” and mass
mobilizations of Bosnian Muslims, who are Islamized Serbs, as they had been known
until
recently, when Tito recognized the Muslim “nationality” in 1972. The Srebrenica legend
feeds the paranoia that prevents reconciliation with their Serbian neighbors, and manipulate
their citizens by manufacturing fear and insecurity.
Karganović

ruefu
lly notes that this also
means that Bosnian Muslims, after having been subjected to such social engineering, will be
less likely to think for themselves, much less think “outside the box.” The Bosnian Muslims
have instead, under the cover of the alleged
Srebrenica massacre, subjected themselves to re
-
Islamization, because the Saudis and others consider them to have been insufficiently
Islamized in the first place. For all these reasons, the Sarajevo
-
based government will never
tolerate the demystificatio
n of the Srebrenica cult. This has resulted in continued
backwardness in Muslim
-
held Bosnia, and insures a dysfunctional Bosnian government,
which is what the U.S. and the EU wanted in the first place, so that these neo
-
imperialist
powers can continue to “
supervise” the crippled state they created.

The phony version of Srebrenica, the core of which is a heinous
crime that did not occur, which the Serbs did not commit and
which they will never accept as their collective act, was
invented deliberately to se
rve as a permanent and unbridgeable
obstacle to the unity of two religious communities which are
component parts of the same people.

One cannot improve on Mr.
Karganović
’s conclusion:

A decade and a half after the war’s end, Srebrenica continues to
be an e
nigma which provokes countless questions to which we
still have few honest answers. The only statement about it we
can make confidently is that this toxic myth is beyond the pale
of the truth. We must invest every effort to use the truth to
neutralize it
and to replace it with an account of events which,
at least in its fundamental features, correlates with reality. That
is the best way we can help the people of Srebrenica to achieve
the one goal that at this precise moment many of them may not
recognize a
s the most essential, but without which they have no
future: lasting peace, with themselves and their neighbors.

* * *

It is not an exaggeration to liken Stefan
Karganović

to a latter day David who vanquishes,
against all odds, the overconfident Goliath.
T
he

Deconstruction of a Virtual Genocide

deserves editorials in leading newspapers; in
-
depth analyses in weekly news magazines; it
deserves to be featured in the window of public libraries and bookstores; and its authors
deserve slots on talk shows. Surely
the perpetrators of the phantom massacre known as
“Srebrenica,” Bill Clinton, Madeleine Albright, Richard Holbrook
et alia

deserve to be
punished for the crime of having invented a crime to advance their foreign policy ambitions. I
enumerate these hypothet
ical events because none of them will ever occur. Governments do
not confess they omitted to undertaking a certain course of action, nor do they confess they
undertook actions they ought not to have undertaken. Rival states do not, and cannot, forgive
them
. That is why reading
Deconstruction of a Virtual Genocide

is imperative. No
subsequent responsible discussion of Srebrenica in private or in a public forum will take
place unless the reader is duly informed and ventures to participate in such a dialogue,
if not
initiate it. Let us recall the obstacles that we, the responsible bearers of this information, face:

The aide said that guys like me were “in what we call the
reality
-
based community,” which he defines as people who
“believe that solutions emerge fr
om your judicious study of
discernable reality.” I nodded and murmured something about
enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off.
“That’s not the way the world really works any more,” he
continued. “We’re an empire now, and when we act, we cre
ate
our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality


judiciously, as you will


we’ll act again, creating other new
realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will
sort out. We’re history’s actors . . . and you, all of you, will be
left to just study what we do.”

“Without a Doubt,” by Ron Suskind

The New York Times Magazine
, October 14, 2004


And what are these bold visionary actions that create new realities? It is sponsoring
Turkey’s entry into the European Union. Why? Because it
is European? Most certainly not. Is
it because the Turkish state meets minimum European civil criteria? No. Is it because the
Europeans themselves want Muslim immigration? No. It is because the powers that be are
inebriated with an old idea, the reformatio
n of the Roman Empire, the Eastern as well as the
Western Empires, which would allow such an entity to rule the world. This is a very old idea,
and we know how it will sort itself out.

Another bold, visionary action is the creation of the European Union. A

united Europe?
The idea is as old as Julius Caesar, and attempted once again by Napoleon and Hitler, but
finally succeeded because it was obviously a good idea. Or was it? Thanks to Julia Gorin’s
recent article, “The Nazis and Fascists Who Founded the EU
and Their Influence today,
which was posted on her blog September 3, 2011
(
http://www.juliagorin.com/wordpress/?p=2675
):

“The European Union is based on the Nazi plans published in Berlin in
1942.


In 2008, director of the Freenations site Rodney Atkinson


former
British Ministerial Advisor, author, and lecturer at University of Mainz
in Germany


sent out the following press release (dated 26
th

June
2008), a recording on CD of a speech given at a

public meeting at the
House of Commons in February 2009 chaired by Philip Davies MP by
Rodney Atkinson:

“Nazi Leadership Officer” Became First Head of the
European Commission in 1957

“The EU was founded and initially led by ‘former’ Nazis
and Fascists, as

was the Charlemagne Prize awarded to
Tony Blair, Edward Heath, Roy Jenkins and others for their
role in removing democratic sovereignty from the nation
states of Europe.” No wonder, says Atkinson, that the EU
today has reproduced the policies and structur
es of 1940s
Europe and shows all the characteristics of a totalitarian
anti
-
democratic corporatists Empire


for that is what its
fascist founders intended.

(…)

No wonder, says Atkinson, that “The EU has promoted the
ethnic cleansing of 1m people in the Ba
lkans, mainly Serbs,
Jews and gypsies, from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo which
all provided Waffen SS divisions for the Nazis in the
1940s.”

These bold visionaries


the EU, the U.S., the ICTY (its offical organ), and the fatal
infatuation with the idea of a

reunited Roman Empire


they are the ones retailing the
official narrative of “Srebrenica.” The corporate media, an ever attendant handmaiden to
corporate interests, perverts this discourse by means of saturation
-
level repetition of media
lies. The Bosnia
n Serbian leadership always maintained that about 1,500 to 1,800 Bosnian
Muslim troops were killed in the Srebrenica action, and that an uncertain number of those
were executed. Sixteen years after the fact, the initial Bosnian Serb estimates of Muslim
cas
ualties in Srebrenica end up being closer to the truth than any of the subsequent
formulations or pseudo
-
legal constructs proffered by The Hague Tribunal. I urge these
corporatists to read Shelly’s classic sonnet, “Ozymandias,” which will instruct them wha
t
happens with “history’s actors.”

The day has come when Americans must interpret the news by applying techniques that
were once reserved for literary criticism. Besides conveying a literal meaning, the “news”
conveys a latent meaning that is brought to li
ght by the act of interpretation. One must
“interpret” the news because it withholds some secret that must be explained in order to
understand its meaning. Corporate high priests still guard the official meaning the
“Srebrenica,” and they still try to marg
inalize or shun those who would question it. Thus, the
“news” is a social engineering construct that necessitates “interpreatation.”

This phantom massacre, an urban legend, erases the memory of the 750,000 Serbs, Jews,
and Roma who were killed in the Jasen
ovac Concentration Camp during WWII; this phantom
massacre erases the memory of the forced conversion to Roman Catholicism of some 300,000
Serbs who lived in Croatia during WWII; this phantom massacre erases the memory of
Operation Storm and the ethnic cle
ansing of 250,000 Serbs from Croatia; this phantom
massacre erases the memory of the 3,200 Serbs who were killed in the area around Srebrenica
between 1991 and 1995, commensurate to the number to American lives lost in 9/11; this
phantom massacre erases th
e genocide conducted against Serbs in Srebrenica specifically,
and in Bosnia generally during WWI and WWII; and this phantom massacre erases the
bombardment of Serbia in 1999.

Genocide is a crime. The extrajudicial execution of prisoners is a war crime and

such
crimes deserve the punishment to the fullest extent of the law. Yet what punishment for those
who create a phantom genocide


one that never took place? There is no punishment for
such a crime. It’s not on the books, so, it isn’t a crime after all. E
ven so, the act of fabricating
a false genocide is its own punishment, because to lie to others is to lie to one’s self. And the
U.S. is now suffering the terrible consequences of having lied to itself, because it has
distorted its own view of the world as

well as its own place in it, and the U.S. has far more
ominously poisoned the discourse it conducts on the question of its own survival. The
corporate media conducts noxious social engineering efforts at the expense open dialogue
with respect to our vital

interests, such as: the government
-
sponsored bail
-
out of U.S. banks;
the war against state and municipal union employees; the growing number of U.S. states that
are tottering on the edge of bankruptcy; the movement to destroy public education by the
intro
duction of charter schools, and along with it, the attacks on teachers’ unions; chronic
unemployment; the artificially induced national debt; low taxes favoring corporations and
wealthy individuals; the never
-
ending engagement in several simultaneous imper
ialist wars


each and every public dialogue has been corrupted by the same mechanism that unleashed
the “Srebrenica massacre” on us, and still sustains it. That is how the corporate media
rewrites history for the benefit of its sibling, corporate interest
s. Rodney Atkinson says this:

We live in very dangerous times. But let us be in no doubt what has
happened to the United Kingdom as it surrendered to the rule of those
who have for centuries sought our destruction. Nothing has happened
which our Parliament

and our governments did not freely do to
themselves, albeit behind the backs of the true sovereigns, the voters.
And if our MPs and government wish to survive, there is no power on
earth which can stop them restoring the sovereignty of a free British
peop
le. But so long as they refuse to do so, they are and will be seen to
be guilty of the enslavement of Britain by those very imperialist and
fascist European powers which 50 million deaths and two world wars
apparently failed to defeat.

Here is a link to a
free copy of
The Deconstruction of a Virtual Genocide
:

http://www.srebrenica
-
project.com/DOWNLOAD/books/Deconstruction_of_a_virtual_genoci
de.pdf

Print it out. Read it. You are not simply a member of the skeptical reading public. In this
age of perception management, social engineering, and media lies, reading is an act of
resistance


and you are the media.


Milo Yelesiyevich