I. Introduction To Criminal Procedure

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Suzanne Amiel


Prof. Alana Klein

Criminal Procedure


Fall 2010


1

C
RIMINAL
P
ROCEDURE
S
UMMARY



T
ABLE OF
C
ONTENTS


I. INTRODUCTION TO C
RIMINAL PROCEDURE

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4

Kent Roach, “Due Process and Victims’ Rights: the New Law and Politics of Criminal Justice”

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4

Exc
erpt 1: National Council of Welfare Report


Justice and the Poor

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6

Excerpt 2: National Council on Welfare Report


Justice and the Poor, “The Police and the Poor”

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6

II. JURISDICTION AND

CLASSIFICATION OF OF
FENCES

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6

1. Jurisdiction

of the Courts

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2. Classification of Offences

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III. POLICE POWERS

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9

S
OURCES OF
P
OLICE
P
OWERS

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9

1. The Principle of Legality

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9

Colet v. the Queen (1981 SCC)

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2. The Ancillary Powers Doctrine

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9

Dedman v. the Queen (1985 SCC)

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9

R. v. Mann (2004 SCC)

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11

P
OLICE
S
TOPPING
P
OWERS
:

I
NVESTIGATIVE
D
ETENTION

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11

1. The Standard for Investiga
tive Detention

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12

Mann (reprise)

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2. Defining Investigative
Detention

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13

R. v. Grant (2009 SCC)

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13

R. v. Suberu (2009 SCC)

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14

P
OLICE
S
TOPPING
P
OWERS
:

R
OADBLOCK AND
S
TATUTORY
S
TOPPING
P
OWERS

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15

1. Roadblock Stops

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15

R. v. Clayton (2007 SCC)

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16

2. Statutory Motor
-
Vehicle Stopping Powers

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16

R. v. Hufsky (SCC 1988)

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16

R. v. Mellenthin (SCC1992)

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17

IV. SEARCH AND SEIZU
RE

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1
7

C
ONSTITUTIONAL
F
RAMEWORK OF
S
EARCH AND
S
EIZURE

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18

Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc. (1984 SCC)

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18

R. v. Collins (1987 SCC)

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19

A

R
EASONABLE
E
XPECTATION OF
P
RIVACY

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20

R. v. Edwards (1996 SCC)

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20

R. v. Tessling (SCC 2004)

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21

W
ARRANTS AND
W
ARRANTLESS
S
EARCHES

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23

1. Search Warrants

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23

R. v. Morelli (2010 SCC)

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24

R. v. Bernard (Ont. SCJ 2009)

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2. Warrantless Searches

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25

R. v. Caslake (1998 SCC)

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25

R. v. Golden (2001 SCC)

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26

R. v. Godoy (SCC 1999)

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27

R. v. Law (SCC 2002)

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28

R. v. Buhay (SCC 2003)

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28

R. v. Borden (SCC 1994)

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29

R. v. Kennedy (2000 BCCA)

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29

R. v. Clement

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29

V. ARREST, RIGHTS ON

ARREST, AND RIGHTS D
URING INTERROGATION

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29

Suzanne Amiel


Prof. Alana Klein

Criminal Procedure


Fall 2010


2

A
RREST

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29

1. What is an Arrest?

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29

R. v. Latimer (SCC 1997)

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2. General Powers of Arrest: Citizen’s Arrest

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George S. Rigakos & David R. Greener, Bubbles of Governance: Private Policing and the Law in Canada

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31

3. Police Powers of Arrest

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4. Alternatives to Arrest/Post
-
Arrest Detention

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5. Minimum Standards for Arrest

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32

R. v. Storrey (1990 SCC)
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32

R. v. Duguay, Murphy, & Sevigny (1985 OCA)

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33

R. v. Grant, reprise

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6. Arrest Warrants

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34

R. v. Feeney (SCC 1997)

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7. Use of Force in Arrest

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R. v. Nasogaluak (SCC 2010)

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R
IGHTS ON
A
RREST

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1. Section 10(a): Right to be Informed of the Reasons for the Arrest

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37

R. v. Evans (SCC 1991)

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2. Section 10(b): Right to Counsel

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38

Renke, “The Right to Counsel
and the Exclusion of Evidence”

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38

R. v. Suberu, reprise

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38

Wightman &
Mack, “Has Suberu Marked the End of Investigative Detention?”

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38

R. v. Bartle

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39

R. v. Manninen (SCC 1987)

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40

R. v. Ross (SCC 1989)

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R. v. Burlingham (SCC 1995)

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41

R. v. Sinclair (SCC 2010)

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R. v. Smith (SCC 1989)

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R. v. Bartle, reprise

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43

Clarkson v. the Queen (SCC 1986)

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44

R
IGHTS ON
I
NTERROGATION
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1. Distinguishing between the Voluntary Confessions Rule and the Right
to Silence

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44

R. v. Hebert (1990 SCC)

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2. The Section 7 Right to Sil
ence

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46

R. v. Singh (2007 SCC)
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46

3. The Voluntary Confessions Rule

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R. v. Oickle (2000 SCC)

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47

R
IGHTS ON
U
NDERCOVER
I
NTERROGATION

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48

R. v. Broyles (1991 SCC)

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48

R. v. Liew (1999 SCC)

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VI. PRE
-
TRIAL PROCEDURE: (PR
ELIMS), BAIL, DISCLO
SURE

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49

G
ENERAL
P
RE
-
T
RIAL
P
ROCEDURE

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49

R. v. Dudley (2009 SCC)

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50

T
HE
P
RELIMINARY
I
NQUIRY

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51

R. v. Hynes (SCC 2001)

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52

J
UDICIAL
I
NTERIM
R
ELEASE
:

I
.
E
.

B
AIL

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52

1. Introduction to Bail

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Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (2010 SCC)

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2. The Ladder Approach

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R. v. Anoussis (2008 QCCQ)

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3. Reverse Onus Provisions

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R. v. Pearson (1992 SCC)

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4(a). The Primary Ground for Detention: Flight Risk (s. 515(10)(a))

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R. v.

Parsons (2007 BCSC)

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4(b). The Secondary Ground for Detention: Public Safety (s. 515(10)(b))

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57

R. c. Cantave (2008 QCCQ)

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57

Suzanne Amiel


Prof. Alana Klein

Criminal Procedure


Fall 2010


3

4(c).The Tertiary Ground for Detention: Public Confidence in the Admi
nistration of Justice (s.
515(10)(c))

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57

R. v. Morales (1992 SCC)

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R. v. Hall (2002 SCC)

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D
ISCLOSURE

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1. Disclosure of Information
in the Crown’s Hands

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R. v. Stinchcombe (1991 SCC)

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Tanovich et a
l., “A Modest Proposal for Reciprocal Defence Disclosure”

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Davison, “A Reply to the Modest Proposal for Reciprocal Defence Disclosure”

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2. Third Party Production of Information

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R. v. O’Connor (1995 SCC)

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3. Lost or Destroyed Evidence

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Graeme G. Mitchell, “R v. La: The Evolving Right of
Crown Disclosure and the Supreme Court Divided”
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R. v. Carosella (1997 SCC)

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VII. PLEAS AND PLEA
BARGAINING

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P
LEAS

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Adgey v. R.
(1975 SCC)

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Khanfoussi c. La Reine (2010 QCCQ)

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Stephanos Bibas,
“Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas”
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P
LEA
B
ARGAINING

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J. Di Luca,
“A Review of Plea Bargaining in Canada”

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Ken Chasse, “Plea Bargaining is Sentencing”

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VIII. CHARTER REMEDI
ES

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S
ECTION
24(2):

E
XCLUSION OF
E
VIDENCE

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Steven Penney, “Taking Deterrence Seriously”

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R. v. Grant (2009 SCC), reprise

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R v. Harrison (2009 SCC)

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R. v. Blacquier (2010 NBPC)

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R. c. Ferracane (2010 QCCQ)

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R. v. Archambault (2010 QCCQ)

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S
ECTION
24(1):

O
THER
R
EMEDIES

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1. Remedies Generally

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2. Stays of Proceedings

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R. v. Keyowski (1988 SCC)

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R. v. Power (1994 SCC)

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R. v. Regan (2002 SCC)

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R. v. Tran (2010 OCA)

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3. Costs

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R. v. 934649 Ontario Inc. (2001 SCC)

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4. Damages

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Vancouver (City) v. Ward (SCC 2010)

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5. Reduction of Sentence

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IX. JURY SELECTION

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74

T
HE
F
UNCTION AND
R
ISKS OF THE
J
URY
S
YSTEM

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74

Lisa Dufraimont, “Evidence Law and the Jury: a Reassessment”

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J
URY
S
ELECTION
P
ROCEDURE
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1. Qualifications to be a Juror

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2. Overview of the Selection Procedure (
R. v. Find
)

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3. Challenges to the Array

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R. v. Born with a Tooth (1993 Alta. QB)

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4. Challenges to the Poll

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R. v. Williams (1998 SCC)

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R. v. Find (2001 SCC)

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5. Interference with Jury Selection

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X. TRIALS AND TRIAL
RIGHTS

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79

Suzanne Amiel


Prof. Alana Klein

Criminal Procedure


Fall 2010


4

T
HE
T
RIAL
S
TRUCTURE

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79

1. The Trial Timeline
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2. The Courtroom Players

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T
RIAL
R
IGHTS

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1. The Right to Trial within a Reasonable Time: s. 11(b)

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Kent Roach, “Askov”

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R. v. Morin (1992 SCC)

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2. The Right to Counsel at Trial: s. 7

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I.

I
NTRODUCTION TO
C
RIMINAL
P
ROCEDURE


Basic question of this course
: what is the state allowed to do to investigate and prosecute criminal offences?


This question tries to resolve the
B
asic Tension in Criminal Procedure
: the constraint of the use of State
power against individuals v. the
interests of the public in

effective

law enforcement


Some theoretical approaches to criminal procedure:

Kent Roach, “Due Process and Victims’ Rights:
the New Law and Politics of Criminal Justice”



Herbert Packer has 2 models of the criminal justice system:

1. Crime Control Model



Metaphor: high
-
speed assembly line conveyor belt, operated by police/prosecutors. The
end product is a
guilty plea
.



Primarily c
oncerned with:
efficiency



Crime
-
control model looks to the
legislature
, as opposed to the courts, as its “validating authority”



“Criminal sanction” is a positive guarantor of social freedom:

o

Employed for: protecting people/property from harm, promoting ord
er and social stability



Given limited law enforcement resources, criminal process must place a premium on speed and finality



Police/prosecutors are the expert administrators of the criminal justice system: they should be allowed to
screen out the innocent
and secure the conviction of the rest with a minimum of occasion for challenge



Most fact
-
finding in the crime control model is conducted by the police on the streets/at the station, not by
judges in court



The police are concerned with
factual guilt



wheth
er or not the accused committed the crime

o

Are not overly concerned with
legal guilt



whether the accused can be shown to be guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, through admissible evidence, and after cons
idering all accused’s rights/
defences



Police should ha
ve broad investigative powers t
o arrest people for questioning

o

Only limits on police interrogations are those designed to ensure
reliability
of suspect’s statements

o

Detained people
should not b
e permitted to contact a lawyer
, because this will slow down th
e
process and only benefit the guilty



Police should have wide powers to conduct searches because only the guilty have something to hide



Illegally seized evidence
should be
admissible
at trial



Police misconduct should be taken seriously in disciplinary, civ
il, criminal proceedings (this is important
for the rule of law)

o

But the criminal trial of a factually guilty accused is an inappropriate and indirect vehicle for
addressing police and prosecutorial misconduct

o

The criminal should not go free because the
constable has blundered



Pre
-
trial detention is the rule
to ensure the accused’s presence at trial, to prevent future crime, to
persuade the accused to plead guilty at the first opportunity



The goal should be to terminate without trial every case in which t
here is no genuine doubt about the
factual guilt of the defendant



Trial judges should happily accept guilty pleas


should not inquire into the factual accuracy of the plea or
whether the accused had any defences

Suzanne Amiel


Prof. Alana Klein

Criminal Procedure


Fall 2010


5

o

Should get a sentencing discount for saving

resources by pleading guilty early



Appeals should not be encouraged

2. Due Process Model



Metaphor: obstacle course in which defence lawyers argue that the prosecution should be rejected because
the accused’s rights have been violated
=


Primarily concerned w
ith: fairness to the accused, “quality control”
=


The validating authority for this model is the Supreme Court which interprets the constitution so as to
restrict the powers of the State and give rights to the accused



This model starts with
scepticism about
the morality and utility of the criminal sanction
(especially in
relation to victimless crimes)

o

Based on liberal values of primacy of the individual and the need to limit official power so as to
avoid intrusive policing



This model is concerned with the equ
ality of all accused

=
t桥h⁳桯畬搠r散敩v攠e煵慬⁴re慴m敮e
=
o

Should all be represented by a lawyer

o

Should protect due process rights of all accused so most disadvantaged will be protected



There should be numerous restraints on the police:

o

Want to minimize th
e informal fact
-
finding in the streets/stations

o

Police should not arrest or detain a person in order to develop their case



Accused should be carefully informed about the right to be silent and the right to contact counsel

o

“There is no moment in the crimina
l⁰=潣os猠睨敮st桥h摩獰srity⁩渠r敳潵rc敳⁢=tw敥渠n桥⁳tat攠e湤n
accused is greater than the moment of arrest”
=


Any statements taken absent a clear and voluntary waiver by the accused of his rights should be excluded
from trial



It is up to the State to prove

their case against a defendant without forcing him to cooperate in the process,
or capitalizing on his ignorance of his legal rights



Criminal trial of factually guilty accused must address violations of their rights because those
subject to police abuse
will not (as required by the crime control model) be able to bring separate
civil, disciplinary, or criminal actions



Strong exclusionary rules are necessary because much police abuse will never otherwise be remedied



Accused should be detained awaiting tria
l only when absolutely necessary



Neither the prosecutor nor judge should encourage guilty pleas



Criminal trial, the culmination of the process, is concerned with legal guilt, not factual guilt

3.
Criticisms of Packer



Due process is empirically irrelevant:
in minor cases, the cost of invoking one’s rights is greater than the
l潳o=潦=t桥hrig桴猠t桥h獥lves
=
o

Due process rights are hollow symbols of fairness

o

The guilty plea is often in the interests of all criminal justice participants, including the accused



I
nst
ead of restraining the state, illusion of due process enables and legitimates crime control

o

“Due process” is part of the rhetoric of justice

=
it=i猠sn⁩摥dliz敤e慮搠灵扬i捬y⁣潮s畭敤⁶敲獩潮o=
t桥hl慷⁴a慴=獵灰srt猠srim攠e潮or潬=批⁣=敡ti湧⁴h攠ell畳i潮o
t桡h⁡=c畳ud⁡=攠er敡t敤ef慩rly
=


In reality, it is the crime control model which the accused is actually undergoing



Packer makes adversarial assumptions, which limit creative thinking about criminal justice



Packer’s m
潤敬猠s慩l⁴漠t慫e⁩湴o⁡=c潵ot敷湯n
l敤g敳⁡扯畴=捲im攠ei捴imiz慴i潮
=
4
. Victim
-
Oriented Models



Punitive Model

o

This model is in a state of constant crisis: is always trying to respond to the inadequacies of crime
control
to protect victims

o

Rights of victims and rights of the accused are oppos
ed in this system

o

The focus is again on factual guilt; tendency to stress also the innocence of victims

o

No recognition that there is overlap between the populations of victims and offenders

o

The language of victims’ rights is a new symbolic and legitimating
=
l慮a畡u攠e潲=th攠e慭攠潬搠
Suzanne Amiel


Prof. Alana Klein

Criminal Procedure


Fall 2010


6

crime
-
control routine of enacting criminal laws, arresting, convicting, etc



Non
-
Punitive: circle model of prevention/restoration


Some sociological considerations in criminal procedure:

Excerpt 1: National Council of Welfare
Report


Justice and the Poor



There is discrimination against the poor at every level of the criminal justice system



For the same criminal behaviour, the poor are more likely to be arrested, charged, convicted, sentenced to
prison for longer

o

Are less likel
y to be released on bail

o

Less likely to have a lawyer



Practices that have biggest impact on criminalizing the poor = police deployment to low
-
income
neighbourhoods and their use of their discretion in discriminatory ways

Excerpt 2: National Council on Wel
fare Report


Justice and the Poor
, “The Police and the Poor”



Police practices have the biggest impact on the disproportional representation of the poor in the criminal
justice system

Who Commits Crimes?



Contrary to popular belief, there is no direct estab
lished connection between poverty and crime



The idea is really that everyone commits crimes, from all strata of society, but low
-
income people are
much likelier to get caught and charged. Many reasons for this:

o

There is a connection between unemployment an
d crime, and they are a vicious cycle

o

Low
-
income people have to commit their crimes in public


high
-
income people generally do so in
private (esp. corporate, white
-
collar crime, which is very hard to detect)

o

High
-
income people have alternate solutions
than criminal justice for their blunders

Why Do the Police Arrest/Charge for Crimes?



Low
-
income people are heavy users of police services for non
-
crime
-
related situations


so there are a
disproportionate number of police in low
-
income neighbourhoods

o

The “
official crime rate” has more to do with police activity than with actual crime activity



Most liable to arrest are groups with least access to privacy: street people (mentally ill)



People who are disrespectful in their interactions with the police are more

likely to be arrested


those
who show deference to the cops, have good social skills, show contrition for their acts are less likely

o

Means that white middle
-
class suspects who are educated and better informed, and more likely to
hire a lawyer to institut
e complaints against the police, are treated with greater care and are almost
never subject to police violence



One of the most crucial factors in the police decision on whether to charge is whether the detainee has a
police or criminal record


more determ
inative than the seriousness of the offence



Two questionable government policies increase the criminalization of the poor:

o

Mandatory charges for domestic violence

o

War on drugs

***
People in poor neighbourhoods are both over
-
policed and under
-
policed. High
rates of crime; high rates
of victimization.


II.

J
URISDICTION AND
C
LASSIFICATION OF
O
FFENCES


1.
Jurisdiction of the Courts


“Jurisdiction”



Is the power of a court/tribunal/legal actor to act in a certain way



Different kinds:

o

A. Legislative

o

B.
Prosecutorial

o

C
. Adjudicative

Suzanne Amiel


Prof. Alana Klein

Criminal Procedure


Fall 2010


7


A
. Legislative



Where do the rules about criminal procedure come from?

o

Federal Parliament has jurisdiction to legislate on
criminal procedure

by virtue of s. 91(27) of the
Constitution Act, 1867
. It i
s limited by ss. 7
-
15 of
the Charter
.

o

Police powers are found in
C
C

and also the
common law
. They are
also limited by
the
Charter
.



Police
only have the powers given to them by law (criminal code, common law); they have no
inherent special status by virtue of being a policeperson



H
owever, it seems that over time, in law and in practice, powers given to police have grown
and are growing


general trend
is
towards expansion



Police also have powers by virtue of
consent



ex. police lineups are done on “consent” (are
found nowhere in st
atute)

o

Source of pre
-
trial and
trial procedure is also the CC, but it varies by province


B. Prosecutorial



Federal prosecutors deal with CDSA, and other

federal statutes (Immigration A
ct, Tax Act)



Provincial prosecutors deal wit
h C
C offences and provincial

offences

o

The reason for this split is historical


provinces had responsibility for prosecuting crimes at
Confederation



Provincial prosecutors can also be delegated prosecution of federal offences (drug

offences in conjunction
with C
C offences)


C
.
Adjudicative



What is the jurisdiction of the courts?

Which court will hear which case? Is based on
the
classification of
offences

into different types
.


a. Trial Courts


i
. Provincial Courts



Trial
-
level courts; hear the majority of criminal cases in Canada



Judges always sit alone in these courts


no juries



Created by s. 92(14) of the CA1867



These courts are statutory courts: can only hear matters that are legislatively assigned to them



Have absolute jurisdiction (cannot be challenged by the accused, but is

not exclusive) over summary
offences (s. 785) and certain
, less serious

indictable offences (s. 553)


ii
. Superior Courts



Have inherent jurisdiction



Trial jurisdiction: all jury trials, exclusive jurisdiction over s. 469 offences (ex. murder)



Appeal juris
diction: summary offences which have been tried in provincial courts


Special Note: Quebec



Quebec’s provincial court (Court of Quebec) has a broader jurisdiction over indictable offences than other
provincial courts

o

See s. 558


if an accused elects to do
so, will be tried by a judge alone

o

See s. 552


defines “judges”


in the CML provinces, means a Superior Court judge; in QC,
means a provincial court judge



Exception: s. 469 offences



Municipal courts also have the power to hear criminal offences in Quebec

and Montreal


b. Appeals

Suzanne Amiel


Prof. Alana Klein

Criminal Procedure


Fall 2010


8




Appeals of summary convictions (heard in provincial court) go to superior court



Appeals of indictable offences go to Court of Appeal (s. 675, 676)


2.
Classification of Offences


i
. Indictable Offences



Parts XIX
-
XX CC



Generally m
ore serious offences



If no maximum penalty is specified in the particular offence provision, it is 5 years in prison



Most serious indictable offences are in s. 469


within Superior Court jurisdiction exclusively



Least serious indictable offences are in s.

553


within provincial court jurisdiction absolutely



For all other indictable offences, accused can elect whether to be tried before a provincial court judge, a
superior court judge, or superior court judge/jury

o

This is a more complex procedure than is a
vailable for summary offences


ii. Summary Offences



Part XXVI CC



Generally less serious offences



Are adjudicated in lower courts, with a simplified procedure (no prelim)



Subject to 6
-
month statute of limitation



If no maximum penalty is specified, default
is 6 months, $5000 fine, or both

o

Except super summaries (generally hybrids) with higher maximum punishment of 18 months



If an offence is not specified to be indictable or summary, it is assumed to be summary under the
Interpretation Act, s. 34(1)(b)


iii.
Hybrid Offences



Can be tried as summary OR

indictable


Crown chooses how to proceed


Different Modes of Trial for Different Offences



Different modes of trial are available:

o

Can have a superior court judge, with OR without a jury; can have a provincial cou
rt judge alone



People charged with indictable offences generally have a choice in their mode of trial


called the
“election” (see s. 536(2)): they get to pick between all of the above choices

o

Some offences that are indictable have no available election (
s. 553: less serious indictable offences).
They are in the “absolute jurisdiction” of the provincial court (must be tried by a provincial court
judge alone)



This only means that the accused cannot challenge the jurisdiction


it is not a full privative
cla
use precluding a prosecutor from bringing the case in Superior Court, and that court from
hearing the case

o

s. 469 offences (the most serious indictable offences: ex. treason, murder) also have no election.
They are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supe
rior Court



Provincial Court judge cannot hear the trial

o

s. 471 indictable offences have to be tried in front of judge/jury. But this provision is completely
antiquated in light of s. 536, which gives accused the choice.



Where do all the non
-
553, non
-
469 in
dictable offences go?

To wherever the accused elects.

o

Remember special nature of QC: if the accused elects judge alone, it is a provincial court judge he’s
getting (see s. 558, 552).


***SEE CHART ON PAGE 46 OF COURSEPACK VOLUME 1.


Suzanne Amiel


Prof. Alana Klein

Criminal Procedure


Fall 2010


9

III.

P
OLICE
P
OWERS


S
OURCES OF
P
OLICE
P
OWERS


Police Duties & Police Powers



Police duties
: to maintain
peace
,
order
, and
public security
; to
prevent

and
repress crime
; to
apprehend
offenders

(are now found in statute, but reflect duties of police at common law)



Although polic
e have a wide ambit to fulfil their mandates, they
do not have unlimited powers



Today
, the Charter str
ongly constrains police action



H
owever, before the Charter, the courts used the principle of legality: the police have no powers not
explicitly granted to

them by
law (
statute

or common law)


1.
The Principle of Legality




Police powers, until recently, were granted mostly by statute (establishment of new CML police powers
was rare)


courts read these statutes restrictively if they constrain individual libe
rty or interfere with
personal property



Any ambiguities are resolved in favour of the person against whom the law is sought to be enforced


Example of the use of the principle of legality:

Colet v. the Queen (1981 SCC)



Law gave BC police the power to
seize, with a warrant, any or all firearms/weapons from someone who
they have reason to think is dangerous



Police got a warrant authorizing them to seize Colet’s guns; entered on his property in order to do so

C潬整=re獩st敤⁡湤=i猠s敩湧=捨crg敤⁷et栠潢獴
r畣ti湧awf畬⁡畴桯rity
=


SCC decided that the authority to seize granted by the law/warrant did not include the authority to search
(i.e. enter) the property for that purpose



It was most likely a legislative oversight that the law did not grant BC police t
he power to search the
suspect’s home in order to seize the firearms; but that failure cannot be remedied by giving the police a
灯p敲=t桡t⁷慳=t⁥硰xe獳ly⁣潮=敲r敤⁢e⁴h攠䱥eisl慴畲e
=
hl敩渠潮o
Colet
:



Court refused to imply the right to search in the right to seize


獴rict⁣ 湳tr畣ti潮 ⁰敮慬 獴慴ut敳 i渠
w桩捨⁡湹⁡ 扩g畩ty⁩猠s敳潬v敤⁩渠f慶潵of⁴h攠灥r獯渠n桯獥 rig桴猠慲e⁴h敲敢e 扥b湧imit敤



So at
Colet
, police powers = CML powers + statute (na
rrowly construed)



Is the principle of legality unsatisfying to protect individual rights? Yes. Because
it
allows Parliament to
give police the power to infringe rights as long as
Parliament
do
es

so explicitly.


2. T
he Ancillary Powers Doctrine




The SCC’s approach to police powers has shifted significantly since
Colet



In
Dedman
, the Court accepted the
ancillary powers doctrine
, which finds police powers in the
absence of explicit statutory authority if they fulfil a two
-
step test


The advent of th
e ancillary powers doctrine:

Dedman v. the Queen (1985 SCC)

Facts
: RIDE program instituted by Ontario police had them pulling over random people and asking them for
their driver’s license and proof of insurance. This was just to see if they could form a
reasonable suspicion
that the driver was drunk. If so, gave them a breathalyzer. Dedman was randomly pulled over (officer had no
reason to be
lieve the accused had committed
/was committing an offence)


he failed to give the requested
breathalyzer. He is c
harged with refuse breath sample. He is arguing that his initial stop was unlawful.

Issue
: Do the police have the authority (either statutory or common law) to randomly pull people over to see if
Suzanne Amiel


Prof. Alana Klein

Criminal Procedure


Fall 2010


10

they have been drinking?
Holding
: Yes, with dissent.

Reasoni
ng
:

Majority (Le Dain J. + 3)
:



At common law, the principal duties of police officers are: preservation of the peace, prevention of crime,
and the protection of life and property

o

Latter imposes the duty to control traffic



Waterfield

test for the existence
of police powers at common law

=
i⹥⸠K桥⁁湣illary⁐潷敲猠䑯stri湥W
=
o

1. Does such conduct fall within the general scope of any police duty imposed by statute or
recognized at common law?

o

2. Does such conduct

=
alb敩t⁷ithi渠t桥⁧敮eral⁳=o灥=⁡⁰潬i捥f
ficer’s duty

=
i湶潬v攠e渠
畮j畳tifi慢a攠畳攠潦=灯p敲猠慳獯siat敤⁷it栠t桥⁤畴y?
=


Test allows police officers to perform such reasonable acts as necessary for the execution of their duties

o

Any
interference with liberty

must be
necessary

to carry out the part
icular police duty

o

It also must be
reasonable, with regard for the nature of the liberty interfered with, and the
importance of the public purpose served

by the interference



Police officers have a duty to control traffic; this is an important public purpos
e; the random stop is a
police action that is necessary and reasonable for carrying out that purpose


s漠oh敲攠i猠s潭m潮慷a
慵a桯rity⁦潲 t桥hr慮a潭⁶e桩cl攠et潰⁡猠灡rt 潦 t桥⁒hD䔠灲潧r慭

Di獳敮t (Di捫獯渠䌮J⸠⬠+)
:



It is a fundamental tenet of the rul
e of law that the police have limited powers; they are only entitled to
interfere with the liberty or property of a citizen to the extent authorized by law



Absent explicit or implied statutory authority, the police must be able to find authority for their
actions at
common law

=
潴桥rwi獥⁴h敹⁡=t⁵=l慷晵lly
=


Police have wide duties but limited powers

=
t桥h⁣=湮潴⁵=攠e湹敡湳⁴漠o捨c敶攠e桥ir=敮摳;⁡湹=m敡湳n
t桥h⁵獥⁷hi捨ci湴敲f敲攠睩t栠h湤ivi摵慬i扥rty=
must be founded upon some rule of positive law



Th
e test proposed by the majority will justify illegal police practices whenever the benefit of police action
seems to outweigh the infringement of an individual’s rights
=
o

Sets a dangerous exception to the supremacy of law

Ratio
: This case creates a

way

for c
ourts to develop novel police powers through the ancillary powers
doctrine.

Commentary
: The ancillary powers doctrine has rarely been used by the courts (except
Godoy
, to create a
limited police power to enter a dwelling after a 911 call). But see
Mann
.

K
lein on
Dedman
:



D’s defence is that the police had no reason to stop him; not that he wasn’t drunk, or they didn’t have a
reason to give him the breathalyzer. Idea is that they would have to drop the charge if they didn’t have the
rig桴⁴漠ot潰⁨im⁩渠n桥h
first⁰=慣攮
=
o

Court never decides this question, because they decide the stop was legal



How do they decide the stop was legal?
Waterfield

test and the creation of the ancillary powers doctrine.



Waterfield test
for recognizing new common law police powers
(h
ow to find out if police had common
law authority to do what they did):

o

Is there a prima facie unlawful interference with a person’s liberty or property? If so, consider:
=


1. Whether such conduct falls in the general scope of any
police
duty imposed by
statute or
recognized at common law, and



2. Whether such conduct, albeit within the general scope of the duty, involved an unjustifiable
use of powers associated with that duty



Factors to consider under second branch: Was
the action
necessary? Was it reaso
nable? Was
it proportional? (consider nature and extent of the interference

with liberty/property
)



This test is pretty broad

=
w敲攠t桥⁣潰猠摯i湧⁳潭整hi湧⁶慧略uy⁡=獯siat敤⁷ith⁴桥ir=j潢㼠坡猠st=
j畳tifie搠潲=r敡獯湡扬e?
=


In Dedman, the court thinks the
stop was reasonable because: driving is a licensed activity, the stop served
its purpose, it was minimally interfering, the program was publicized

Suzanne Amiel


Prof. Alana Klein

Criminal Procedure


Fall 2010


11



Dedman

does not sit well with the principle of legality



There is a very strong dissent by Justice Dickson

o

Obj
ection to the authority (
Waterfield
, random English case which developed the test in order to tell
when a person is obstructing a police officer)



Obscure nature of the case? Has been cited 6 times in UK, never in support of creating a new
police power (and

once to reject it)



Application of the case to give police new powers?

o

Dickson is also worried about the slippery slope

=
whic栠摩搠d潴捣urⰠ慣t畡lly⸠
Dedman

lay
dormant for quite a while

=
w慳⁳=e渠慳=愠ari畭灨p⁰=慧a慴i獭=敲⁰=i湣iple
=
=
Police’s po
wer to effect investigative detentions was recognized under ancillary powers doctrine in this case:

R. v. Mann (2004 SCC)

Facts
: Police got a call about a break
-
and
-
enter; got a suspect description and name (Parisienne). Mann was
walking down the street in the area, and matched the suspect’s description exactly. Police stopped him; he told
t桥h⁨=猠湡m攠e湤⁄lB;=t桥h⁳=慲c桥搠him=
慮搠a潵o搠摲畧猠s猠睥ll⁡=⁨i猠sa⁣潮=irmi湧⁴桡h⁨攠=慳=t⁷桯h
t桥h⁷敲攠l潯oi湧⁦潲⸠K攠e猠s桡rg敤⁷楴栠灯獳敳si潮of潲⁴h攠灵r灯p攮
=
Issue
: Did the police have the power to stop him and search him without arresting him?
Holding
: In this case,
no. But inv
estigative detentions and searches are valid exercises of police power in certain circumstances.

Reasoning
:



N.B.
The second aspect of the
Waterfield
test requires a balancing of the competing interests of the
police duty and the liberty interests at stake.



Police duties and police powers are not necessarily correlative



Investigative detentions are valid exercises of police power

=
摥t敮ti潮畳u⁢=⁶i敷敤⁡猠r敡獯湡bly=
湥n敳獡ryⰠ扡I敤渠慮nje捴iv攠ei敷e⁡=l=t桥⁣ir捵c獴慮捥s
=


In addition, a power of se
arch incidental to investigative detention does exist because it satisfies the
Waterfield

test

o

Police’s common law duty to protect life and property may sometimes necessitate search upon
i湶敳tig慴iv攠摥t敮tion
=
o

The power to pat down someone who is investig
atively detained does not exist as a matter of course

o

The officer must believe, on reasonable grounds, that his or her safety, or that of others, is at risk

Ratio
: The Court recognized the power of the police to detain people for investigative purposes, an
d also that
the police have the power to search that person upon such detention in certain circumstances.

Klein on
Mann
:



First SCC case to make reference to
Waterfield

since
Dedman



Was used to recognize a new police power: investigative detention (and
power to search incident to
investigative detention)

o

Before this case, no recognition by the courts that police have the power to detain someone without
the reasonable and probable grounds necessary to arrest them

o

Allows people to be detained by police on
less

than reasonable and probable grounds



Need SOME grounds though: “nexus”, “articulable cause”, “reasonable grounds to suspect”
=
=


Critique:
R. v. Kang
-
Brown



precedents such as
Mann

do not mean the court should always expand
common law rules in order to

address perceived gaps in police powers

o

Court has a law
-
making function, but it must be exercised appropriately


***T
HREE SOURCES OF POLI
CE POWERS
:

COMMON LAW
,

STATUTE
,

ANCILLARY POWERS DOC
TRINE
***


P
OLICE
S
TOPPING
P
OWERS
:

I
NVESTIGATIVE
D
ETENTION


So,
investigative detention was recognized by the SCC in
Mann

under the ancillary powers doctrine. Why was
it recognized? What is involved in the concept of “investigative detention”?

Suzanne Amiel


Prof. Alana Klein

Criminal Procedure


Fall 2010


12


Reasons for Recognizing Investigative Detention as a Valid Police Power




T
here is no statutory authority allowing police to stop people short of their power to arrest (to speak to
them, to investigate, etc)



Recognition of this power is both good and bad:

o

Good
: helps investigations, makes it so that there are standards and rules
governing this practice



Police have indicated that it has helped them to be able to talk to people on the street without
having to arrest them



Once someone is investigatively detained, their Charter rights (s. 10(a), (b), s. 7, 13) come into
effect to prot
ect them

o

Bad
: is a broader power than arrest, so it is an opportunity for police to abuse their discretion, be
arbitrary


1.
The Standard for Investigative Detention




The standard required before a detention is legally permissible is:
reasonable grounds to

detain

o

Derived from the second branch of the Waterfield test

o

Any detention for which the police officer is not able to provide reasonable grounds will be
considered arbitrary by the court, and therefore contrary to s. 9


This case outlines the standard fo
r investigative detention: “reasonable grounds to detain”:

Mann (reprise)

Reasoning
:



The PO needs
reasonable cause to suspect

that the detainee is criminally implicated in either an
ongoing crime or one that has been committed in order to detain them for investigative purposes

o

Clearly a lower threshold than the reasonable and probable grounds required for lawful arrest

o

But a hun
ch based on intuition gained by experience is not enough to satisfy it



Standard: the detention must be viewed as reasonably necessary on an objective view of the totality of the
circumstances, and officer has to suspect that there is a
clear nexus between
the individual to be
detained and a recent or ongoing criminal offence



The overall reasonableness of the decision to detain needs to be assessed against all of the circumstances:
the extent to which the interference with individual liberty is necessary to
perform the officer’s duty, the
lib敲ty⁩湴erf敲e搠dit栬⁡湤ht桥慴ur攠e湤⁥nt敮tf⁴hat⁩nterfer敮捥
=
Ratio
: In order to detain an individual for investigative purposes, the PO needs to have reasonable grounds to
detain them

=
i⹥⸠r敡獯湡bl攠er潵湤猠t漠
獵獰sct=t桥h⁨慶攠扥敮e慲e⁩湶潬v敤⁷et栠愠arimi湡nffe湣nK
=
hl敩渠潮o
Mann
, reprise
:



On what grounds are POs allowed to stop someone and not have to let them go (without arresting them)?

o

R
EASONABLE GROUNDS TO

SUSPECT

THAT A PERSON IS CUR
RENTLY COMMITTING AN

OFFENCE
OR HAS COMMITTED AN
OFFENCE

o

The reasonable grounds to suspect has to be an objective suspicion; cannot just be a hunch

o

See
Mann
, para. 34: detention has to be necessary, which needs to be assessed against a
n objective
view of all the circumstances. Must consider extent of interference with liberty.



Criticism of
Waterfield

and
Mann
:

o

Para. 20: “A detention for investigative purposes is, like any other detention, subject to Charter
獣ruti湹⸠卥Kti潮‹f⁴桥⁃桡ht敲=灲潶i摥猠sh慴=敶敲y潮攠桡猠t桥⁲ig桴潴=t漠o攠er扩tr慲ily⁤整ai湥搮n
ft⁩猠睥sl=r散潧湩z敤⁴桡t=
愠l慷晵a=摥d敮ei潮oi猠s潴=
‘arbitrary’ within the meaning of that provision

C潮獥煵q湴lyⰠ慮⁩湶敳tig慴iv攠摥te湴i潮ot桡t⁩猠sarri敤e潵o⁩渠慣捯cd慮a攠睩e栠hh攠捯cm潮慷a
power recognized in this case will not infringe the detainee’s rights under s. 9 of the Charter.”
=
o

The difficult
y here is the definition of the word arbitrary

=
wasn’t the stop in
Dedman

arbitrary?
But it was decided to be a lawful stop.



PROBLEM HERE: equating lawfulness with non
-
arbitrariness

Suzanne Amiel


Prof. Alana Klein

Criminal Procedure


Fall 2010


13

o

A lawful detention is one for which the police have statutory/common law
authority (get the latter
by passing the Waterfield test’s societal balancing branch

=
society’s interest in catching criminals
v. alleged criminals’ rights).
=


If it’s not arbitrary for Waterfield, then it’s not arbitrary for s. 9 says the Court in
Mann

o

So
never get to the s. 1 analysis (higher standard), because there will never be an infringement of s.
9 as long as the power passes the Waterfield test



So no minimal impairment will ever be considered



Short of the RG to suspect, the detention is arbitrary; t
he police can still question people without those
grounds; but they can’t detain them
=
=
2. Defining Investigative Detention



What qualifies as a detention? When is a person not merely being questioned, but detained?


R. v. Grant
(2009 SCC)

Facts
: Two
officers were patrolling a problem area near a school in plainclothes and an unmarked car. They
spotted G, who was looking suspicious. Their uniformed colleague went to go talk to G. The two plainclothes
officers walked up as support, and identified themse
lves. Uniform asked G to keep his hands in front of him,
and asked if he had anything on him. G admitted to having some weed, and after prompting, a gun.

Issue
: Was this a detention, and if so, was it arbitrary?
Holding
: Yes to both.

Reasoning
:

Majority (M
cLachlin C.J. & Charron J.)
:



Detention under ss. 9, 10 Charter means a
suspension of a person’s liberty interest
批W

o

Physical Restraint

o

Psychological Restraint
, established where



Person has a
legal obligation to comply

with the restrictive demand (ex. brea
th sample)



Reasonable person would conclude, from the state conduct, that he or she had no choice but to
comply
. To consider:



Circumstances giving rise to the encounter as they would be perceived by the person: were
police providing general assistance,
maintaining general order, or making general inquiries,
or singling out the individual for focused investigation



Nature of police conduct

=
l慮a畡u攠畳敤Ⱐe桹獩捡l⁣=湴慣tⰠl潣oti潮Ⱐor敳e湣nf=潴桥r猬s
摵dati潮==敮e潵湴er
=


Particular characteristics of i
ndividual in question (minority status, age, physical size)



The reasonable conclusion of detention by a person is determined
objectively


=
p潬i捥=敤⁴漠扥o慢a攠e漠
g慵a攠睨慴⁣潮=tit畴敳⁤整e湴io測⁢散慵a攠eh敹⁨慶攠e漠f畬fil⁴h敩r⁡tt敮摡nt⁃桡rter扬ig
慴i潮猠E献‱sF
=
o

But it is objective with regard to the circumstances of the person



The balancing act to be made here: safeguard the notion of
choice
that is at the centre of the individual’s
lib敲ty⁩湴er敳t⁷it桯ht=imp慩ri湧⁥=f散tiv攠e慷⁥湦潲cem敮e
=


The p
sychological detention possibility recognizes that it isn’t realistic to regard compliance with police
摥d慮摳⁡=⁴ruly⁶潬畮u慲y;⁰敯灬攠es獵s攠e桥h⁨慶攠e漠捯o灬y
=
o

Further recognizes that police tactics, even in the absence of physical restraint, might be

coercive
enough to effectively remove the individual’s choice to walk away
=


Police have to mindful, in light of possibility for psychological detention, that depending on how they act,
the point may be reached where a person is detained

=
慮搠at⁴h慴⁰潩nt
ⰠI桥h⁨慶攠e漠o敡搠t桥h⁴桥hr⁲ig桴s
=


In this case, G was detained because the point was reached where the police had taken control over him
and were attempting to elicit information



Before he was detained and made incriminating statements, the police had
no reasonable grounds to detain
him. Arbitrary and against s. 9.

Concurrence (Binnie J.)
:



Detention should also take into account the perceptions of the police

=
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慣tu慬ly=f匠摥p慩湥搠n湤nt=j畳t⁷桥t桥h⁴h敹⁔efkh⁴桥h⁡=e
=
Suzanne Amiel


Prof. Alana Klein

Criminal Procedure


Fall 2010


14

R
atio
: Detention may be constituted by physical detention and psychological detention for the purposes of ss.
9 and 10 of the Charter.

Commentary
: Grant’s right to counsel (s. 10(b)) was also violated, because he was detained and not advised
潦⁨=猠sig桴⁴o
=
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=
hl敩渠潮o
Grant
:



There are two kinds of detention:

o

1. Physical Detention: when you are physically held and stopped from leaving

o

2. Psychological Detention: when a person
reasonably feels they have no choice but to stay put, are
obligated to stay. This is an objective test. Court says two things might give a person that
impression:



a. If you will face legal sanctions for leaving



b. Nature of police conduct and characteristi
cs of the individual



Binnie has a big problem with this test

=
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t桥h⁡=攠扥b湧⁤整ai湥搬n慮搠獯⁴桥h敦or攠eig桴潴⁢e
=
o

Thinks they should use an objective jeopardy test


R. v. Suberu (2009

SCC)

Facts
: Crown’s theory is that S and an associate were buying gift cards and merchandise at LCBOs and
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獴畦f渠愠at潬敮⁣慲搠

=
匠慮搠慳獯捩慴攠捡me
=
i湴漠oh攠e潢潵og⁳=or攠慮搠a桥⁰hli捥=w敲攠e慬l敤⸠䅳⁃潮ot慢l攠
o潵o桬敹⁣=m攠e湴漠oh攠䱃BlⰠ匠I慳e慶i湧=

=
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r散eiv敤⁳潭攠e湦潲m慴i潮o
潶敲⁲慤i漠
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i猠sig桴猠t漠捯畮獥lK
=
Issue
: Was Suberu
in fact

detained at any point?
Holding
: No, with dissent.

Reasoning
:

Majority (McLachlin C.J.
&
Charron J.)
:

Recap of Grant



“Detention” for the purposes of the Charter means a suspension of an individual’s liberty in
ter敳t⁢=⁶irtu攠
潦⁡⁳ig湩fi捡湴⁰桹獩捡l==灳p捨潬潧i捡l⁲敳traint⁡=⁴h攠桡湤猠潦=t桥h獴慴e
=
o

Psychological restraint means that a reasonable person would conclude that they no longer have the
freedom to choose whether or not to cooperate with the police

(objective determination)



Onus is on applicant to show, in the circumstances, he was effectively deprived of his liberty of choice



Line between no detention/detention is the line between general questioning/focussed interrogation

Application to This
Situation



The constable was just orienting himself as to the situation when he was talking to S

=
he hadn’t yet zeroed
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=
o

He had to ask some preliminary questions in order to decide how to proceed



Once
he got the radio information linking S’s van to the previous fraud, he then arrested him and gave him
桩猠rig桴猠t漠o潵湳敬
=
ai獳敮t=EBi湮i攠䨮g
W
=


The fact that a police command is not justified according to law doesn’t make it any less imperative in the
敹e
猠潦⁡=r敡獯湡扬攠灥p獯s
=


On the basis of the claimant
-
centred approa
ch endorsed by the majority,
S was detained, because he was
told not to go, while everyone else in the store was free to leave

Ratio
: Police have some latitude to make pr
eliminary inquirie
s without having

to caution a person of their
rights.

Klein on
Suberu
:



All Cst. Roughley knows when he gets to the LCBO is that there were 2 male persons trying to commit
fraud; as he gets there, S is leaving

=
so Roughley says “wait a minute, I need to t
alk to you”
=


Court decides S was not detained, on the criteria outlined in Grant (circumstances of situation, police
conduct, characteristics of accused). Why?

o

Roughley had not physically restrained S; R wasn’t being intimidating
=
Suzanne Amiel


Prof. Alana Klein

Criminal Procedure


Fall 2010


15



When we are setting our sta
ndard for investigative detention, need to set it high enough that police can still
do their work

=
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i湧⁥湯畧h
=


In this case, using the dissent’s approach wouldn’t really change anything

=
R wasn’t intending to detain S,
and he wasn’t in much objective jeopardy until R got the radio call implicating the van
=


What majority and dissent disagree about: before

S should be cautioned about making incriminating
statements, should he have to FEEL like he has to make them? Majority

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J
t慬ki湧=
捯瀠c潮捥r温K
=
=
Christopher Bird, “It’s Not a Post
-
Racial World:
R. v. Suberu

and the Failure of Obje
ctivity”



The reasonable person standard outlined in Grant needs to be adjusted for social positioning



A white person told what Suberu was told might not think they are under arrest; because they tend to be
more privileged and have reason to trust the polic
e more



A person that comes from a visible racial minority, that trusts the police less because of their racialized
experiences with police, would likely (reasonably) assume they are suspect and detained



The reasonable person standard has to remain fluid

=
the reasonable white person doesn’t
=
t桩湫
=
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r敡s潮慢l攠el慣k⁰=r獯渠thi湫猠睨敮⁳s潰灥搠批⁣潰s
=
=
Klein’s Recap of Investigative Detention



Before investigative detention was recognized as a police power, we were operating under the fallacy that